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From: Nuno S. <nun...@vg...> - 2003-06-25 00:43:06
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Hello! Matt Zimmerman wrote: > > > So does any other method of chrooting UML, unless the UML binary itself and > all auxiliary files are also inside the chroot (leading to an escape from > UML if the user can manage to modify the on-disk UML executable). If the > idea is to keep the user contained, the chroot should be as empty as > possible. > I keep everything inside the chroot owned by another user. The file containing the filesystem is mode 666 (rw-rw-rw-) so that the filesystem is read-write. The tmpfs filesystem shoulf have limited inodes, too. If you want to harden your setup you should take a look at some of the security patches out there (grsecurity for instance) and the methods they provide to restrict processes and users. Regards, Nuno Silva |