|
From: Smith, B. <phi...@bu...> - 2008-01-24 15:14:21
|
At 06:38 AM 1/24/2008, Matthew Pocock wrote: >On Wednesday 23 January 2008, Melanie Courtot wrote: > > > At 07:31 PM 1/22/2008, Alan Ruttenberg wrote: > > > >>If the entity is a process in which an incision is made in the > > >>animal, some tissue is cut and then sutured, and the animal is closed > > >>up, we have a number of possibilities around what might have > > >>motivated it ( or for which the process was "designed"). It could be > > >>that it is a sham surgery, it could be that it is an unlearned > > >>attempt to heal, it could be the cruel act of a sadist. These > > >>descriptions feel like the process "plays some role" that is > > >>essentially determined socially. So here there is a similarity. > > > > > > What motivated it, motivated it, independently of any description we > > > assign to it later. > >The act is the same in each case. The plan realised is different. Is this not >sufficient? Sufficient for some purposes (just as it is sufficient for some purposes to identity an immune epitope with a set of ordered pairs of molecules). But wrong. The act realized by the parrot when it utters: "I promise to pay you $5 tomorrow" is different from the act realized by me when I utter this to realize the plan of making a promise. That is why the latter act can realize that plan and the former cannot. If they were the same act (i.e. instances of the same act type) then both could (in other possible worlds) realize exactly the same plans. >As a logical follow-on from this, does this also sudgest that roles should >stick to things that happened, and the 'motiviational' roles should move into >the plan? Can you clarify the question? BS >Matthew |