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From: Matthew P. <mat...@nc...> - 2008-01-24 16:40:39
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On Thursday 24 January 2008, Smith, Barry wrote: > At 06:38 AM 1/24/2008, Matthew Pocock wrote: > >On Wednesday 23 January 2008, Melanie Courtot wrote: > > > > At 07:31 PM 1/22/2008, Alan Ruttenberg wrote: > > > >>If the entity is a process in which an incision is made in the > > > >>animal, some tissue is cut and then sutured, and the animal is closed > > > >>up, we have a number of possibilities around what might have > > > >>motivated it ( or for which the process was "designed"). It could be > > > >>that it is a sham surgery, it could be that it is an unlearned > > > >>attempt to heal, it could be the cruel act of a sadist. These > > > >>descriptions feel like the process "plays some role" that is > > > >>essentially determined socially. So here there is a similarity. > > > > > > > > What motivated it, motivated it, independently of any description we > > > > assign to it later. > > > >The act is the same in each case. The plan realised is different. Is this > > not sufficient? > > Sufficient for some purposes (just as it is sufficient for some > purposes to identity an immune epitope with a set of ordered pairs of > molecules). But wrong. > The act realized by the parrot when it utters: "I promise to pay you > $5 tomorrow" is different from the act realized by me when I utter > this to realize the plan of making a promise. Can you spell out for me which part of the activity the parrot undertook in uttering "I promise to pay you $5 tomorrow" is different to that undertaken when you utter the same phrase? > >As a logical follow-on from this, does this also sudgest that roles should > >stick to things that happened, and the 'motiviational' roles should move > > into the plan? > > Can you clarify the question? Not sure I can untill we have a broader consensus on what is going on here. M > BS > > >Matthew |