nchat-security Mailing List for NexusChat
Brought to you by:
haplo
You can subscribe to this list here.
2000 |
Jan
|
Feb
|
Mar
|
Apr
|
May
|
Jun
(1) |
Jul
|
Aug
|
Sep
(1) |
Oct
|
Nov
|
Dec
|
---|
From: Bryan B. <ha...@ww...> - 2000-09-15 20:51:05
|
Summary ------ There is at least one possibly exploitable format string attack in versions of NexusChat prior to 3.23. Description -------- In the /s (show users) command the user's away message (/msg) is sent directly to sock_printf() allowing a user to enter a 22 character format string that may be exploited when any user types /s Solution ------ Upgrade to 3.23 or grab the soon-to-be-available patch to fix the holes. -- Bryan Burns a.k.a "Haplo" <ha...@ww...> A copy of my PGP key is available at: http://www.wwa.com/~haplo/public_key |
From: Bryan B. <ha...@ww...> - 2000-06-02 01:37:58
|
In previous versions of nchat, an undocumented command (/ps) allowed people to send a message to all channels, in 3.2pre10 this command may now be restricted via priority with a new option (sysp_priority) It's default value is one, allowing anyone but guests to use it. It may be changed via /set or the nchat resource file. -- Bryan Burns a.k.a "Haplo" <ha...@ww...> A copy of my PGP key is available at: http://www.wwa.com/~haplo/public_key |