Signature Spoofing with PGP Inline and Text Header
Proof of concept.
Signature Spoofing with PGP Inline and Text Header
Here is the latest draft of the disclosure document, so you can better understand the key import issue and the context of the attacks.
The set-filename issue (filename injection) is CVE-2018-12020. The other issues are bundled as CVE-2018-12019.
That seems to be a good idea. You can redirect stderr to a file with --log-file (which requires --batch) or status output to a file with --status-file, or do both. If you also use --output-file, gpg seems to be pretty quiet. Nice catch!
Note: I didn't include the key import issue in the patch, because that's not really a vulnerable. It's just something I needed to look at to justify the preconditions of the other attack. So I would argue that has lower priority.
I can't test this right now, but here are some specific ideas how to mitigate the exploits.