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From: chiccofx <chi...@to...> - 2013-06-08 04:00:41
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adrelanos: > How do you plan to replace grml-debootstrap, i.e. the step for creating > a base VM image? > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > How ServiceNow helps IT people transform IT departments: > 1. A cloud service to automate IT design, transition and operations > 2. Dashboards that offer high-level views of enterprise services > 3. A single system of record for all IT processes > http://p.sf.net/sfu/servicenow-d2d-j > _______________________________________________ > Whonix-devel mailing list > Who...@li... > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/whonix-devel I just recently started looking into whonix source code. I believe that whonix would have to be built from inside an OpenBSD machine. This could possibly break the workstation building process, but I believe that it is easier to fix that from inside OpenBSD, than building OpenBSD inside linux. OpenBSD introduces changes to the gcc, assembler, linker, etc. This: http://www.openbsd.org/faq/faq5.html, illustrates the building process. Anyway, as it is limiting to only being able to build openbsd whonix gateway from inside an openbsd machine it is not that hard to install it on a virtual machine, since virtualbox HAS to be setup in advance to whonix installation. Of course this would only apply to the ones wanting to build from source, and these could (or not?) be considered computer literate enough to setup a OpenBSD virtual machine (that if they are not already using one as host). Also, the script can detect and only build an OpenBSD gateway if being run from inside it (or asked to, or both), if not build the debian based gateway. This is the price to pay for extra security, even smaller attack surface on the gateway and less RAM needed for it, freeing RAM to the workstation (to me this is the most nice, for performance reasons). Cheers, -- GPG: 12E9 BCD6 5298 70B5 6C4C 7F1C 8C70 D6ED 188C AACE |
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From: adrelanos <adr...@ri...> - 2013-06-07 14:35:15
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How do you plan to replace grml-debootstrap, i.e. the step for creating a base VM image? |
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From: adrelanos <adr...@ri...> - 2013-05-29 23:53:41
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http://whonix.sourceforge.net/pictures/stream_isolation.1.0.jpg Contributed by: Cuan Knaggs – graphic and web design revlover http://revolver.za.net/ print media – web design – web development – cms – e-commerce It has been incorporated into the stream isolation page, which also has been updated: https://sourceforge.net/p/whonix/wiki/Stream%20Isolation/ |
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From: adrelanos <adr...@ri...> - 2013-05-25 12:48:19
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Hi! I am currently working on the graphical Whonix-Gateway: https://github.com/Whonix/Whonix/issues/26 This is what I currently have, file /etc/profile.d/20_desktop.sh: #!/bin/bash echo "Starting kdm (graphical KDE login manager) in 10 seconds," echo "unless you abort using ctrl + c." sleep 10 ## There is a /etc/sudoers.d/kdm exception. sudo /usr/sbin/service kdm start The problem is, /etc/profile.d/ scripts get run at least three times. (After boot, after auto login, after kdm started.) Do you know, a) any better place for this kind of user interaction during boot, or b) know how to only run /etc/profile.d/20_desktop.sh when executed by autologin (getty) and exit in all other cases? (Autologin is currently done using "1:2345:respawn:/sbin/getty --autologin user 38400 tty1" in whonix_shared/etc/inittab.) (And I plan on having variables in /etc/whonix.d/ to either disable waiting for this, always boot into cli, always boot into kdm, etc. - that is simple to implement, once I found the appropriate hook.) Cheers, adrelanos |
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From: adrelanos <adr...@ri...> - 2013-05-21 22:58:24
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Whonix is an anonymous general purpose operating system based on Virtual Box, Debian GNU/Linux and Tor. It has its focus on anonymity, privacy, security and usability. If you're interested in maintaining a website for a linux distribution (Whonix) and know how to setup mediawiki, askbot, SSL, HSTS and such things (or willing to learn), please contact me by mail: adrelanos at riseup dot net |
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From: adrelanos <adr...@ri...> - 2013-05-18 02:53:46
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rss2email messed up. Sorry for the flood. |
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From: <adr...@ri...> - 2013-05-18 02:50:20
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The details behind that feature will be explained and you will be hand over a draft. Please contact me by mail: adrelanos at riseup dot net URL: http://sourceforge.net/p/whonix/featureblog/2013/05/looking-for-someone-to-create-a-graphic-to-explain-whonixs-stream-isolation-feature/ |
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From: <adr...@ri...> - 2013-05-18 02:49:46
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This is only interesting for VPN users. VPN's generally fail open. VPN servers and VPN software can occasionally break down without announcement. This means, if the VPN is unreachable, connections breaks down for whatever reasons and so on, in most cases, you can continue to connect to the internet without the VPN. Unless you are only using the VPN to circumvent censorship and not because you believe you're safer because of any (additional) VPN, this is most likely something you want to prevent. This is not a Whonix specific problem. It is a general problem with VPNs. Most users are simply not aware of it. There are some blog posts about this topic, but no real Open Source / Free Software project supporting Linux. Therefore the VPN-Firewall project has been created by adrelanos (Whonix maintainer), providing tight firewall rules to prevent connecting to any other servers than the VPN server and to load the firewall before the network, so it's ensured, that all traffic goes through the VPN. If that's of interest to you, carefully check out the VPN-Firewall project page: [https://github.com/adrelanos/VPN-Firewall](https://github.com/adrelanos/VPN-Firewall) URL: http://sourceforge.net/p/whonix/featureblog/2013/05/vpn-firewall---leak-protection-fail-safe-mechanism-for-openvpn/ |
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From: <adr...@ri...> - 2013-05-18 02:49:41
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(This is a general issue. Not an issue caused by Whonix.) Using a VPN or SSH neither doesn't provide strong guarantees of hiding your the fact you are using Tor from your ISP. VPN's and SSH's are vulnerable to an attack called Website traffic fingerprinting ^5^. Very briefly, it's a passive eavesdropping attack, although the adversary only watches encrypted traffic from the VPN or SSH, the adversary can still guess what website is being visited, because all websites have specific traffic patterns. The content of the transmission is still hidden, but to which website one connects to isn't secret anymore. There are multiple research papers on that topic. ^6^ Once the premise is accepted, that VPN's and SSH's can leak which website one is visiting with a high accuracy, it's not difficult to imagine, that also encrypted Tor traffic hidden by a VPN's or SSH's could be classified. There are no research papers on that topic. As another issue that may apply, people who need to hide Tor, may also not want to be associated with other encrypted traffic such as traffic from VPN's or SSH's. So in many cases, recommending another kind of encrypted traffic (VPN or SSH) to hide encrypted traffic one wants to hide (Tor), isn't an applicable advice. Traffic stenography; private and obfuscated bridges as an maybe alternative method, have their own blog post. [5] ^5^ See Tor Browser Design [1] for a general definition and introduction into Website traffic fingerprinting. ^6^ See slides for Touching from a Distance: Website Fingerprinting Attacks and Defenses [2]. There is also a research paper [3] from those authors. Unfortunately, it's not free. However, you can find free ones using search engines. Good search terms include "Website Fingerprinting VPN". You'll find multiple research papers on that topic. The article "Hide the fact, that you are using Tor/Whonix" has been updated with this information. [4] [1] [https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/](https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/) [2] [http://www.cs.sunysb.edu/~xcai/fp.pdf](http://www.cs.sunysb.edu/~xcai/fp.pdf) [3] [https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2382260](https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2382260) [4] [https://sourceforge.net/p/whonix/wiki/Hide%20Tor%20and%20Whonix%20from%20your%20ISP/](https://sourceforge.net/p/whonix/wiki/Hide%20Tor%20and%20Whonix%20from%20your%20ISP/) [5] [https://sourceforge.net/p/whonix/featureblog/2013/04/private-and-obfuscated-bridges-not-so-good-for-hiding-tor/](https://sourceforge.net/p/whonix/featureblog/2013/04/private-and-obfuscated-bridges-not-so-good-for-hiding-tor/) URL: http://sourceforge.net/p/whonix/featureblog/2013/04/vpns-and-sshs-not-as-good-for-hiding-tor-traffic/ |
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From: <adr...@ri...> - 2013-05-18 02:49:33
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(This is a general issue. Not an issue caused by Whonix.) Using private and obfuscated bridges alone doesn't provide strong guarantees of hiding your the fact you are using Tor from your ISP. Quote [1] (w [2]) Jacob Appelbaum: > "Some pluggable transports may seek to obfuscate traffic or to morph it. However, they do not claim to hide that you are using Tor in all cases but rather in very specific cases. An example threat model includes a DPI device with limited time to make a classification choice - so the hiding is very specific to functionality and generally does not take into account endless data retention with retroactive policing." I agree. It's an arms race. The goal of the user is to hide the fact, being a Tor user. The goal of the adversary is to find out who is using Tor by passively logging all (or reasonable portions) of traffic. Even if a private and obfuscated (pluggable transports) bridge is trustworthy and there are at the moment no known weaknesses in the traffic obfuscation, time plays for of the adversary. Once a weakness has been found, all traffic can be retrospectively classified as Tor traffic. Updated and improved pluggable transports enable users again with censorship circumvention, users already known to have used Tor however, will still be known. [1] [https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2013-April/002950.html](https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2013-April/002950.html) [2] [http://www.webcitation.org/6G67ltL45](http://www.webcitation.org/6G67ltL45) URL: http://sourceforge.net/p/whonix/featureblog/2013/04/private-and-obfuscated-bridges-not-so-good-for-hiding-tor/ |
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From: <adr...@ri...> - 2013-05-18 02:49:21
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Please vote [http://meta.stackoverflow.com/a/175357](http://meta.stackoverflow.com/a/175357) up if you can. When Whonix gets 6+ votes, stackoverflow will advertise, that Whonix the Libre Software project is looking for developers. URL: http://sourceforge.net/p/whonix/featureblog/2013/04/need-your-help-got-a-stackexchange-google-wordpress-etc-account/ |
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From: <adr...@ri...> - 2013-05-18 02:49:20
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Whonix-Workstation: * Using Boot Clock Randomization (Whonix 0.6.2 and above), i.e. after boot, the clock is set randomly between 5 and 180 seconds into the past or future. This is useful to enforce the design goal, that the host clock and Whonix-Workstation clock should always slightly differ. It's also useful to obfuscate the clock when tails_htp itself is running, because naturally at this time, tails_htp hasn't finished. Whonix-Gateway: * Doesn't use Boot Clock Randomization. If the assumption is correct, that the ISP can detect clock jumps by observing Tor's TLS client hello, clock jumps should be avoided to prevent fingerprinting Whonix users. URL: http://sourceforge.net/p/whonix/featureblog/2013/04/boot-clock-randomization---the-timesync-design-updated/ |
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From: adrelanos <adr...@ri...> - 2013-05-09 17:30:36
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chiccofx: > It appears that someone read my mind: > > http://undeadly.org/cgi?action=article&sid=20130509120042 > > They are offering digitally signed package updates for the -stable > branch of the OpenBSD pkg/ports. Seems that offering OpenBSD as a > firewall option to whonix, is not that far. The trust still relies on a > third party, and not on the OpenBSD project. But I believe that this is > way more secure than fetching packages in plain text ftp or http, from > OpenBSD mirrors, without any digital signing, which is the way things > happen these days. One more incentive to work on this! Good find! |
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From: chiccofx <chi...@to...> - 2013-05-09 13:38:37
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adrelanos: > chiccofx: >> Truth be told, a ssl certificate that signs an entire domain >> *.example.com and example.com, does not cost that much, perhaps in the >> figures of a couple hundred of dollars. The problem is to pay for it, >> and to renew it in a yearly base. > > Yes, startssl certicates are even free (and fine). Hosting isn't very > expensive. It's just really expensive and difficult to do anonymously. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Learn Graph Databases - Download FREE O'Reilly Book > "Graph Databases" is the definitive new guide to graph databases and > their applications. This 200-page book is written by three acclaimed > leaders in the field. The early access version is available now. > Download your free book today! http://p.sf.net/sfu/neotech_d2d_may > _______________________________________________ > Whonix-devel mailing list > Who...@li... > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/whonix-devel It appears that someone read my mind: http://undeadly.org/cgi?action=article&sid=20130509120042 They are offering digitally signed package updates for the -stable branch of the OpenBSD pkg/ports. Seems that offering OpenBSD as a firewall option to whonix, is not that far. The trust still relies on a third party, and not on the OpenBSD project. But I believe that this is way more secure than fetching packages in plain text ftp or http, from OpenBSD mirrors, without any digital signing, which is the way things happen these days. One more incentive to work on this! Cheers, -- GPG: 12E9 BCD6 5298 70B5 6C4C 7F1C 8C70 D6ED 188C AACE |
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From: adrelanos <adr...@ri...> - 2013-05-08 14:19:27
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chiccofx: > Truth be told, a ssl certificate that signs an entire domain > *.example.com and example.com, does not cost that much, perhaps in the > figures of a couple hundred of dollars. The problem is to pay for it, > and to renew it in a yearly base. Yes, startssl certicates are even free (and fine). Hosting isn't very expensive. It's just really expensive and difficult to do anonymously. |
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From: chiccofx <chi...@to...> - 2013-05-08 13:48:37
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adrelanos: > chiccofx: >>>> Openbsd as a whonix gateway would not only decrease the attack >>>> surface, but the VM would required even less RAM than what is used >>>> currently. This would improve the overall user experience and allow >>>> more RAM to be assigned to the whonix workstation by default. >>>> >>>> Let me know what are your thoughts on this. I am planning to replace >>>> my current debian whonix gateway with an OpenBSD 5.3 (launched May 1) >>>> and see how it perform. Happy to share the result. >>> >>> Most interesting. As the FAQ says, I don't regard OpenBSD as very secure >>> myself in context of Whonix's threat model, especially due to the >>> OpenBSBD package manager not passing the TUF threat model, at least not >>> for ordinary users who don't run their own signed OpenBSD repository... >>> >> >> Since you use sourceforge for hosting and since users are already >> advised to not trust whonix, > > I hope to change this. I am in contact with an organization which may or > may not be interested to create binary builds. This organization won't > be trusted by everyone of course, there is always space for doubt. There > is nothing negative in their public record. For objective reasons, they > are more to be trusted than some anonymous person (me). I am not that > interested in creating binary builds anyway and would like to have such > a trusted organization or person helping out. (At some point we decide > to make a maybe-release branch, start snapshot builds for testers, > stabilize and eventually call it a release. I'll concentrate on code > development and documentation and they help out with uploads.) > > It's still in the very early discussion phase, not sure if there will be > any outcome. > > On the other front, I also made some tiny progress with deterministic > builds. Not sure if I will be able to script it, but perhaps I can at > least get up a proposal and then ask people who offer to volunteer if > they have the skill to script it. > Nice to hear it. The true is that nobody can or should be trusted. But in general, since we are all anonymous, there should be at least a level of benefit of the doubt. >> we could create a OpenBSD repository, >> signed initially with my key, > > Well, that would be as far I understand it a nice contribution to the > OpenBSD and Free Software world and perhaps useful for many other > people, not just people interested in Whonix. > Yes, it would. But I believe it would not get to the mainstream since it would be signed by a third party and not the OpenBSD project/developers. >> and perhaps, in the future with the whonix >> project key. > > Not sure if I get into OpenBSD, but it seems I am getting educated here. > >> Will start working on my free time as soon as possible. The OpenBSD >> project officially dropped sendmail in favor of OpenSMTPD. In your FAQ >> you stated that OpenBSD does not support PIE but, in facth, OpenBSD was >> one of the first mainstream OSes to support it. OpenBSD support complete >> ASLR support with PIE binaries since 2008. Also, it can be run in >> securelevel with not only prevents changes to the firewall ruleset as it >> does apply other restrictions, as not letting any kind of disk writing, >> among other things. Also, the tor package/port can be run on a chroot. >> All this will help to decrease the attack surface. I know that there are >> many criticisms to some of the security features of OpenBSD, but I have >> never had one machine compromised, either remotely or locally (using >> securelevel) > > I removed those points from the faq > https://sourceforge.net/p/whonix/wiki/FAQ/#why-arent-you-using-openbsd-its-the-most-secure-os-ever1 > I should rewrite that FAQ entry anyway. Never know how to do it best. > Originally it was written by anonymous long time ago. > > Maybe Whonix gets sponsored with https hosting from that organization as > well, in that case, in future there could be something like a download > wizard where people choose which flavor they prefer depending on some > helpful questions. (Flavor as in Debian based Gateway, OpenBSD based > Gateway, Physical Isolation.) > Truth be told, a ssl certificate that signs an entire domain *.example.com and example.com, does not cost that much, perhaps in the figures of a couple hundred of dollars. The problem is to pay for it, and to renew it in a yearly base. As to the wizard, it would be awesome. I'll first test an OpenBSD gateway and try to harden/secure it as much as I can, and then proceed to build it from scratch. > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Learn Graph Databases - Download FREE O'Reilly Book > "Graph Databases" is the definitive new guide to graph databases and > their applications. This 200-page book is written by three acclaimed > leaders in the field. The early access version is available now. > Download your free book today! http://p.sf.net/sfu/neotech_d2d_may > _______________________________________________ > Whonix-devel mailing list > Who...@li... > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/whonix-devel -- GPG: 12E9 BCD6 5298 70B5 6C4C 7F1C 8C70 D6ED 188C AACE |
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From: adrelanos <adr...@ri...> - 2013-05-08 11:18:50
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chiccofx: >>> Openbsd as a whonix gateway would not only decrease the attack >>> surface, but the VM would required even less RAM than what is used >>> currently. This would improve the overall user experience and allow >>> more RAM to be assigned to the whonix workstation by default. >>> >>> Let me know what are your thoughts on this. I am planning to replace >>> my current debian whonix gateway with an OpenBSD 5.3 (launched May 1) >>> and see how it perform. Happy to share the result. >> >> Most interesting. As the FAQ says, I don't regard OpenBSD as very secure >> myself in context of Whonix's threat model, especially due to the >> OpenBSBD package manager not passing the TUF threat model, at least not >> for ordinary users who don't run their own signed OpenBSD repository... >> > > Since you use sourceforge for hosting and since users are already > advised to not trust whonix, I hope to change this. I am in contact with an organization which may or may not be interested to create binary builds. This organization won't be trusted by everyone of course, there is always space for doubt. There is nothing negative in their public record. For objective reasons, they are more to be trusted than some anonymous person (me). I am not that interested in creating binary builds anyway and would like to have such a trusted organization or person helping out. (At some point we decide to make a maybe-release branch, start snapshot builds for testers, stabilize and eventually call it a release. I'll concentrate on code development and documentation and they help out with uploads.) It's still in the very early discussion phase, not sure if there will be any outcome. On the other front, I also made some tiny progress with deterministic builds. Not sure if I will be able to script it, but perhaps I can at least get up a proposal and then ask people who offer to volunteer if they have the skill to script it. > we could create a OpenBSD repository, > signed initially with my key, Well, that would be as far I understand it a nice contribution to the OpenBSD and Free Software world and perhaps useful for many other people, not just people interested in Whonix. > and perhaps, in the future with the whonix > project key. Not sure if I get into OpenBSD, but it seems I am getting educated here. > Will start working on my free time as soon as possible. The OpenBSD > project officially dropped sendmail in favor of OpenSMTPD. In your FAQ > you stated that OpenBSD does not support PIE but, in facth, OpenBSD was > one of the first mainstream OSes to support it. OpenBSD support complete > ASLR support with PIE binaries since 2008. Also, it can be run in > securelevel with not only prevents changes to the firewall ruleset as it > does apply other restrictions, as not letting any kind of disk writing, > among other things. Also, the tor package/port can be run on a chroot. > All this will help to decrease the attack surface. I know that there are > many criticisms to some of the security features of OpenBSD, but I have > never had one machine compromised, either remotely or locally (using > securelevel) I removed those points from the faq https://sourceforge.net/p/whonix/wiki/FAQ/#why-arent-you-using-openbsd-its-the-most-secure-os-ever1 I should rewrite that FAQ entry anyway. Never know how to do it best. Originally it was written by anonymous long time ago. Maybe Whonix gets sponsored with https hosting from that organization as well, in that case, in future there could be something like a download wizard where people choose which flavor they prefer depending on some helpful questions. (Flavor as in Debian based Gateway, OpenBSD based Gateway, Physical Isolation.) |
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From: chiccofx <chi...@to...> - 2013-05-08 02:24:33
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adrelanos: > Hi chiccofx! > > chiccofx: >> Hello Everybody, >> >> I am a new user to whonix, but an experienced *nix developer. I have >> read the faq about the question related with openbsd and security. I >> want volunteer myself to address many of those issues. > >> There have been >> some recent developments on the issues pointed by the faq. > > Will they get a secure package manager like apt/rpm? Unfortunately, as far as I am concerned, no. They still suggest to buy the dvd's/cd's which lead a trace back to the real identity. I have been a user of OpenBSD for hardened firewalling purposes for many years so there is a level of plausible deniability in my persona acquiring a set of cd/dvd. > >> Openbsd as a whonix gateway would not only decrease the attack >> surface, but the VM would required even less RAM than what is used >> currently. This would improve the overall user experience and allow >> more RAM to be assigned to the whonix workstation by default. >> >> Let me know what are your thoughts on this. I am planning to replace >> my current debian whonix gateway with an OpenBSD 5.3 (launched May 1) >> and see how it perform. Happy to share the result. > > Most interesting. As the FAQ says, I don't regard OpenBSD as very secure > myself in context of Whonix's threat model, especially due to the > OpenBSBD package manager not passing the TUF threat model, at least not > for ordinary users who don't run their own signed OpenBSD repository... > Since you use sourceforge for hosting and since users are already advised to not trust whonix, we could create a OpenBSD repository, signed initially with my key, and perhaps, in the future with the whonix project key. There cannot be hashes of the packages in the OpenBSD mirrors but, there is a hash of the ports file and some of the ports can be configured to get the source using https, and they do hash checking of the source, so it is secure in this manner (it gets the source from the official place and do check the hashes) > Anyway, other developers can come to different conclusions, that's fine. > It's quite interesting to see an alternative implementation of > Whonix-Gateway. I will support this effort with > questions/answers/comments, perhaps some code changes to prepare Whonix > source code better for such ports. > > So lets see where this goes. Whether you do this as a one shot or are > interested in merging this (so the builder can just switch an option in > build config), we'll see how it develops. If you share codes early, it > will be easier for me to follow how it develops. Looking forward to it. > Will start working on my free time as soon as possible. The OpenBSD project officially dropped sendmail in favor of OpenSMTPD. In your FAQ you stated that OpenBSD does not support PIE but, in facth, OpenBSD was one of the first mainstream OSes to support it. OpenBSD support complete ASLR support with PIE binaries since 2008. Also, it can be run in securelevel with not only prevents changes to the firewall ruleset as it does apply other restrictions, as not letting any kind of disk writing, among other things. Also, the tor package/port can be run on a chroot. All this will help to decrease the attack surface. I know that there are many criticisms to some of the security features of OpenBSD, but I have never had one machine compromised, either remotely or locally (using securelevel) > Cheers, > adrelanos Cheers, chiccofx > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Learn Graph Databases - Download FREE O'Reilly Book > "Graph Databases" is the definitive new guide to graph databases and > their applications. This 200-page book is written by three acclaimed > leaders in the field. The early access version is available now. > Download your free book today! http://p.sf.net/sfu/neotech_d2d_may > _______________________________________________ > Whonix-devel mailing list > Who...@li... > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/whonix-devel -- GPG: 12E9 BCD6 5298 70B5 6C4C 7F1C 8C70 D6ED 188C AACE |
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From: adrelanos <adr...@ri...> - 2013-05-08 01:39:23
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Hi chiccofx! chiccofx: > Hello Everybody, > > I am a new user to whonix, but an experienced *nix developer. I have > read the faq about the question related with openbsd and security. I > want volunteer myself to address many of those issues. > There have been > some recent developments on the issues pointed by the faq. Will they get a secure package manager like apt/rpm? > Openbsd as a whonix gateway would not only decrease the attack > surface, but the VM would required even less RAM than what is used > currently. This would improve the overall user experience and allow > more RAM to be assigned to the whonix workstation by default. > > Let me know what are your thoughts on this. I am planning to replace > my current debian whonix gateway with an OpenBSD 5.3 (launched May 1) > and see how it perform. Happy to share the result. Most interesting. As the FAQ says, I don't regard OpenBSD as very secure myself in context of Whonix's threat model, especially due to the OpenBSBD package manager not passing the TUF threat model, at least not for ordinary users who don't run their own signed OpenBSD repository... Anyway, other developers can come to different conclusions, that's fine. It's quite interesting to see an alternative implementation of Whonix-Gateway. I will support this effort with questions/answers/comments, perhaps some code changes to prepare Whonix source code better for such ports. So lets see where this goes. Whether you do this as a one shot or are interested in merging this (so the builder can just switch an option in build config), we'll see how it develops. If you share codes early, it will be easier for me to follow how it develops. Looking forward to it. Cheers, adrelanos |
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