Please avoid using SHA1 to sign releases
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waterlan
When signing future releases, please avoid relying on the SHA1 digest algorithm since it is cryptographically weak and incompatible with the current OpenPGP standard.
$ sq inspect wcd-6.0.7.tar.gz.asc --keyring wcd.gpg
wcd-6.0.7.tar.gz.asc: Detached signature.
Error: F8F1BEA490496A09CCA328CC38C1F572B12725BE is not valid according to the current policy, ignoring
because: No binding signature at time 2026-09-12T08:39:21Z
because: Policy rejected non-revocation signature (PositiveCertification) requiring second pre-image resistance
because: SHA1 is not considered secure
Alleged signer: signer's cert not found
F8F1BEA490496A09CCA328CC38C1F572B12725BE
(signature subkey)
Note: Signatures have NOT been verified!
See also https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/updating-gpg-keys-for-fedora-and-rhel, which is written with signing RPM packages in mind, but which nevertheless has useful general advice.
Anonymous