opensc-devel — discussion of developement of OpenSC and related projects

Re: [Opensc-devel] Question about OpenSC

[Jaroslav I. <jar...@gm...>]

Hello David,

seems like your primary problem is behaviour of SunPKCS11 provider so IMO
you should take a look at "Java PKCS#11 Reference Guide" [0] which
describes in detail how this provider operates. I remember that values of
CKA_LABEL and CKA_ID attributes were very important and that SunPKCS11
provider didn't "show" private key which were not associated with the
certificate.

[0]
http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/technotes/guides/security/p11guide.html

Kind Regards / S pozdravom

Jaroslav Imrich
http://www.jimrich.sk
jar...@gm...


On Mon, Jan 18, 2016 at 3:40 PM, David Sills <DS...@da...>
wrote:

> To whom it may concern:
>
>
>
> This is apparently not a mailing list for users, but I am a (potential)
> user with many questions. Is there a mailing list for me?
>
>
>
> I have successfully (more or less) got OpenSC working on my Windows 7
> machine with a Dell Smart Card Reader Keyboard and pkcs11-tool seems to be
> able to detect keys (and thus certificates, I assume) on the card, but when
> I go through the Sun API (SunPKCS11) I get no aliases in the Keystore I
> generate, which makes it, of course, impossible to get at the data. (What I
> really want to know is, is the certificate expired?) Is this a common
> occurrence, and has anyone any kind of solution for it?
>
>
>
> Please redirect me if I am in the wrong list. Many thanks for your work in
> creating OpenSC.
>
>
>
> Thanks!
>
>
>
> David
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Site24x7 APM Insight: Get Deep Visibility into Application Performance
> APM + Mobile APM + RUM: Monitor 3 App instances at just $35/Month
> Monitor end-to-end web transactions and take corrective actions now
> Troubleshoot faster and improve end-user experience. Signup Now!
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> _______________________________________________
> Opensc-devel mailing list
> Ope...@li...
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel
>
>

[Opensc-devel] Question about OpenSC

[David S. <DS...@da...>]

To whom it may concern:

This is apparently not a mailing list for users, but I am a (potential) user with many questions. Is there a mailing list for me?

I have successfully (more or less) got OpenSC working on my Windows 7 machine with a Dell Smart Card Reader Keyboard and pkcs11-tool seems to be able to detect keys (and thus certificates, I assume) on the card, but when I go through the Sun API (SunPKCS11) I get no aliases in the Keystore I generate, which makes it, of course, impossible to get at the data. (What I really want to know is, is the certificate expired?) Is this a common occurrence, and has anyone any kind of solution for it?

Please redirect me if I am in the wrong list. Many thanks for your work in creating OpenSC.

Thanks!

David

Re: [Opensc-devel] Signed JavaScript/JSON

[Anders R. <and...@gm...>]

On 2016-01-14 11:29, Andreas Schwier wrote:
> Interesting.

Hi Andreas,

> But how does this approach address the issue of a canonical format for
> the signature input ?

The described approach does not depend on a canonical JSON representation but
on a normalized ditto which is what ECMAScript (using the specified constraints)
does automatically.


> If you use different JSON encoders generating valid, but different JSON
> textual presentations (e.g. different white-space), then signature
> validation will fail. I would have expected that white-space is
> eliminated during canonicalization, but don't see that in the code sample.

White-space is ignored by ECMAScript which means that other systems MUST
also do that in order to utilize this scheme.

Relying on the number algorithms featured in
https://developers.google.com/v8/ may appear slightly "hacky" but OTOH
there are already tons of systems out there building on this platform
including https://nodejs.org/en/ so it is about as "standard" you can get.


> It's the same issue as in XML Signatures and the transformation in a
> canonical XML format before hashing.

I believe there is 1 to 25 difference in complexity.

Anders

>
> Andreas
>
> On 01/14/2016 10:41 AM, Anders Rundgren wrote:
>> The samples below should be comparable with respect to securing the integrity of the payload and the signature parameters, but they obviously differ a lot in the way they get the work done.
>>
>> JCS was developed to match information-rich, multi-signature schemes like
>> https://www.w3.org/Payments/IG/wiki/Main_Page/ProposalsQ42015/SCAI#The_SCAI_line
>> and similar.  JCS has recently been upgraded to match ECMAScript revision 6.
>>
>>
>> JSON Cleartext Signature (JCS): https://cyberphone.github.io/openkeystore/resources/docs/jcs.html#ECMAScript_Compatibility_Mode
>>
>> var signedObject = {
>>        // The data
>>        statement: "Hello signed world!",
>>        otherProperties: [2000, true],
>>        // The signature
>>        signature: {
>>            algorithm: "ES256",
>>            publicKey: {
>>                type: "EC",
>>                curve: "P-256",
>>                x: "vlYxD4dtFJOp1_8_QUcieWCW-4KrLMmFL2rpkY1bQDs",
>>                y: "fxEF70yJenP3SPHM9hv-EnvhG6nXr3_S-fDqoj-F6yM"
>>            },
>>            value: "2H__TkcV28QpGWPkyVbR1CW0I8L4xARrVGL0LjOeHJLOPozdzRqCTyYfmAippJXqdzgNAonnFPVCSI5A6novMQ"
>>        }
>> };
>>
>>
>> JSON Web Signature (JWS): https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7515.txt
>>
>> var signedObject = {
>>        "payload": "eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ",
>>        "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9",
>>        "signature": "DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8IS lSApmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q"
>> };
>>
>>
>>
>> Anders
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Site24x7 APM Insight: Get Deep Visibility into Application Performance
>> APM + Mobile APM + RUM: Monitor 3 App instances at just $35/Month
>> Monitor end-to-end web transactions and take corrective actions now
>> Troubleshoot faster and improve end-user experience. Signup Now!
>> http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=267308311&iu=/4140
>> _______________________________________________
>> Opensc-devel mailing list
>> Ope...@li...
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel
>>
>
>

Re: [Opensc-devel] Signed JavaScript/JSON

[Andreas S. <and...@ca...>]

Interesting.

But how does this approach address the issue of a canonical format for
the signature input ?

If you use different JSON encoders generating valid, but different JSON
textual presentations (e.g. different white-space), then signature
validation will fail. I would have expected that white-space is
eliminated during canonicalization, but don't see that in the code sample.

It's the same issue as in XML Signatures and the transformation in a
canonical XML format before hashing.

Andreas

On 01/14/2016 10:41 AM, Anders Rundgren wrote:
> The samples below should be comparable with respect to securing the integrity of the payload and the signature parameters, but they obviously differ a lot in the way they get the work done.
> 
> JCS was developed to match information-rich, multi-signature schemes like
> https://www.w3.org/Payments/IG/wiki/Main_Page/ProposalsQ42015/SCAI#The_SCAI_line
> and similar.  JCS has recently been upgraded to match ECMAScript revision 6.
> 
> 
> JSON Cleartext Signature (JCS): https://cyberphone.github.io/openkeystore/resources/docs/jcs.html#ECMAScript_Compatibility_Mode
> 
> var signedObject = {
>       // The data
>       statement: "Hello signed world!",
>       otherProperties: [2000, true],
>       // The signature
>       signature: {
>           algorithm: "ES256",
>           publicKey: {
>               type: "EC",
>               curve: "P-256",
>               x: "vlYxD4dtFJOp1_8_QUcieWCW-4KrLMmFL2rpkY1bQDs",
>               y: "fxEF70yJenP3SPHM9hv-EnvhG6nXr3_S-fDqoj-F6yM"
>           },
>           value: "2H__TkcV28QpGWPkyVbR1CW0I8L4xARrVGL0LjOeHJLOPozdzRqCTyYfmAippJXqdzgNAonnFPVCSI5A6novMQ"
>       }
> };
> 
> 
> JSON Web Signature (JWS): https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7515.txt
> 
> var signedObject = {
>       "payload": "eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ",
>       "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9",
>       "signature": "DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8IS lSApmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q"
> };
> 
> 
> 
> Anders
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Site24x7 APM Insight: Get Deep Visibility into Application Performance
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> Troubleshoot faster and improve end-user experience. Signup Now!
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> _______________________________________________
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> Ope...@li...
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel
> 


-- 

    ---------    CardContact Software & System Consulting
   |.##> <##.|   Andreas Schwier
   |#       #|   Schülerweg 38
   |#       #|   32429 Minden, Germany
   |'##> <##'|   Phone +49 571 56149
    ---------    http://www.cardcontact.de
                 http://www.tscons.de
                 http://www.openscdp.org
                 http://www.smartcard-hsm.com

[Opensc-devel] Signed JavaScript/JSON

[Anders R. <and...@gm...>]

The samples below should be comparable with respect to securing the integrity of the payload and the signature parameters, but they obviously differ a lot in the way they get the work done.

JCS was developed to match information-rich, multi-signature schemes like
https://www.w3.org/Payments/IG/wiki/Main_Page/ProposalsQ42015/SCAI#The_SCAI_line
and similar.  JCS has recently been upgraded to match ECMAScript revision 6.


JSON Cleartext Signature (JCS): https://cyberphone.github.io/openkeystore/resources/docs/jcs.html#ECMAScript_Compatibility_Mode

var signedObject = {
      // The data
      statement: "Hello signed world!",
      otherProperties: [2000, true],
      // The signature
      signature: {
          algorithm: "ES256",
          publicKey: {
              type: "EC",
              curve: "P-256",
              x: "vlYxD4dtFJOp1_8_QUcieWCW-4KrLMmFL2rpkY1bQDs",
              y: "fxEF70yJenP3SPHM9hv-EnvhG6nXr3_S-fDqoj-F6yM"
          },
          value: "2H__TkcV28QpGWPkyVbR1CW0I8L4xARrVGL0LjOeHJLOPozdzRqCTyYfmAippJXqdzgNAonnFPVCSI5A6novMQ"
      }
};


JSON Web Signature (JWS): https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7515.txt

var signedObject = {
      "payload": "eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ",
      "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9",
      "signature": "DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8IS lSApmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q"
};



Anders

Re: [Opensc-devel] Smartcard HSM built-in root CA?

[Andreas S. <and...@ca...>]

Sure

> Can you please be more specific about some aspects of this PKI:
> 
> a) if CardContact goes out of business for any reason, what is the
> impact on people using the cards?  Will people using the intermediate
> certificates signed by your root be able to keep using them until they
> expire?  How long are they valid?
If CardContact goes out of business, then the Scheme Root CA will stop
operating and will not issue new device issuer certificates. Existing
device issuer can of course continue to operate their CA instance and
can produce legitimate SmartCard-HSMs.

A device issuer certificate is valid for 8 years. Device certificates
have a validity date, which does not exceed the expiration date of the
device issuer CA certificate. But remember that these certificates are
card-verifiable-certificates not suitable for X.509 based applications.
We are not operating a X509 PKI.
> 
> b) if the CardContact root certificate is compromised (private key
> stolen, etc), what is the impact on people using the cards?
The Scheme Root CA private key is - of course - stored on a
SmartCard-HSM with dual-control for both, operation and recovery. The CA
is an offline CA.

We do our best to protect the Scheme Root CA, but if it would be
compromised, a relying party could no longer trust public keys generated
in the device. The impact would need to be evaluated in the actual
application scenario.

Any customer is of course free to become a device issuer himself and
even operate his own scheme root CA. This is common for customers that
have additional security requirements that we can't (or don't want to)
fulfil.
> 
> c) you say that some customers operate their own root, does that mean
> they can completely eliminate or replace the "device authentication key"
> you create at the factory?
The device authentication key is generated during SmartCard-HSM
personalization, which can be done by any device issuer.

Our business model with the SmartCard-HSM is to license the applet to
device issuer and to provide the required infrastructure to produce the
devices. At the same time we are a device issuer for the USB and MicroSD
based form factor.

> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Site24x7 APM Insight: Get Deep Visibility into Application Performance
> APM + Mobile APM + RUM: Monitor 3 App instances at just $35/Month
> Monitor end-to-end web transactions and take corrective actions now
> Troubleshoot faster and improve end-user experience. Signup Now!
> http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=267308311&iu=/4140
> _______________________________________________
> Opensc-devel mailing list
> Ope...@li...
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel
> 


-- 

    ---------    CardContact Software & System Consulting
   |.##> <##.|   Andreas Schwier
   |#       #|   Schülerweg 38
   |#       #|   32429 Minden, Germany
   |'##> <##'|   Phone +49 571 56149
    ---------    http://www.cardcontact.de
                 http://www.tscons.de
                 http://www.openscdp.org
                 http://www.smartcard-hsm.com

Re: [Opensc-devel] Smartcard HSM built-in root CA?

[Daniel P. <da...@po...>]

On 12/01/16 23:38, Andreas Schwier wrote:
> Hi Daniel,
> 
> the purpose of the SmartCard-HSM PKI is to allow a relying party to
> authenticate public keys for private keys generated on the device. It
> does both, proof of possession and proof of correspondence.
> 
> It also allows using the public key without a certificate, because the
> internally generated certificate signing request is signed by the device
> authentication key. In some applications like the n-of-m scheme [1] this
> is sufficient, i.e. there is no need for another separate PKI to issue
> certificates that bind the public key to a identity (each SmartCard-HSM
> has an identity asserted by the device certificate and linked to the
> device authentication key).
> 
> This means, that if someone relies on this PKI, he must rely on the
> device issuer and the correct operation of the systems at the two PKI
> layers.
> 
> This is not limited to ourselves, as we have customers that are
> operating their own root and production CA.
> 
> Having a full PKI for public key authentication is something that - as
> far as I know - only the SmartCard-HSM provides for. Other schemes
> provide key attestation, but typically with a key shared amongst all
> devices.
> 

Can you please be more specific about some aspects of this PKI:

a) if CardContact goes out of business for any reason, what is the
impact on people using the cards?  Will people using the intermediate
certificates signed by your root be able to keep using them until they
expire?  How long are they valid?

b) if the CardContact root certificate is compromised (private key
stolen, etc), what is the impact on people using the cards?

c) you say that some customers operate their own root, does that mean
they can completely eliminate or replace the "device authentication key"
you create at the factory?

Re: [Opensc-devel] cards that only do SHA-1

[Thomas C. <cal...@gm...>]

Hi Daniel,

If I am not mistaken, most cards working with OpenSC do not perform
onboard hash computation (even if it is supported by the card's spec)
but rather use a software approach (using OpenSSL as a backend for
those operations).

Hence, this means that you should be able to use OpenSC's PKCS#11
middleware to perform CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS signatures even if the card
only supports plain RSA signatures (the padding is also generally
computed by the middleware).

Now if you require ECC support but your cards lack support, then you
need newer ones.

Hope this helps,

Thomas

On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 10:08 PM, Daniel Pocock <da...@po...> wrote:
>
>
> Hi,
>
> I've got a few cards in my drawer that I'm trying to identify.
>
> Spec sheets for some versions of these cards only mention SHA-1 while
> I've come across other spec sheets that mention SHA-256, I'm not sure if
> there are different versions of the same card, software updates or
> something else.
>
> The cards in question are Athena "ASECard Crypto" and the "CryptoFlex
> for Windows 32k"
>
> Can opensc tell me definitively if these cards have anything better than
> SHA-1 capability?
>
> With SHA-1 being considered insecure, is there any practical use for
> cards that don't have SHA-256 built-in already?  Can they be upgraded
> somehow to support newer hashes and/or adding ECC support?
>
> Regards,
>
> Daniel
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Site24x7 APM Insight: Get Deep Visibility into Application Performance
> APM + Mobile APM + RUM: Monitor 3 App instances at just $35/Month
> Monitor end-to-end web transactions and take corrective actions now
> Troubleshoot faster and improve end-user experience. Signup Now!
> http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=267308311&iu=/4140
> _______________________________________________
> Opensc-devel mailing list
> Ope...@li...
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel

[Opensc-devel] Oberthur PIV card

[Ryan C. <ry...@rc...>]

Hi,

Does anyone know of a source to obtain a Oberthur ID-One Piv on Cosmo card
(preferably their newest, the Cosmo V8) or a Cosmo V8 eval kit?  Of course
I'm willing to pay for it, but haven't been able to find a supplier.  My
attempts to contact Oberthur directly have gone unanswered.

Best regards,
Ryan

Re: [Opensc-devel] Smartcard HSM built-in root CA?

[Andreas S. <and...@ca...>]

Hi Daniel,

the purpose of the SmartCard-HSM PKI is to allow a relying party to
authenticate public keys for private keys generated on the device. It
does both, proof of possession and proof of correspondence.

It also allows using the public key without a certificate, because the
internally generated certificate signing request is signed by the device
authentication key. In some applications like the n-of-m scheme [1] this
is sufficient, i.e. there is no need for another separate PKI to issue
certificates that bind the public key to a identity (each SmartCard-HSM
has an identity asserted by the device certificate and linked to the
device authentication key).

This means, that if someone relies on this PKI, he must rely on the
device issuer and the correct operation of the systems at the two PKI
layers.

This is not limited to ourselves, as we have customers that are
operating their own root and production CA.

Having a full PKI for public key authentication is something that - as
far as I know - only the SmartCard-HSM provides for. Other schemes
provide key attestation, but typically with a key shared amongst all
devices.

Andreas


[1]
http://www.smartcard-hsm.com/docs/SmartCard-HSM_n-of-m_Authentication_V1.0_2015-03-25.pdf

On 01/12/2016 11:08 PM, Daniel Pocock wrote:
> 
> 
> Hi all,
> 
> I was looking at the specs for Smartcard HSM:
> 
> http://www.smartcard-hsm.com/features.html#devaut
> 
> and it suggests that a "Scheme Root CA maintained by CardContact issues
> certificates for Device Issuer CAs, which in turn issue an unique device
> certificate for each SmartCard-HSM produced."
> 
> Does this mean the card has some dependency on the manufacturer/vendor?
>  Is this typical?
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Daniel
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Site24x7 APM Insight: Get Deep Visibility into Application Performance
> APM + Mobile APM + RUM: Monitor 3 App instances at just $35/Month
> Monitor end-to-end web transactions and take corrective actions now
> Troubleshoot faster and improve end-user experience. Signup Now!
> http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=267308311&iu=/4140
> _______________________________________________
> Opensc-devel mailing list
> Ope...@li...
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel
> 


-- 

    ---------    CardContact Software & System Consulting
   |.##> <##.|   Andreas Schwier
   |#       #|   Schülerweg 38
   |#       #|   32429 Minden, Germany
   |'##> <##'|   Phone +49 571 56149
    ---------    http://www.cardcontact.de
                 http://www.tscons.de
                 http://www.openscdp.org
                 http://www.smartcard-hsm.com

[Opensc-devel] cards that only do SHA-1

[Daniel P. <da...@po...>]

Hi,

I've got a few cards in my drawer that I'm trying to identify.

Spec sheets for some versions of these cards only mention SHA-1 while
I've come across other spec sheets that mention SHA-256, I'm not sure if
there are different versions of the same card, software updates or
something else.

The cards in question are Athena "ASECard Crypto" and the "CryptoFlex
for Windows 32k"

Can opensc tell me definitively if these cards have anything better than
SHA-1 capability?

With SHA-1 being considered insecure, is there any practical use for
cards that don't have SHA-256 built-in already?  Can they be upgraded
somehow to support newer hashes and/or adding ECC support?

Regards,

Daniel

[Opensc-devel] Smartcard HSM built-in root CA?

[Daniel P. <da...@po...>]

Hi all,

I was looking at the specs for Smartcard HSM:

http://www.smartcard-hsm.com/features.html#devaut

and it suggests that a "Scheme Root CA maintained by CardContact issues
certificates for Device Issuer CAs, which in turn issue an unique device
certificate for each SmartCard-HSM produced."

Does this mean the card has some dependency on the manufacturer/vendor?
 Is this typical?

Regards,

Daniel

Re: [Opensc-devel] libp11 and engine_pkcs11

[Ludovic R. <lud...@gm...>]

2015-12-29 17:57 GMT+01:00 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <
n.m...@gm...>:

> Hi,
>

Hello,


>  I'm lately quite busy and cannot keep up with maintaining libp11 and
> engine_pkcs11; for that I'd like to recommend to give the
> maintainership of libp11 and engine_pkcs11 to Michal Trojnara (the
> author of stunnel). He has already provided few merged (and unmerged)
> patches [0], and most importantly he uses these projects and is
> willing to plan and make the next releases.
>
>
OK
I just invited him in the Engine pkcs11 maintainers [1] and libp11
maintainers [2] teams on github.
Michal, if you need something on github please just ask on this
opensc-deval mailing list.

Thanks to Nikos for your past work and Michal for your future work.

Bye

[1] https://github.com/orgs/OpenSC/teams/engine-pkcs11-maintainers
[2] https://github.com/orgs/OpenSC/teams/libp11-maintainers

-- 
 Dr. Ludovic Rousseau

[Opensc-devel] libp11 and engine_pkcs11

[Nikos M. <n.m...@gm...>]

Hi,
 I'm lately quite busy and cannot keep up with maintaining libp11 and
engine_pkcs11; for that I'd like to recommend to give the
maintainership of libp11 and engine_pkcs11 to Michal Trojnara (the
author of stunnel). He has already provided few merged (and unmerged)
patches [0], and most importantly he uses these projects and is
willing to plan and make the next releases.

regards,
Nikos


[0]. https://github.com/opensc/libp11/pulls

Re: [Opensc-devel] smart card reset after 5 seconds on Windows

[Vincent Le T. <vin...@my...>]

My comment about the pin pad is not about the authentication itself but
about the fact that you can't cache the pin and that long transaction was a
workaround.

Vincent

Le lundi 14 décembre 2015, Douglas E Engert <dee...@gm...> a écrit :

>
> https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa379469%28v=vs.85%29.aspx
> says: "If a transaction is held on the card for more than five seconds
> with no operations happening on that card,"
>
> The key phrase is: "with no operations happening on the card"
>
> I would say a pin pad reader prompt is part of the verify command sent to
> the reader, and thus would be considered an active operation and not timed.
> (I believe the the pinpad reader command has its own timeout too.)
> Generating a key on the card should also be considered an active operation
> on the card.
> The card and the reader should be doing the keep alive protocol for this.
>
> I think the point is a transaction SCardBeginTransaction -
> SCardEndTransaction should not hold the card indefinitely.
> The 5 seconds by the middleware should be long enough to get the next
> command to the card.
>
> Any software prompt for a PIN should be done before starting the
> transaction to send the verify and crypto operations.
>
> This may be a problem if OpenSC tries to hold the transaction from verify
> to logoff.
> https://github.com/frankmorgner Is this what the "atomic"  changes are
> doing?
>
> The Microsoft doc also says: "Calling any of the Smart Card and Reader
> Access Functions
> <https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa380141%28v=vs.85%29.aspx>
> or Direct Card Access Functions
> <https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa375369%28v=vs.85%29.aspx>
> on the card
>  that is transacted results in the timer being reset to continue allowing
> the transaction to be used".
>
> With FireFox, it calls C_GetSessionInfo every few seconds. If
> C_GetSessionInfo would force a command to the card
> that could keep the session alive.
> https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/624
> is a step in that direction.
>
>
> This should be easy to test on W7, if the 30 seconds timer  is set to 5
> seconds.
>
>
> On 12/14/2015 3:08 AM, Vincent Le Toux wrote:
>
> Long apdu are still been performed but that will be a problem with pin pad
> sessions.
> The workaround for minidriver are called session pin.
> You get one with a pin pad then use this session pin for further
> authentication
>
> I do not know a card / minidriver which supports it (gemalto Id prime
> included)
>
> Vincent
>
> Le lundi 14 décembre 2015, Martin Paljak <
> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ma...@ma...');>
> ma...@ma...
> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ma...@ma...');>> a écrit :
>
>> On 14/12/15 10:37, Ludovic Rousseau wrote:
>> > I looks like Microsoft added an undocumented registry key to change the
>> 5
>> > seconds delay.
>> >
>> > Key CardDisconnectPowerDownDelay in
>> > HK_local_machine\software\microsoft\cryptography\calais
>> > The value defines the delay in seconds.
>> >
>> > It also looks like this feature is also present in Windows 7 but with a
>> 30
>> > seconds delay.
>>
>>
>> Wow, this is funny (not encountered yet) but basically this means that
>> generating longer keys (sometimes takes minute(s)) is not possible
>> without hacks on Windows, inside a card transaction ?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> _______________________________________________
>> Opensc-devel mailing list
>> Ope...@li...
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel
>>
>
>
> --
> --
> Vincent Le Toux
>
> My Smart Logon
> www.mysmartlogon.com
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Opensc-devel mailing lis...@li... <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Ope...@li...');>https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel
>
>
> --
>
>  Douglas E. Engert  <DEE...@gm...> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','DEE...@gm...');>
>
>

-- 
--
Vincent Le Toux

My Smart Logon
www.mysmartlogon.com

Re: [Opensc-devel] smart card reset after 5 seconds on Windows

[Douglas E E. <dee...@gm...>]

<html>
  <head>
    <meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
      http-equiv="Content-Type">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa379469%28v=vs.85%29.aspx">https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa379469%28v=vs.85%29.aspx</a><br>
    says: "If a transaction is held on the card for more than five
    seconds with no operations happening on that card,"<br>
    <br>
    The key phrase is: "with no operations happening on the card"<br>
    <br>
    I would say a pin pad reader prompt is part of the verify command
    sent to the reader, and thus would be considered an active operation
    and not timed.<br>
    (I believe the the pinpad reader command has its own timeout too.) 
    <br>
    Generating a key on the card should also be considered an active
    operation on the card. <br>
    The card and the reader should be doing the keep alive protocol for
    this.<br>
    <br>
    I think the point is a transaction SCardBeginTransaction -
    SCardEndTransaction should not hold the card indefinitely. <br>
    The 5 seconds by the middleware should be long enough to get the
    next command to the card.<br>
    <br>
    Any software prompt for a PIN should be done before starting the
    transaction to send the verify and crypto operations. <br>
    <br>
    This may be a problem if OpenSC tries to hold the transaction from
    verify to logoff.<br>
    <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://github.com/frankmorgner">https://github.com/frankmorgner</a> Is this what the "atomic"  changes
    are doing? <br>
    <br>
    The Microsoft doc also says: "Calling any of the <a
href="https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa380141%28v=vs.85%29.aspx">Smart
      Card and Reader Access Functions</a> or <a
href="https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa375369%28v=vs.85%29.aspx">Direct
      Card Access Functions</a> on the card<br>
     that is transacted results in the timer being reset to continue
    allowing the transaction to be used".<br>
    <br>
    With FireFox, it calls C_GetSessionInfo every few seconds. If
    C_GetSessionInfo would force a command to the card<br>
    that could keep the session alive. 
    <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/624">https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/624</a><br>
    is a step in that direction. <br>
    <br>
    <br>
    This should be easy to test on W7, if the 30 seconds timer  is set
    to 5 seconds. <br>
     <br>
    <br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 12/14/2015 3:08 AM, Vincent Le Toux
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CAO...@ma..."
      type="cite">Long apdu are still been performed but that will be a
      problem with pin pad sessions.
      <div>The workaround for minidriver are called session pin.</div>
      <div>You get one with a pin pad then use this session pin for
        further authentication </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>I do not know a card / minidriver which supports it (gemalto
        Id prime included)</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Vincent <br>
        <br>
        Le lundi 14 décembre 2015, Martin Paljak &lt;<a
          moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:ma...@ma..."><a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:ma...@ma...">ma...@ma...</a></a>&gt;
        a écrit :<br>
        <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
          .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On 14/12/15
          10:37, Ludovic Rousseau wrote:<br>
          &gt; I looks like Microsoft added an undocumented registry key
          to change the 5<br>
          &gt; seconds delay.<br>
          &gt;<br>
          &gt; Key CardDisconnectPowerDownDelay in<br>
          &gt; HK_local_machine\software\microsoft\cryptography\calais<br>
          &gt; The value defines the delay in seconds.<br>
          &gt;<br>
          &gt; It also looks like this feature is also present in
          Windows 7 but with a 30<br>
          &gt; seconds delay.<br>
          <br>
          <br>
          Wow, this is funny (not encountered yet) but basically this
          means that<br>
          generating longer keys (sometimes takes minute(s)) is not
          possible<br>
          without hacks on Windows, inside a card transaction ?<br>
          <br>
          <br>
          <br>
------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
          _______________________________________________<br>
          Opensc-devel mailing list<br>
          <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="javascript:;"
            onclick="_e(event, 'cvml',
            'Ope...@li...')">Ope...@li...</a><br>
          <a moz-do-not-send="true"
            href="https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel"
            target="_blank">https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel</a><br>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
      <br>
      -- <br>
      --<br>
      Vincent Le Toux<br>
      <br>
      My Smart Logon<br>
      <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://www.mysmartlogon.com/"
        target="_blank">www.mysmartlogon.com</a><br>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">------------------------------------------------------------------------------
</pre>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
Opensc-devel mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Ope...@li...">Ope...@li...</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel">https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    <pre class="moz-signature" cols="200">-- 

 Douglas E. Engert  <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:DEE...@gm...">&lt;DEE...@gm...&gt;</a>
 
</pre>
  </body>
</html>

Re: [Opensc-devel] Nitrokey HSM - Details of DKEK/key-wrapping algorithm, or key import

[Andreas S. <and...@ca...>]

Dear Evan,

if you register at the CDN [1], then I can enable access to the
SmartCard-HSM SDK which contains a script to decode the wrapped key
container.

Andreas

[1] http://www.cardcontact.de/cdn/about.html

On 12/14/2015 01:00 PM, Evan Anderson wrote:
> I recently acquired a Nitrokey HSM for testing for one of my Customers. The 
> feature-set of the SmartCard-HSM software appears to be quite good and a 
> nearly perfect fit for my Customer's needs.
> 
> My Customer will be signing firmware for a series of embedded control 
> devices w/ RSA keys. These devices have a planned 15-20 year lifetime in the 
> field/market (embedded devices attached to very large, very expensive pieces 
> of machinery with long service lifetimes). Losing access to the firmware 
> signing key during the device's supported lifetime would be quite bad 
> (physically recalling the devices and replacing secure SoC devices w/ public 
> keys stored in on-chip fuse-protected bootloader flash).
> 
> While the built-in key backup/restore functionality in SmartCard-HSM looks 
> quite good, I'm concerned that without details of the 
> key-wrapping/unwrapping algorithm my Customer could find themselves, in the 
> future, in a situation where SmartCard-HSM is no longer available for 
> purchase. I am reticent to simply recommend assuming that the Customer 
> purchase extra devices to hold in storage and hope that they will remain 
> functional for 10+ years. My Customer is already accustomed to supporting 
> devices in the field w/ 15+ year lifetimes, so this concern is a very real 
> one to them.
> 
> Are there details of the DKEK key-wrapping/unwrapping algorithm available 
> (under NDA and/or for a fee, if necessary) that would enable my Customer to 
> have confidence that, even if the SmartCard-HSM product were discontinued 
> and no longer available, they would be able to bring the DKEK shares and 
> key-backup together to reconstruct their key to load into some new device?
> 
> As an alternative to understanding the DKEK key-wrapping/unwrapping 
> algorithm, is there functionality to import an externally-generated key into 
> the SmartCard-HSM product? I see a reference here 
> <http://www.smartcard-hsm.com/features.html#keyimport> but I've reviewed all 
> the materials I can find publicly, and on the CardContact Developer Network 
> website, and I am not finding any examples or documentation showing how to 
> perform this import. On this mailing list, as recently as October 2015 
> (under the thread "Cannot delete imported private key from SmartCard-HSM") I 
> am seeing statements that make me think that this import functionality may 
> have difficulties.
> 
> Thank you,
> Evan Anderson
> Wellbury LLC
> Troy, OH, US
> 
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> _______________________________________________
> Opensc-devel mailing list
> Ope...@li...
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel
> 


-- 

    ---------    CardContact Software & System Consulting
   |.##> <##.|   Andreas Schwier
   |#       #|   Schülerweg 38
   |#       #|   32429 Minden, Germany
   |'##> <##'|   Phone +49 571 56149
    ---------    http://www.cardcontact.de
                 http://www.tscons.de
                 http://www.openscdp.org
                 http://www.smartcard-hsm.com


-- 

    ---------    CardContact Software & System Consulting
   |.##> <##.|   Andreas Schwier
   |#       #|   Schülerweg 38
   |#       #|   32429 Minden, Germany
   |'##> <##'|   Phone +49 571 56149
    ---------    http://www.cardcontact.de
                 http://www.tscons.de
                 http://www.openscdp.org
                 http://www.smartcard-hsm.com

[Opensc-devel] Nitrokey HSM - Details of DKEK/key-wrapping algorithm, or key import

[Evan A. <EAn...@we...>]

I recently acquired a Nitrokey HSM for testing for one of my Customers. The 
feature-set of the SmartCard-HSM software appears to be quite good and a 
nearly perfect fit for my Customer's needs.

My Customer will be signing firmware for a series of embedded control 
devices w/ RSA keys. These devices have a planned 15-20 year lifetime in the 
field/market (embedded devices attached to very large, very expensive pieces 
of machinery with long service lifetimes). Losing access to the firmware 
signing key during the device's supported lifetime would be quite bad 
(physically recalling the devices and replacing secure SoC devices w/ public 
keys stored in on-chip fuse-protected bootloader flash).

While the built-in key backup/restore functionality in SmartCard-HSM looks 
quite good, I'm concerned that without details of the 
key-wrapping/unwrapping algorithm my Customer could find themselves, in the 
future, in a situation where SmartCard-HSM is no longer available for 
purchase. I am reticent to simply recommend assuming that the Customer 
purchase extra devices to hold in storage and hope that they will remain 
functional for 10+ years. My Customer is already accustomed to supporting 
devices in the field w/ 15+ year lifetimes, so this concern is a very real 
one to them.

Are there details of the DKEK key-wrapping/unwrapping algorithm available 
(under NDA and/or for a fee, if necessary) that would enable my Customer to 
have confidence that, even if the SmartCard-HSM product were discontinued 
and no longer available, they would be able to bring the DKEK shares and 
key-backup together to reconstruct their key to load into some new device?

As an alternative to understanding the DKEK key-wrapping/unwrapping 
algorithm, is there functionality to import an externally-generated key into 
the SmartCard-HSM product? I see a reference here 
<http://www.smartcard-hsm.com/features.html#keyimport> but I've reviewed all 
the materials I can find publicly, and on the CardContact Developer Network 
website, and I am not finding any examples or documentation showing how to 
perform this import. On this mailing list, as recently as October 2015 
(under the thread "Cannot delete imported private key from SmartCard-HSM") I 
am seeing statements that make me think that this import functionality may 
have difficulties.

Thank you,
Evan Anderson
Wellbury LLC
Troy, OH, US

Re: [Opensc-devel] smart card reset after 5 seconds on Windows

[Vincent Le T. <vin...@my...>]

Long apdu are still been performed but that will be a problem with pin pad
sessions.
The workaround for minidriver are called session pin.
You get one with a pin pad then use this session pin for further
authentication

I do not know a card / minidriver which supports it (gemalto Id prime
included)

Vincent

Le lundi 14 décembre 2015, Martin Paljak <ma...@ma...> a écrit :

> On 14/12/15 10:37, Ludovic Rousseau wrote:
> > I looks like Microsoft added an undocumented registry key to change the 5
> > seconds delay.
> >
> > Key CardDisconnectPowerDownDelay in
> > HK_local_machine\software\microsoft\cryptography\calais
> > The value defines the delay in seconds.
> >
> > It also looks like this feature is also present in Windows 7 but with a
> 30
> > seconds delay.
>
>
> Wow, this is funny (not encountered yet) but basically this means that
> generating longer keys (sometimes takes minute(s)) is not possible
> without hacks on Windows, inside a card transaction ?
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> _______________________________________________
> Opensc-devel mailing list
> Ope...@li... <javascript:;>
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel
>


-- 
--
Vincent Le Toux

My Smart Logon
www.mysmartlogon.com

Re: [Opensc-devel] smart card reset after 5 seconds on Windows

[Martin P. <ma...@ma...>]

On 14/12/15 10:37, Ludovic Rousseau wrote:
> I looks like Microsoft added an undocumented registry key to change the 5
> seconds delay.
> 
> Key CardDisconnectPowerDownDelay in
> HK_local_machine\software\microsoft\cryptography\calais
> The value defines the delay in seconds.
> 
> It also looks like this feature is also present in Windows 7 but with a 30
> seconds delay.


Wow, this is funny (not encountered yet) but basically this means that
generating longer keys (sometimes takes minute(s)) is not possible
without hacks on Windows, inside a card transaction ?

Re: [Opensc-devel] smart card reset after 5 seconds on Windows

[Ludovic R. <lud...@gm...>]

Hello,

I looks like Microsoft added an undocumented registry key to change the 5
seconds delay.

Key CardDisconnectPowerDownDelay in
HK_local_machine\software\microsoft\cryptography\calais
The value defines the delay in seconds.

It also looks like this feature is also present in Windows 7 but with a 30
seconds delay.

This is all untested by me. I am not a Windows user.
I think we have Windows experts here that can confirm the use of this
registry key.

I don't know why Microsoft decided to to that. Maybe that is a good idea
after all.

Regards,

2015-12-13 22:18 GMT+01:00 Douglas E Engert <dee...@gm...>:

> Sounds like a call to SCardStatus resets the 5 second timer.  Could a
> thread be added with a 2 second timer to  to keep the transaction  alive?
> May not help with debugging.
>
>
>
>
> On 12/13/2015 12:42 PM, Jaroslav Imrich wrote:
>
> As a result there are also commercial middleware solutions available out
> there which display their own PIN dialog during the signing operation and
> you need to enter your PIN in less then 5 seconds otherwise signing
> operation fails :)
>
> Regards, Jaroslav
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 7:09 PM, Vincent Le Toux <
> <vin...@my...>vin...@my...> wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> I just want to share something on which I've lost my day before finding
>> this:
>> Since Windows 10 (8?) the card is reset if a smart card transaction is
>> inactive for 5 seconds.
>>
>> Quote: "If a transaction is held on the card for more than five seconds
>> with no operations happening on that card, then the card is reset. Calling
>> any of the Smart Card and Reader Access Functions or Direct Card Access
>> Functions on the card that is transacted results in the timer being reset
>> to continue allowing the transaction to be used."
>> source:
>> https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa379469%28v=vs.85%29.aspx
>>
>> This timeout was not active on Windows 7.
>> Not easy to attach a debugger to debug OpenSC with that  ...
>>
>> regards,
>> --
>> --
>> Vincent Le Toux
>>
>> My Smart Logon
>> www.mysmartlogon.com
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Opensc-devel mailing list
>> Ope...@li...
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel
>>
>>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Opensc-devel mailing lis...@li...://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel
>
>
> --
>
>  Douglas E. Engert  <DEE...@gm...> <DEE...@gm...>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Opensc-devel mailing list
> Ope...@li...
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel
>
>


-- 
 Dr. Ludovic Rousseau

Re: [Opensc-devel] smart card reset after 5 seconds on Windows

[Douglas E E. <dee...@gm...>]

<html>
  <head>
    <meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
      http-equiv="Content-Type">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    Sounds like a call to SCardStatus resets the 5 second timer.  Could
    a thread be added with a 2 second timer to  to keep the transaction 
    alive?  May not help with debugging.<br>
      <br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 12/13/2015 12:42 PM, Jaroslav Imrich
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CAB6OCMvhWWCNy2=QjZ...@ma..."
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr">As a result there are also commercial middleware
        solutions available out there which display their own PIN dialog
        during the signing operation and you need to enter your PIN in
        less then 5 seconds otherwise signing operation fails :)<br>
        <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
        </div>
        <div class="gmail_extra">Regards, Jaroslav<br>
          <br>
        </div>
        <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
          <div class="gmail_quote">On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 7:09 PM,
            Vincent Le Toux <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a
                moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="mailto:vin...@my..."
                target="_blank"><a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:vin...@my...">vin...@my...</a></a>&gt;</span>
            wrote:<br>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
              .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
              <div dir="ltr">
                <div>
                  <div>
                    <div>Hi,<br>
                      <br>
                    </div>
                    I just want to share something on which I've lost my
                    day before finding this:<br>
                  </div>
                  Since Windows 10 (8?) the card is reset if a smart
                  card transaction is inactive for 5 seconds.<br>
                  <br>
                </div>
                Quote: "If a transaction is held on the card for more
                than five seconds with no operations happening on that
                card, then the card is reset. Calling any of the Smart
                Card and Reader Access Functions or Direct Card Access
                Functions on the card that is transacted results in the
                timer being reset to continue allowing the transaction
                to be used."
                <div>
                  <div>
                    <div>
                      <div>
                        <div>source: <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa379469%28v=vs.85%29.aspx"
                            target="_blank">https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa379469%28v=vs.85%29.aspx</a><br>
                          <br>
                        </div>
                        <div>This timeout was not active on Windows 7.<br>
                        </div>
                        <div>Not easy to attach a debugger to debug
                          OpenSC with that  ...<br>
                        </div>
                        <div><br>
                        </div>
                        <div>regards,<span class="HOEnZb"><font
                              color="#888888"><br>
                              -- <br>
                            </font></span></div>
                        <span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">
                            <div>
                              <div>--<br>
                                Vincent Le Toux<br>
                                <br>
                                My Smart Logon<br>
                                <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                                  href="http://www.mysmartlogon.com/"
                                  target="_blank">www.mysmartlogon.com</a></div>
                            </div>
                          </font></span></div>
                    </div>
                  </div>
                </div>
              </div>
              <br>
------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
              <br>
              _______________________________________________<br>
              Opensc-devel mailing list<br>
              <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="mailto:Ope...@li...">Ope...@li...</a><br>
              <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel"
                rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel</a><br>
              <br>
            </blockquote>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">------------------------------------------------------------------------------
</pre>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
Opensc-devel mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Ope...@li...">Ope...@li...</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel">https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    <pre class="moz-signature" cols="200">-- 

 Douglas E. Engert  <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:DEE...@gm...">&lt;DEE...@gm...&gt;</a>
 
</pre>
  </body>
</html>

Re: [Opensc-devel] smart card reset after 5 seconds on Windows

[Jaroslav I. <jar...@gm...>]

As a result there are also commercial middleware solutions available out
there which display their own PIN dialog during the signing operation and
you need to enter your PIN in less then 5 seconds otherwise signing
operation fails :)

Regards, Jaroslav


On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 7:09 PM, Vincent Le Toux <
vin...@my...> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> I just want to share something on which I've lost my day before finding
> this:
> Since Windows 10 (8?) the card is reset if a smart card transaction is
> inactive for 5 seconds.
>
> Quote: "If a transaction is held on the card for more than five seconds
> with no operations happening on that card, then the card is reset. Calling
> any of the Smart Card and Reader Access Functions or Direct Card Access
> Functions on the card that is transacted results in the timer being reset
> to continue allowing the transaction to be used."
> source:
> https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa379469%28v=vs.85%29.aspx
>
> This timeout was not active on Windows 7.
> Not easy to attach a debugger to debug OpenSC with that  ...
>
> regards,
> --
> --
> Vincent Le Toux
>
> My Smart Logon
> www.mysmartlogon.com
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
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[Opensc-devel] smart card reset after 5 seconds on Windows

[Vincent Le T. <vin...@my...>]

Hi,

I just want to share something on which I've lost my day before finding
this:
Since Windows 10 (8?) the card is reset if a smart card transaction is
inactive for 5 seconds.

Quote: "If a transaction is held on the card for more than five seconds
with no operations happening on that card, then the card is reset. Calling
any of the Smart Card and Reader Access Functions or Direct Card Access
Functions on the card that is transacted results in the timer being reset
to continue allowing the transaction to be used."
source:
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa379469%28v=vs.85%29.aspx

This timeout was not active on Windows 7.
Not easy to attach a debugger to debug OpenSC with that  ...

regards,
-- 
--
Vincent Le Toux

My Smart Logon
www.mysmartlogon.com

Re: [Opensc-devel] Example to write signed CHUID?

[Ryan C. <ry...@rc...>]

Thanks for the pointers Douglas.  You were right--the size of the CHUID object was incorrect (53 <length> xx xx xx). I was able to use the function you suggested in PIVDataTempl.java to encode the signed CHUID and then use piv-tool to load it successfully.


On Dec 7, 2015, at 10:44 AM, Douglas E Engert <dee...@gm...> wrote:

> looking at keysupport/nist80073/datamodel/PIVCardHolderUniqueID.java 
> it looks like getEncoded() 
> does an encode(). 
> 
> Bit the encode()  line 203 does:
>    this.chuid = baos.toByteArray();
> 
> but this does not have the PIV_DATA  TLV that   piv-tool is expecting. 
> 
> ./nist80073/cardedge/PIVDataTempl.java encode will add this:
> 
> 111                         TLV _data = BERTLVFactory.encodeTLV(new Tag(Tag.PIV_DATA), this.data);
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/7/2015 1:42 AM, Ryan Chapman wrote:
>> Hi,
>> 
>> I'm trying to get an asymmetric CHUID signature on a PIV card, in this case a Yubikey NEO.  The FIPS 201 standard requires it, but yubkey-piv-tool only supports writing a random chuid to the card.
>> The basic question is... does someone have an example program that, given a signing certificate and associated private key, can write the asymmetric key to a PIV card??
>> 
>> I'm close, but am stuck on long CHUIDs.  I can write a short length one successfully, but the longer one required for the asymmetric key is failing.
>> 
>> Now a little more detail on what I've got so far, if anyone cares...
>> I've using the piv-tool program to write a short CHUID like so:
>> 
>> # Check current CHUID
>> $ piv-tool -A A:9B:03 -s "00:CB:3F:FF:05:5C:03:5F:C1:02:00"
>> Using reader with a card: Yubico Yubikey NEO CCID
>> Sending: 00 CB 3F FF 05 5C 03 5F C1 02 00
>> Received (SW1=0x90, SW2=0x00):
>> 53 3B 30 19 D4 E7 39 DA 73 9C ED 39 CE 73 9D 83 S;0...9.s..9.s..
>> 68 58 21 08 42 10 84 21 38 42 10 C3 F5 34 10 78 hX!.B..!8B...4.x
>> E1 97 B4 5A CA C0 1A 82 64 63 A9 92 3B 56 26 35 ...Z....dc..;V&5
>> 08 32 30 33 30 30 31 30 31 3E 00 FE 00          .20300101>...
>> 
>> # Write desired CHUID to file 'chuid'
>> $ X="53:3B:30:19:D4:E7:39:DA:73:9C:ED:39:CE:73:9D:83:68:58:21:08:42:10:84:21:38:42:10:C3:F5:34:10:37:6F:92:E6:EA:92:65:85:0B:AB:D6:9D:73:8B:15:F0:35:08:32:30:33:30:30:31:30:31:3E:00:FE:00"
>> 
>> $ (OLDIFS=$IFS; IFS=:; for x in $X; do echo 0x$x | awk '{printf "%c", $1}'; done; IFS=$OLDIFS ) > chuid
>> 
>> # Write chuid file to the Yubikey
>> $ piv-tool -A A:9B:03 -O 3000 -i chuid
>> Using reader with a card: Yubico Yubikey NEO CCID
>> 
>> # Verify it worked... appears to have worked
>> $ piv-tool -A A:9B:03 -s "00:CB:3F:FF:05:5C:03:5F:C1:02:00"
>> Using reader with a card: Yubico Yubikey NEO CCID
>> Sending: 00 CB 3F FF 05 5C 03 5F C1 02 00
>> Received (SW1=0x90, SW2=0x00):
>> 53 3B 30 19 D4 E7 39 DA 73 9C ED 39 CE 73 9D 83 S;0...9.s..9.s..
>> 68 58 21 08 42 10 84 21 38 42 10 C3 F5 34 10 37 hX!.B..!8B...4.7
>> 6F 92 E6 EA 92 65 85 0B AB D6 9D 73 8B 15 F0 35 o....e.....s...5
>> 08 32 30 33 30 30 31 30 31 3E 00 FE 00          .20300101>...
>> 
>> TLV '3E' is where the asymmetric signature goes.  Above, look at the last four bytes '3E 00 FE 00'; the '3E 00' signifies a null asymmetric signature.
>> 
>> I loaded my cert authority's pub/private keypair in the java keystore, then used the library at https://code.google.com/p/keysupport-java-api/ to generate the CHUID signature, which ends up being 2077 (0x81D) bytes, a little strange, but ok.
>> 
>> I then try the same thing as before, but encode the '3E' TLV as such:
>> 3E 82 08 1D .. .. <total of 2077 bytes for CHUID asymmetric signature payload> .. ..
>> 82 08 1D is BER-TLV to indicate 2077 bytes
>> 
>> What ended up in the 'chuid' file:
>> 53 3b 30 19 d4 e7 39 da 73 9c ed 39 ce 73 9d 83 68 58 21 08 42 10 84 21 38 42 10 c3 f5 34 10 05 9b 23 97 21 6e ee b0 2d b8 d6 01 0a 69 99 3c 35 08 32 30 33 30 30 31 30 31 3e 82 08 1d ..           .. <2077 bytes for asymm signature> .. .. fe 00
>> 
>> When I attempt to write the 'chuid' file using piv-tools, I get this error:
>> 
>> $ piv-tool -A A:9B:03 -O 3000 -i chuid
>> Using reader with a card: Yubico Yubikey NEO CCID
>> object tag or length not valid
>> 
>> I'm hoping I missed something elementary.  Any ideas?
>> 
>> Thanks
>> 
>> Ryan
>> 
>> 
>> 
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> 
> -- 
> 
>  Douglas E. Engert  <DEE...@gm...>
>  
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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