Re: [kvm-devel] Ways to exit from kvm on behalf of the quest system?

[Dimitry G. <gol...@gm...>]

Daniel,

On 8/1/07, Daniel P. Berrange <ber...@re...> wrote:

> Unless you whitelist which monitor commands it can run this would be a
> significant security hole.  eg a guest could run
>
>   'usb_add disk /some/path'
>
> To get access to arbitrary files & disks from the host.
>

If we assume that kvm runs under root, yes (and if kvm finds out it
runs under root, it might disable such access to monitor). I have
written a suid wrapper (very simple) that does whatever necessary
under root, and then drops to user privileges, then execs kvm, so
these actions will be limited by Linux multi-user mechanisms as usual.
In my daily practice, I run kvm under my user privileges, and it works
fine.

See the kvmadm project (link on the kvm wiki page "Management tools").

-- 
Dimitry Golubovsky

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