Re: [Blocks-development] Avoiding malicious content-dilution through PKI encryption

[Erik M. <mo...@sc...>]

On 30 Jul 2000, at 22:39, Michael Spencer Jr. wrote:

Sorry for the duplicates, Michael. The list doesn't seem to use the 
"Reply-To" field so I had to select the recipient manually.

> On #blocks in EFnet we were talking about what happens when a file 
is
> routed across another node -- it seems once all of the blocks pass
> through an intermediate server, that intermediate server then knows 
it
> has a copy of the file, and advertises that copy as well.
> 
> The only problem with this is...if I search for * and find
> questionable content in my own cache, legally it should be my
> responsibility to leave and rejoin the network to remove that 
content
> from my server, since I can directly see that my own cache is
> providing the content.

[...]

> In the change I'm proposing...suppose my client keeps the blocks
> cached, but doesn't advertise the completed file.  Once the download
> is complete, other clients only see search results with routing
> entries AF, but the data comes directly from me.  Suppose the leaf
> node disconnects...now routing entry F on my client is invalid. 
> However, the file is still known to the rest of the network as on AF
> (for example).  If a client again tries to download AF, ideally
> instead of returning that the route is no-longer valid, my client
> should return the cached blocks, not revealing the fact that my 
node F
> has disconnected.
> 
> Wait a minute...there seems to be a hole in my logic somewhere.  Can
> someone help me find it?

Doesn't that make the originator of information easier to find? I 
would only have to know which IP number is "F" and then I could call 
the FBI.

Regards,
Erik Moeller
-- 
Scientific Reviewer, Freelancer, Humanist -- Berlin/Germany
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