ipsec-tools-devel — Development discussion of IPsec Tools

Re: [Ipsec-tools-devel] shoule racoon use prot [500] and [4500] exclusively?

[Reinoud K. <rei...@gm...>]

Hi Guyue,

Purely looking from a port standpoint, no. It can be any other port you're
listening on as long as the connecting site can be configured to connect on
a different port as well. Thanks,

Reinoud.

On Wed, Nov 6, 2019, 7:56 AM guyue huang <hhh...@gm...> wrote:

> Dear experts,
>
> I really need some help from you guys since I met an issue when set up a
> VPN with an Android phone, log showed that some other application use the
> port[500] and [4500] which prevent racoon from setting up turnel.
>
> Here is my question: should racoon use prot [500] and [4500]  exclusively
> for any security concern so that it can share the ports with any other
> applications?
>
> Thanks,
> Frank
> _______________________________________________
> Ipsec-tools-devel mailing list
> Ips...@li...
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/ipsec-tools-devel
>

[Ipsec-tools-devel] shoule racoon use prot [500] and [4500] exclusively?

[guyue h. <hhh...@gm...>]

Dear experts,

I really need some help from you guys since I met an issue when set up a
VPN with an Android phone, log showed that some other application use the
port[500] and [4500] which prevent racoon from setting up turnel.

Here is my question: should racoon use prot [500] and [4500]  exclusively
for any security concern so that it can share the ports with any other
applications?

Thanks,
Frank

Re: [Ipsec-tools-devel] Patch for hmac-sha256 with 128 bits support

[Reinoud K. <rei...@gm...>]

I did post a patch for this in 2015. It requires changes in Racoon , but
also in your kernel. The patch never went in  ipsec-tools. Racoon isn't
really maintained anymore. Thanks,

Reinoud.

On Thu, Mar 14, 2019, 3:19 AM Bartłomiej Krawczyk <ba...@kr...>
wrote:

> I have a similar issue as described in bug report #75 with Debian stable
> (using racoon) and Mikrotik. StrongSwan works fine with HMAC SHA256 but
> racoon fails to pass traffic properly.
> See Debian bug https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=877721
>
> Was this patch included?
> --
> Bartłomiej Krawczyk
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Ipsec-tools-devel mailing list
> Ips...@li...
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/ipsec-tools-devel
>

Re: [Ipsec-tools-devel] Patch for hmac-sha256 with 128 bits support

[Bartłomiej K. <ba...@kr...>]

I have a similar issue as described in bug report #75 with Debian stable (using racoon) and Mikrotik. StrongSwan works fine with HMAC SHA256 but racoon fails to pass traffic properly.
See Debian bug https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=877721

Was this patch included?
-- 
Bartłomiej Krawczyk

[Ipsec-tools-devel] Reg: Unable to find racoon service in /etc/init.d

[Kanniganti K. <kan...@tc...>]

Hi,

We are using ipsec-tools-0.8.0-19.3.1.x86_64 version in SLES 12 SP4 OS.

We are unable to find racoon service in /etc/init.d after the installation 
of ipsec rpm.

Unable to find libipsec library as well.May i know the issue is with 
ipsectools and the rpm is  unable to create the racoon service in 
SLES12SP4.

Thanks and Regards,
Kalyani.k
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[Ipsec-tools-devel] Problem about porting ipsec-tools setkey utility on Android8.1

[Cai, X. (X.) <xc...@yf...>]

Dear All,
                Excuse me.
                I am  porting the ipsec-tools on Android 8.1 system. Because Android only support racoon utility, not support setkey utility. But, unfortunately, I always meet issues when adding esp SAD (add ah SAD is ok). The error message is below . I am reading source code, but still cannot understand what is the root cause.
                Could you please give me any guide?
                Thank you very much !



                The result of line 22: (null).
The result of line 23: (null).


Thanks & Best Regards
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Cai Xiaodong (蔡小冬）
Tel: (86-21) 33323361
Email: xc...@yf...<mailto:xc...@yf...>

Re: [Ipsec-tools-devel] problem with building IPSec-android on Android Studio

[Han L. <heh...@gm...>]

May I ask for the android-file-dialog for building the ipsec tool by any
chance?

Sorry maybe I shouldn't ask for that.
Thank you for your time,

Best regards,
Lin


Han Lin <heh...@gm...> 于2018年9月28日周五 下午5:12写道：

> Hi,
>
> I'm having troubles to build this IPSec-android on my Android Studio. I
> didn't see gradle file. I'm wondering would you be able to help me to set
> it up? Sending me more detailed instructions about this project?
>
>
> I appreciate for your help
> Best regards,
> Lin
>

Re: [Ipsec-tools-devel] [PATCH v2 1/1] ipsec-tools: add openssl 1.1 support

[Eneas U. de Q. <cot...@ya...>]

 Any news regarding this patch?  I'd love to get some feedback.
Cheers,
Eneas

    Em quarta-feira, 30 de maio de 2018 16:28:02 BRT, Eneas U de Queiroz <cot...@ya...> escreveu:  
 
 This patch updates the calls to openssl 1.1 API, and adds a
compatibility layer so it compiles with (at least) openssl 1.0.2, I
haven't tested it with lower versions, but all that's needed is to edit
the openssl_compat.* files and add the missing functions there--they're
usually trivial.

Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cot...@ya...>
---
 src/racoon/Makefile.am      |  10 +--
 src/racoon/algorithm.c      |  6 +-
 src/racoon/cfparse.y        |  2 +-
 src/racoon/crypto_openssl.c | 197 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 src/racoon/crypto_openssl.h |  2 +-
 src/racoon/eaytest.c        |  7 +-
 src/racoon/ipsec_doi.c      |  2 +-
 src/racoon/openssl_compat.c | 213 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 src/racoon/openssl_compat.h |  45 ++++++++++
 src/racoon/plainrsa-gen.c  |  41 +++++----
 src/racoon/prsa_par.y      |  28 ++++--
 src/racoon/rsalist.c        |  5 +-
 12 files changed, 431 insertions(+), 127 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 src/racoon/openssl_compat.c
 create mode 100644 src/racoon/openssl_compat.h

diff --git a/src/racoon/Makefile.am b/src/racoon/Makefile.am
index dbaded9..4c585f3 100644
--- a/src/racoon/Makefile.am
+++ b/src/racoon/Makefile.am
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ sbin_PROGRAMS = racoon racoonctl plainrsa-gen
 noinst_PROGRAMS = eaytest
 include_racoon_HEADERS = racoonctl.h var.h vmbuf.h misc.h gcmalloc.h admin.h \
     schedule.h sockmisc.h isakmp_var.h isakmp.h isakmp_xauth.h \
-    isakmp_cfg.h isakmp_unity.h ipsec_doi.h evt.h
+    isakmp_cfg.h isakmp_unity.h ipsec_doi.h evt.h openssl_compat.h
 lib_LTLIBRARIES = libracoon.la
 
 adminsockdir=${localstatedir}/racoon
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ racoon_SOURCES = \
     gssapi.c dnssec.c getcertsbyname.c privsep.c \
     pfkey.c admin.c evt.c ipsec_doi.c oakley.c grabmyaddr.c vendorid.c \
     policy.c localconf.c remoteconf.c crypto_openssl.c algorithm.c \
-    proposal.c sainfo.c strnames.c \
+    openssl_compat.c proposal.c sainfo.c strnames.c \
     plog.c logger.c schedule.c str2val.c \
     safefile.c backupsa.c genlist.c rsalist.c \
     cftoken.l cfparse.y prsa_tok.l prsa_par.y 
@@ -51,12 +51,12 @@ libracoon_la_SOURCES = kmpstat.c vmbuf.c sockmisc.c misc.c
 libracoon_la_CFLAGS = -DNOUSE_PRIVSEP $(AM_CFLAGS)
 
 plainrsa_gen_SOURCES = plainrsa-gen.c plog.c \
-    crypto_openssl.c logger.c 
+    crypto_openssl.c logger.c openssl_compat.c
 EXTRA_plainrsa_gen_SOURCES = $(MISSING_ALGOS)
 plainrsa_gen_LDADD = $(CRYPTOBJS) vmbuf.o misc.o
 plainrsa_gen_DEPENDENCIES = $(CRYPTOBJS) vmbuf.o misc.o
 
-eaytest_SOURCES = eaytest.c plog.c logger.c
+eaytest_SOURCES = eaytest.c plog.c logger.c openssl_compat.c
 EXTRA_eaytest_SOURCES = missing/crypto/sha2/sha2.c
 eaytest_LDADD =    crypto_openssl_test.o vmbuf.o str2val.o misc_noplog.o \
     $(CRYPTOBJS)
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ noinst_HEADERS = \
     debugrm.h        isakmp.h      misc.h          sainfo.h \
     dhgroup.h        isakmp_agg.h  netdb_dnssec.h  schedule.h \
     isakmp_cfg.h      isakmp_xauth.h isakmp_unity.h isakmp_frag.h \
-    throttle.h      privsep.h \
+    throttle.h      privsep.h    openssl_compat.h \
     cfparse_proto.h      cftoken_proto.h genlist.h    rsalist.h \
     missing/crypto/sha2/sha2.h missing/crypto/rijndael/rijndael_local.h \
     missing/crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.h \
diff --git a/src/racoon/algorithm.c b/src/racoon/algorithm.c
index 3fd50f6..66c874b 100644
--- a/src/racoon/algorithm.c
+++ b/src/racoon/algorithm.c
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static struct enc_algorithm oakley_encdef[] = {
 { "aes",    algtype_aes,    OAKLEY_ATTR_ENC_ALG_AES,    16,
         eay_aes_encrypt,    eay_aes_decrypt,
         eay_aes_weakkey,    eay_aes_keylen, },
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA)
 { "camellia",    algtype_camellia,    OAKLEY_ATTR_ENC_ALG_CAMELLIA,    16,
         eay_camellia_encrypt,    eay_camellia_decrypt,
         eay_camellia_weakkey,    eay_camellia_keylen, },
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static struct enc_algorithm ipsec_encdef[] = {
 { "twofish",    algtype_twofish,    IPSECDOI_ESP_TWOFISH,        16,
         NULL,            NULL,
         NULL,            eay_twofish_keylen, },
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_IDEA)
 { "3idea",    algtype_3idea,        IPSECDOI_ESP_3IDEA,        8,
         NULL,            NULL,
         NULL,            NULL, },
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static struct enc_algorithm ipsec_encdef[] = {
 { "rc4",    algtype_rc4,        IPSECDOI_ESP_RC4,        8,
         NULL,            NULL,
         NULL,            NULL, },
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA)
 { "camellia",    algtype_camellia,    IPSECDOI_ESP_CAMELLIA,        16,
         NULL,            NULL,
         NULL,            eay_camellia_keylen, },
diff --git a/src/racoon/cfparse.y b/src/racoon/cfparse.y
index 0d9bd67..8415752 100644
--- a/src/racoon/cfparse.y
+++ b/src/racoon/cfparse.y
@@ -2564,7 +2564,7 @@ set_isakmp_proposal(rmconf)
         plog(LLV_DEBUG2, LOCATION, NULL,
             "encklen=%d\n", s->encklen);
 
-        memset(types, 0, ARRAYLEN(types));
+        memset(types, 0, sizeof types);
         types[algclass_isakmp_enc] = s->algclass[algclass_isakmp_enc];
         types[algclass_isakmp_hash] = s->algclass[algclass_isakmp_hash];
         types[algclass_isakmp_dh] = s->algclass[algclass_isakmp_dh];
diff --git a/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.c b/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.c
index 55b076a..8fb358f 100644
--- a/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.c
+++ b/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.c
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@
 #endif
 #endif
 #include "plog.h"
+#include "openssl_compat.h"
 
 #define USE_NEW_DES_API
 
@@ -316,9 +317,12 @@ eay_cmp_asn1dn(n1, n2)
             i = idx+1;
             goto end;
         }
-        if ((ea->value->length == 1 && ea->value->data[0] == '*') ||
-            (eb->value->length == 1 && eb->value->data[0] == '*')) {
-                if (OBJ_cmp(ea->object,eb->object)) {
+        ASN1_STRING *sa = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ea);
+        ASN1_STRING *sb = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(eb);
+        if ((ASN1_STRING_length(sa) == 1 && ASN1_STRING_get0_data(sa)[0] == '*') ||
+            (ASN1_STRING_length(sb) == 1 && ASN1_STRING_get0_data(sb)[0] == '*')) {
+                if (OBJ_cmp(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(ea),
+                    X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(eb))) {
                 i = idx+1;
                 goto end;
                 }
@@ -430,7 +434,7 @@ cb_check_cert_local(ok, ctx)
 
     if (!ok) {
         X509_NAME_oneline(
-                X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert),
+                X509_get_subject_name(X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx)),
                 buf,
                 256);
         /*
@@ -438,7 +442,8 @@ cb_check_cert_local(ok, ctx)
         * ok if they are self signed. But we should still warn
         * the user.
          */
-        switch (ctx->error) {
+        int ctx_error = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+        switch (ctx_error) {
         case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
         case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
         case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
@@ -453,9 +458,9 @@ cb_check_cert_local(ok, ctx)
         }
         plog(log_tag, LOCATION, NULL,
             "%s(%d) at depth:%d SubjectName:%s\n",
-            X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error),
-            ctx->error,
-            ctx->error_depth,
+            X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx_error),
+            ctx_error,
+            X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx),
             buf);
     }
     ERR_clear_error();
@@ -477,10 +482,11 @@ cb_check_cert_remote(ok, ctx)
 
     if (!ok) {
         X509_NAME_oneline(
-                X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert),
+                X509_get_subject_name(X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx)),
                 buf,
                 256);
-        switch (ctx->error) {
+        int ctx_error=X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+        switch (ctx_error) {
         case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
             ok = 1;
             log_tag = LLV_WARNING;
@@ -490,9 +496,9 @@ cb_check_cert_remote(ok, ctx)
         }
         plog(log_tag, LOCATION, NULL,
             "%s(%d) at depth:%d SubjectName:%s\n",
-            X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error),
-            ctx->error,
-            ctx->error_depth,
+            X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx_error),
+            ctx_error,
+            X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx),
             buf);
     }
     ERR_clear_error();
@@ -516,14 +522,15 @@ eay_get_x509asn1subjectname(cert)
     if (x509 == NULL)
         goto error;
 
+    X509_NAME *subject_name = X509_get_subject_name(x509);
     /* get the length of the name */
-    len = i2d_X509_NAME(x509->cert_info->subject, NULL);
+    len = i2d_X509_NAME(subject_name, NULL);
     name = vmalloc(len);
     if (!name)
         goto error;
     /* get the name */
     bp = (unsigned char *) name->v;
-    len = i2d_X509_NAME(x509->cert_info->subject, &bp);
+    len = i2d_X509_NAME(subject_name, &bp);
 
     X509_free(x509);
 
@@ -661,15 +668,16 @@ eay_get_x509asn1issuername(cert)
     if (x509 == NULL)
         goto error;
 
+    X509_NAME *issuer_name = X509_get_issuer_name(x509);
     /* get the length of the name */
-    len = i2d_X509_NAME(x509->cert_info->issuer, NULL);
+    len = i2d_X509_NAME(issuer_name, NULL);
     name = vmalloc(len);
     if (name == NULL)
         goto error;
 
     /* get the name */
     bp = (unsigned char *) name->v;
-    len = i2d_X509_NAME(x509->cert_info->issuer, &bp);
+    len = i2d_X509_NAME(issuer_name, &bp);
 
     X509_free(x509);
 
@@ -850,7 +858,7 @@ eay_check_x509sign(source, sig, cert)
         return -1;
     }
 
-    res = eay_rsa_verify(source, sig, evp->pkey.rsa);
+    res = eay_rsa_verify(source, sig, EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp));
 
     EVP_PKEY_free(evp);
     X509_free(x509);
@@ -992,7 +1000,7 @@ eay_get_x509sign(src, privkey)
     if (evp == NULL)
         return NULL;
 
-    sig = eay_rsa_sign(src, evp->pkey.rsa);
+    sig = eay_rsa_sign(src, EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp));
 
     EVP_PKEY_free(evp);
 
@@ -1079,7 +1087,11 @@ eay_strerror()
     int line, flags;
     unsigned long es;
 
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+    es = 0; /* even when allowed by OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, it is defined as 0 */
+#else
     es = CRYPTO_thread_id();
+#endif
 
     while ((l = ERR_get_error_line_data(&file, &line, &data, &flags)) != 0){
         n = snprintf(ebuf + len, sizeof(ebuf) - len,
@@ -1100,7 +1112,7 @@ vchar_t *
 evp_crypt(vchar_t *data, vchar_t *key, vchar_t *iv, const EVP_CIPHER *e, int enc)
 {
     vchar_t *res;
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
 
     if (!e)
         return NULL;
@@ -1111,7 +1123,7 @@ evp_crypt(vchar_t *data, vchar_t *key, vchar_t *iv, const EVP_CIPHER *e, int enc
     if ((res = vmalloc(data->l)) == NULL)
         return NULL;
 
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+    ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
 
     switch(EVP_CIPHER_nid(e)){
     case NID_bf_cbc:
@@ -1125,54 +1137,41 @@ evp_crypt(vchar_t *data, vchar_t *key, vchar_t *iv, const EVP_CIPHER *e, int enc
         /* XXX: can we do that also for algos with a fixed key size ?
         */
         /* init context without key/iv
-        */
-        if (!EVP_CipherInit(&ctx, e, NULL, NULL, enc))
-        {
-            OpenSSL_BUG();
-            vfree(res);
-            return NULL;
-        }
+                */
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx, e, NULL, NULL, enc))
+            goto out;
         
-        /* update key size
-        */
-        if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ctx, key->l))
-        {
-            OpenSSL_BUG();
-            vfree(res);
-            return NULL;
-        }
-
-        /* finalize context init with desired key size
-        */
-        if (!EVP_CipherInit(&ctx, NULL, (u_char *) key->v,
+        /* update key size
+        */
+        if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, key->l))
+            goto out;
+
+        /* finalize context init with desired key size
+        */
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx, NULL, (u_char *) key->v,
                             (u_char *) iv->v, enc))
-        {
-            OpenSSL_BUG();
-            vfree(res);
-            return NULL;
-        }
+            goto out;
         break;
     default:
-        if (!EVP_CipherInit(&ctx, e, (u_char *) key->v, 
-                            (u_char *) iv->v, enc)) {
-            OpenSSL_BUG();
-            vfree(res);
-            return NULL;
-        }
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx, e, (u_char *) key->v,
+                            (u_char *) iv->v, enc))
+                    goto out;
     }
 
     /* disable openssl padding */
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&ctx, 0); 
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
     
-    if (!EVP_Cipher(&ctx, (u_char *) res->v, (u_char *) data->v, data->l)) {
-        OpenSSL_BUG();
-        vfree(res);
-        return NULL;
-    }
+    if (!EVP_Cipher(ctx, (u_char *) res->v, (u_char *) data->v, data->l))
+        goto out;
 
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
 
     return res;
+out:
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+    OpenSSL_BUG();
+    vfree(res);
+    return NULL;
 }
 
 int
@@ -1230,7 +1229,7 @@ eay_des_keylen(len)
     return evp_keylen(len, EVP_des_cbc());
 }
 
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_IDEA)
 /*
  * IDEA-CBC
  */
@@ -1587,7 +1586,7 @@ eay_aes_keylen(len)
     return len;
 }
 
-#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H)
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA)
 /*
  * CAMELLIA-CBC
  */
@@ -1680,9 +1679,9 @@ eay_hmac_init(key, md)
     vchar_t *key;
     const EVP_MD *md;
 {
-    HMAC_CTX *c = racoon_malloc(sizeof(*c));
+    HMAC_CTX *c = HMAC_CTX_new();
 
-    HMAC_Init(c, key->v, key->l, md);
+    HMAC_Init_ex(c, key->v, key->l, md, NULL);
 
     return (caddr_t)c;
 }
@@ -1761,8 +1760,7 @@ eay_hmacsha2_512_final(c)
 
     HMAC_Final((HMAC_CTX *)c, (unsigned char *) res->v, &l);
     res->l = l;
-    HMAC_cleanup((HMAC_CTX *)c);
-    (void)racoon_free(c);
+    HMAC_CTX_free((HMAC_CTX *)c);
 
     if (SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH != res->l) {
         plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
@@ -1811,8 +1809,7 @@ eay_hmacsha2_384_final(c)
 
     HMAC_Final((HMAC_CTX *)c, (unsigned char *) res->v, &l);
     res->l = l;
-    HMAC_cleanup((HMAC_CTX *)c);
-    (void)racoon_free(c);
+    HMAC_CTX_free((HMAC_CTX *)c);
 
     if (SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH != res->l) {
         plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
@@ -1861,8 +1858,7 @@ eay_hmacsha2_256_final(c)
 
     HMAC_Final((HMAC_CTX *)c, (unsigned char *) res->v, &l);
     res->l = l;
-    HMAC_cleanup((HMAC_CTX *)c);
-    (void)racoon_free(c);
+    HMAC_CTX_free((HMAC_CTX *)c);
 
     if (SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH != res->l) {
         plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
@@ -1912,8 +1908,7 @@ eay_hmacsha1_final(c)
 
     HMAC_Final((HMAC_CTX *)c, (unsigned char *) res->v, &l);
     res->l = l;
-    HMAC_cleanup((HMAC_CTX *)c);
-    (void)racoon_free(c);
+    HMAC_CTX_free((HMAC_CTX *)c);
 
     if (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH != res->l) {
         plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
@@ -1962,8 +1957,7 @@ eay_hmacmd5_final(c)
 
     HMAC_Final((HMAC_CTX *)c, (unsigned char *) res->v, &l);
     res->l = l;
-    HMAC_cleanup((HMAC_CTX *)c);
-    (void)racoon_free(c);
+    HMAC_CTX_free((HMAC_CTX *)c);
 
     if (MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH != res->l) {
         plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
@@ -2266,6 +2260,7 @@ eay_dh_generate(prime, g, publen, pub, priv)
     u_int32_t g;
 {
     BIGNUM *p = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *BNg = NULL;
     DH *dh = NULL;
     int error = -1;
 
@@ -2276,25 +2271,28 @@ eay_dh_generate(prime, g, publen, pub, priv)
 
     if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
         goto end;
-    dh->p = p;
-    p = NULL;    /* p is now part of dh structure */
-    dh->g = NULL;
-    if ((dh->g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+    if ((BNg = BN_new()) == NULL)
         goto end;
-    if (!BN_set_word(dh->g, g))
+    if (!BN_set_word(BNg, g))
         goto end;
+    if (! DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, BNg))
+        goto end;
+    BNg = NULL;
+    p = NULL;    /* p is now part of dh structure */
 
     if (publen != 0)
-        dh->length = publen;
+        DH_set_length(dh, publen);
 
     /* generate public and private number */
     if (!DH_generate_key(dh))
         goto end;
 
     /* copy results to buffers */
-    if (eay_bn2v(pub, dh->pub_key) < 0)
+    BIGNUM *pub_key, *priv_key;
+    DH_get0_key(dh, (const BIGNUM**) &pub_key, (const BIGNUM**) &priv_key);
+    if (eay_bn2v(pub, pub_key) < 0)
         goto end;
-    if (eay_bn2v(priv, dh->priv_key) < 0) {
+    if (eay_bn2v(priv, priv_key) < 0) {
         vfree(*pub);
         goto end;
     }
@@ -2306,6 +2304,8 @@ end:
         DH_free(dh);
     if (p != 0)
         BN_free(p);
+    if (BNg != 0)
+        BN_free(BNg);
     return(error);
 }
 
@@ -2319,6 +2319,10 @@ eay_dh_compute(prime, g, pub, priv, pub2, key)
     int l;
     unsigned char *v = NULL;
     int error = -1;
+    BIGNUM *p = BN_new();
+    BIGNUM *BNg = BN_new();
+    BIGNUM *pub_key = BN_new();
+    BIGNUM *priv_key = BN_new();
 
     /* make public number to compute */
     if (eay_v2bn(&dh_pub, pub2) < 0)
@@ -2327,19 +2331,21 @@ eay_dh_compute(prime, g, pub, priv, pub2, key)
     /* make DH structure */
     if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
         goto end;
-    if (eay_v2bn(&dh->p, prime) < 0)
+    if (p == NULL || BNg == NULL || pub_key == NULL || priv_key == NULL)
         goto end;
-    if (eay_v2bn(&dh->pub_key, pub) < 0)
+
+    if (eay_v2bn(&p, prime) < 0)
         goto end;
-    if (eay_v2bn(&dh->priv_key, priv) < 0)
+    if (eay_v2bn(&pub_key, pub) < 0)
         goto end;
-    dh->length = pub2->l * 8;
-
-    dh->g = NULL;
-    if ((dh->g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+    if (eay_v2bn(&priv_key, priv) < 0)
         goto end;
-    if (!BN_set_word(dh->g, g))
+    if (!BN_set_word(BNg, g))
         goto end;
+    DH_set0_key(dh, pub_key, priv_key);
+    DH_set_length(dh, pub2->l * 8);
+    DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, BNg);
+    pub_key = priv_key = p = BNg = NULL;
 
     if ((v = racoon_calloc(prime->l, sizeof(u_char))) == NULL)
         goto end;
@@ -2350,6 +2356,14 @@ eay_dh_compute(prime, g, pub, priv, pub2, key)
     error = 0;
 
 end:
+    if (p != NULL)
+        BN_free(p);
+    if (BNg != NULL)
+        BN_free(BNg);
+    if (pub_key != NULL)
+        BN_free(pub_key);
+    if (priv_key != NULL)
+        BN_free(priv_key);
     if (dh_pub != NULL)
         BN_free(dh_pub);
     if (dh != NULL)
@@ -2400,12 +2414,14 @@ eay_bn2v(var, bn)
 void
 eay_init()
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
     OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
     ERR_load_crypto_strings();
 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
     ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
     ENGINE_register_all_complete();
 #endif
+#endif
 }
 
 vchar_t *
@@ -2504,8 +2520,7 @@ binbuf_pubkey2rsa(vchar_t *binbuf)
         goto out;
     }
     
-    rsa_pub->n = mod;
-    rsa_pub->e = exp;
+    RSA_set0_key(rsa_pub, mod, exp, NULL);
 
 out:
     return rsa_pub;
@@ -2582,5 +2597,5 @@ eay_random()
 const char *
 eay_version()
 {
-    return SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION);
+    return OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION);
 }
diff --git a/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.h b/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.h
index 66fac73..ee5b765 100644
--- a/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.h
+++ b/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.h
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ extern vchar_t *eay_aes_decrypt __P((vchar_t *, vchar_t *, vchar_t *));
 extern int eay_aes_weakkey __P((vchar_t *));
 extern int eay_aes_keylen __P((int));
 
-#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H)
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA)
 /* Camellia */
 extern vchar_t *eay_camellia_encrypt __P((vchar_t *, vchar_t *, vchar_t *));
 extern vchar_t *eay_camellia_decrypt __P((vchar_t *, vchar_t *, vchar_t *));
diff --git a/src/racoon/eaytest.c b/src/racoon/eaytest.c
index 1474bdc..ae09db3 100644
--- a/src/racoon/eaytest.c
+++ b/src/racoon/eaytest.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
 #include "dhgroup.h"
 #include "crypto_openssl.h"
 #include "gnuc.h"
+#include "openssl_compat.h"
 
 #include "package_version.h"
 
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ rsa_verify_with_pubkey(src, sig, pubkey_txt)
         printf ("PEM_read_PUBKEY(): %s\n", eay_strerror());
         return -1;
     }
-    error = eay_check_rsasign(src, sig, evp->pkey.rsa);
+    error = eay_check_rsasign(src, sig, EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp));
 
     return error;
 }
@@ -698,7 +699,7 @@ ciphertest(ac, av)
               eay_cast_encrypt, eay_cast_decrypt) < 0)
       return -1;
     
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_IDEA)
     if (ciphertest_1 ("IDEA",
               &data, 8,
               &key, key.l,
@@ -715,7 +716,7 @@ ciphertest(ac, av)
               eay_rc5_encrypt, eay_rc5_decrypt) < 0)
       return -1;
 #endif
-#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H)
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA)
     if (ciphertest_1 ("CAMELLIA",
               &data, 16,
               &key, key.l,
diff --git a/src/racoon/ipsec_doi.c b/src/racoon/ipsec_doi.c
index 84a4c71..b52469f 100644
--- a/src/racoon/ipsec_doi.c
+++ b/src/racoon/ipsec_doi.c
@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ out:
     /* key length must not be specified on some algorithms */
     if (keylen) {
         if (sa->enctype == OAKLEY_ATTR_ENC_ALG_DES
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_IDEA)
         || sa->enctype == OAKLEY_ATTR_ENC_ALG_IDEA
 #endif
         || sa->enctype == OAKLEY_ATTR_ENC_ALG_3DES) {
diff --git a/src/racoon/openssl_compat.c b/src/racoon/openssl_compat.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..864b5fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/racoon/openssl_compat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "openssl_compat.h"
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+static void *OPENSSL_zalloc(size_t num)
+{
+    void *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+
+    if (ret != NULL)
+        memset(ret, 0, num);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
+{
+    /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+    * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e.  d may be
+    * left NULL (in case only the public key is used).
+    */
+    if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL)
+        || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (n != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->n);
+        r->n = n;
+    }
+    if (e != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->e);
+        r->e = e;
+    }
+    if (d != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->d);
+        r->d = d;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q)
+{
+    /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+    * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+    */
+    if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+        || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (p != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->p);
+        r->p = p;
+    }
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->q);
+        r->q = q;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp)
+{
+    /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+    * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+    */
+    if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL)
+        || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL)
+        || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (dmp1 != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->dmp1);
+        r->dmp1 = dmp1;
+    }
+    if (dmq1 != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->dmq1);
+        r->dmq1 = dmq1;
+    }
+    if (iqmp != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->iqmp);
+        r->iqmp = iqmp;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
+                  const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
+{
+    if (n != NULL)
+        *n = r->n;
+    if (e != NULL)
+        *e = r->e;
+    if (d != NULL)
+        *d = r->d;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q)
+{
+    if (p != NULL)
+        *p = r->p;
+    if (q != NULL)
+        *q = r->q;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
+                        const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
+                        const BIGNUM **iqmp)
+{
+    if (dmp1 != NULL)
+        *dmp1 = r->dmp1;
+    if (dmq1 != NULL)
+        *dmq1 = r->dmq1;
+    if (iqmp != NULL)
+        *iqmp = r->iqmp;
+}
+
+int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
+{
+    /* If the fields p and g in d are NULL, the corresponding input
+    * parameters MUST be non-NULL.  q may remain NULL.
+    */
+    if ((dh->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+        || (dh->g == NULL && g == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (p != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->p);
+        dh->p = p;
+    }
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->q);
+        dh->q = q;
+    }
+    if (g != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->g);
+        dh->g = g;
+    }
+
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        dh->length = BN_num_bits(q);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key)
+{
+    if (pub_key != NULL)
+        *pub_key = dh->pub_key;
+    if (priv_key != NULL)
+        *priv_key = dh->priv_key;
+}
+
+int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key)
+{
+    /* If the field pub_key in dh is NULL, the corresponding input
+    * parameters MUST be non-NULL.  The priv_key field may
+    * be left NULL.
+    */
+    if (dh->pub_key == NULL && pub_key == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (pub_key != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->pub_key);
+        dh->pub_key = pub_key;
+    }
+    if (priv_key != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->priv_key);
+        dh->priv_key = priv_key;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length)
+{
+    dh->length = length;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void)
+{
+    return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX));
+}
+
+void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    HMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return pkey->pkey.rsa;
+}
+
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
diff --git a/src/racoon/openssl_compat.h b/src/racoon/openssl_compat.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e152c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/racoon/openssl_compat.h
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+#ifndef OPENSSL_COMPAT_H
+#define OPENSSL_COMPAT_H
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d);
+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q);
+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp);
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d);
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q);
+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, const BIGNUM **iqmp);
+
+int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
+void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key);
+int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
+int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length);
+
+HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void);
+void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX* ctx);
+
+RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+#define ASN1_STRING_length(s) s->length
+#define ASN1_STRING_get0_data(s) s->data
+
+#define X509_get_subject_name(x) x->cert_info->subject
+#define X509_get_issuer_name(x) x->cert_info->issuer
+#define X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(n) n->value
+#define X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(n) n->object
+#define X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx) ctx->current_cert
+#define X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx) ctx->error
+#define X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx) ctx->error_depth
+
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLEAY_VERSION
+#define OpenSSL_version SSLeay_version
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_COMPAT_H */
diff --git a/src/racoon/plainrsa-gen.c b/src/racoon/plainrsa-gen.c
index cad1861..b949b08 100644
--- a/src/racoon/plainrsa-gen.c
+++ b/src/racoon/plainrsa-gen.c
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
 #include "vmbuf.h"
 #include "plog.h"
 #include "crypto_openssl.h"
+#include "openssl_compat.h"
 
 #include "package_version.h"
 
@@ -90,12 +91,14 @@ mix_b64_pubkey(const RSA *key)
     char *binbuf;
     long binlen, ret;
     vchar_t *res;
-    
-    binlen = 1 + BN_num_bytes(key->e) + BN_num_bytes(key->n);
+    const BIGNUM *e, *n;
+
+    RSA_get0_key(key, &n, &e, NULL);
+    binlen = 1 + BN_num_bytes(e) + BN_num_bytes(n);
     binbuf = malloc(binlen);
     memset(binbuf, 0, binlen);
-    binbuf[0] = BN_bn2bin(key->e, (unsigned char *) &binbuf[1]);
-    ret = BN_bn2bin(key->n, (unsigned char *) (&binbuf[binbuf[0] + 1]));
+    binbuf[0] = BN_bn2bin(e, (unsigned char *) &binbuf[1]);
+    ret = BN_bn2bin(n, (unsigned char *) (&binbuf[binbuf[0] + 1]));
     if (1 + binbuf[0] + ret != binlen) {
         plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
             "Pubkey generation failed. This is really strange...\n");
@@ -131,16 +134,20 @@ print_rsa_key(FILE *fp, const RSA *key)
     
     fprintf(fp, "# : PUB 0s%s\n", pubkey64->v);
     fprintf(fp, ": RSA\t{\n");
-    fprintf(fp, "\t# RSA %d bits\n", BN_num_bits(key->n));
+    const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *p, *q, *dmp1, *dmq1, *iqmp;
+    RSA_get0_key(key, &n, &e, &d);
+    RSA_get0_factors(key, &p, &q);
+    RSA_get0_crt_params(key, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
+    fprintf(fp, "\t# RSA %d bits\n", BN_num_bits(n));
     fprintf(fp, "\t# pubkey=0s%s\n", pubkey64->v);
-    fprintf(fp, "\tModulus: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->n)));
-    fprintf(fp, "\tPublicExponent: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->e)));
-    fprintf(fp, "\tPrivateExponent: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->d)));
-    fprintf(fp, "\tPrime1: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->p)));
-    fprintf(fp, "\tPrime2: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->q)));
-    fprintf(fp, "\tExponent1: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->dmp1)));
-    fprintf(fp, "\tExponent2: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->dmq1)));
-    fprintf(fp, "\tCoefficient: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->iqmp)));
+    fprintf(fp, "\tModulus: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(n)));
+    fprintf(fp, "\tPublicExponent: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(e)));
+    fprintf(fp, "\tPrivateExponent: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(d)));
+    fprintf(fp, "\tPrime1: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(p)));
+    fprintf(fp, "\tPrime2: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(q)));
+    fprintf(fp, "\tExponent1: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(dmp1)));
+    fprintf(fp, "\tExponent2: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(dmq1)));
+    fprintf(fp, "\tCoefficient: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(iqmp)));
     fprintf(fp, "  }\n");
 
     vfree(pubkey64);
@@ -203,11 +210,13 @@ int
 gen_rsa_key(FILE *fp, size_t bits, unsigned long exp)
 {
     int ret;
-    RSA *key;
+    RSA *key = RSA_new();
+    BIGNUM *e = BN_new();
 
-    key = RSA_generate_key(bits, exp, NULL, NULL);
-    if (!key) {
+    BN_set_word(e, exp);
+    if (! RSA_generate_key_ex(key, bits, e, NULL)) {
         fprintf(stderr, "RSA_generate_key(): %s\n", eay_strerror());
+        RSA_free(key);
         return -1;
     }
     
diff --git a/src/racoon/prsa_par.y b/src/racoon/prsa_par.y
index 1987e4d..27ce4c6 100644
--- a/src/racoon/prsa_par.y
+++ b/src/racoon/prsa_par.y
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
 #include "isakmp_var.h"
 #include "handler.h"
 #include "crypto_openssl.h"
+#include "openssl_compat.h"
 #include "sockmisc.h"
 #include "rsalist.h"
 
@@ -85,7 +86,18 @@ char *prsa_cur_fname = NULL;
 struct genlist *prsa_cur_list = NULL;
 enum rsa_key_type prsa_cur_type = RSA_TYPE_ANY;
 
-static RSA *rsa_cur;
+struct my_rsa_st {
+    BIGNUM *n;
+    BIGNUM *e;
+    BIGNUM *d;
+    BIGNUM *p;
+    BIGNUM *q;
+    BIGNUM *dmp1;
+    BIGNUM *dmq1;
+    BIGNUM *iqmp;
+};
+
+static struct my_rsa_st *rsa_cur;
 
 void
 prsaerror(const char *s, ...)
@@ -201,8 +213,12 @@ rsa_statement:
                 rsa_cur->iqmp = NULL;
             }
         }
-        $$ = rsa_cur;
-        rsa_cur = RSA_new();
+        RSA * rsa_tmp = RSA_new();
+        RSA_set0_key(rsa_tmp, rsa_cur->n, rsa_cur->e, rsa_cur->d);
+        RSA_set0_factors(rsa_tmp, rsa_cur->p, rsa_cur->q);
+        RSA_set0_crt_params(rsa_tmp, rsa_cur->dmp1, rsa_cur->dmq1, rsa_cur->iqmp);
+        $$ = rsa_tmp;
+        memset(rsa_cur, 0, sizeof(struct my_rsa_st));
     }
     | TAG_PUB BASE64
     {
@@ -351,10 +367,12 @@ prsa_parse_file(struct genlist *list, char *fname, enum rsa_key_type type)
     prsa_cur_fname = fname;
     prsa_cur_list = list;
     prsa_cur_type = type;
-    rsa_cur = RSA_new();
+    rsa_cur = malloc(sizeof(struct my_rsa_st));
+    memset(rsa_cur, 0, sizeof(struct my_rsa_st));
     ret = prsaparse();
     if (rsa_cur) {
-        RSA_free(rsa_cur);
+        memset(rsa_cur, 0, sizeof(struct my_rsa_st));
+        free(rsa_cur);
         rsa_cur = NULL;
     }
     fclose (fp);
diff --git a/src/racoon/rsalist.c b/src/racoon/rsalist.c
index f152c82..96e8363 100644
--- a/src/racoon/rsalist.c
+++ b/src/racoon/rsalist.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
 #include "genlist.h"
 #include "remoteconf.h"
 #include "crypto_openssl.h"
+#include "openssl_compat.h"
 
 #ifndef LIST_FIRST
 #define LIST_FIRST(head)        ((head)->lh_first)
@@ -98,7 +99,9 @@ rsa_key_dup(struct rsa_key *key)
         return NULL;
 
     if (key->rsa) {
-        new->rsa = key->rsa->d != NULL ? RSAPrivateKey_dup(key->rsa) : RSAPublicKey_dup(key->rsa);
+        const BIGNUM *d;
+        RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
+        new->rsa = (d != NULL ? RSAPrivateKey_dup(key->rsa) : RSAPublicKey_dup(key->rsa));
         if (new->rsa == NULL)
             goto dup_error;
     }
-- 
2.16.1

  

[Ipsec-tools-devel] [PATCH v2 1/1] ipsec-tools: add openssl 1.1 support

[Eneas U de Q. <cot...@ya...>]

This patch updates the calls to openssl 1.1 API, and adds a
compatibility layer so it compiles with (at least) openssl 1.0.2, I
haven't tested it with lower versions, but all that's needed is to edit
the openssl_compat.* files and add the missing functions there--they're
usually trivial.

Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cot...@ya...>
---
 src/racoon/Makefile.am      |  10 +--
 src/racoon/algorithm.c      |   6 +-
 src/racoon/cfparse.y        |   2 +-
 src/racoon/crypto_openssl.c | 197 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 src/racoon/crypto_openssl.h |   2 +-
 src/racoon/eaytest.c        |   7 +-
 src/racoon/ipsec_doi.c      |   2 +-
 src/racoon/openssl_compat.c | 213 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 src/racoon/openssl_compat.h |  45 ++++++++++
 src/racoon/plainrsa-gen.c   |  41 +++++----
 src/racoon/prsa_par.y       |  28 ++++--
 src/racoon/rsalist.c        |   5 +-
 12 files changed, 431 insertions(+), 127 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 src/racoon/openssl_compat.c
 create mode 100644 src/racoon/openssl_compat.h

diff --git a/src/racoon/Makefile.am b/src/racoon/Makefile.am
index dbaded9..4c585f3 100644
--- a/src/racoon/Makefile.am
+++ b/src/racoon/Makefile.am
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ sbin_PROGRAMS = racoon racoonctl plainrsa-gen
 noinst_PROGRAMS = eaytest
 include_racoon_HEADERS = racoonctl.h var.h vmbuf.h misc.h gcmalloc.h admin.h \
 	schedule.h sockmisc.h isakmp_var.h isakmp.h isakmp_xauth.h \
-	isakmp_cfg.h isakmp_unity.h ipsec_doi.h evt.h
+	isakmp_cfg.h isakmp_unity.h ipsec_doi.h evt.h openssl_compat.h
 lib_LTLIBRARIES = libracoon.la
 
 adminsockdir=${localstatedir}/racoon
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ racoon_SOURCES = \
 	gssapi.c dnssec.c getcertsbyname.c privsep.c \
 	pfkey.c admin.c evt.c ipsec_doi.c oakley.c grabmyaddr.c vendorid.c \
 	policy.c localconf.c remoteconf.c crypto_openssl.c algorithm.c \
-	proposal.c sainfo.c strnames.c \
+	openssl_compat.c proposal.c sainfo.c strnames.c \
 	plog.c logger.c schedule.c str2val.c \
 	safefile.c backupsa.c genlist.c rsalist.c \
 	cftoken.l cfparse.y prsa_tok.l prsa_par.y 
@@ -51,12 +51,12 @@ libracoon_la_SOURCES = kmpstat.c vmbuf.c sockmisc.c misc.c
 libracoon_la_CFLAGS = -DNOUSE_PRIVSEP $(AM_CFLAGS)
 
 plainrsa_gen_SOURCES = plainrsa-gen.c plog.c \
-	crypto_openssl.c logger.c 
+	crypto_openssl.c logger.c openssl_compat.c
 EXTRA_plainrsa_gen_SOURCES = $(MISSING_ALGOS)
 plainrsa_gen_LDADD = $(CRYPTOBJS) vmbuf.o misc.o
 plainrsa_gen_DEPENDENCIES = $(CRYPTOBJS) vmbuf.o misc.o
 
-eaytest_SOURCES = eaytest.c plog.c logger.c
+eaytest_SOURCES = eaytest.c plog.c logger.c openssl_compat.c
 EXTRA_eaytest_SOURCES = missing/crypto/sha2/sha2.c
 eaytest_LDADD =	crypto_openssl_test.o vmbuf.o str2val.o misc_noplog.o \
 	$(CRYPTOBJS)
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ noinst_HEADERS = \
 	debugrm.h         isakmp.h      misc.h          sainfo.h \
 	dhgroup.h         isakmp_agg.h  netdb_dnssec.h  schedule.h \
 	isakmp_cfg.h      isakmp_xauth.h isakmp_unity.h isakmp_frag.h \
-	throttle.h	  privsep.h \
+	throttle.h	  privsep.h     openssl_compat.h \
 	cfparse_proto.h	  cftoken_proto.h genlist.h     rsalist.h \
 	missing/crypto/sha2/sha2.h missing/crypto/rijndael/rijndael_local.h \
 	missing/crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.h \
diff --git a/src/racoon/algorithm.c b/src/racoon/algorithm.c
index 3fd50f6..66c874b 100644
--- a/src/racoon/algorithm.c
+++ b/src/racoon/algorithm.c
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static struct enc_algorithm oakley_encdef[] = {
 { "aes",	algtype_aes,	OAKLEY_ATTR_ENC_ALG_AES,	16,
 		eay_aes_encrypt,	eay_aes_decrypt,
 		eay_aes_weakkey,	eay_aes_keylen, },
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA)
 { "camellia",	algtype_camellia,	OAKLEY_ATTR_ENC_ALG_CAMELLIA,	16,
 		eay_camellia_encrypt,	eay_camellia_decrypt,
 		eay_camellia_weakkey,	eay_camellia_keylen, },
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static struct enc_algorithm ipsec_encdef[] = {
 { "twofish",	algtype_twofish,	IPSECDOI_ESP_TWOFISH,		16,
 		NULL,			NULL,
 		NULL,			eay_twofish_keylen, },
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_IDEA)
 { "3idea",	algtype_3idea,		IPSECDOI_ESP_3IDEA,		8,
 		NULL,			NULL,
 		NULL,			NULL, },
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static struct enc_algorithm ipsec_encdef[] = {
 { "rc4",	algtype_rc4,		IPSECDOI_ESP_RC4,		8,
 		NULL,			NULL,
 		NULL,			NULL, },
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA)
 { "camellia",	algtype_camellia,	IPSECDOI_ESP_CAMELLIA,		16,
 		NULL,			NULL,
 		NULL,			eay_camellia_keylen, },
diff --git a/src/racoon/cfparse.y b/src/racoon/cfparse.y
index 0d9bd67..8415752 100644
--- a/src/racoon/cfparse.y
+++ b/src/racoon/cfparse.y
@@ -2564,7 +2564,7 @@ set_isakmp_proposal(rmconf)
 		plog(LLV_DEBUG2, LOCATION, NULL,
 			"encklen=%d\n", s->encklen);
 
-		memset(types, 0, ARRAYLEN(types));
+		memset(types, 0, sizeof types);
 		types[algclass_isakmp_enc] = s->algclass[algclass_isakmp_enc];
 		types[algclass_isakmp_hash] = s->algclass[algclass_isakmp_hash];
 		types[algclass_isakmp_dh] = s->algclass[algclass_isakmp_dh];
diff --git a/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.c b/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.c
index 55b076a..8fb358f 100644
--- a/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.c
+++ b/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.c
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@
 #endif
 #endif
 #include "plog.h"
+#include "openssl_compat.h"
 
 #define USE_NEW_DES_API
 
@@ -316,9 +317,12 @@ eay_cmp_asn1dn(n1, n2)
 			i = idx+1;
 			goto end;
 		}
-		if ((ea->value->length == 1 && ea->value->data[0] == '*') ||
-		    (eb->value->length == 1 && eb->value->data[0] == '*')) {
-	    		if (OBJ_cmp(ea->object,eb->object)) {
+		ASN1_STRING *sa = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ea);
+		ASN1_STRING *sb = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(eb);
+		if ((ASN1_STRING_length(sa) == 1 && ASN1_STRING_get0_data(sa)[0] == '*') ||
+		    (ASN1_STRING_length(sb) == 1 && ASN1_STRING_get0_data(sb)[0] == '*')) {
+	    		if (OBJ_cmp(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(ea),
+				    X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(eb))) {
 				i = idx+1;
 				goto end;
 	    		}
@@ -430,7 +434,7 @@ cb_check_cert_local(ok, ctx)
 
 	if (!ok) {
 		X509_NAME_oneline(
-				X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert),
+				X509_get_subject_name(X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx)),
 				buf,
 				256);
 		/*
@@ -438,7 +442,8 @@ cb_check_cert_local(ok, ctx)
 		 * ok if they are self signed. But we should still warn
 		 * the user.
  		 */
-		switch (ctx->error) {
+		int ctx_error = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+		switch (ctx_error) {
 		case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
 		case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
 		case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
@@ -453,9 +458,9 @@ cb_check_cert_local(ok, ctx)
 		}
 		plog(log_tag, LOCATION, NULL,
 			"%s(%d) at depth:%d SubjectName:%s\n",
-			X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error),
-			ctx->error,
-			ctx->error_depth,
+			X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx_error),
+			ctx_error,
+			X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx),
 			buf);
 	}
 	ERR_clear_error();
@@ -477,10 +482,11 @@ cb_check_cert_remote(ok, ctx)
 
 	if (!ok) {
 		X509_NAME_oneline(
-				X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert),
+				X509_get_subject_name(X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx)),
 				buf,
 				256);
-		switch (ctx->error) {
+		int ctx_error=X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+		switch (ctx_error) {
 		case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
 			ok = 1;
 			log_tag = LLV_WARNING;
@@ -490,9 +496,9 @@ cb_check_cert_remote(ok, ctx)
 		}
 		plog(log_tag, LOCATION, NULL,
 			"%s(%d) at depth:%d SubjectName:%s\n",
-			X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error),
-			ctx->error,
-			ctx->error_depth,
+			X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx_error),
+			ctx_error,
+			X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx),
 			buf);
 	}
 	ERR_clear_error();
@@ -516,14 +522,15 @@ eay_get_x509asn1subjectname(cert)
 	if (x509 == NULL)
 		goto error;
 
+	X509_NAME *subject_name = X509_get_subject_name(x509);
 	/* get the length of the name */
-	len = i2d_X509_NAME(x509->cert_info->subject, NULL);
+	len = i2d_X509_NAME(subject_name, NULL);
 	name = vmalloc(len);
 	if (!name)
 		goto error;
 	/* get the name */
 	bp = (unsigned char *) name->v;
-	len = i2d_X509_NAME(x509->cert_info->subject, &bp);
+	len = i2d_X509_NAME(subject_name, &bp);
 
 	X509_free(x509);
 
@@ -661,15 +668,16 @@ eay_get_x509asn1issuername(cert)
 	if (x509 == NULL)
 		goto error;
 
+	X509_NAME *issuer_name = X509_get_issuer_name(x509);
 	/* get the length of the name */
-	len = i2d_X509_NAME(x509->cert_info->issuer, NULL);
+	len = i2d_X509_NAME(issuer_name, NULL);
 	name = vmalloc(len);
 	if (name == NULL)
 		goto error;
 
 	/* get the name */
 	bp = (unsigned char *) name->v;
-	len = i2d_X509_NAME(x509->cert_info->issuer, &bp);
+	len = i2d_X509_NAME(issuer_name, &bp);
 
 	X509_free(x509);
 
@@ -850,7 +858,7 @@ eay_check_x509sign(source, sig, cert)
 		return -1;
 	}
 
-	res = eay_rsa_verify(source, sig, evp->pkey.rsa);
+	res = eay_rsa_verify(source, sig, EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp));
 
 	EVP_PKEY_free(evp);
 	X509_free(x509);
@@ -992,7 +1000,7 @@ eay_get_x509sign(src, privkey)
 	if (evp == NULL)
 		return NULL;
 
-	sig = eay_rsa_sign(src, evp->pkey.rsa);
+	sig = eay_rsa_sign(src, EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp));
 
 	EVP_PKEY_free(evp);
 
@@ -1079,7 +1087,11 @@ eay_strerror()
 	int line, flags;
 	unsigned long es;
 
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+	es = 0; /* even when allowed by OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, it is defined as 0 */
+#else
 	es = CRYPTO_thread_id();
+#endif
 
 	while ((l = ERR_get_error_line_data(&file, &line, &data, &flags)) != 0){
 		n = snprintf(ebuf + len, sizeof(ebuf) - len,
@@ -1100,7 +1112,7 @@ vchar_t *
 evp_crypt(vchar_t *data, vchar_t *key, vchar_t *iv, const EVP_CIPHER *e, int enc)
 {
 	vchar_t *res;
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
 
 	if (!e)
 		return NULL;
@@ -1111,7 +1123,7 @@ evp_crypt(vchar_t *data, vchar_t *key, vchar_t *iv, const EVP_CIPHER *e, int enc
 	if ((res = vmalloc(data->l)) == NULL)
 		return NULL;
 
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+	ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
 
 	switch(EVP_CIPHER_nid(e)){
 	case NID_bf_cbc:
@@ -1125,54 +1137,41 @@ evp_crypt(vchar_t *data, vchar_t *key, vchar_t *iv, const EVP_CIPHER *e, int enc
 		/* XXX: can we do that also for algos with a fixed key size ?
 		 */
 		/* init context without key/iv
-         */
-        if (!EVP_CipherInit(&ctx, e, NULL, NULL, enc))
-        {
-            OpenSSL_BUG();
-            vfree(res);
-            return NULL;
-        }
+                 */
+		if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx, e, NULL, NULL, enc))
+			goto out;
 		
-        /* update key size
-         */
-        if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ctx, key->l))
-        {
-            OpenSSL_BUG();
-            vfree(res);
-            return NULL;
-        }
-
-        /* finalize context init with desired key size
-         */
-        if (!EVP_CipherInit(&ctx, NULL, (u_char *) key->v,
+		/* update key size
+		 */
+		if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, key->l))
+			goto out;
+
+		/* finalize context init with desired key size
+		 */
+		if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx, NULL, (u_char *) key->v,
 							(u_char *) iv->v, enc))
-        {
-            OpenSSL_BUG();
-            vfree(res);
-            return NULL;
-		}
+			goto out;
 		break;
 	default:
-		if (!EVP_CipherInit(&ctx, e, (u_char *) key->v, 
-							(u_char *) iv->v, enc)) {
-			OpenSSL_BUG();
-			vfree(res);
-			return NULL;
-		}
+		if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx, e, (u_char *) key->v,
+							(u_char *) iv->v, enc))
+            		goto out;
 	}
 
 	/* disable openssl padding */
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&ctx, 0); 
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
 	
-	if (!EVP_Cipher(&ctx, (u_char *) res->v, (u_char *) data->v, data->l)) {
-		OpenSSL_BUG();
-		vfree(res);
-		return NULL;
-	}
+	if (!EVP_Cipher(ctx, (u_char *) res->v, (u_char *) data->v, data->l))
+		goto out;
 
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
 
 	return res;
+out:
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+	OpenSSL_BUG();
+	vfree(res);
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 int
@@ -1230,7 +1229,7 @@ eay_des_keylen(len)
 	return evp_keylen(len, EVP_des_cbc());
 }
 
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_IDEA)
 /*
  * IDEA-CBC
  */
@@ -1587,7 +1586,7 @@ eay_aes_keylen(len)
 	return len;
 }
 
-#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H)
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA)
 /*
  * CAMELLIA-CBC
  */
@@ -1680,9 +1679,9 @@ eay_hmac_init(key, md)
 	vchar_t *key;
 	const EVP_MD *md;
 {
-	HMAC_CTX *c = racoon_malloc(sizeof(*c));
+	HMAC_CTX *c = HMAC_CTX_new();
 
-	HMAC_Init(c, key->v, key->l, md);
+	HMAC_Init_ex(c, key->v, key->l, md, NULL);
 
 	return (caddr_t)c;
 }
@@ -1761,8 +1760,7 @@ eay_hmacsha2_512_final(c)
 
 	HMAC_Final((HMAC_CTX *)c, (unsigned char *) res->v, &l);
 	res->l = l;
-	HMAC_cleanup((HMAC_CTX *)c);
-	(void)racoon_free(c);
+	HMAC_CTX_free((HMAC_CTX *)c);
 
 	if (SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH != res->l) {
 		plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
@@ -1811,8 +1809,7 @@ eay_hmacsha2_384_final(c)
 
 	HMAC_Final((HMAC_CTX *)c, (unsigned char *) res->v, &l);
 	res->l = l;
-	HMAC_cleanup((HMAC_CTX *)c);
-	(void)racoon_free(c);
+	HMAC_CTX_free((HMAC_CTX *)c);
 
 	if (SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH != res->l) {
 		plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
@@ -1861,8 +1858,7 @@ eay_hmacsha2_256_final(c)
 
 	HMAC_Final((HMAC_CTX *)c, (unsigned char *) res->v, &l);
 	res->l = l;
-	HMAC_cleanup((HMAC_CTX *)c);
-	(void)racoon_free(c);
+	HMAC_CTX_free((HMAC_CTX *)c);
 
 	if (SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH != res->l) {
 		plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
@@ -1912,8 +1908,7 @@ eay_hmacsha1_final(c)
 
 	HMAC_Final((HMAC_CTX *)c, (unsigned char *) res->v, &l);
 	res->l = l;
-	HMAC_cleanup((HMAC_CTX *)c);
-	(void)racoon_free(c);
+	HMAC_CTX_free((HMAC_CTX *)c);
 
 	if (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH != res->l) {
 		plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
@@ -1962,8 +1957,7 @@ eay_hmacmd5_final(c)
 
 	HMAC_Final((HMAC_CTX *)c, (unsigned char *) res->v, &l);
 	res->l = l;
-	HMAC_cleanup((HMAC_CTX *)c);
-	(void)racoon_free(c);
+	HMAC_CTX_free((HMAC_CTX *)c);
 
 	if (MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH != res->l) {
 		plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
@@ -2266,6 +2260,7 @@ eay_dh_generate(prime, g, publen, pub, priv)
 	u_int32_t g;
 {
 	BIGNUM *p = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *BNg = NULL;
 	DH *dh = NULL;
 	int error = -1;
 
@@ -2276,25 +2271,28 @@ eay_dh_generate(prime, g, publen, pub, priv)
 
 	if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
 		goto end;
-	dh->p = p;
-	p = NULL;	/* p is now part of dh structure */
-	dh->g = NULL;
-	if ((dh->g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+	if ((BNg = BN_new()) == NULL)
 		goto end;
-	if (!BN_set_word(dh->g, g))
+	if (!BN_set_word(BNg, g))
 		goto end;
+	if (! DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, BNg))
+		goto end;
+	BNg = NULL;
+	p = NULL;	/* p is now part of dh structure */
 
 	if (publen != 0)
-		dh->length = publen;
+		DH_set_length(dh, publen);
 
 	/* generate public and private number */
 	if (!DH_generate_key(dh))
 		goto end;
 
 	/* copy results to buffers */
-	if (eay_bn2v(pub, dh->pub_key) < 0)
+	BIGNUM *pub_key, *priv_key;
+	DH_get0_key(dh, (const BIGNUM**) &pub_key, (const BIGNUM**) &priv_key);
+	if (eay_bn2v(pub, pub_key) < 0)
 		goto end;
-	if (eay_bn2v(priv, dh->priv_key) < 0) {
+	if (eay_bn2v(priv, priv_key) < 0) {
 		vfree(*pub);
 		goto end;
 	}
@@ -2306,6 +2304,8 @@ end:
 		DH_free(dh);
 	if (p != 0)
 		BN_free(p);
+	if (BNg != 0)
+		BN_free(BNg);
 	return(error);
 }
 
@@ -2319,6 +2319,10 @@ eay_dh_compute(prime, g, pub, priv, pub2, key)
 	int l;
 	unsigned char *v = NULL;
 	int error = -1;
+	BIGNUM *p = BN_new();
+	BIGNUM *BNg = BN_new();
+	BIGNUM *pub_key = BN_new();
+	BIGNUM *priv_key = BN_new();
 
 	/* make public number to compute */
 	if (eay_v2bn(&dh_pub, pub2) < 0)
@@ -2327,19 +2331,21 @@ eay_dh_compute(prime, g, pub, priv, pub2, key)
 	/* make DH structure */
 	if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
 		goto end;
-	if (eay_v2bn(&dh->p, prime) < 0)
+	if (p == NULL || BNg == NULL || pub_key == NULL || priv_key == NULL)
 		goto end;
-	if (eay_v2bn(&dh->pub_key, pub) < 0)
+
+	if (eay_v2bn(&p, prime) < 0)
 		goto end;
-	if (eay_v2bn(&dh->priv_key, priv) < 0)
+	if (eay_v2bn(&pub_key, pub) < 0)
 		goto end;
-	dh->length = pub2->l * 8;
-
-	dh->g = NULL;
-	if ((dh->g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+	if (eay_v2bn(&priv_key, priv) < 0)
 		goto end;
-	if (!BN_set_word(dh->g, g))
+	if (!BN_set_word(BNg, g))
 		goto end;
+	DH_set0_key(dh, pub_key, priv_key);
+	DH_set_length(dh, pub2->l * 8);
+	DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, BNg);
+	pub_key = priv_key = p = BNg = NULL;
 
 	if ((v = racoon_calloc(prime->l, sizeof(u_char))) == NULL)
 		goto end;
@@ -2350,6 +2356,14 @@ eay_dh_compute(prime, g, pub, priv, pub2, key)
 	error = 0;
 
 end:
+	if (p != NULL)
+		BN_free(p);
+	if (BNg != NULL)
+		BN_free(BNg);
+	if (pub_key != NULL)
+		BN_free(pub_key);
+	if (priv_key != NULL)
+		BN_free(priv_key);
 	if (dh_pub != NULL)
 		BN_free(dh_pub);
 	if (dh != NULL)
@@ -2400,12 +2414,14 @@ eay_bn2v(var, bn)
 void
 eay_init()
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
 	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
 	ERR_load_crypto_strings();
 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
 	ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
 	ENGINE_register_all_complete();
 #endif
+#endif
 }
 
 vchar_t *
@@ -2504,8 +2520,7 @@ binbuf_pubkey2rsa(vchar_t *binbuf)
 		goto out;
 	}
 	
-	rsa_pub->n = mod;
-	rsa_pub->e = exp;
+	RSA_set0_key(rsa_pub, mod, exp, NULL);
 
 out:
 	return rsa_pub;
@@ -2582,5 +2597,5 @@ eay_random()
 const char *
 eay_version()
 {
-	return SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION);
+	return OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION);
 }
diff --git a/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.h b/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.h
index 66fac73..ee5b765 100644
--- a/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.h
+++ b/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.h
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ extern vchar_t *eay_aes_decrypt __P((vchar_t *, vchar_t *, vchar_t *));
 extern int eay_aes_weakkey __P((vchar_t *));
 extern int eay_aes_keylen __P((int));
 
-#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H)
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA)
 /* Camellia */
 extern vchar_t *eay_camellia_encrypt __P((vchar_t *, vchar_t *, vchar_t *));
 extern vchar_t *eay_camellia_decrypt __P((vchar_t *, vchar_t *, vchar_t *));
diff --git a/src/racoon/eaytest.c b/src/racoon/eaytest.c
index 1474bdc..ae09db3 100644
--- a/src/racoon/eaytest.c
+++ b/src/racoon/eaytest.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
 #include "dhgroup.h"
 #include "crypto_openssl.h"
 #include "gnuc.h"
+#include "openssl_compat.h"
 
 #include "package_version.h"
 
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ rsa_verify_with_pubkey(src, sig, pubkey_txt)
 		printf ("PEM_read_PUBKEY(): %s\n", eay_strerror());
 		return -1;
 	}
-	error = eay_check_rsasign(src, sig, evp->pkey.rsa);
+	error = eay_check_rsasign(src, sig, EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp));
 
 	return error;
 }
@@ -698,7 +699,7 @@ ciphertest(ac, av)
 			  eay_cast_encrypt, eay_cast_decrypt) < 0)
 	  return -1;
 	
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_IDEA)
 	if (ciphertest_1 ("IDEA",
 			  &data, 8,
 			  &key, key.l,
@@ -715,7 +716,7 @@ ciphertest(ac, av)
 			  eay_rc5_encrypt, eay_rc5_decrypt) < 0)
 	  return -1;
 #endif
-#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H)
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA)
 	if (ciphertest_1 ("CAMELLIA",
 			  &data, 16,
 			  &key, key.l,
diff --git a/src/racoon/ipsec_doi.c b/src/racoon/ipsec_doi.c
index 84a4c71..b52469f 100644
--- a/src/racoon/ipsec_doi.c
+++ b/src/racoon/ipsec_doi.c
@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ out:
 	/* key length must not be specified on some algorithms */
 	if (keylen) {
 		if (sa->enctype == OAKLEY_ATTR_ENC_ALG_DES
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_IDEA)
 		 || sa->enctype == OAKLEY_ATTR_ENC_ALG_IDEA
 #endif
 		 || sa->enctype == OAKLEY_ATTR_ENC_ALG_3DES) {
diff --git a/src/racoon/openssl_compat.c b/src/racoon/openssl_compat.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..864b5fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/racoon/openssl_compat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "openssl_compat.h"
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+static void *OPENSSL_zalloc(size_t num)
+{
+    void *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+
+    if (ret != NULL)
+        memset(ret, 0, num);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
+{
+    /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e.  d may be
+     * left NULL (in case only the public key is used).
+     */
+    if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL)
+        || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (n != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->n);
+        r->n = n;
+    }
+    if (e != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->e);
+        r->e = e;
+    }
+    if (d != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->d);
+        r->d = d;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q)
+{
+    /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+     */
+    if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+        || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (p != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->p);
+        r->p = p;
+    }
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->q);
+        r->q = q;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp)
+{
+    /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+     */
+    if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL)
+        || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL)
+        || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (dmp1 != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->dmp1);
+        r->dmp1 = dmp1;
+    }
+    if (dmq1 != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->dmq1);
+        r->dmq1 = dmq1;
+    }
+    if (iqmp != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->iqmp);
+        r->iqmp = iqmp;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
+                  const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
+{
+    if (n != NULL)
+        *n = r->n;
+    if (e != NULL)
+        *e = r->e;
+    if (d != NULL)
+        *d = r->d;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q)
+{
+    if (p != NULL)
+        *p = r->p;
+    if (q != NULL)
+        *q = r->q;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
+                         const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
+                         const BIGNUM **iqmp)
+{
+    if (dmp1 != NULL)
+        *dmp1 = r->dmp1;
+    if (dmq1 != NULL)
+        *dmq1 = r->dmq1;
+    if (iqmp != NULL)
+        *iqmp = r->iqmp;
+}
+
+int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
+{
+    /* If the fields p and g in d are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.  q may remain NULL.
+     */
+    if ((dh->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+        || (dh->g == NULL && g == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (p != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->p);
+        dh->p = p;
+    }
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->q);
+        dh->q = q;
+    }
+    if (g != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->g);
+        dh->g = g;
+    }
+
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        dh->length = BN_num_bits(q);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key)
+{
+    if (pub_key != NULL)
+        *pub_key = dh->pub_key;
+    if (priv_key != NULL)
+        *priv_key = dh->priv_key;
+}
+
+int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key)
+{
+    /* If the field pub_key in dh is NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.  The priv_key field may
+     * be left NULL.
+     */
+    if (dh->pub_key == NULL && pub_key == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (pub_key != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->pub_key);
+        dh->pub_key = pub_key;
+    }
+    if (priv_key != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->priv_key);
+        dh->priv_key = priv_key;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length)
+{
+    dh->length = length;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void)
+{
+    return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX));
+}
+
+void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    HMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return pkey->pkey.rsa;
+}
+
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
diff --git a/src/racoon/openssl_compat.h b/src/racoon/openssl_compat.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e152c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/racoon/openssl_compat.h
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+#ifndef OPENSSL_COMPAT_H
+#define OPENSSL_COMPAT_H
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d);
+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q);
+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp);
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d);
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q);
+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, const BIGNUM **iqmp);
+
+int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
+void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key);
+int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
+int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length);
+
+HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void);
+void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX* ctx);
+
+RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+#define ASN1_STRING_length(s) s->length
+#define ASN1_STRING_get0_data(s) s->data
+
+#define X509_get_subject_name(x) x->cert_info->subject
+#define X509_get_issuer_name(x) x->cert_info->issuer
+#define X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(n) n->value
+#define X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(n) n->object
+#define X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx) ctx->current_cert
+#define X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx) ctx->error
+#define X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx) ctx->error_depth
+
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLEAY_VERSION
+#define OpenSSL_version SSLeay_version
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_COMPAT_H */
diff --git a/src/racoon/plainrsa-gen.c b/src/racoon/plainrsa-gen.c
index cad1861..b949b08 100644
--- a/src/racoon/plainrsa-gen.c
+++ b/src/racoon/plainrsa-gen.c
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
 #include "vmbuf.h"
 #include "plog.h"
 #include "crypto_openssl.h"
+#include "openssl_compat.h"
 
 #include "package_version.h"
 
@@ -90,12 +91,14 @@ mix_b64_pubkey(const RSA *key)
 	char *binbuf;
 	long binlen, ret;
 	vchar_t *res;
-	
-	binlen = 1 + BN_num_bytes(key->e) + BN_num_bytes(key->n);
+	const BIGNUM *e, *n;
+
+	RSA_get0_key(key, &n, &e, NULL);
+	binlen = 1 + BN_num_bytes(e) + BN_num_bytes(n);
 	binbuf = malloc(binlen);
 	memset(binbuf, 0, binlen);
-	binbuf[0] = BN_bn2bin(key->e, (unsigned char *) &binbuf[1]);
-	ret = BN_bn2bin(key->n, (unsigned char *) (&binbuf[binbuf[0] + 1]));
+	binbuf[0] = BN_bn2bin(e, (unsigned char *) &binbuf[1]);
+	ret = BN_bn2bin(n, (unsigned char *) (&binbuf[binbuf[0] + 1]));
 	if (1 + binbuf[0] + ret != binlen) {
 		plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
 		     "Pubkey generation failed. This is really strange...\n");
@@ -131,16 +134,20 @@ print_rsa_key(FILE *fp, const RSA *key)
 	
 	fprintf(fp, "# : PUB 0s%s\n", pubkey64->v);
 	fprintf(fp, ": RSA\t{\n");
-	fprintf(fp, "\t# RSA %d bits\n", BN_num_bits(key->n));
+	const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *p, *q, *dmp1, *dmq1, *iqmp;
+	RSA_get0_key(key, &n, &e, &d);
+	RSA_get0_factors(key, &p, &q);
+	RSA_get0_crt_params(key, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
+	fprintf(fp, "\t# RSA %d bits\n", BN_num_bits(n));
 	fprintf(fp, "\t# pubkey=0s%s\n", pubkey64->v);
-	fprintf(fp, "\tModulus: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->n)));
-	fprintf(fp, "\tPublicExponent: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->e)));
-	fprintf(fp, "\tPrivateExponent: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->d)));
-	fprintf(fp, "\tPrime1: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->p)));
-	fprintf(fp, "\tPrime2: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->q)));
-	fprintf(fp, "\tExponent1: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->dmp1)));
-	fprintf(fp, "\tExponent2: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->dmq1)));
-	fprintf(fp, "\tCoefficient: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->iqmp)));
+	fprintf(fp, "\tModulus: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(n)));
+	fprintf(fp, "\tPublicExponent: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(e)));
+	fprintf(fp, "\tPrivateExponent: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(d)));
+	fprintf(fp, "\tPrime1: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(p)));
+	fprintf(fp, "\tPrime2: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(q)));
+	fprintf(fp, "\tExponent1: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(dmp1)));
+	fprintf(fp, "\tExponent2: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(dmq1)));
+	fprintf(fp, "\tCoefficient: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(iqmp)));
 	fprintf(fp, "  }\n");
 
 	vfree(pubkey64);
@@ -203,11 +210,13 @@ int
 gen_rsa_key(FILE *fp, size_t bits, unsigned long exp)
 {
 	int ret;
-	RSA *key;
+	RSA *key = RSA_new();
+	BIGNUM *e = BN_new();
 
-	key = RSA_generate_key(bits, exp, NULL, NULL);
-	if (!key) {
+	BN_set_word(e, exp);
+	if (! RSA_generate_key_ex(key, bits, e, NULL)) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "RSA_generate_key(): %s\n", eay_strerror());
+		RSA_free(key);
 		return -1;
 	}
 	
diff --git a/src/racoon/prsa_par.y b/src/racoon/prsa_par.y
index 1987e4d..27ce4c6 100644
--- a/src/racoon/prsa_par.y
+++ b/src/racoon/prsa_par.y
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
 #include "isakmp_var.h"
 #include "handler.h"
 #include "crypto_openssl.h"
+#include "openssl_compat.h"
 #include "sockmisc.h"
 #include "rsalist.h"
 
@@ -85,7 +86,18 @@ char *prsa_cur_fname = NULL;
 struct genlist *prsa_cur_list = NULL;
 enum rsa_key_type prsa_cur_type = RSA_TYPE_ANY;
 
-static RSA *rsa_cur;
+struct my_rsa_st {
+	BIGNUM *n;
+	BIGNUM *e;
+	BIGNUM *d;
+	BIGNUM *p;
+	BIGNUM *q;
+	BIGNUM *dmp1;
+	BIGNUM *dmq1;
+	BIGNUM *iqmp;
+};
+
+static struct my_rsa_st *rsa_cur;
 
 void
 prsaerror(const char *s, ...)
@@ -201,8 +213,12 @@ rsa_statement:
 				rsa_cur->iqmp = NULL;
 			}
 		}
-		$$ = rsa_cur;
-		rsa_cur = RSA_new();
+		RSA * rsa_tmp = RSA_new();
+		RSA_set0_key(rsa_tmp, rsa_cur->n, rsa_cur->e, rsa_cur->d);
+		RSA_set0_factors(rsa_tmp, rsa_cur->p, rsa_cur->q);
+		RSA_set0_crt_params(rsa_tmp, rsa_cur->dmp1, rsa_cur->dmq1, rsa_cur->iqmp);
+		$$ = rsa_tmp;
+		memset(rsa_cur, 0, sizeof(struct my_rsa_st));
 	}
 	| TAG_PUB BASE64
 	{
@@ -351,10 +367,12 @@ prsa_parse_file(struct genlist *list, char *fname, enum rsa_key_type type)
 	prsa_cur_fname = fname;
 	prsa_cur_list = list;
 	prsa_cur_type = type;
-	rsa_cur = RSA_new();
+	rsa_cur = malloc(sizeof(struct my_rsa_st));
+	memset(rsa_cur, 0, sizeof(struct my_rsa_st));
 	ret = prsaparse();
 	if (rsa_cur) {
-		RSA_free(rsa_cur);
+		memset(rsa_cur, 0, sizeof(struct my_rsa_st));
+		free(rsa_cur);
 		rsa_cur = NULL;
 	}
 	fclose (fp);
diff --git a/src/racoon/rsalist.c b/src/racoon/rsalist.c
index f152c82..96e8363 100644
--- a/src/racoon/rsalist.c
+++ b/src/racoon/rsalist.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
 #include "genlist.h"
 #include "remoteconf.h"
 #include "crypto_openssl.h"
+#include "openssl_compat.h"
 
 #ifndef LIST_FIRST
 #define LIST_FIRST(head)        ((head)->lh_first)
@@ -98,7 +99,9 @@ rsa_key_dup(struct rsa_key *key)
 		return NULL;
 
 	if (key->rsa) {
-		new->rsa = key->rsa->d != NULL ? RSAPrivateKey_dup(key->rsa) : RSAPublicKey_dup(key->rsa);
+		const BIGNUM *d;
+		RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
+		new->rsa = (d != NULL ? RSAPrivateKey_dup(key->rsa) : RSAPublicKey_dup(key->rsa));
 		if (new->rsa == NULL)
 			goto dup_error;
 	}
-- 
2.16.1

[Ipsec-tools-devel] [PATCH v2 0/1] ipsec-tools: add openssl 1.1 support

[Eneas U de Q. <cot...@ya...>]

After feedback from Noah Meyerhans, I've revised the patch to avoid
freeing uninitilized BNs.

Cheers

Eneas U de Queiroz (1):
  ipsec-tools: add openssl 1.1 support

 src/racoon/Makefile.am      |  10 +--
 src/racoon/algorithm.c      |   6 +-
 src/racoon/cfparse.y        |   2 +-
 src/racoon/crypto_openssl.c | 197 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 src/racoon/crypto_openssl.h |   2 +-
 src/racoon/eaytest.c        |   7 +-
 src/racoon/ipsec_doi.c      |   2 +-
 src/racoon/openssl_compat.c | 213 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 src/racoon/openssl_compat.h |  45 ++++++++++
 src/racoon/plainrsa-gen.c   |  41 +++++----
 src/racoon/prsa_par.y       |  28 ++++--
 src/racoon/rsalist.c        |   5 +-
 12 files changed, 431 insertions(+), 127 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 src/racoon/openssl_compat.c
 create mode 100644 src/racoon/openssl_compat.h

-- 
2.16.1

[Ipsec-tools-devel] [PATCH] ipsec-tools: add openssl 1.1 support

[Eneas U de Q. <cot...@ya...>]

This patch updates the calls to openssl 1.1 API, and adds a
compatibility layer so it compiles with (at least) openssl 1.0.2, I
haven't tested it with lower versions, but all that's needed is to edit
the openssl_compat.* files and add the missing functions there--they're
usually trivial.

Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cot...@ya...>
---
 src/racoon/Makefile.am      |  10 +--
 src/racoon/algorithm.c      |   6 +-
 src/racoon/cfparse.y        |   2 +-
 src/racoon/crypto_openssl.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 src/racoon/crypto_openssl.h |   2 +-
 src/racoon/eaytest.c        |   7 +-
 src/racoon/ipsec_doi.c      |   2 +-
 src/racoon/openssl_compat.c | 213 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 src/racoon/openssl_compat.h |  45 ++++++++++
 src/racoon/plainrsa-gen.c   |  41 +++++----
 src/racoon/prsa_par.y       |  28 ++++--
 src/racoon/rsalist.c        |   5 +-
 12 files changed, 432 insertions(+), 127 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 src/racoon/openssl_compat.c
 create mode 100644 src/racoon/openssl_compat.h

diff --git a/src/racoon/Makefile.am b/src/racoon/Makefile.am
index dbaded9..4c585f3 100644
--- a/src/racoon/Makefile.am
+++ b/src/racoon/Makefile.am
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ sbin_PROGRAMS = racoon racoonctl plainrsa-gen
 noinst_PROGRAMS = eaytest
 include_racoon_HEADERS = racoonctl.h var.h vmbuf.h misc.h gcmalloc.h admin.h \
 	schedule.h sockmisc.h isakmp_var.h isakmp.h isakmp_xauth.h \
-	isakmp_cfg.h isakmp_unity.h ipsec_doi.h evt.h
+	isakmp_cfg.h isakmp_unity.h ipsec_doi.h evt.h openssl_compat.h
 lib_LTLIBRARIES = libracoon.la
 
 adminsockdir=${localstatedir}/racoon
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ racoon_SOURCES = \
 	gssapi.c dnssec.c getcertsbyname.c privsep.c \
 	pfkey.c admin.c evt.c ipsec_doi.c oakley.c grabmyaddr.c vendorid.c \
 	policy.c localconf.c remoteconf.c crypto_openssl.c algorithm.c \
-	proposal.c sainfo.c strnames.c \
+	openssl_compat.c proposal.c sainfo.c strnames.c \
 	plog.c logger.c schedule.c str2val.c \
 	safefile.c backupsa.c genlist.c rsalist.c \
 	cftoken.l cfparse.y prsa_tok.l prsa_par.y 
@@ -51,12 +51,12 @@ libracoon_la_SOURCES = kmpstat.c vmbuf.c sockmisc.c misc.c
 libracoon_la_CFLAGS = -DNOUSE_PRIVSEP $(AM_CFLAGS)
 
 plainrsa_gen_SOURCES = plainrsa-gen.c plog.c \
-	crypto_openssl.c logger.c 
+	crypto_openssl.c logger.c openssl_compat.c
 EXTRA_plainrsa_gen_SOURCES = $(MISSING_ALGOS)
 plainrsa_gen_LDADD = $(CRYPTOBJS) vmbuf.o misc.o
 plainrsa_gen_DEPENDENCIES = $(CRYPTOBJS) vmbuf.o misc.o
 
-eaytest_SOURCES = eaytest.c plog.c logger.c
+eaytest_SOURCES = eaytest.c plog.c logger.c openssl_compat.c
 EXTRA_eaytest_SOURCES = missing/crypto/sha2/sha2.c
 eaytest_LDADD =	crypto_openssl_test.o vmbuf.o str2val.o misc_noplog.o \
 	$(CRYPTOBJS)
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ noinst_HEADERS = \
 	debugrm.h         isakmp.h      misc.h          sainfo.h \
 	dhgroup.h         isakmp_agg.h  netdb_dnssec.h  schedule.h \
 	isakmp_cfg.h      isakmp_xauth.h isakmp_unity.h isakmp_frag.h \
-	throttle.h	  privsep.h \
+	throttle.h	  privsep.h     openssl_compat.h \
 	cfparse_proto.h	  cftoken_proto.h genlist.h     rsalist.h \
 	missing/crypto/sha2/sha2.h missing/crypto/rijndael/rijndael_local.h \
 	missing/crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.h \
diff --git a/src/racoon/algorithm.c b/src/racoon/algorithm.c
index 3fd50f6..66c874b 100644
--- a/src/racoon/algorithm.c
+++ b/src/racoon/algorithm.c
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static struct enc_algorithm oakley_encdef[] = {
 { "aes",	algtype_aes,	OAKLEY_ATTR_ENC_ALG_AES,	16,
 		eay_aes_encrypt,	eay_aes_decrypt,
 		eay_aes_weakkey,	eay_aes_keylen, },
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA)
 { "camellia",	algtype_camellia,	OAKLEY_ATTR_ENC_ALG_CAMELLIA,	16,
 		eay_camellia_encrypt,	eay_camellia_decrypt,
 		eay_camellia_weakkey,	eay_camellia_keylen, },
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static struct enc_algorithm ipsec_encdef[] = {
 { "twofish",	algtype_twofish,	IPSECDOI_ESP_TWOFISH,		16,
 		NULL,			NULL,
 		NULL,			eay_twofish_keylen, },
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_IDEA)
 { "3idea",	algtype_3idea,		IPSECDOI_ESP_3IDEA,		8,
 		NULL,			NULL,
 		NULL,			NULL, },
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static struct enc_algorithm ipsec_encdef[] = {
 { "rc4",	algtype_rc4,		IPSECDOI_ESP_RC4,		8,
 		NULL,			NULL,
 		NULL,			NULL, },
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA)
 { "camellia",	algtype_camellia,	IPSECDOI_ESP_CAMELLIA,		16,
 		NULL,			NULL,
 		NULL,			eay_camellia_keylen, },
diff --git a/src/racoon/cfparse.y b/src/racoon/cfparse.y
index 0d9bd67..8415752 100644
--- a/src/racoon/cfparse.y
+++ b/src/racoon/cfparse.y
@@ -2564,7 +2564,7 @@ set_isakmp_proposal(rmconf)
 		plog(LLV_DEBUG2, LOCATION, NULL,
 			"encklen=%d\n", s->encklen);
 
-		memset(types, 0, ARRAYLEN(types));
+		memset(types, 0, sizeof types);
 		types[algclass_isakmp_enc] = s->algclass[algclass_isakmp_enc];
 		types[algclass_isakmp_hash] = s->algclass[algclass_isakmp_hash];
 		types[algclass_isakmp_dh] = s->algclass[algclass_isakmp_dh];
diff --git a/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.c b/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.c
index 55b076a..292fb1a 100644
--- a/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.c
+++ b/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.c
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@
 #endif
 #endif
 #include "plog.h"
+#include "openssl_compat.h"
 
 #define USE_NEW_DES_API
 
@@ -316,9 +317,12 @@ eay_cmp_asn1dn(n1, n2)
 			i = idx+1;
 			goto end;
 		}
-		if ((ea->value->length == 1 && ea->value->data[0] == '*') ||
-		    (eb->value->length == 1 && eb->value->data[0] == '*')) {
-	    		if (OBJ_cmp(ea->object,eb->object)) {
+		ASN1_STRING *sa = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ea);
+		ASN1_STRING *sb = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(eb);
+		if ((ASN1_STRING_length(sa) == 1 && ASN1_STRING_get0_data(sa)[0] == '*') ||
+		    (ASN1_STRING_length(sb) == 1 && ASN1_STRING_get0_data(sb)[0] == '*')) {
+	    		if (OBJ_cmp(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(ea),
+				    X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(eb))) {
 				i = idx+1;
 				goto end;
 	    		}
@@ -430,7 +434,7 @@ cb_check_cert_local(ok, ctx)
 
 	if (!ok) {
 		X509_NAME_oneline(
-				X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert),
+				X509_get_subject_name(X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx)),
 				buf,
 				256);
 		/*
@@ -438,7 +442,8 @@ cb_check_cert_local(ok, ctx)
 		 * ok if they are self signed. But we should still warn
 		 * the user.
  		 */
-		switch (ctx->error) {
+		int ctx_error = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+		switch (ctx_error) {
 		case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
 		case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
 		case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
@@ -453,9 +458,9 @@ cb_check_cert_local(ok, ctx)
 		}
 		plog(log_tag, LOCATION, NULL,
 			"%s(%d) at depth:%d SubjectName:%s\n",
-			X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error),
-			ctx->error,
-			ctx->error_depth,
+			X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx_error),
+			ctx_error,
+			X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx),
 			buf);
 	}
 	ERR_clear_error();
@@ -477,10 +482,11 @@ cb_check_cert_remote(ok, ctx)
 
 	if (!ok) {
 		X509_NAME_oneline(
-				X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert),
+				X509_get_subject_name(X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx)),
 				buf,
 				256);
-		switch (ctx->error) {
+		int ctx_error=X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+		switch (ctx_error) {
 		case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
 			ok = 1;
 			log_tag = LLV_WARNING;
@@ -490,9 +496,9 @@ cb_check_cert_remote(ok, ctx)
 		}
 		plog(log_tag, LOCATION, NULL,
 			"%s(%d) at depth:%d SubjectName:%s\n",
-			X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error),
-			ctx->error,
-			ctx->error_depth,
+			X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx_error),
+			ctx_error,
+			X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx),
 			buf);
 	}
 	ERR_clear_error();
@@ -516,14 +522,15 @@ eay_get_x509asn1subjectname(cert)
 	if (x509 == NULL)
 		goto error;
 
+	X509_NAME *subject_name = X509_get_subject_name(x509);
 	/* get the length of the name */
-	len = i2d_X509_NAME(x509->cert_info->subject, NULL);
+	len = i2d_X509_NAME(subject_name, NULL);
 	name = vmalloc(len);
 	if (!name)
 		goto error;
 	/* get the name */
 	bp = (unsigned char *) name->v;
-	len = i2d_X509_NAME(x509->cert_info->subject, &bp);
+	len = i2d_X509_NAME(subject_name, &bp);
 
 	X509_free(x509);
 
@@ -661,15 +668,16 @@ eay_get_x509asn1issuername(cert)
 	if (x509 == NULL)
 		goto error;
 
+	X509_NAME *issuer_name = X509_get_issuer_name(x509);
 	/* get the length of the name */
-	len = i2d_X509_NAME(x509->cert_info->issuer, NULL);
+	len = i2d_X509_NAME(issuer_name, NULL);
 	name = vmalloc(len);
 	if (name == NULL)
 		goto error;
 
 	/* get the name */
 	bp = (unsigned char *) name->v;
-	len = i2d_X509_NAME(x509->cert_info->issuer, &bp);
+	len = i2d_X509_NAME(issuer_name, &bp);
 
 	X509_free(x509);
 
@@ -850,7 +858,7 @@ eay_check_x509sign(source, sig, cert)
 		return -1;
 	}
 
-	res = eay_rsa_verify(source, sig, evp->pkey.rsa);
+	res = eay_rsa_verify(source, sig, EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp));
 
 	EVP_PKEY_free(evp);
 	X509_free(x509);
@@ -992,7 +1000,7 @@ eay_get_x509sign(src, privkey)
 	if (evp == NULL)
 		return NULL;
 
-	sig = eay_rsa_sign(src, evp->pkey.rsa);
+	sig = eay_rsa_sign(src, EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp));
 
 	EVP_PKEY_free(evp);
 
@@ -1079,7 +1087,11 @@ eay_strerror()
 	int line, flags;
 	unsigned long es;
 
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+	es = 0; /* even when allowed by OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, it is defined as 0 */
+#else
 	es = CRYPTO_thread_id();
+#endif
 
 	while ((l = ERR_get_error_line_data(&file, &line, &data, &flags)) != 0){
 		n = snprintf(ebuf + len, sizeof(ebuf) - len,
@@ -1100,7 +1112,7 @@ vchar_t *
 evp_crypt(vchar_t *data, vchar_t *key, vchar_t *iv, const EVP_CIPHER *e, int enc)
 {
 	vchar_t *res;
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
 
 	if (!e)
 		return NULL;
@@ -1111,7 +1123,7 @@ evp_crypt(vchar_t *data, vchar_t *key, vchar_t *iv, const EVP_CIPHER *e, int enc
 	if ((res = vmalloc(data->l)) == NULL)
 		return NULL;
 
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+	ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
 
 	switch(EVP_CIPHER_nid(e)){
 	case NID_bf_cbc:
@@ -1125,54 +1137,41 @@ evp_crypt(vchar_t *data, vchar_t *key, vchar_t *iv, const EVP_CIPHER *e, int enc
 		/* XXX: can we do that also for algos with a fixed key size ?
 		 */
 		/* init context without key/iv
-         */
-        if (!EVP_CipherInit(&ctx, e, NULL, NULL, enc))
-        {
-            OpenSSL_BUG();
-            vfree(res);
-            return NULL;
-        }
+                 */
+		if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx, e, NULL, NULL, enc))
+			goto out;
 		
-        /* update key size
-         */
-        if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ctx, key->l))
-        {
-            OpenSSL_BUG();
-            vfree(res);
-            return NULL;
-        }
-
-        /* finalize context init with desired key size
-         */
-        if (!EVP_CipherInit(&ctx, NULL, (u_char *) key->v,
+		/* update key size
+		 */
+		if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, key->l))
+			goto out;
+
+		/* finalize context init with desired key size
+		 */
+		if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx, NULL, (u_char *) key->v,
 							(u_char *) iv->v, enc))
-        {
-            OpenSSL_BUG();
-            vfree(res);
-            return NULL;
-		}
+			goto out;
 		break;
 	default:
-		if (!EVP_CipherInit(&ctx, e, (u_char *) key->v, 
-							(u_char *) iv->v, enc)) {
-			OpenSSL_BUG();
-			vfree(res);
-			return NULL;
-		}
+		if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx, e, (u_char *) key->v,
+							(u_char *) iv->v, enc))
+            		goto out;
 	}
 
 	/* disable openssl padding */
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&ctx, 0); 
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
 	
-	if (!EVP_Cipher(&ctx, (u_char *) res->v, (u_char *) data->v, data->l)) {
-		OpenSSL_BUG();
-		vfree(res);
-		return NULL;
-	}
+	if (!EVP_Cipher(ctx, (u_char *) res->v, (u_char *) data->v, data->l))
+		goto out;
 
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
 
 	return res;
+out:
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+	OpenSSL_BUG();
+	vfree(res);
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 int
@@ -1230,7 +1229,7 @@ eay_des_keylen(len)
 	return evp_keylen(len, EVP_des_cbc());
 }
 
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_IDEA)
 /*
  * IDEA-CBC
  */
@@ -1587,7 +1586,7 @@ eay_aes_keylen(len)
 	return len;
 }
 
-#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H)
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA)
 /*
  * CAMELLIA-CBC
  */
@@ -1680,9 +1679,9 @@ eay_hmac_init(key, md)
 	vchar_t *key;
 	const EVP_MD *md;
 {
-	HMAC_CTX *c = racoon_malloc(sizeof(*c));
+	HMAC_CTX *c = HMAC_CTX_new();
 
-	HMAC_Init(c, key->v, key->l, md);
+	HMAC_Init_ex(c, key->v, key->l, md, NULL);
 
 	return (caddr_t)c;
 }
@@ -1761,8 +1760,7 @@ eay_hmacsha2_512_final(c)
 
 	HMAC_Final((HMAC_CTX *)c, (unsigned char *) res->v, &l);
 	res->l = l;
-	HMAC_cleanup((HMAC_CTX *)c);
-	(void)racoon_free(c);
+	HMAC_CTX_free((HMAC_CTX *)c);
 
 	if (SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH != res->l) {
 		plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
@@ -1811,8 +1809,7 @@ eay_hmacsha2_384_final(c)
 
 	HMAC_Final((HMAC_CTX *)c, (unsigned char *) res->v, &l);
 	res->l = l;
-	HMAC_cleanup((HMAC_CTX *)c);
-	(void)racoon_free(c);
+	HMAC_CTX_free((HMAC_CTX *)c);
 
 	if (SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH != res->l) {
 		plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
@@ -1861,8 +1858,7 @@ eay_hmacsha2_256_final(c)
 
 	HMAC_Final((HMAC_CTX *)c, (unsigned char *) res->v, &l);
 	res->l = l;
-	HMAC_cleanup((HMAC_CTX *)c);
-	(void)racoon_free(c);
+	HMAC_CTX_free((HMAC_CTX *)c);
 
 	if (SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH != res->l) {
 		plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
@@ -1912,8 +1908,7 @@ eay_hmacsha1_final(c)
 
 	HMAC_Final((HMAC_CTX *)c, (unsigned char *) res->v, &l);
 	res->l = l;
-	HMAC_cleanup((HMAC_CTX *)c);
-	(void)racoon_free(c);
+	HMAC_CTX_free((HMAC_CTX *)c);
 
 	if (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH != res->l) {
 		plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
@@ -1962,8 +1957,7 @@ eay_hmacmd5_final(c)
 
 	HMAC_Final((HMAC_CTX *)c, (unsigned char *) res->v, &l);
 	res->l = l;
-	HMAC_cleanup((HMAC_CTX *)c);
-	(void)racoon_free(c);
+	HMAC_CTX_free((HMAC_CTX *)c);
 
 	if (MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH != res->l) {
 		plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
@@ -2266,6 +2260,7 @@ eay_dh_generate(prime, g, publen, pub, priv)
 	u_int32_t g;
 {
 	BIGNUM *p = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *BNg = NULL;
 	DH *dh = NULL;
 	int error = -1;
 
@@ -2276,25 +2271,28 @@ eay_dh_generate(prime, g, publen, pub, priv)
 
 	if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
 		goto end;
-	dh->p = p;
-	p = NULL;	/* p is now part of dh structure */
-	dh->g = NULL;
-	if ((dh->g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+	if ((BNg = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		goto end;
+	if (!BN_set_word(BNg, g))
 		goto end;
-	if (!BN_set_word(dh->g, g))
+	if (! DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, BNg))
 		goto end;
+	BNg = NULL;
+	p = NULL;	/* p is now part of dh structure */
 
 	if (publen != 0)
-		dh->length = publen;
+		DH_set_length(dh, publen);
 
 	/* generate public and private number */
 	if (!DH_generate_key(dh))
 		goto end;
 
 	/* copy results to buffers */
-	if (eay_bn2v(pub, dh->pub_key) < 0)
+	BIGNUM *pub_key, *priv_key;
+	DH_get0_key(dh, (const BIGNUM**) &pub_key, (const BIGNUM**) &priv_key);
+	if (eay_bn2v(pub, pub_key) < 0)
 		goto end;
-	if (eay_bn2v(priv, dh->priv_key) < 0) {
+	if (eay_bn2v(priv, priv_key) < 0) {
 		vfree(*pub);
 		goto end;
 	}
@@ -2306,6 +2304,8 @@ end:
 		DH_free(dh);
 	if (p != 0)
 		BN_free(p);
+	if (BNg != 0)
+		BN_free(BNg);
 	return(error);
 }
 
@@ -2327,19 +2327,26 @@ eay_dh_compute(prime, g, pub, priv, pub2, key)
 	/* make DH structure */
 	if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
 		goto end;
-	if (eay_v2bn(&dh->p, prime) < 0)
+	BIGNUM *p = BN_new();
+	BIGNUM *BNg = BN_new();
+	BIGNUM *pub_key = BN_new();
+	BIGNUM *priv_key = BN_new();
+
+	if (p == NULL || BNg == NULL || pub_key == NULL || priv_key == NULL)
 		goto end;
-	if (eay_v2bn(&dh->pub_key, pub) < 0)
+
+	if (eay_v2bn(&p, prime) < 0)
 		goto end;
-	if (eay_v2bn(&dh->priv_key, priv) < 0)
+	if (eay_v2bn(&pub_key, pub) < 0)
 		goto end;
-	dh->length = pub2->l * 8;
-
-	dh->g = NULL;
-	if ((dh->g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+	if (eay_v2bn(&priv_key, priv) < 0)
 		goto end;
-	if (!BN_set_word(dh->g, g))
+	if (!BN_set_word(BNg, g))
 		goto end;
+	DH_set0_key(dh, pub_key, priv_key);
+	DH_set_length(dh, pub2->l * 8);
+	DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, BNg);
+	pub_key = priv_key = p = BNg = NULL;
 
 	if ((v = racoon_calloc(prime->l, sizeof(u_char))) == NULL)
 		goto end;
@@ -2350,6 +2357,14 @@ eay_dh_compute(prime, g, pub, priv, pub2, key)
 	error = 0;
 
 end:
+	if (p != NULL)
+		BN_free(p);
+	if (BNg != NULL)
+		BN_free(BNg);
+	if (pub_key != NULL)
+		BN_free(pub_key);
+	if (priv_key != NULL)
+		BN_free(priv_key);
 	if (dh_pub != NULL)
 		BN_free(dh_pub);
 	if (dh != NULL)
@@ -2400,12 +2415,14 @@ eay_bn2v(var, bn)
 void
 eay_init()
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
 	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
 	ERR_load_crypto_strings();
 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
 	ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
 	ENGINE_register_all_complete();
 #endif
+#endif
 }
 
 vchar_t *
@@ -2504,8 +2521,7 @@ binbuf_pubkey2rsa(vchar_t *binbuf)
 		goto out;
 	}
 	
-	rsa_pub->n = mod;
-	rsa_pub->e = exp;
+	RSA_set0_key(rsa_pub, mod, exp, NULL);
 
 out:
 	return rsa_pub;
@@ -2582,5 +2598,5 @@ eay_random()
 const char *
 eay_version()
 {
-	return SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION);
+	return OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION);
 }
diff --git a/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.h b/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.h
index 66fac73..ee5b765 100644
--- a/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.h
+++ b/src/racoon/crypto_openssl.h
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ extern vchar_t *eay_aes_decrypt __P((vchar_t *, vchar_t *, vchar_t *));
 extern int eay_aes_weakkey __P((vchar_t *));
 extern int eay_aes_keylen __P((int));
 
-#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H)
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA)
 /* Camellia */
 extern vchar_t *eay_camellia_encrypt __P((vchar_t *, vchar_t *, vchar_t *));
 extern vchar_t *eay_camellia_decrypt __P((vchar_t *, vchar_t *, vchar_t *));
diff --git a/src/racoon/eaytest.c b/src/racoon/eaytest.c
index 1474bdc..ae09db3 100644
--- a/src/racoon/eaytest.c
+++ b/src/racoon/eaytest.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
 #include "dhgroup.h"
 #include "crypto_openssl.h"
 #include "gnuc.h"
+#include "openssl_compat.h"
 
 #include "package_version.h"
 
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ rsa_verify_with_pubkey(src, sig, pubkey_txt)
 		printf ("PEM_read_PUBKEY(): %s\n", eay_strerror());
 		return -1;
 	}
-	error = eay_check_rsasign(src, sig, evp->pkey.rsa);
+	error = eay_check_rsasign(src, sig, EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp));
 
 	return error;
 }
@@ -698,7 +699,7 @@ ciphertest(ac, av)
 			  eay_cast_encrypt, eay_cast_decrypt) < 0)
 	  return -1;
 	
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_IDEA)
 	if (ciphertest_1 ("IDEA",
 			  &data, 8,
 			  &key, key.l,
@@ -715,7 +716,7 @@ ciphertest(ac, av)
 			  eay_rc5_encrypt, eay_rc5_decrypt) < 0)
 	  return -1;
 #endif
-#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H)
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CAMELLIA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA)
 	if (ciphertest_1 ("CAMELLIA",
 			  &data, 16,
 			  &key, key.l,
diff --git a/src/racoon/ipsec_doi.c b/src/racoon/ipsec_doi.c
index 84a4c71..b52469f 100644
--- a/src/racoon/ipsec_doi.c
+++ b/src/racoon/ipsec_doi.c
@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ out:
 	/* key length must not be specified on some algorithms */
 	if (keylen) {
 		if (sa->enctype == OAKLEY_ATTR_ENC_ALG_DES
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_IDEA_H) && ! defined(OPENSSL_NO_IDEA)
 		 || sa->enctype == OAKLEY_ATTR_ENC_ALG_IDEA
 #endif
 		 || sa->enctype == OAKLEY_ATTR_ENC_ALG_3DES) {
diff --git a/src/racoon/openssl_compat.c b/src/racoon/openssl_compat.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..864b5fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/racoon/openssl_compat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "openssl_compat.h"
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+static void *OPENSSL_zalloc(size_t num)
+{
+    void *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+
+    if (ret != NULL)
+        memset(ret, 0, num);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
+{
+    /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e.  d may be
+     * left NULL (in case only the public key is used).
+     */
+    if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL)
+        || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (n != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->n);
+        r->n = n;
+    }
+    if (e != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->e);
+        r->e = e;
+    }
+    if (d != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->d);
+        r->d = d;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q)
+{
+    /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+     */
+    if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+        || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (p != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->p);
+        r->p = p;
+    }
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->q);
+        r->q = q;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp)
+{
+    /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+     */
+    if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL)
+        || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL)
+        || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (dmp1 != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->dmp1);
+        r->dmp1 = dmp1;
+    }
+    if (dmq1 != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->dmq1);
+        r->dmq1 = dmq1;
+    }
+    if (iqmp != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->iqmp);
+        r->iqmp = iqmp;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
+                  const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
+{
+    if (n != NULL)
+        *n = r->n;
+    if (e != NULL)
+        *e = r->e;
+    if (d != NULL)
+        *d = r->d;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q)
+{
+    if (p != NULL)
+        *p = r->p;
+    if (q != NULL)
+        *q = r->q;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
+                         const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
+                         const BIGNUM **iqmp)
+{
+    if (dmp1 != NULL)
+        *dmp1 = r->dmp1;
+    if (dmq1 != NULL)
+        *dmq1 = r->dmq1;
+    if (iqmp != NULL)
+        *iqmp = r->iqmp;
+}
+
+int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
+{
+    /* If the fields p and g in d are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.  q may remain NULL.
+     */
+    if ((dh->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+        || (dh->g == NULL && g == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (p != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->p);
+        dh->p = p;
+    }
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->q);
+        dh->q = q;
+    }
+    if (g != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->g);
+        dh->g = g;
+    }
+
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        dh->length = BN_num_bits(q);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key)
+{
+    if (pub_key != NULL)
+        *pub_key = dh->pub_key;
+    if (priv_key != NULL)
+        *priv_key = dh->priv_key;
+}
+
+int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key)
+{
+    /* If the field pub_key in dh is NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.  The priv_key field may
+     * be left NULL.
+     */
+    if (dh->pub_key == NULL && pub_key == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (pub_key != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->pub_key);
+        dh->pub_key = pub_key;
+    }
+    if (priv_key != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->priv_key);
+        dh->priv_key = priv_key;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length)
+{
+    dh->length = length;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void)
+{
+    return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX));
+}
+
+void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    HMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return pkey->pkey.rsa;
+}
+
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
diff --git a/src/racoon/openssl_compat.h b/src/racoon/openssl_compat.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e152c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/racoon/openssl_compat.h
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+#ifndef OPENSSL_COMPAT_H
+#define OPENSSL_COMPAT_H
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d);
+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q);
+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp);
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d);
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q);
+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, const BIGNUM **iqmp);
+
+int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
+void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key);
+int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
+int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length);
+
+HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void);
+void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX* ctx);
+
+RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+#define ASN1_STRING_length(s) s->length
+#define ASN1_STRING_get0_data(s) s->data
+
+#define X509_get_subject_name(x) x->cert_info->subject
+#define X509_get_issuer_name(x) x->cert_info->issuer
+#define X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(n) n->value
+#define X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(n) n->object
+#define X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx) ctx->current_cert
+#define X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx) ctx->error
+#define X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx) ctx->error_depth
+
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLEAY_VERSION
+#define OpenSSL_version SSLeay_version
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_COMPAT_H */
diff --git a/src/racoon/plainrsa-gen.c b/src/racoon/plainrsa-gen.c
index cad1861..b949b08 100644
--- a/src/racoon/plainrsa-gen.c
+++ b/src/racoon/plainrsa-gen.c
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
 #include "vmbuf.h"
 #include "plog.h"
 #include "crypto_openssl.h"
+#include "openssl_compat.h"
 
 #include "package_version.h"
 
@@ -90,12 +91,14 @@ mix_b64_pubkey(const RSA *key)
 	char *binbuf;
 	long binlen, ret;
 	vchar_t *res;
-	
-	binlen = 1 + BN_num_bytes(key->e) + BN_num_bytes(key->n);
+	const BIGNUM *e, *n;
+
+	RSA_get0_key(key, &n, &e, NULL);
+	binlen = 1 + BN_num_bytes(e) + BN_num_bytes(n);
 	binbuf = malloc(binlen);
 	memset(binbuf, 0, binlen);
-	binbuf[0] = BN_bn2bin(key->e, (unsigned char *) &binbuf[1]);
-	ret = BN_bn2bin(key->n, (unsigned char *) (&binbuf[binbuf[0] + 1]));
+	binbuf[0] = BN_bn2bin(e, (unsigned char *) &binbuf[1]);
+	ret = BN_bn2bin(n, (unsigned char *) (&binbuf[binbuf[0] + 1]));
 	if (1 + binbuf[0] + ret != binlen) {
 		plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
 		     "Pubkey generation failed. This is really strange...\n");
@@ -131,16 +134,20 @@ print_rsa_key(FILE *fp, const RSA *key)
 	
 	fprintf(fp, "# : PUB 0s%s\n", pubkey64->v);
 	fprintf(fp, ": RSA\t{\n");
-	fprintf(fp, "\t# RSA %d bits\n", BN_num_bits(key->n));
+	const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *p, *q, *dmp1, *dmq1, *iqmp;
+	RSA_get0_key(key, &n, &e, &d);
+	RSA_get0_factors(key, &p, &q);
+	RSA_get0_crt_params(key, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
+	fprintf(fp, "\t# RSA %d bits\n", BN_num_bits(n));
 	fprintf(fp, "\t# pubkey=0s%s\n", pubkey64->v);
-	fprintf(fp, "\tModulus: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->n)));
-	fprintf(fp, "\tPublicExponent: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->e)));
-	fprintf(fp, "\tPrivateExponent: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->d)));
-	fprintf(fp, "\tPrime1: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->p)));
-	fprintf(fp, "\tPrime2: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->q)));
-	fprintf(fp, "\tExponent1: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->dmp1)));
-	fprintf(fp, "\tExponent2: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->dmq1)));
-	fprintf(fp, "\tCoefficient: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(key->iqmp)));
+	fprintf(fp, "\tModulus: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(n)));
+	fprintf(fp, "\tPublicExponent: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(e)));
+	fprintf(fp, "\tPrivateExponent: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(d)));
+	fprintf(fp, "\tPrime1: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(p)));
+	fprintf(fp, "\tPrime2: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(q)));
+	fprintf(fp, "\tExponent1: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(dmp1)));
+	fprintf(fp, "\tExponent2: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(dmq1)));
+	fprintf(fp, "\tCoefficient: 0x%s\n", lowercase(BN_bn2hex(iqmp)));
 	fprintf(fp, "  }\n");
 
 	vfree(pubkey64);
@@ -203,11 +210,13 @@ int
 gen_rsa_key(FILE *fp, size_t bits, unsigned long exp)
 {
 	int ret;
-	RSA *key;
+	RSA *key = RSA_new();
+	BIGNUM *e = BN_new();
 
-	key = RSA_generate_key(bits, exp, NULL, NULL);
-	if (!key) {
+	BN_set_word(e, exp);
+	if (! RSA_generate_key_ex(key, bits, e, NULL)) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "RSA_generate_key(): %s\n", eay_strerror());
+		RSA_free(key);
 		return -1;
 	}
 	
diff --git a/src/racoon/prsa_par.y b/src/racoon/prsa_par.y
index 1987e4d..27ce4c6 100644
--- a/src/racoon/prsa_par.y
+++ b/src/racoon/prsa_par.y
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
 #include "isakmp_var.h"
 #include "handler.h"
 #include "crypto_openssl.h"
+#include "openssl_compat.h"
 #include "sockmisc.h"
 #include "rsalist.h"
 
@@ -85,7 +86,18 @@ char *prsa_cur_fname = NULL;
 struct genlist *prsa_cur_list = NULL;
 enum rsa_key_type prsa_cur_type = RSA_TYPE_ANY;
 
-static RSA *rsa_cur;
+struct my_rsa_st {
+	BIGNUM *n;
+	BIGNUM *e;
+	BIGNUM *d;
+	BIGNUM *p;
+	BIGNUM *q;
+	BIGNUM *dmp1;
+	BIGNUM *dmq1;
+	BIGNUM *iqmp;
+};
+
+static struct my_rsa_st *rsa_cur;
 
 void
 prsaerror(const char *s, ...)
@@ -201,8 +213,12 @@ rsa_statement:
 				rsa_cur->iqmp = NULL;
 			}
 		}
-		$$ = rsa_cur;
-		rsa_cur = RSA_new();
+		RSA * rsa_tmp = RSA_new();
+		RSA_set0_key(rsa_tmp, rsa_cur->n, rsa_cur->e, rsa_cur->d);
+		RSA_set0_factors(rsa_tmp, rsa_cur->p, rsa_cur->q);
+		RSA_set0_crt_params(rsa_tmp, rsa_cur->dmp1, rsa_cur->dmq1, rsa_cur->iqmp);
+		$$ = rsa_tmp;
+		memset(rsa_cur, 0, sizeof(struct my_rsa_st));
 	}
 	| TAG_PUB BASE64
 	{
@@ -351,10 +367,12 @@ prsa_parse_file(struct genlist *list, char *fname, enum rsa_key_type type)
 	prsa_cur_fname = fname;
 	prsa_cur_list = list;
 	prsa_cur_type = type;
-	rsa_cur = RSA_new();
+	rsa_cur = malloc(sizeof(struct my_rsa_st));
+	memset(rsa_cur, 0, sizeof(struct my_rsa_st));
 	ret = prsaparse();
 	if (rsa_cur) {
-		RSA_free(rsa_cur);
+		memset(rsa_cur, 0, sizeof(struct my_rsa_st));
+		free(rsa_cur);
 		rsa_cur = NULL;
 	}
 	fclose (fp);
diff --git a/src/racoon/rsalist.c b/src/racoon/rsalist.c
index f152c82..96e8363 100644
--- a/src/racoon/rsalist.c
+++ b/src/racoon/rsalist.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
 #include "genlist.h"
 #include "remoteconf.h"
 #include "crypto_openssl.h"
+#include "openssl_compat.h"
 
 #ifndef LIST_FIRST
 #define LIST_FIRST(head)        ((head)->lh_first)
@@ -98,7 +99,9 @@ rsa_key_dup(struct rsa_key *key)
 		return NULL;
 
 	if (key->rsa) {
-		new->rsa = key->rsa->d != NULL ? RSAPrivateKey_dup(key->rsa) : RSAPublicKey_dup(key->rsa);
+		const BIGNUM *d;
+		RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
+		new->rsa = (d != NULL ? RSAPrivateKey_dup(key->rsa) : RSAPublicKey_dup(key->rsa));
 		if (new->rsa == NULL)
 			goto dup_error;
 	}
-- 
2.16.1

Re: [Ipsec-tools-devel] OpenSSL 1.1 support?

[Reinoud K. <rei...@gm...>]

Hi Noah,

I don't think so.
It would be interesting to do so I think.
It's sad this project hasn't gained more interest. Thanks,

Reinoud.

On Oct 14, 2017 8:27 AM, "Noah Meyerhans via Ipsec-tools-devel" <
ips...@li...> wrote:

> Has anybody done any work toward supporting OpenSSL 1.1 in ipsec-tools?
> As documented at [1], the work is non-trivial, and before I dive too
> deep into it I'd like to see if it's something that can be coordinated
> with others.
>
> Debian is currently planning on removing Openssl 1.0 in the next major
> release, meaning that ipsec-tools will also be dropped if it can't be
> used with 1.1. [2]
>
> noah
>
> 1. https://www.mail-archive.com/te...@op.../msg36437.html
> 2. https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=858930
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> ------------------
> Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
> engaging tech sites, Slashdot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot
> _______________________________________________
> Ipsec-tools-devel mailing list
> Ips...@li...
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/ipsec-tools-devel
>
>

[Ipsec-tools-devel] OpenSSL 1.1 support?

[Noah M. <fr...@mo...>]

Has anybody done any work toward supporting OpenSSL 1.1 in ipsec-tools?
As documented at [1], the work is non-trivial, and before I dive too
deep into it I'd like to see if it's something that can be coordinated
with others.

Debian is currently planning on removing Openssl 1.0 in the next major
release, meaning that ipsec-tools will also be dropped if it can't be
used with 1.1. [2]

noah

1. https://www.mail-archive.com/te...@op.../msg36437.html
2. https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=858930

Re: [Ipsec-tools-devel] Racoon and openssl engine

[Leon B. <le...@pa...>]

For anybody interested...

There are two calls making use of hardcoded strings "SHA1" which it seems is not allowed for signing (by default) anymore in OpenSSL 1.0.2l  I changed this to SHA256 and it all worked again. When I have time I'll make then configurable and upload a patch.

Regards,
LJB

[Ipsec-tools-devel] Racoon and openssl engine

[Leon B. <le...@pa...>]

Hi all,

I hope somebody can help me (in some way). I have to linux boxes that setup an IPsec tunnel using racoon2. We have a HSM and an OpenSSL engine to generate keypair and encrypt and decrypt with the private key. In crypto_openssl.c we've added code to get the privatekey via the engine e.g.:

bp = (unsigned char *)pubkey->v;
#ifdef SNP
evp = ENGINE_load_private_key(customEngine, "name", NULL, NULL);
#else
evp = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &bp, pubkey->l);
#endif
if (evp == NULL)
:
:

All of this worked fine for OpenSSL v0.9.8z. However I had to update the OpenSSL to v1.0.2 and now  I get the error:

[INTERNAL_ERR]: crypto_openssl.c:1223:eay_rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_sign(): RSA_sign failed: 4359:error:0606B06E:digital envelope routines:EVP_SignFinal:wrong public key type:p_sign.c:123:

So it seems OpenSSL is not diverting the call to the engine's private key sign function. It is there and I know it works since I am able to make TLS connections using the same engine. A normal app, with the new OpenSSL and the engine works fine, but not iked.

Is there some "build" thing I am not doing correct?

Thanks for your time
Regards,
LJB

[Ipsec-tools-devel] possible gotcha in delph1

[Rainer W. <rwe...@mo...>]

That's a function used to delete a ph1andle structure in handler.c. It
contains the following code (in 0.8.0 and since at least 2010 as it's in
the oldest import into my repository):

-------------
void
delph1(iph1)
        struct ph1handle *iph1;
{
        if (iph1 == NULL)
                return;

[...]

        if (iph1->approval) {
                delisakmpsa(iph1->approval);
                iph1->approval = NULL;
        }

        VPTRINIT(iph1->authstr);
        VPTRINIT(iph1->sendbuf);
        VPTRINIT(iph1->dhpriv);
        VPTRINIT(iph1->dhpub);
        VPTRINIT(iph1->dhpub_p);
        VPTRINIT(iph1->dhgxy);
        VPTRINIT(iph1->nonce);
        VPTRINIT(iph1->nonce_p);
        VPTRINIT(iph1->skeyid);
        VPTRINIT(iph1->skeyid_d);
        VPTRINIT(iph1->skeyid_a);

        [...]

        if(iph1->approval != NULL)
                delisakmpsa(iph1->approval);
---------------

IOW, this deletes iph1->approval if its not a null pointer and then sets
it to NULL. After a block of VPTRINITS, iph1->approval is again checked
for not being a NULL pointer and in case it isn't, it will be freed
again.

This caused some very strange effects in the racoon I'm working with
because I replaced the initial

        if (iph1->approval) {
                delisakmpsa(iph1->approval);
                iph1->approval = NULL;
        }

with

	if (iph1->approval) delisakmpsa(iph1->approval);

on the grounds that clearing pointers which won't be used anymore is
pointless. Hence, the lurking double-free came to live ...

[Ipsec-tools-devel] [PATCH] Update racoon to support selinux_check_access(3).

[Richard H. <ric...@bt...>]

avc_init(3) is deprecated, therefore replace the SELinux avc_* calls
with selinux_check_access(3) that combines all those services, plus:
Checks if SELinux enabled.
Supports reordering of classes/permissions at runtime.
Handles unknown classes/permissions.

Requires libselinux 2.1.9 or greater.

The patch builds on top of ipsec-tools-0.8.2 and was tested on Fedora 25.

[Ipsec-tools-devel] [patch] add NAT_T_OAI/OAR support

[Andrey V. E. <bu...@ya...>]

Hi All,

I made a small patch, that adds support for SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_OAI and
SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_OAR extension headers to libipsec and racoon.

The only questionable chunk I think is src/racoon/isakmp_quick.c.
I used for tests configuration with rsasig certificates and
"generate_policy on". Without this change racoon has created SAs with
private addresses.

-- 
WBR, Andrey V. Elsukov

[Ipsec-tools-devel] IPsec VTI support

[Andrey V. E. <bu...@ya...>]

Hi All,

Recently I did some refactoring in the FreeBSD IPsec code. The changes
also include a prototype of virtual tunneling interface for IPsec.
The main idea is that configured tunneling interface has own private
security policies like these:

0.0.0.0/0[any] 0.0.0.0/0[any] any
	in ipsec
	esp/tunnel/RemoteIP-LocalIP/unique:REQID
	spid=33 seq=3 pid=52261
	refcnt=1
::/0[any] ::/0[any] any
	in ipsec
	esp/tunnel/RemoteIP-LocalIP/unique:REQID
	spid=35 seq=2 pid=52261
	refcnt=1
0.0.0.0/0[any] 0.0.0.0/0[any] any
	out ipsec
	esp/tunnel/LocalIP-RemoteIP/unique:REQID
	spid=34 seq=1 pid=52261
	refcnt=1
::/0[any] ::/0[any] any
	out ipsec
	esp/tunnel/LocalIP-RemoteIP/unique:REQID
	spid=36 seq=0 pid=52261
	refcnt=1

The LocalIP, RemoteIP, and REQID are specific for each ipsecN interface
and should be configured by administrator.

# ifconfig ipsec0
ipsec0: flags=8051<UP,POINTOPOINT,RUNNING,MULTICAST> metric 0 mtu 1400
	tunnel inet LocalIP --> RemoteIP
	nd6 options=23<PERFORMNUD,ACCEPT_RTADV,AUTO_LINKLOCAL>
	reqid: REQID
	groups: ipsec


When first packet goes through this interface, the kernel sends
SADB_ACQUIRE message to the racoon and it creates corresponding SAs.
It uses SP id and information from ipsec request to create SAs.
This works without any changes in racoon, but I have to use anonymous
sainfo. Is there a way to use several different sainfo for different
interfaces?

-- 
WBR, Andrey V. Elsukov

Re: [Ipsec-tools-devel] Several running racoon

[Rainer W. <rwe...@mo...>]

Mario Ciccarelli <mar...@mo...> writes:
> sorry to bother but i didn't found any significant results with this
> question: we're trying to concentrate many ipsec site-to-site vpn on same
> box and i'm thinking if it's possibile to have racoon listen (on same box)
> on different ip, loaded as aliases on eth interface. Btw we're dealing with
> FreeBSD10.1

I haven't tested this on FreeBSD but by default, racoon is supposed to
create sockets for all available addresses and ports 500 and 4500. Eg,
(example log output)

Nov 21 18:23:43 marsh racoon[3303]: 10.11.12.13[500] used as isakmp port (fd=10)
Nov 21 18:23:43 marsh racoon[3303]: 10.11.12.13[500] used for NAT-T
Nov 21 18:23:43 marsh racoon[3303]: 10.11.12.13[4500] used as isakmp port (fd=11)
Nov 21 18:23:43 marsh racoon[3303]: 10.11.12.13[4500] used for NAT-T
Nov 21 18:23:43 marsh racoon[3303]: 10.1.4.254[500] used as isakmp port (fd=12)
Nov 21 18:23:43 marsh racoon[3303]: 10.1.4.254[500] used for NAT-T
Nov 21 18:23:43 marsh racoon[3303]: 10.1.4.254[4500] used as isakmp port (fd=13)
Nov 21 18:23:43 marsh racoon[3303]: 10.1.4.254[4500] used for NAT-T
Nov 21 18:23:43 marsh racoon[3303]: 127.0.0.1[500] used as isakmp port (fd=14)
Nov 21 18:23:43 marsh racoon[3303]: 127.0.0.1[500] used for NAT-T
Nov 21 18:23:43 marsh racoon[3303]: 127.0.0.1[4500] used as isakmp port (fd=15)
Nov 21 18:23:43 marsh racoon[3303]: 127.0.0.1[4500] used for NAT-T

> Second chance: is it possibile to have several running racoon (renamed like
> racoon1 - racoon2 - racoon3 ) each one listening on different ip address
> with different conf file ?

It should be.

Re: [Ipsec-tools-devel] Several running racoon

[Mario C. <mar...@mo...>]

Hi Reinoud,

thanks for helping. The main reason is we need to create many ipsec tunnels
with some partner companies that have some of our ip addresses whitelisted.
They do not change them easily.

So now the situation is : some boxes (freebsd), with different ip, running
each one a racoon. This is and old, spof architecture and my idea is to
consolidate them. I'm trying to consolidate, in first step, within a single
box with all ip address on a public interface with aliases , a fail over
strategy (CARP) waiting to migrate them to an enterprise class appliance.

It would be useful to know what do you think about that. Thanks !

Cheers, Mario.

--
ing. Mario Ciccarelli
Sysadmin at Mobyt S.p.A.
Via Aldighieri, 10 - 44121 Ferrara - Italy
------------------------------------------
Phone : +39 02 83508000 - +39 331 6465889
E-mail: mar...@mo... - Web: http://www.mobyt.it

Mobyt® - messaging services

2016-11-21 12:17 GMT+01:00 Reinoud Koornstra <rei...@gm...>:

> Hi Mario,
>
> The best way is to simply try it.
> I don't quickly see global vars that'll prevent it from running multiple
> instances. There will be one upset table maintained in the kernel and
> hopefully it'll give the appropriate response to the correct requestor. I'd
> try it with two raccoon daemons running on different ports have rules for
> different sites. The question would be why you would want this? What
> benefit would it bring?
> Thanks,
>
> Reinoud.
>
> On Nov 18, 2016 2:58 AM, "Mario Ciccarelli" <mar...@mo...>
> wrote:
>
>> Hi guys,
>>
>> sorry to bother but i didn't found any significant results with this
>> question: we're trying to concentrate many ipsec site-to-site vpn on same
>> box and i'm thinking if it's possibile to have racoon listen (on same box)
>> on different ip, loaded as aliases on eth interface. Btw we're dealing with
>> FreeBSD10.1
>>
>> Second chance: is it possibile to have several running racoon (renamed
>> like racoon1 - racoon2 - racoon3 ) each one listening on different ip
>> address with different conf file ?
>>
>> Thanks for help.
>>
>> Mario.
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> ------------------
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Ipsec-tools-devel mailing list
>> Ips...@li...
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/ipsec-tools-devel
>>
>>

Re: [Ipsec-tools-devel] Several running racoon

[Reinoud K. <rei...@gm...>]

Hi Mario,

The best way is to simply try it.
I don't quickly see global vars that'll prevent it from running multiple
instances. There will be one upset table maintained in the kernel and
hopefully it'll give the appropriate response to the correct requestor. I'd
try it with two raccoon daemons running on different ports have rules for
different sites. The question would be why you would want this? What
benefit would it bring?
Thanks,

Reinoud.

On Nov 18, 2016 2:58 AM, "Mario Ciccarelli" <mar...@mo...>
wrote:

> Hi guys,
>
> sorry to bother but i didn't found any significant results with this
> question: we're trying to concentrate many ipsec site-to-site vpn on same
> box and i'm thinking if it's possibile to have racoon listen (on same box)
> on different ip, loaded as aliases on eth interface. Btw we're dealing with
> FreeBSD10.1
>
> Second chance: is it possibile to have several running racoon (renamed
> like racoon1 - racoon2 - racoon3 ) each one listening on different ip
> address with different conf file ?
>
> Thanks for help.
>
> Mario.
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> ------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Ipsec-tools-devel mailing list
> Ips...@li...
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/ipsec-tools-devel
>
>

[Ipsec-tools-devel] Several running racoon

[Mario C. <mar...@mo...>]

Hi guys,

sorry to bother but i didn't found any significant results with this
question: we're trying to concentrate many ipsec site-to-site vpn on same
box and i'm thinking if it's possibile to have racoon listen (on same box)
on different ip, loaded as aliases on eth interface. Btw we're dealing with
FreeBSD10.1

Second chance: is it possibile to have several running racoon (renamed like
racoon1 - racoon2 - racoon3 ) each one listening on different ip address
with different conf file ?

Thanks for help.

Mario.

Re: [Ipsec-tools-devel] [Ipsec-tools-core] Potential Vulnerability Discovered in IPsec-Tools

[Robert F. <RF...@tr...>]

Hi Rainer,

Thanks for the feedback.  Just checking if there are any news on this.  Thanks!


Best regards,

Robert Foggia
Security Researcher, Intelligence Team, SpiderLabs
t: +1 312.873.7696

Trustwave | SMART SECURITY ON DEMAND
www.trustwave.com <http://www.trustwave.com/>






On 10/18/16, 11:33 AM, "Rainer Weikusat" <rwe...@mo...> wrote:

>Reinoud Koornstra <rei...@gm...> writes:
>> Thanks for the patch and discovering this. Adding Rainer to this thread as
>> he'll know quickly if this patch is good or needs a small adjustment.
>> Thanks,
>
>The underlying problem is really that racoon just puts all fragments it
>receives on a list without checking for duplicate fragment indices. This
>means an unauthenticated attacker can just keep sending a fragment with
>the same index and the list will keep growing until the machine runs out
>of memory. It's also possible to make the daemon additionally consume a
>lot of CPU time by triggering 'did we receive all fragements' scans
>after each fragment was received. The algorithm used for detecting this
>is roughly:
>
>
>for (i = 1; i <= last_frag_index; ++i)
>       /* walk complete list to look for fragment with index i */
>
>The proposed patch addresses this partially by checking that no
>duplicate fragments are received and by keeping the fragment list sorted
>(insertion sort) so that the scan for 'all fragments received' becomes
>linear. But there's another quadratic scan in the reassembly function and
>for at most 255 fragments, the complexity doesn't matter that much.
>
>As bandaid, I suggest to leave the scan algorithm alone and just reject
>duplicated and/or obviously nonsensical fragment numbers.
>
>It's possible to do a O(1) implementation here (I'm using a partial O(1)
>implementation in the commercial fork I'm maintaining) and I'm planning
>to replace this with a complete one. I'll ask for permission to publish
>it once it's done.
>
>Getting in touch with NetBSD might also a good idea as they are (AFAIK)
>maintaining there own fork as part of the NetBSD tree.
>
>NB: A known issue with this (and also the other patch) is that the
>daemon will accept fragments whose index is larger than that of the one
>marked as last fragment. But this should be harmless.
>
>---
>diff -rNu ipsec-tools-0.8.0/src/racoon/isakmp_frag.c patched/src/racoon/isakmp_frag.c
>--- ipsec-tools-0.8.0/src/racoon/isakmp_frag.c  2009-04-22 12:24:20.000000000 +0100
>+++ patched/src/racoon/isakmp_frag.c    2016-10-18 17:28:57.289513357 +0100
>@@ -231,14 +231,31 @@
>        if (iph1->frag_chain == NULL) {
>                iph1->frag_chain = item;
>        } else {
>-               struct isakmp_frag_item *current;
>+               struct isakmp_frag_item *current, *next;
>
>-               current = iph1->frag_chain;
>-               while (current->frag_next) {
>-                       if (current->frag_last)
>-                               last_frag = item->frag_num;
>-                       current = current->frag_next;
>-               }
>+               next = iph1->frag_chain;
>+               do {
>+                       current = next;
>+                       if (current->frag_num == item->frag_num) {
>+                               plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "duplicate fragment %d\n",
>+                                    item->frag_num);
>+
>+                               free(item);
>+                               return 0;
>+                       }
>+
>+                       if (current->last_frag) {
>+                               if (item->last_frag) {
>+                                       plog(LLV_WARNING, LOCATION, NULL, "multiple last fragments received\n");
>+
>+                                       free(item);
>+                                       return -1;
>+                               }
>+
>+                               last_frag = current->frag_num;
>+                       }
>+               } while ((next = next->next));
>+
>                current->frag_next = item;
>        }
>

________________________________

This transmission may contain information that is privileged, confidential, and/or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution, or use of the information contained herein (including any reliance thereon) is strictly prohibited. If you received this transmission in error, please immediately contact the sender and destroy the material in its entirety, whether in electronic or hard copy format.

Re: [Ipsec-tools-devel] [Ipsec-tools-core] Potential Vulnerability Discovered in IPsec-Tools

[Rainer W. <rwe...@mo...>]

Rainer Weikusat <rwe...@mo...> writes:

[...]


> +                       current = next;
> +                       if (current->frag_num == item->frag_num) {
> +                               plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "duplicate fragment %d\n",
> +                                    item->frag_num);
> +
> +                               free(item);
> +                               return 0;
> +                       }

This leaks memory in both early exits as the data is in a dynamically
allocated buffer[*].

[*] It also calls free instead of racoon_free. This doesn't really
matter because the only difference is that the code could be compiled
with the Boehm-GC and I doubt anyone uses that (plain malloc is also
used in other places).

---
diff -rNu ipsec-tools-0.8.0/src/racoon/isakmp_frag.c patched/src/racoon/isakmp_frag.c
--- ipsec-tools-0.8.0/src/racoon/isakmp_frag.c	2009-04-22 12:24:20.000000000 +0100
+++ patched/src/racoon/isakmp_frag.c	2016-10-18 21:37:12.033038458 +0100
@@ -231,14 +231,35 @@
 	if (iph1->frag_chain == NULL) {
 		iph1->frag_chain = item;
 	} else {
-		struct isakmp_frag_item *current;
+		struct isakmp_frag_item *current, *next;
 
-		current = iph1->frag_chain;
-		while (current->frag_next) {
-			if (current->frag_last)
-				last_frag = item->frag_num;
-			current = current->frag_next;
-		}
+		next = iph1->frag_chain;
+		do {
+			current = next;
+			if (current->frag_num == item->frag_num) {
+				plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "duplicate fragment %d\n",
+				     item->frag_num);
+				
+				racoon_free(item);
+				vfree(buf);
+				
+				return 0;
+			}
+
+			if (current->last_frag) {
+				if (item->last_frag) {
+					plog(LLV_WARNING, LOCATION, NULL, "multiple last fragments received\n");
+					
+					racoon_free(item);
+					vfree(buf);
+					
+					return -1;
+				}
+
+				last_frag = current->frag_num;
+			}
+		} while ((next = next->next));
+		
 		current->frag_next = item;
 	}