Changelog

v0.12.1 — Security Patch (2025-05-14)

High

• H-1: Replaced err.message with generic 'Internal server error' in all API catch blocks (71 instances across 16 files) — full errors logged server-side only
• H-2: Added rate limiters to all 6 user-facing auth flow endpoints (password reset, verification, email change — 5 req/hr request, 10 req/15min confirm)
• H-3: Added rate limiters to OAuth2 authentication callback and admin token refresh
• H-4: Replaced blocklist-based view query validation with EXPLAIN-based opcode analysis — blocks write operations (DDL, DML, PRAGMA, ATTACH)

Medium

• M-1: Added SELECT-only guard to findRecordsByRawQuery
• M-2: Clamped setBcryptRounds to [10, 12] to prevent DoS via excessive work factor
• M-3: Replaced predictable superuser_${Date.now()} IDs with crypto.randomBytes
• M-4: CLI superuser password input now masked with * characters

Low

• L-1: Added Referrer-Policy: no-referrer header to password reset email responses
• L-2: Replaced inline regex with shared validateIdentifier in vector search
• L-3: Replaced sync fs calls with fs/promises in automated backup cron

v0.12.0 — Security Patch (2025-05-14)

Critical

• C-1: Replaced ...createData spread in OAuth2 flow with explicit field allowlist to prevent mass assignment of passwordHash
• C-2: Added rate limiter to auth-with-otp endpoint (5 req/min per IP+otpId)
• C-3: Replaced Math.random() with crypto.randomInt for OTP code generation
• C-4: Replaced Math.random() with crypto.randomInt for MFA backup codes; codes now hashed before storage

High

• H-1: Added requireSuperuserAuth to GET /api/collections and GET /api/collections/:id endpoints
• H-2: Added requireSuperuserAuth to GET /api/crons endpoint
• H-3: Fixed SQL column/placeholder count mismatch in OTP INSERT statement
• H-4: Fixed +/- field modifier bypass of protected-field stripping in record upsert
• H-5: Replaced all Math.random().toString(36) ID generation with crypto.randomBytes across 5 files
• H-6: Enabled rate limiting by default (60 req/min per IP)

Medium

• M-1: Enabled SMTP TLS certificate validation by default
• M-2: Replaced hardcoded KDF salt with random per-encryption salt; added backward-compatible decryption
• M-3: Lowered JSON/URL-encoded body limit from 50MB to 10MB
• M-4: Sanitized morgan request logging to omit query strings
• M-5: Added field type validation for file upload field query parameter
• M-6: Implemented per-account lockout after 10 consecutive failed auth attempts within 15 minutes

Low

• L-1: Replaced string comparison with crypto.timingSafeEqual for OTP hash verification
• L-2: Capped workflow stream input size to 64KB before JSON.parse
• L-3: Applied rejection sampling to eliminate modulo bias in generateRandomString
• L-4: Loaded version from package.json at runtime; enabled helmet.hidePoweredBy()
• L-5: Added structural validation for collection objects in the import endpoint
• L-6: Removed hardcoded localhost entries from OAuth2 redirect URL allowlist

v0.11.0 — Security Remediation (2025-05-13)

Security

• Fixed 32 security findings including critical SQL injection vulnerabilities, unauthenticated endpoints, weak encryption key fallback, and missing WebSocket authentication
• Added shared validateIdentifier utility for consistent SQL injection prevention
• Applied principle of least privilege with auth middleware additions
• See previous audit report for full details

v0.10.0 — Torque Integration

• Torque agent and workflow engine
• AI-assisted collection and rule generation