| Name | Modified | Size | Downloads / Week |
|---|---|---|---|
| Parent folder | |||
| README.md | 2026-10-02 | 3.8 kB | |
| v0.8.2 source code.tar.gz | 2026-10-02 | 1.8 MB | |
| v0.8.2 source code.zip | 2026-10-02 | 2.4 MB | |
| Totals: 3 Items | 4.2 MB | 0 | |
A security fix. Every install should upgrade. One migration (a database trigger; no table or column changes); no new environment variable; no change to install, backup, restore or uninstall. Advisory: GHSA-6qrx-8q6w-hvgj.
If your upgrade stops with "would clobber existing tag"
This affects installs whose source checkout was cloned before the repository's
history was rewritten. On those copies the tags v0.1.0 to v0.7.1 still point
at the old commits, and git refuses to overwrite them. upgrade-native.sh takes
its backup, then exits right after git prints [rejected] ... (would clobber
existing tag); it prints nothing of its own. Nothing has been changed and your
current version keeps running. Copies cloned after the rewrite are not affected.
Fix: force the tag fetch (the public tags are authoritative, and nothing of yours lives in a tag), then run the upgrade again:
:::bash
sudo git -C /opt/openestate-src fetch --tags --force origin
cd /opt/openestate-src && sudo ./deploy/native/upgrade-native.sh --ref v0.8.2
Security
- An administrator could act beyond their own permissions. Anyone who
could create or edit users, or edit roles, could give any user, including
themselves, a role holding permissions they did not have (up to
super_admin), issue a password-reset link or clear the 2FA of any user they could manage (so the link was shown on their screen and later actions were recorded under the victim's name), deactivate asuper_admin, or add permissions to a role, including their own. Confined to one company; no cross-tenant access. Every such action is now checked against the caller's current permissions in the database (not the token they logged in with): you can only act on a user, or grant a role, whose permissions you already hold; nobody can change their own role; only asuper_admincan act on asuper_admin; and the last activesuper_admincannot be demoted or deactivated. - An account with a customer or broker role but no applicant/broker link
could sign in to the staff app (all versions up to 0.8.1; 0.8.1 only
stopped new ones being created). Staff login, 2FA verify and refresh now
refuse any account whose role is a portal role, and a database trigger
rejects creating or editing such an account. Existing ones are not
changed:
upgrade-native.shlists them after migrating.
Changed
- Behaviour changes to know about:
- Nobody can change their own role (ask another administrator).
- Only a
super_admincan edit, deactivate, reset the password or 2FA of, or change the role of asuper_admin. The last activesuper_admincannot be demoted or deactivated. - You can only give a user, or a role, permissions you hold yourself. Two administrators with identical permissions can still act on each other.
- The
super_adminrole's permissions can no longer be edited, and the role cannot be deleted. It always holds every permission (the upgrade keeps it complete), and the slugsuper_adminis reserved. Edit other roles as before. - Editing a role's permissions now writes an audit row (
ROLE_PERMS_CHANGED).
Workarounds (until you can upgrade)
Grant user- and role-management permissions (admin.user.*, admin.role.*)
only to administrators you fully trust, and review any custom role that
holds them.
After upgrading
Review who holds super_admin or company_admin, and any custom role with
user- or role-management permissions. Review RESET_LINK_ISSUED and
TOTP_RESET_BY_ADMIN audit rows. The upgrade output lists any unlinked
portal-role accounts: deactivate them or give them a staff role.