| Name | Modified | Size | Downloads / Week |
|---|---|---|---|
| Parent folder | |||
| README.md | 2026-09-29 | 2.9 kB | |
| v0.8.1 -- Security fix (portal_staff session boundary) source code.tar.gz | 2026-09-29 | 1.8 MB | |
| v0.8.1 -- Security fix (portal_staff session boundary) source code.zip | 2026-09-29 | 2.3 MB | |
| Totals: 3 Items | 4.1 MB | 0 | |
[0.8.1] - 2026-09-27
A security fix. Every install should upgrade. One migration (row-level data only, no schema change); no new environment variable; no change to install, backup, restore or uninstall.
Security
- Portal sessions could reach staff API routes. A signed-in customer or broker on the portal could call staff API routes: the server didn't check which login a session came from, only which permissions its role held. The seeded broker role held one staff permission (for its dashboard), so any broker could read the staff broker reports: every broker's commission figures and contact details, and customer-level detail of other brokers' bookings. Separately, a customer or broker account could sign in through the staff login and get a staff session. Each session is now tied to the login it came from, and a portal session is refused on every staff route (and a staff session on every portal route), whatever its role's permissions.
- Affected versions: all releases up to and including 0.8.0.
- You can't tell whether this was used. Reads aren't audited. nginx's
access log records each request's path, status and client address, but
not the access token, so a broker reading
/api/v1/reports/brokers/...looks the same as a staff user doing their job. An install has no reliable record of which API calls a portal session made. - Staff login refuses portal accounts. Customers and brokers can no longer sign in through the staff login; they use the portal as before. Each surface's 2FA step also accepts only its own sign-in.
Changed
- The upgrade removes staff permissions from customer and broker roles.
Portal roles can now hold only portal permissions. The upgrade removes
any others, including ones an admin granted on purpose, prints how many
it removed and from which roles, and writes one audit row per role
changed (visible in Admin, Audit Log). On a default install it removes
one: the broker role's
reports.broker.view. - The broker dashboard has its own permission,
portal.broker.dashboard.read, granted to the broker role on upgrade. Brokers signed in during the upgrade may see an error on their dashboard for up to 15 minutes, until their session renews; reloading the page fixes it sooner. - Admin, Roles: a customer or broker role can only be given portal permissions, and the edit screen lists only those. The API refuses anything else with a message naming the permissions.
- Admin, Users: a customer or broker account can only be given a portal role, and a staff account only a staff role. A role from another company is refused with a clear error (it previously failed with a server error).
Database: one migration, 20260927120000_portal_broker_dashboard_permission
(adds the permission and grants it to broker roles).