| Name | Modified | Size | Downloads / Week |
|---|---|---|---|
| Parent folder | |||
| README.md | 2026-09-17 | 5.6 kB | |
| v0.6.0 -- Admin-generated password-reset links, and login cross-links source code.tar.gz | 2026-09-17 | 1.6 MB | |
| v0.6.0 -- Admin-generated password-reset links, and login cross-links source code.zip | 2026-09-17 | 2.1 MB | |
| Totals: 3 Items | 3.7 MB | 0 | |
v0.6.0 — Admin-generated password-reset links, and login cross-links
What's new
Admins can now generate a one-time password-reset link for a staff, customer, or broker user — no mail server required. This install has no built-in mailer: the only way to notify anyone of anything is a console log line, which is fine for demos but useless for actually getting a link to a real person. From now on, an admin who needs to reset someone's password (a forgotten password, an onboarding hiccup, whatever) clicks a button — "Force password reset" on the Admin → Users page for a staff account, or the portal-reset action on Applicant 360 / Broker Detail for a customer or broker — and gets back a complete, ready-to-share URL with a Copy button, valid for 30 minutes. Deliver it however you already talk to that person: WhatsApp, phone, in person. Generating a new link for someone immediately cancels any earlier one still outstanding for them.
The staff and portal login screens now link to each other. If you've ever had a customer or broker ask "where do I log in?" or had your own staff land on the wrong login page, this closes that gap — staff login links to the portal, and portal login links back to staff.
Security hardening
Building the reset-link feature above turned up four real gaps, found in review before this branch merged and closed in the same release:
- Admin-issued staff password-reset tokens no longer pass through the plaintext-logging message provider. Previously, the moment an admin generated a staff reset link, the raw token was also written to the server log. It now reaches only the admin, in the response. This is narrower than "reset tokens no longer reach logs" — admin-issued portal reset links never went through the provider to begin with, and the separate self-service portal password-reset flow (a portal user requesting their own reset, no admin involved) still logs its token in plaintext through the same provider. See "Known issues" below.
- Every other way a password gets set now invalidates that user's outstanding reset links. Before this, a stale admin-issued link could still redeem after the user had already changed their own password. Now a staff change-password, staff forced first-login change, portal change-password, or portal invite consumption all consume any live reset link for that user first.
- A deactivated account can no longer redeem a reset link.
- Reactivating a deactivated account does not revive a reset link that deactivation had already consumed.
None of these require any action from you — they're fixed in the code, not something you configure.
Is any action needed beyond upgrading?
No. No new required environment variable, no forced re-enrolment, no credential rotation.
Also in this release
See CHANGELOG.md (github.com),
the [0.6.0] section, for the full detail behind everything above.
Upgrading
:::bash
cd /opt/openestate-src/deploy/native
sudo ./upgrade-native.sh --ref v0.6.0
Full procedure (backup, rollback behaviour, troubleshooting): Installation Guide.
This release adds one new table (portal_password_resets gains a
created_by_id column; the reset-link feature otherwise reuses the
existing password_resets/portal_password_resets tables) — a normal,
low-risk migration, no lock-timeout concerns beyond what
upgrade-native.sh already guards against on every release.
Known issues
There is still no admin-side way to reset a user's 2FA. If someone
loses both their password and their 2FA device, there is no product
path to recover their account — reset-admin-password.sh (the
break-glass CLI) resets the password but does not clear 2FA, so the
user ends up locked at the code-entry screen with a working password
they can't use. If you're enabling 2FA broadly, make sure recovery
codes are stored somewhere safe, or keep more than one admin account
enrolled — this is the situation that gap bites.
Portal self-service password-reset tokens still reach server logs in
plaintext. ConsoleCommunicationProvider — this install's only
message provider — logs full message bodies, and the portal's own
self-service "forgot password" flow (as opposed to an admin-generated
link) sends its token through it. On an install with no SMS/email
provider configured, that log line is today the only way that token
actually reaches the requesting user — closing it means deciding what
delivery path replaces it, not just redacting a log line. Tracked in
docs/todo.md.
A handful of smaller, related gaps around the reset-link feature are
tracked and open — none are new risks introduced by this release, and
none block it: a narrow race where a link issued in the same instant an
account is deactivated can survive a later reactivation; reset tokens
travel in the URL query string, so they land in nginx's access log
(mitigated by a 30-minute, single-use expiry); consumedAt on a reset
row can mean "used," "superseded," or "invalidated by a password
change" with no way to tell which; and reset-admin-password.sh (the
CLI path) doesn't consume outstanding reset links the way every in-app
password change now does. See docs/todo.md's "Auth / rate limiting"
section for the complete, honest list.