| Name | Modified | Size | Downloads / Week |
|---|---|---|---|
| Parent folder | |||
| NetSentinel.exe | 2026-10-31 | 81.6 MB | |
| NetSentinel.exe.sha256 | 2026-10-31 | 83 Bytes | |
| NetSentinel v1.9.1 source code.tar.gz | 2026-10-31 | 998.9 kB | |
| NetSentinel v1.9.1 source code.zip | 2026-10-31 | 1.1 MB | |
| README.md | 2026-10-31 | 3.4 kB | |
| Totals: 5 Items | 83.7 MB | 0 | |
2124 unit tests plus 14 integration checks. A day of 1.9.0 on a real network raised 263 alerts; none was an attack, and every rule behind them is fixed here, each with a test that fails on 1.9.0.
ARP: a remembered address is not spoofing
Two smart-home devices that each remembered 192.168.1.80 from the network they were set up on announced it once whenever they rejoined Wi-Fi, hours apart, and NetSentinel called it a CRITICAL "ARP Spoofing": the address had gone back to a MAC that held it before, and that counted however long ago it was.
- An address now changes hands only when the new MAC claims it twice within two minutes; a spoofer repeats itself every few seconds to keep caches poisoned.
- It is spoofing only while the previous owner is still using the address (heard in the last ten minutes).
- A device that is not the gateway is no longer met with "verify your gateway".
- The traffic saved with an ARP alert now holds the ARP that raised it.
- This computer's MAC, pinned as a "gateway" before 1.9.0 read the route table properly, is dropped from the saved pins.
The rest of the day's alerts
All false, and all from rules that misread ordinary traffic:
- Services are named by the server's port. The capture now records which end of each TCP connection is the server, from the handshake. For one already open, this computer is the server only if it listens on the port.
- Windows here is set to give outgoing connections local ports from 1024 up, so replies came back to ports like 5900 and 9050. Google "ran a VNC server" on this PC (CRITICAL), and a Raspberry Pi "connected to Tor" on it.
- The same went for MSSQL, an admin page, a printer, a malware port, and "Redis" from an HTTP request sent from local port 6379.
- Redis needs a Redis command:
a and b or clet any "GET" count. - Modbus needs a real MBAP header. A few bytes on port 502, from a printer and a router answering the audit's probe, were CRITICAL "unauthenticated Modbus".
- BACnet is UDP: a web client whose port happened to be 47808 made a local web server "BACnet".
- Fast-flux needs addresses spread over at least four unrelated networks, and goes by the largest TTL seen. A caching router hands out what is left of a TTL, down to 1 second. api.weather.gov and Xbox's catalogue, both on Akamai (8 addresses in two networks), were HIGH every five minutes all night. A name is reported at most once an hour.
- Port scans raise one alert per scanner, about its main target. A 7-second audit raised 87, naming internet servers as "targets".
- SYN flood needs 300 SYNs in ten seconds, not 50. A program retrying a Raspberry Pi's service five times a second was CRITICAL.
- ESET's hourly update login (HTTP Digest, hashed) is noted once a day as "likely safe". The verifier had confirmed every captured credential, which raised it from LOW to HIGH.
- Certificate checks over plain HTTP are not insecure services, like updates: revocation lists, OCSP and issuer certificates are signed by design.
Installing. Install Npcap first (tick "WinPcap API-compatible
mode"), then run NetSentinel.exe. It asks for administrator rights because packet
capture needs them. NetSentinel.exe.sha256 holds the checksum to verify the download.