Menu
▾
▴
[tpmdd-devel] [PATCH 20/23] TPMLIB: Implement call to TPM_CreateWrapKey
|
From: David H. <dho...@re...> - 2018-08-21 15:59:14
|
Implement a function to invoke TPM_CreateWrapKey.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dho...@re...>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-library.c | 248 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/tpm.h | 16 ++-
include/linux/tpm_command.h | 1
3 files changed, 264 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-library.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-library.c
index 0676165322a3..3413abeb3635 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-library.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-library.c
@@ -500,6 +500,7 @@ static int tpm_create_oiap(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *tb,
struct tpm_digests {
unsigned char encauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ unsigned char encauth2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
unsigned char pubauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
unsigned char xorwork[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2];
unsigned char xorhash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
@@ -769,6 +770,253 @@ out:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_unseal);
+enum tpm_key_usage {
+ TPM_KEY_SIGNING = 0x0010,
+ TPM_KEY_STORAGE = 0x0011,
+ TPM_KEY_IDENTITY = 0x0012,
+ TPM_KEY_AUTHCHANGE = 0x0013,
+ TPM_KEY_BIND = 0x0014,
+ TPM_KEY_LEGACY = 0x0015,
+ TPM_KEY_MIGRATE = 0x0016,
+};
+
+enum tpm_algorithm_id {
+ TPM_ALG_RSA = 0x00000001,
+ TPM_ALG_SHA = 0x00000004,
+ TPM_ALG_HMAC = 0x00000005,
+ TPM_ALG_AES128 = 0x00000006,
+ TPM_ALG_MGF1 = 0x00000007,
+ TPM_ALG_AES192 = 0x00000008,
+ TPM_ALG_AES256 = 0x00000009,
+ TPM_ALG_XOR = 0x0000000a,
+};
+
+enum tpm_enc_scheme {
+ TPM_ES_NONE = 0x0001,
+ TPM_ES_RSAESPKCSv15 = 0x0002,
+ TPM_ES_RSAESOAEP_SHA1_MGF1 = 0x0003,
+ TPM_ES_SYM_CTR = 0x0004,
+ TPM_ES_SYM_OFB = 0x0005,
+};
+
+enum tpm_sig_scheme {
+ TPM_SS_NONE = 0x0001,
+ TPM_SS_RSAESPKCSv15_SHA1 = 0x0002,
+ TPM_SS_RSAESPKCSv15_DER = 0x0003,
+ TPM_SS_RSAESPKCSv15_INFO = 0x0004,
+};
+
+enum tpm_auth_data_usage {
+ TPM_AUTH_NEVER = 0x00,
+ TPM_AUTH_ALWAYS = 0x01,
+ TPM_NO_READ_PUBKEY_AUTH = 0x03,
+};
+
+#define TPM_KEY_REDIRECTION 0x00000001
+#define TPM_KEY_MIGRATABLE 0x00000002
+#define TPM_KEY_ISVOLATILE 0x00000004
+#define TPM_KEY_PCRIGNOREDONREAD 0x00000008
+#define TPM_KEY_MIGRATEAUTHORITY 0x00000010
+
+struct tpm_key {
+ struct tpm_struct_ver {
+ u8 major, minor, rev_major, rev_minor;
+ } ver;
+ __be16 key_usage; /* enum tpm_key_usage */
+ __be32 key_flags;
+ u8 auth_data_usage; /* enum tpm_auth_data_usage */
+ struct tpm_key_parms {
+ __be32 algorithm_id; /* enum tpm_algorithm_id */
+ __be16 enc_scheme; /* enum tpm_enc_scheme */
+ __be16 sig_scheme; /* enum tpm_sig_scheme */
+ __be32 parm_size;
+ struct tpm_rsa_key_parms {
+ __be32 key_length;
+ __be32 num_primes;
+ __be32 exponent_size;
+ } __packed rsa;
+ } __packed parms;
+ __be32 pcr_info_size;
+ struct tpm_store_pubkey {
+ __be32 key_length;
+ u8 key_data[0];
+ } __packed pub;
+ __be32 enc_data_size;
+ u8 enc_data[0];
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * tpm_create_wrap_key - Generate a new key and return it encrypted
+ * @chip: The chip to use
+ * @tb: Large scratch buffer for I/O
+ * @parent_type: Type of entity attached to @parent_handle
+ * @parent_handle: TPM-resident key used to encrypt
+ * @parent_auth: Parent authorisation HMAC key
+ * @usage_auth: Encrypted usage authdata for the key
+ * @migration_auth: Encrypted migration authdata for the key (or NULL)
+ * @_wrapped_key: Pointer to where to return the wrapped key (kmalloc'd)
+ *
+ * Have the TPM generate a new key and return it encrypted. The encryption is
+ * based on a key already resident in the TPM and may also include the state of
+ * one or more Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs).
+ *
+ * AUTH1 is used for sealing key.
+ */
+int tpm_create_wrap_key(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+ enum tpm_entity_type parent_type,
+ uint32_t parent_handle,
+ const unsigned char *parent_auth,
+ const unsigned char *usage_auth,
+ const unsigned char *migration_auth,
+ struct tpm_wrapped_key **_wrapped_key)
+{
+ struct tpm_wrapped_key *wrapped_key;
+ struct tpm_osapsess sess;
+ struct tpm_digests *td;
+ struct tpm_buf *tb;
+ struct tpm_key *result;
+ unsigned char cont;
+ __be32 ordinal_be;
+ int key_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ struct tpm_key tpm_key = {
+ .ver = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00 },
+ .key_usage = cpu_to_be16(TPM_KEY_SIGNING),
+ .key_flags = cpu_to_be32(0),
+ .auth_data_usage = TPM_AUTH_ALWAYS,
+ .parms.algorithm_id = cpu_to_be32(TPM_ALG_RSA),
+ .parms.enc_scheme = cpu_to_be16(TPM_ES_RSAESPKCSv15),
+ .parms.sig_scheme = cpu_to_be16(TPM_SS_RSAESPKCSv15_SHA1),
+ .parms.parm_size = cpu_to_be32(sizeof(struct tpm_rsa_key_parms)),
+ .parms.rsa.key_length = cpu_to_be32(2048),
+ .parms.rsa.num_primes = cpu_to_be32(2),
+ .parms.rsa.exponent_size = cpu_to_be32(0),
+ .pcr_info_size = cpu_to_be32(0),
+ .pub.key_length = cpu_to_be32(0),
+ .enc_data_size = cpu_to_be32(0),
+ };
+
+ kenter("");
+
+ if (migration_auth)
+ tpm_key.key_flags |= cpu_to_be32(TPM_KEY_MIGRATABLE);
+
+ /* alloc some work space */
+ tb = kmalloc(sizeof(*tb) + sizeof(*td), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tb)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ td = (void *)tb + sizeof(*tb);
+
+ /* Get the encryption session */
+ ret = tpm_create_osap(chip, tb, &sess,
+ parent_auth, parent_type, parent_handle);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ dump_sess(&sess);
+
+ /* We need to pass 'passwords' to the TPM with which it will encrypt
+ * the key before returning it. So that the passwords don't travel to
+ * the TPM in the clear, we generate a symmetric key from the
+ * negotiated and encrypted session data and encrypt the passwords with
+ * that.
+ */
+ ret = tpm_calc_symmetric_authkey(td, sess.secret, &sess.enonce);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ tpm_crypt_with_authkey(td, usage_auth, td->encauth);
+ if (migration_auth)
+ tpm_crypt_with_authkey(td, migration_auth, td->encauth2);
+ else
+ tpm_crypt_with_authkey(td, sess.enonce.data, td->encauth2);
+
+ /* Set up the parameters we will be sending */
+ ret = tpm_gen_odd_nonce(chip, &td->ononce);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* calculate authorization HMAC value */
+ ordinal_be = cpu_to_be32(TPM_ORD_CREATEWRAPKEY);
+ cont = 0;
+ ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ &sess.enonce, &td->ononce, cont,
+ /* 1S */ sizeof(__be32), &ordinal_be,
+ /* 2S */ SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, td->encauth,
+ /* 3S */ SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, td->encauth2,
+ /* 4S */ sizeof(tpm_key), &tpm_key,
+ 0, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* build and send the TPM request packet */
+ INIT_BUF(tb);
+ store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND);
+ store32(tb, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + 44 + sizeof(tpm_key) + 45);
+ store32(tb, TPM_ORD_CREATEWRAPKEY);
+ store32(tb, parent_handle);
+ store_s(tb, td->encauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ store_s(tb, td->encauth2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ store_s(tb, &tpm_key, sizeof(tpm_key));
+ store32(tb, sess.handle);
+ store_s(tb, td->ononce.data, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ store_8(tb, cont);
+ store_s(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+ ret = tpm_send_dump(chip, tb, "creating key");
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* We need to work out how big the TPM_KEY or TPM_KEY12 struct we got
+ * back is. These structs have several variable-length fields inside
+ * to make parsing more difficult. However, they are only followed by
+ * fixed-length structs...
+ */
+ SET_BUF_OFFSET(tb, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
+ key_size = LOAD32(tb);
+ key_size -= TPM_DATA_OFFSET;
+ key_size -= 2 * TPM_NONCE_SIZE + 1;
+ if (key_size < sizeof(tpm_key)) {
+ ret = -EBADMSG;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Check the HMAC in the response */
+ ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb, ordinal_be, &td->ononce,
+ sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ /* 3S */ key_size, TPM_DATA_OFFSET,
+ 0, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Parse the key */
+ result = (void *)tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET;
+ ret = -EBADMSG;
+ if (key_size < sizeof(tpm_key) + be32_to_cpu(tpm_key.parms.rsa.key_length) / 8)
+ goto out;
+ if (memcmp(result, &tpm_key, offsetof(struct tpm_key, pub.key_length)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (be32_to_cpu(result->pub.key_length) >
+ be32_to_cpu(tpm_key.parms.rsa.key_length) / 8)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ wrapped_key = kmalloc(sizeof(struct tpm_wrapped_key) + key_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!wrapped_key)
+ goto out;
+ wrapped_key->data_len = key_size;
+ wrapped_key->pubkey_offset = offsetof(struct tpm_key, pub.key_data);
+ wrapped_key->pubkey_len = be32_to_cpu(result->pub.key_length);
+ memcpy(wrapped_key->data, result, key_size);
+ *_wrapped_key = wrapped_key;
+ ret = 0;
+
+out:
+ kfree(tb);
+ kleave(" = %d", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_create_wrap_key);
+
/**
* tpm_library_use - Tell the TPM library we want to make use of it
*
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index 398bfaef2325..0bc954ac8266 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static inline int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *data, size_t max) {
*/
/* implementation specific TPM constants */
#define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 64
-#define MAX_BUF_SIZE 512
+#define MAX_BUF_SIZE (2048 - 4)
#define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE 14
#define TPM_OSAP_SIZE 36
#define TPM_OIAP_SIZE 10
@@ -133,4 +133,18 @@ extern int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *tb,
const unsigned char *blobauth,
unsigned char *data, unsigned int *datalen);
+struct tpm_wrapped_key {
+ unsigned short data_len;
+ unsigned short pubkey_offset;
+ unsigned short pubkey_len;
+ u8 data[];
+};
+
+extern int tpm_create_wrap_key(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+ enum tpm_entity_type parent_type,
+ uint32_t parent_handle,
+ const unsigned char *parent_auth,
+ const unsigned char *usage_auth,
+ const unsigned char *migration_auth,
+ struct tpm_wrapped_key **_wrapped_key);
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm_command.h b/include/linux/tpm_command.h
index a3e0bb670e62..0417a3db7e8f 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm_command.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm_command.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ enum tpm_ordinal {
TPM_ORD_PCR_READ = 21,
TPM_ORD_SEAL = 23,
TPM_ORD_UNSEAL = 24,
+ TPM_ORD_CREATEWRAPKEY = 31,
TPM_ORD_GET_RANDOM = 70,
TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST = 83,
TPM_ORD_GET_CAP = 101,
|