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tipc-discussion
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From: Tuong L. <tuo...@de...> - 2019-10-14 11:07:49
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As a need to support the crypto asynchronous operations in the later
commits, apart from the current RCU mechanism for bearer pointer, we
add a 'refcnt' to the bearer object as well.
So, a bearer can be hold via 'tipc_bearer_hold()' without being freed
even though the bearer or interface can be disabled in the meanwhile.
If that happens, the bearer will be released then when the crypto
operation is completed and 'tipc_bearer_put()' is called.
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuo...@de...>
---
net/tipc/bearer.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
net/tipc/bearer.h | 3 +++
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/tipc/bearer.c b/net/tipc/bearer.c
index 0214aa1c4427..6e0962e0f759 100644
--- a/net/tipc/bearer.c
+++ b/net/tipc/bearer.c
@@ -315,6 +315,7 @@ static int tipc_enable_bearer(struct net *net, const char *name,
b->net_plane = bearer_id + 'A';
b->priority = prio;
test_and_set_bit_lock(0, &b->up);
+ refcount_set(&b->refcnt, 1);
res = tipc_disc_create(net, b, &b->bcast_addr, &skb);
if (res) {
@@ -351,6 +352,26 @@ static int tipc_reset_bearer(struct net *net, struct tipc_bearer *b)
return 0;
}
+bool tipc_bearer_hold(struct tipc_bearer *b)
+{
+ if (unlikely(!b))
+ return false;
+
+ if (unlikely(!refcount_inc_not_zero(&b->refcnt)))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+void tipc_bearer_put(struct tipc_bearer *b)
+{
+ if (unlikely(!b))
+ return;
+
+ if (refcount_dec_and_test(&b->refcnt))
+ kfree_rcu(b, rcu);
+}
+
/**
* bearer_disable
*
@@ -369,7 +390,7 @@ static void bearer_disable(struct net *net, struct tipc_bearer *b)
if (b->disc)
tipc_disc_delete(b->disc);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(tn->bearer_list[bearer_id], NULL);
- kfree_rcu(b, rcu);
+ tipc_bearer_put(b);
tipc_mon_delete(net, bearer_id);
}
diff --git a/net/tipc/bearer.h b/net/tipc/bearer.h
index ea0f3c49cbed..faca696d422f 100644
--- a/net/tipc/bearer.h
+++ b/net/tipc/bearer.h
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ struct tipc_bearer {
struct tipc_discoverer *disc;
char net_plane;
unsigned long up;
+ refcount_t refcnt;
};
struct tipc_bearer_names {
@@ -210,6 +211,8 @@ int tipc_media_set_window(const char *name, u32 new_value);
int tipc_media_addr_printf(char *buf, int len, struct tipc_media_addr *a);
int tipc_enable_l2_media(struct net *net, struct tipc_bearer *b,
struct nlattr *attrs[]);
+bool tipc_bearer_hold(struct tipc_bearer *b);
+void tipc_bearer_put(struct tipc_bearer *b);
void tipc_disable_l2_media(struct tipc_bearer *b);
int tipc_l2_send_msg(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *buf,
struct tipc_bearer *b, struct tipc_media_addr *dest);
--
2.13.7
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From: Tuong L. <tuo...@de...> - 2019-10-14 11:07:49
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This series provides TIPC encryption feature, kernel part. There will be another one in the 'iproute2/tipc' for user space to set key. Tuong Lien (5): tipc: add reference counter to bearer tipc: enable creating a "preliminary" node tipc: add new AEAD key structure for user API tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication tipc: add support for AEAD key setting via netlink include/uapi/linux/tipc.h | 21 + include/uapi/linux/tipc_netlink.h | 4 + net/tipc/Makefile | 2 +- net/tipc/bcast.c | 2 +- net/tipc/bearer.c | 52 +- net/tipc/bearer.h | 6 +- net/tipc/core.c | 10 + net/tipc/core.h | 4 + net/tipc/crypto.c | 1986 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/tipc/crypto.h | 166 ++++ net/tipc/link.c | 16 +- net/tipc/link.h | 1 + net/tipc/msg.c | 24 +- net/tipc/msg.h | 44 +- net/tipc/netlink.c | 16 +- net/tipc/node.c | 314 +++++- net/tipc/node.h | 10 + net/tipc/sysctl.c | 9 + net/tipc/udp_media.c | 1 + 19 files changed, 2604 insertions(+), 84 deletions(-) create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.c create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.h -- 2.13.7 |
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From: Tuong L. <tuo...@de...> - 2019-10-14 11:07:51
|
When user sets RX key for a peer not existing on the own node, a new
node entry is needed to which the RX key will be attached. However,
since the peer node address (& capabilities) is unknown at that moment,
only the node-ID is provided, this commit allows the creation of a node
with only the data that we call as “preliminary”.
A preliminary node is not the object of the “tipc_node_find()” but the
“tipc_node_find_by_id()”. Once the first message i.e. LINK_CONFIG comes
from that peer, and is successfully decrypted by the own node, the
actual peer node data will be properly updated and the node will
function as usual.
In addition, the node timer always starts when a node object is created
so if a preliminary node is not used, it will be cleaned up.
The later encryption functions will also use the node timer and be able
to create a preliminary node automatically when needed.
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuo...@de...>
---
net/tipc/node.c | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
net/tipc/node.h | 3 ++
2 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/tipc/node.c b/net/tipc/node.c
index f2e3cf70c922..2eeffc380e8f 100644
--- a/net/tipc/node.c
+++ b/net/tipc/node.c
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ struct tipc_bclink_entry {
/**
* struct tipc_node - TIPC node structure
* @addr: network address of node
+ * @preliminary: a preliminary node or not
* @ref: reference counter to node object
* @lock: rwlock governing access to structure
* @net: the applicable net namespace
@@ -102,6 +103,7 @@ struct tipc_bclink_entry {
*/
struct tipc_node {
u32 addr;
+ bool preliminary;
struct kref kref;
rwlock_t lock;
struct net *net;
@@ -120,6 +122,7 @@ struct tipc_node {
u32 signature;
u32 link_id;
u8 peer_id[16];
+ char peer_id_string[NODE_ID_STR_LEN];
struct list_head publ_list;
struct list_head conn_sks;
unsigned long keepalive_intv;
@@ -235,6 +238,16 @@ u16 tipc_node_get_capabilities(struct net *net, u32 addr)
return caps;
}
+u32 tipc_node_get_addr(struct tipc_node *node)
+{
+ return (node) ? node->addr : 0;
+}
+
+char *tipc_node_get_id_str(struct tipc_node *node)
+{
+ return node->peer_id_string;
+}
+
static void tipc_node_kref_release(struct kref *kref)
{
struct tipc_node *n = container_of(kref, struct tipc_node, kref);
@@ -264,7 +277,7 @@ static struct tipc_node *tipc_node_find(struct net *net, u32 addr)
rcu_read_lock();
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &tn->node_htable[thash], hash) {
- if (node->addr != addr)
+ if (node->addr != addr || node->preliminary)
continue;
if (!kref_get_unless_zero(&node->kref))
node = NULL;
@@ -360,22 +373,44 @@ static void tipc_node_write_unlock(struct tipc_node *n)
}
}
-static struct tipc_node *tipc_node_create(struct net *net, u32 addr,
- u8 *peer_id, u16 capabilities)
+struct tipc_node *tipc_node_create(struct net *net, u32 addr, u8 *peer_id,
+ u16 capabilities, bool preliminary)
{
struct tipc_net *tn = net_generic(net, tipc_net_id);
struct tipc_node *n, *temp_node;
struct tipc_link *l;
+ unsigned long intv;
int bearer_id;
int i;
spin_lock_bh(&tn->node_list_lock);
- n = tipc_node_find(net, addr);
+ n = tipc_node_find(net, addr) ?:
+ tipc_node_find_by_id(net, peer_id);
if (n) {
- if (n->capabilities == capabilities)
+ if (!n->preliminary) {
+ if (n->capabilities == capabilities)
+ goto exit;
+ tipc_node_write_lock(n);
+ goto update_caps;
+ }
+ if (preliminary)
goto exit;
- /* Same node may come back with new capabilities */
+ /* Update preliminary node data & make it "real" */
tipc_node_write_lock(n);
+ n->preliminary = false;
+ n->addr = addr;
+ hlist_del_rcu(&n->hash);
+ hlist_add_head_rcu(&n->hash,
+ &tn->node_htable[tipc_hashfn(addr)]);
+ list_del_rcu(&n->list);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(temp_node, &tn->node_list, list) {
+ if (n->addr < temp_node->addr)
+ break;
+ }
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&n->list, &temp_node->list);
+
+update_caps:
+ /* Same node may come back with new capabilities */
n->capabilities = capabilities;
for (bearer_id = 0; bearer_id < MAX_BEARERS; bearer_id++) {
l = n->links[bearer_id].link;
@@ -396,7 +431,9 @@ static struct tipc_node *tipc_node_create(struct net *net, u32 addr,
pr_warn("Node creation failed, no memory\n");
goto exit;
}
+ tipc_nodeid2string(n->peer_id_string, peer_id);
n->addr = addr;
+ n->preliminary = preliminary;
memcpy(&n->peer_id, peer_id, 16);
n->net = net;
n->capabilities = capabilities;
@@ -417,22 +454,14 @@ static struct tipc_node *tipc_node_create(struct net *net, u32 addr,
n->signature = INVALID_NODE_SIG;
n->active_links[0] = INVALID_BEARER_ID;
n->active_links[1] = INVALID_BEARER_ID;
- if (!tipc_link_bc_create(net, tipc_own_addr(net),
- addr, U16_MAX,
- tipc_link_window(tipc_bc_sndlink(net)),
- n->capabilities,
- &n->bc_entry.inputq1,
- &n->bc_entry.namedq,
- tipc_bc_sndlink(net),
- &n->bc_entry.link)) {
- pr_warn("Broadcast rcv link creation failed, no memory\n");
- kfree(n);
- n = NULL;
- goto exit;
- }
+ n->bc_entry.link = NULL;
tipc_node_get(n);
timer_setup(&n->timer, tipc_node_timeout, 0);
- n->keepalive_intv = U32_MAX;
+ /* Start a slow timer anyway, crypto needs it */
+ n->keepalive_intv = 10000;
+ intv = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(n->keepalive_intv);
+ if (!mod_timer(&n->timer, intv))
+ tipc_node_get(n);
hlist_add_head_rcu(&n->hash, &tn->node_htable[tipc_hashfn(addr)]);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(temp_node, &tn->node_list, list) {
if (n->addr < temp_node->addr)
@@ -950,6 +979,8 @@ u32 tipc_node_try_addr(struct net *net, u8 *id, u32 addr)
{
struct tipc_net *tn = tipc_net(net);
struct tipc_node *n;
+ bool preliminary;
+ u32 sugg_addr;
/* Suggest new address if some other peer is using this one */
n = tipc_node_find(net, addr);
@@ -965,9 +996,11 @@ u32 tipc_node_try_addr(struct net *net, u8 *id, u32 addr)
/* Suggest previously used address if peer is known */
n = tipc_node_find_by_id(net, id);
if (n) {
- addr = n->addr;
+ sugg_addr = n->addr;
+ preliminary = n->preliminary;
tipc_node_put(n);
- return addr;
+ if (!preliminary)
+ return sugg_addr;
}
/* Even this node may be in conflict */
@@ -984,7 +1017,7 @@ void tipc_node_check_dest(struct net *net, u32 addr,
bool *respond, bool *dupl_addr)
{
struct tipc_node *n;
- struct tipc_link *l;
+ struct tipc_link *l, *snd_l;
struct tipc_link_entry *le;
bool addr_match = false;
bool sign_match = false;
@@ -998,11 +1031,26 @@ void tipc_node_check_dest(struct net *net, u32 addr,
*dupl_addr = false;
*respond = false;
- n = tipc_node_create(net, addr, peer_id, capabilities);
+ n = tipc_node_create(net, addr, peer_id, capabilities, false);
if (!n)
return;
tipc_node_write_lock(n);
+ if (unlikely(!n->bc_entry.link)) {
+ snd_l = tipc_bc_sndlink(net);
+ if (!tipc_link_bc_create(net, tipc_own_addr(net),
+ addr, U16_MAX,
+ tipc_link_window(snd_l),
+ n->capabilities,
+ &n->bc_entry.inputq1,
+ &n->bc_entry.namedq, snd_l,
+ &n->bc_entry.link)) {
+ pr_warn("Broadcast rcv link creation failed, no mem\n");
+ tipc_node_write_unlock_fast(n);
+ tipc_node_put(n);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
le = &n->links[b->identity];
@@ -2011,6 +2059,8 @@ int tipc_nl_node_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
}
list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &tn->node_list, list) {
+ if (node->preliminary)
+ continue;
if (last_addr) {
if (node->addr == last_addr)
last_addr = 0;
@@ -2526,11 +2576,6 @@ int tipc_nl_node_dump_monitor_peer(struct sk_buff *skb,
return skb->len;
}
-u32 tipc_node_get_addr(struct tipc_node *node)
-{
- return (node) ? node->addr : 0;
-}
-
/**
* tipc_node_dump - dump TIPC node data
* @n: tipc node to be dumped
diff --git a/net/tipc/node.h b/net/tipc/node.h
index 291d0ecd4101..d128c0de3288 100644
--- a/net/tipc/node.h
+++ b/net/tipc/node.h
@@ -72,12 +72,15 @@ enum {
void tipc_node_stop(struct net *net);
bool tipc_node_get_id(struct net *net, u32 addr, u8 *id);
u32 tipc_node_get_addr(struct tipc_node *node);
+char *tipc_node_get_id_str(struct tipc_node *node);
u32 tipc_node_try_addr(struct net *net, u8 *id, u32 addr);
void tipc_node_check_dest(struct net *net, u32 onode, u8 *peer_id128,
struct tipc_bearer *bearer,
u16 capabilities, u32 signature,
struct tipc_media_addr *maddr,
bool *respond, bool *dupl_addr);
+struct tipc_node *tipc_node_create(struct net *net, u32 addr, u8 *peer_id,
+ u16 capabilities, bool preliminary);
void tipc_node_delete_links(struct net *net, int bearer_id);
void tipc_node_apply_property(struct net *net, struct tipc_bearer *b, int prop);
int tipc_node_get_linkname(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id, u32 node,
--
2.13.7
|
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From: Tuong L. <tuo...@de...> - 2019-10-14 11:07:50
|
The new structure 'tipc_aead_key' is added to the 'tipc.h' for user to
be able to transfer a key to TIPC in kernel. Netlink will be used for
this purpose in the later commits.
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuo...@de...>
---
include/uapi/linux/tipc.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tipc.h b/include/uapi/linux/tipc.h
index 7df026ea6aff..a1b64a916797 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/tipc.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/tipc.h
@@ -232,6 +232,27 @@ struct tipc_sioc_nodeid_req {
char node_id[TIPC_NODEID_LEN];
};
+/*
+ * TIPC Crypto, AEAD
+ */
+#define TIPC_AEAD_ALG_NAME (32)
+
+struct tipc_aead_key {
+ char alg_name[TIPC_AEAD_ALG_NAME];
+ unsigned int keylen; /* in bytes */
+ char key[];
+};
+
+#define TIPC_AEAD_KEYLEN_MIN (16 + 4)
+#define TIPC_AEAD_KEYLEN_MAX (32 + 4)
+#define TIPC_AEAD_KEY_SIZE_MAX (sizeof(struct tipc_aead_key) + \
+ TIPC_AEAD_KEYLEN_MAX)
+
+static inline int tipc_aead_key_size(struct tipc_aead_key *key)
+{
+ return sizeof(*key) + key->keylen;
+}
+
/* The macros and functions below are deprecated:
*/
--
2.13.7
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From: Tuong L. <tuo...@de...> - 2019-10-14 11:07:55
|
This commit offers an option to encrypt and authenticate all messaging,
including the neighbor discovery messages. The currently most advanced
algorithm supported is the AEAD AES-GCM (like IPSec or TLS). All
encryption/decryption is done at the bearer layer, just before leaving
or after entering TIPC.
Supported features:
- Encryption & authentication of all TIPC messages (header + data);
- Two symmetric-key modes: Cluster and Per-node;
- Automatic key switching;
- Key-expired revoking (sequence number wrapped);
- Lock-free encryption/decryption (RCU);
- Asynchronous crypto, Intel AES-NI supported;
- Multiple cipher transforms;
- Logs & statistics;
Two key modes:
- Cluster key mode: One single key is used for both TX & RX in all
nodes in the cluster.
- Per-node key mode: Each nodes in the cluster has one specific TX key.
For RX, a node requires its peers' TX key to be able to decrypt the
messages from those peers.
Key setting from user-space is performed via netlink by a user program
(e.g. the iproute2 'tipc' tool).
Internal key state machine:
Attach Align(RX)
+-+ +-+
| V | V
+---------+ Attach +---------+
| IDLE |---------------->| PENDING |(user = 0)
+---------+ +---------+
A A Switch| A
| | | |
| | Free(switch/revoked) | |
(Free)| +----------------------+ | |Timeout
| (TX) | | |(RX)
| | | |
| | v |
+---------+ Switch +---------+
| PASSIVE |<----------------| ACTIVE |
+---------+ (RX) +---------+
(user = 1) (user >= 1)
The number of TFMs is 10 by default and can be changed via the procfs
'net/tipc/max_tfms'. At this moment, as for simplicity, this file is
also used to print the crypto statistics at runtime:
echo 0xfff1 > /proc/sys/net/tipc/max_tfms
The patch defines a new TIPC version (v7) for the encryption message (-
backward compatibility as well). The message is basically encapsulated
as follows:
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| TIPCv7 encryption | Original TIPCv2 | Authentication |
| header | packet (encrypted) | Tag |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
The throughput is about ~40% for small messages (compared with non-
encryption) and ~9% for large messages. With the support from hardware
crypto i.e. the Intel AES-NI CPU instructions, the throughput increases
upto ~85% for small messages and ~55% for large messages.
MAINTAINERS | add two new files 'crypto.h' & 'crypto.c' in tipc
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuo...@de...>
---
net/tipc/Makefile | 2 +-
net/tipc/bcast.c | 2 +-
net/tipc/bearer.c | 29 +-
net/tipc/bearer.h | 3 +-
net/tipc/core.c | 10 +
net/tipc/core.h | 4 +
net/tipc/crypto.c | 1986 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
net/tipc/crypto.h | 166 +++++
net/tipc/link.c | 16 +-
net/tipc/link.h | 1 +
net/tipc/msg.c | 24 +-
net/tipc/msg.h | 44 +-
net/tipc/node.c | 84 ++-
net/tipc/node.h | 5 +
net/tipc/sysctl.c | 9 +
net/tipc/udp_media.c | 1 +
16 files changed, 2330 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.c
create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.h
diff --git a/net/tipc/Makefile b/net/tipc/Makefile
index c86aba0282af..8953a9c9427d 100644
--- a/net/tipc/Makefile
+++ b/net/tipc/Makefile
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ tipc-y += addr.o bcast.o bearer.o \
core.o link.o discover.o msg.o \
name_distr.o subscr.o monitor.o name_table.o net.o \
netlink.o netlink_compat.o node.o socket.o eth_media.o \
- topsrv.o socket.o group.o trace.o
+ topsrv.o socket.o group.o trace.o crypto.o
CFLAGS_trace.o += -I$(src)
diff --git a/net/tipc/bcast.c b/net/tipc/bcast.c
index 6ef1abdd525f..f41096a759fa 100644
--- a/net/tipc/bcast.c
+++ b/net/tipc/bcast.c
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static struct tipc_bc_base *tipc_bc_base(struct net *net)
*/
int tipc_bcast_get_mtu(struct net *net)
{
- return tipc_link_mtu(tipc_bc_sndlink(net)) - INT_H_SIZE;
+ return tipc_link_mss(tipc_bc_sndlink(net));
}
void tipc_bcast_disable_rcast(struct net *net)
diff --git a/net/tipc/bearer.c b/net/tipc/bearer.c
index 6e0962e0f759..b1e32f9fb12a 100644
--- a/net/tipc/bearer.c
+++ b/net/tipc/bearer.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
#include "netlink.h"
#include "udp_media.h"
#include "trace.h"
+#include "crypto.h"
#define MAX_ADDR_STR 60
@@ -525,10 +526,13 @@ void tipc_bearer_xmit_skb(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id,
rcu_read_lock();
b = bearer_get(net, bearer_id);
- if (likely(b && (test_bit(0, &b->up) || msg_is_reset(hdr))))
- b->media->send_msg(net, skb, b, dest);
- else
+ if (likely(b && (test_bit(0, &b->up) || msg_is_reset(hdr)))) {
+ tipc_crypto_xmit(net, &skb, b, dest, NULL);
+ if (skb)
+ b->media->send_msg(net, skb, b, dest);
+ } else {
kfree_skb(skb);
+ }
rcu_read_unlock();
}
@@ -536,7 +540,8 @@ void tipc_bearer_xmit_skb(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id,
*/
void tipc_bearer_xmit(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id,
struct sk_buff_head *xmitq,
- struct tipc_media_addr *dst)
+ struct tipc_media_addr *dst,
+ struct tipc_node *__dnode)
{
struct tipc_bearer *b;
struct sk_buff *skb, *tmp;
@@ -550,10 +555,13 @@ void tipc_bearer_xmit(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id,
__skb_queue_purge(xmitq);
skb_queue_walk_safe(xmitq, skb, tmp) {
__skb_dequeue(xmitq);
- if (likely(test_bit(0, &b->up) || msg_is_reset(buf_msg(skb))))
- b->media->send_msg(net, skb, b, dst);
- else
+ if (likely(test_bit(0, &b->up) || msg_is_reset(buf_msg(skb)))) {
+ tipc_crypto_xmit(net, &skb, b, dst, __dnode);
+ if (skb)
+ b->media->send_msg(net, skb, b, dst);
+ } else {
kfree_skb(skb);
+ }
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
@@ -564,6 +572,7 @@ void tipc_bearer_bc_xmit(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id,
struct sk_buff_head *xmitq)
{
struct tipc_net *tn = tipc_net(net);
+ struct tipc_media_addr *dst;
int net_id = tn->net_id;
struct tipc_bearer *b;
struct sk_buff *skb, *tmp;
@@ -578,7 +587,10 @@ void tipc_bearer_bc_xmit(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id,
msg_set_non_seq(hdr, 1);
msg_set_mc_netid(hdr, net_id);
__skb_dequeue(xmitq);
- b->media->send_msg(net, skb, b, &b->bcast_addr);
+ dst = &b->bcast_addr;
+ tipc_crypto_xmit(net, &skb, b, dst, NULL);
+ if (skb)
+ b->media->send_msg(net, skb, b, dst);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
@@ -605,6 +617,7 @@ static int tipc_l2_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
if (likely(b && test_bit(0, &b->up) &&
(skb->pkt_type <= PACKET_MULTICAST))) {
skb_mark_not_on_list(skb);
+ TIPC_SKB_CB(skb)->flags = 0;
tipc_rcv(dev_net(b->pt.dev), skb, b);
rcu_read_unlock();
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
diff --git a/net/tipc/bearer.h b/net/tipc/bearer.h
index faca696d422f..d0c79cc6c0c2 100644
--- a/net/tipc/bearer.h
+++ b/net/tipc/bearer.h
@@ -232,7 +232,8 @@ void tipc_bearer_xmit_skb(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id,
struct tipc_media_addr *dest);
void tipc_bearer_xmit(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id,
struct sk_buff_head *xmitq,
- struct tipc_media_addr *dst);
+ struct tipc_media_addr *dst,
+ struct tipc_node *__dnode);
void tipc_bearer_bc_xmit(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id,
struct sk_buff_head *xmitq);
void tipc_clone_to_loopback(struct net *net, struct sk_buff_head *pkts);
diff --git a/net/tipc/core.c b/net/tipc/core.c
index 23cb379a93d6..1e3981c9680b 100644
--- a/net/tipc/core.c
+++ b/net/tipc/core.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
#include "socket.h"
#include "bcast.h"
#include "node.h"
+#include "crypto.h"
#include <linux/module.h>
@@ -68,6 +69,10 @@ static int __net_init tipc_init_net(struct net *net)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tn->node_list);
spin_lock_init(&tn->node_list_lock);
+ err = tipc_crypto_start(&tn->crypto_tx, net, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_crypto;
+
err = tipc_sk_rht_init(net);
if (err)
goto out_sk_rht;
@@ -93,16 +98,21 @@ static int __net_init tipc_init_net(struct net *net)
out_nametbl:
tipc_sk_rht_destroy(net);
out_sk_rht:
+ tipc_crypto_stop(&tn->crypto_tx);
+out_crypto:
return err;
}
static void __net_exit tipc_exit_net(struct net *net)
{
+ struct tipc_net *tn = tipc_net(net);
+
tipc_detach_loopback(net);
tipc_net_stop(net);
tipc_bcast_stop(net);
tipc_nametbl_stop(net);
tipc_sk_rht_destroy(net);
+ tipc_crypto_stop(&tn->crypto_tx);
}
static struct pernet_operations tipc_net_ops = {
diff --git a/net/tipc/core.h b/net/tipc/core.h
index 60d829581068..0ee2aa1bba2f 100644
--- a/net/tipc/core.h
+++ b/net/tipc/core.h
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct tipc_link;
struct tipc_name_table;
struct tipc_topsrv;
struct tipc_monitor;
+struct tipc_crypto;
#define TIPC_MOD_VER "2.0.0"
@@ -128,6 +129,9 @@ struct tipc_net {
/* Tracing of node internal messages */
struct packet_type loopback_pt;
+
+ /* TX crypto handler */
+ struct tipc_crypto *crypto_tx;
};
static inline struct tipc_net *tipc_net(struct net *net)
diff --git a/net/tipc/crypto.c b/net/tipc/crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..101a812a0f20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/tipc/crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1986 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/**
+ * net/tipc/crypto.c: TIPC crypto for key handling & packet en/decryption
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2019, Ericsson AB
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the names of the copyright holders nor the names of its
+ * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
+ * this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * Alternatively, this software may be distributed under the terms of the
+ * GNU General Public License ("GPL") version 2 as published by the Free
+ * Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
+ * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include "crypto.h"
+
+#define TIPC_TX_PROBE_LIM msecs_to_jiffies(1000) /* > 1s */
+#define TIPC_TX_LASTING_LIM msecs_to_jiffies(120000) /* 2 mins */
+#define TIPC_RX_ACTIVE_LIM msecs_to_jiffies(3000) /* 3s */
+#define TIPC_RX_PASSIVE_LIM msecs_to_jiffies(180000) /* 3 mins */
+#define TIPC_MAX_TFMS_DEF 10
+#define TIPC_MAX_TFMS_LIM 1000
+
+/**
+ * TIPC Key ids
+ */
+enum {
+ KEY_UNUSED = 0,
+ KEY_MIN,
+ KEY_1 = KEY_MIN,
+ KEY_2,
+ KEY_3,
+ KEY_MAX = KEY_3,
+};
+
+/**
+ * TIPC Crypto statistics
+ */
+enum {
+ STAT_OK,
+ STAT_NOK,
+ STAT_ASYNC,
+ STAT_ASYNC_OK,
+ STAT_ASYNC_NOK,
+ STAT_BADKEYS, /* tx only */
+ STAT_BADMSGS = STAT_BADKEYS, /* rx only */
+ STAT_NOKEYS,
+ STAT_SWITCHES,
+
+ MAX_STATS,
+};
+
+/* TIPC crypto statistics' header */
+static const char *hstats[MAX_STATS] = {"ok", "nok", "async", "async_ok",
+ "async_nok", "badmsgs", "nokeys",
+ "switches"};
+
+/* Max TFMs number per key */
+int sysctl_tipc_max_tfms __read_mostly = TIPC_MAX_TFMS_DEF;
+
+/**
+ * struct tipc_key - TIPC keys' status indicator
+ *
+ * 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
+ * +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
+ * key: | (reserved)|passive idx| active idx|pending idx|
+ * +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
+ */
+struct tipc_key {
+#define KEY_BITS (2)
+#define KEY_MASK ((1 << KEY_BITS) - 1)
+ union {
+ struct {
+#if defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)
+ u8 pending:2,
+ active:2,
+ passive:2, /* rx only */
+ reserved:2;
+#elif defined(__BIG_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)
+ u8 reserved:2,
+ passive:2, /* rx only */
+ active:2,
+ pending:2;
+#else
+#error "Please fix <asm/byteorder.h>"
+#endif
+ } __packed;
+ u8 keys;
+ };
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct tipc_tfm - TIPC TFM structure to form a list of TFMs
+ */
+struct tipc_tfm {
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+ struct list_head list;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct tipc_aead - TIPC AEAD key structure
+ * @tfm_entry: per-cpu pointer to one entry in TFM list
+ * @crypto: TIPC crypto owns this key
+ * @cloned: reference to the source key in case cloning
+ * @users: the number of the key users (TX/RX)
+ * @salt: the key's SALT value
+ * @authsize: authentication tag size (max = 16)
+ * @mode: crypto mode is applied to the key
+ * @hint[]: a hint for user key
+ * @rcu: struct rcu_head
+ * @seqno: the key seqno (cluster scope)
+ * @refcnt: the key reference counter
+ */
+struct tipc_aead {
+#define TIPC_AEAD_HINT_LEN (5)
+ struct tipc_tfm * __percpu *tfm_entry;
+ struct tipc_crypto *crypto;
+ struct tipc_aead *cloned;
+ atomic_t users;
+ u32 salt;
+ u8 authsize;
+ u8 mode;
+ char hint[TIPC_AEAD_HINT_LEN + 1];
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+
+ atomic64_t seqno ____cacheline_aligned;
+ refcount_t refcnt ____cacheline_aligned;
+
+} ____cacheline_aligned;
+
+/**
+ * struct tipc_crypto_stats - TIPC Crypto statistics
+ */
+struct tipc_crypto_stats {
+ unsigned int stat[MAX_STATS];
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct tipc_crypto - TIPC TX/RX crypto structure
+ * @net: struct net
+ * @node: TIPC node (RX)
+ * @aead: array of pointers to AEAD keys for encryption/decryption
+ * @peer_rx_active: replicated peer RX active key index
+ * @key: the key states
+ * @working: the crypto is working or not
+ * @stats: the crypto statistics
+ * @sndnxt: the per-peer sndnxt (TX)
+ * @timer1: general timer 1 (jiffies)
+ * @timer2: general timer 1 (jiffies)
+ * @lock: tipc_key lock
+ */
+struct tipc_crypto {
+ struct net *net;
+ struct tipc_node *node;
+ struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead[KEY_MAX + 1]; /* key[0] is UNUSED */
+ atomic_t peer_rx_active;
+ struct tipc_key key;
+ u8 working:1;
+ struct tipc_crypto_stats __percpu *stats;
+
+ atomic64_t sndnxt ____cacheline_aligned;
+ unsigned long timer1;
+ unsigned long timer2;
+ spinlock_t lock; /* crypto lock */
+
+} ____cacheline_aligned;
+
+/* struct tipc_crypto_tx_ctx - TX context for callbacks */
+struct tipc_crypto_tx_ctx {
+ struct tipc_aead *aead;
+ struct tipc_bearer *bearer;
+ struct tipc_media_addr dst;
+};
+
+/* struct tipc_crypto_rx_ctx - RX context for callbacks */
+struct tipc_crypto_rx_ctx {
+ struct tipc_aead *aead;
+ struct tipc_bearer *bearer;
+};
+
+static struct tipc_aead *tipc_aead_get(struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead);
+static inline void tipc_aead_put(struct tipc_aead *aead);
+static void tipc_aead_free(struct rcu_head *rp);
+static int tipc_aead_users(struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead);
+static void tipc_aead_users_inc(struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead, int lim);
+static void tipc_aead_users_dec(struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead, int lim);
+static void tipc_aead_users_set(struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead, int val);
+static struct crypto_aead *tipc_aead_tfm_next(struct tipc_aead *aead);
+static int tipc_aead_init(struct tipc_aead **aead, struct tipc_aead_key *ukey,
+ u8 mode);
+static int tipc_aead_clone(struct tipc_aead **dst, struct tipc_aead *src);
+static void *tipc_aead_mem_alloc(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+ unsigned int crypto_ctx_size,
+ u8 **iv, struct aead_request **req,
+ struct scatterlist **sg, int nsg);
+static int tipc_aead_encrypt(struct tipc_aead *aead, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct tipc_bearer *b,
+ struct tipc_media_addr *dst,
+ struct tipc_node *__dnode);
+static void tipc_aead_encrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err);
+static int tipc_aead_decrypt(struct net *net, struct tipc_aead *aead,
+ struct sk_buff *skb, struct tipc_bearer *b);
+static void tipc_aead_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err);
+static inline int tipc_ehdr_size(struct tipc_ehdr *ehdr);
+static int tipc_ehdr_build(struct net *net, struct tipc_aead *aead,
+ u8 tx_key, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct tipc_crypto *__rx);
+static inline void tipc_crypto_key_set_state(struct tipc_crypto *c,
+ u8 new_passive,
+ u8 new_active,
+ u8 new_pending);
+static int tipc_crypto_key_attach(struct tipc_crypto *c,
+ struct tipc_aead *aead, u8 pos);
+static bool tipc_crypto_key_try_align(struct tipc_crypto *rx, u8 new_pending);
+static struct tipc_aead *tipc_crypto_key_pick_tx(struct tipc_crypto *tx,
+ struct tipc_crypto *rx,
+ struct sk_buff *skb);
+static void tipc_crypto_key_synch(struct tipc_crypto *rx, u8 new_rx_active,
+ struct tipc_msg *hdr);
+static int tipc_crypto_key_revoke(struct net *net, u8 tx_key);
+static void tipc_crypto_rcv_complete(struct net *net, struct tipc_aead *aead,
+ struct tipc_bearer *b,
+ struct sk_buff **skb, int err);
+static void tipc_crypto_do_cmd(struct net *net, int cmd);
+static char *tipc_crypto_key_dump(struct tipc_crypto *c, char *buf);
+#ifdef TIPC_CRYPTO_DEBUG
+static char *tipc_key_change_dump(struct tipc_key old, struct tipc_key new,
+ char *buf);
+#endif
+
+#define key_next(cur) ((cur) % KEY_MAX + 1)
+
+#define tipc_aead_rcu_ptr(rcu_ptr, lock) \
+ rcu_dereference_protected((rcu_ptr), lockdep_is_held(lock))
+
+#define tipc_aead_rcu_swap(rcu_ptr, ptr, lock) \
+ rcu_swap_protected((rcu_ptr), (ptr), lockdep_is_held(lock))
+
+#define tipc_aead_rcu_replace(rcu_ptr, ptr, lock) \
+do { \
+ typeof(rcu_ptr) __tmp = rcu_dereference_protected((rcu_ptr), \
+ lockdep_is_held(lock)); \
+ rcu_assign_pointer((rcu_ptr), (ptr)); \
+ tipc_aead_put(__tmp); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define tipc_crypto_key_detach(rcu_ptr, lock) \
+ tipc_aead_rcu_replace((rcu_ptr), NULL, lock)
+
+/**
+ * tipc_aead_key_validate - Validate a AEAD user key
+ */
+int tipc_aead_key_validate(struct tipc_aead_key *ukey)
+{
+ int keylen;
+
+ /* Check if algorithm exists */
+ if (unlikely(!crypto_has_alg(ukey->alg_name, 0, 0))) {
+ pr_info("Not found cipher: \"%s\"!\n", ukey->alg_name);
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ /* Currently, we only support the "gcm(aes)" cipher algorithm (or its
+ * templates but with 12-byte IV length)
+ */
+ if (strcmp(ukey->alg_name, "gcm(aes)"))
+ return -ENOTSUPP;
+
+ /* Check if key size is correct */
+ keylen = ukey->keylen - TIPC_AES_GCM_SALT_SIZE;
+ if (unlikely(keylen != TIPC_AES_GCM_KEY_SIZE_128 &&
+ keylen != TIPC_AES_GCM_KEY_SIZE_192 &&
+ keylen != TIPC_AES_GCM_KEY_SIZE_256))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct tipc_aead *tipc_aead_get(struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead)
+{
+ struct tipc_aead *tmp;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tmp = rcu_dereference(aead);
+ if (unlikely(!tmp || !refcount_inc_not_zero(&tmp->refcnt)))
+ tmp = NULL;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return tmp;
+}
+
+static inline void tipc_aead_put(struct tipc_aead *aead)
+{
+ if (aead && refcount_dec_and_test(&aead->refcnt))
+ call_rcu(&aead->rcu, tipc_aead_free);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_aead_free - Release AEAD key incl. all the TFMs in the list
+ * @rp: rcu head pointer
+ */
+static void tipc_aead_free(struct rcu_head *rp)
+{
+ struct tipc_aead *aead = container_of(rp, struct tipc_aead, rcu);
+ struct tipc_tfm *tfm_entry, *head, *tmp;
+
+ if (aead->cloned) {
+ tipc_aead_put(aead->cloned);
+ } else {
+ head = *this_cpu_ptr(aead->tfm_entry);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(tfm_entry, tmp, &head->list, list) {
+ crypto_free_aead(tfm_entry->tfm);
+ list_del(&tfm_entry->list);
+ kfree(tfm_entry);
+ }
+ /* Free the head */
+ crypto_free_aead(head->tfm);
+ list_del(&head->list);
+ kfree(head);
+ }
+ free_percpu(aead->tfm_entry);
+ kfree(aead);
+}
+
+static int tipc_aead_users(struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead)
+{
+ struct tipc_aead *tmp;
+ int users = 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tmp = rcu_dereference(aead);
+ if (tmp)
+ users = atomic_read(&tmp->users);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return users;
+}
+
+static void tipc_aead_users_inc(struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead, int lim)
+{
+ struct tipc_aead *tmp;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tmp = rcu_dereference(aead);
+ if (tmp)
+ atomic_add_unless(&tmp->users, 1, lim);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+static void tipc_aead_users_dec(struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead, int lim)
+{
+ struct tipc_aead *tmp;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tmp = rcu_dereference(aead);
+ if (tmp)
+ atomic_add_unless(&rcu_dereference(aead)->users, -1, lim);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+static void tipc_aead_users_set(struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead, int val)
+{
+ struct tipc_aead *tmp;
+ int cur;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tmp = rcu_dereference(aead);
+ if (tmp) {
+ do {
+ cur = atomic_read(&tmp->users);
+ if (cur == val)
+ break;
+ } while (atomic_cmpxchg(&tmp->users, cur, val) != cur);
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_aead_tfm_next - Move TFM entry to the next one in list and return it
+ */
+static struct crypto_aead *tipc_aead_tfm_next(struct tipc_aead *aead)
+{
+ struct tipc_tfm **tfm_entry = this_cpu_ptr(aead->tfm_entry);
+
+ *tfm_entry = list_next_entry(*tfm_entry, list);
+ return (*tfm_entry)->tfm;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_aead_init - Initiate TIPC AEAD
+ * @aead: returned new TIPC AEAD key handle pointer
+ * @ukey: pointer to user key data
+ * @mode: the key mode
+ *
+ * Allocate a (list of) new cipher transformation (TFM) with the specific user
+ * key data if valid. The number of the allocated TFMs can be set via the sysfs
+ * "net/tipc/max_tfms" first.
+ * Also, all the other AEAD data are also initialized.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if the initiation is successful, otherwise: < 0
+ */
+static int tipc_aead_init(struct tipc_aead **aead, struct tipc_aead_key *ukey,
+ u8 mode)
+{
+ struct tipc_tfm *tfm_entry, *head;
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+ struct tipc_aead *tmp;
+ int keylen, err, cpu;
+ int tfm_cnt = 0;
+
+ if (unlikely(*aead))
+ return -EEXIST;
+
+ /* Allocate a new AEAD */
+ tmp = kzalloc(sizeof(*tmp), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (unlikely(!tmp))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* The key consists of two parts: [AES-KEY][SALT] */
+ keylen = ukey->keylen - TIPC_AES_GCM_SALT_SIZE;
+
+ /* Allocate per-cpu TFM entry pointer */
+ tmp->tfm_entry = alloc_percpu(struct tipc_tfm *);
+ if (!tmp->tfm_entry) {
+ kzfree(tmp);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ /* Make a list of TFMs with the user key data */
+ do {
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_aead(ukey->alg_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(!tfm_cnt &&
+ crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm) != TIPC_AES_GCM_IV_SIZE)) {
+ crypto_free_aead(tfm);
+ err = -ENOTSUPP;
+ break;
+ }
+ err |= crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, TIPC_AES_GCM_TAG_SIZE);
+ err |= crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, ukey->key, keylen);
+ if (unlikely(err)) {
+ crypto_free_aead(tfm);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ tfm_entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*tfm_entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (unlikely(!tfm_entry)) {
+ crypto_free_aead(tfm);
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ }
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tfm_entry->list);
+ tfm_entry->tfm = tfm;
+
+ /* First entry? */
+ if (!tfm_cnt) {
+ head = tfm_entry;
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ *per_cpu_ptr(tmp->tfm_entry, cpu) = head;
+ }
+ } else {
+ list_add_tail(&tfm_entry->list, &head->list);
+ }
+
+ } while (++tfm_cnt < sysctl_tipc_max_tfms);
+
+ /* Not any TFM is allocated? */
+ if (!tfm_cnt) {
+ free_percpu(tmp->tfm_entry);
+ kzfree(tmp);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy some chars from the user key as a hint */
+ memcpy(tmp->hint, ukey->key, TIPC_AEAD_HINT_LEN);
+ tmp->hint[TIPC_AEAD_HINT_LEN] = '\0';
+
+ /* Initialize the other data */
+ tmp->mode = mode;
+ tmp->cloned = NULL;
+ tmp->authsize = TIPC_AES_GCM_TAG_SIZE;
+ memcpy(&tmp->salt, ukey->key + keylen, TIPC_AES_GCM_SALT_SIZE);
+ atomic_set(&tmp->users, 0);
+ atomic64_set(&tmp->seqno, 0);
+ refcount_set(&tmp->refcnt, 1);
+
+ *aead = tmp;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_aead_clone - Clone a TIPC AEAD key
+ * @dst: dest key for the cloning
+ * @src: source key to clone from
+ *
+ * Make a "copy" of the source AEAD key data to the dest, the TFMs list is
+ * common for the keys.
+ * A reference to the source is hold in the "cloned" pointer for the later
+ * freeing purposes.
+ *
+ * Note: this must be done in cluster-key mode only!
+ * Return: 0 in case of success, otherwise < 0
+ */
+static int tipc_aead_clone(struct tipc_aead **dst, struct tipc_aead *src)
+{
+ struct tipc_aead *aead;
+ int cpu;
+
+ if (!src)
+ return -ENOKEY;
+
+ if (src->mode != CLUSTER_KEY)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (unlikely(*dst))
+ return -EEXIST;
+
+ aead = kzalloc(sizeof(*aead), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (unlikely(!aead))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ aead->tfm_entry = alloc_percpu_gfp(struct tipc_tfm *, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (unlikely(!aead->tfm_entry)) {
+ kzfree(aead);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ *per_cpu_ptr(aead->tfm_entry, cpu) =
+ *per_cpu_ptr(src->tfm_entry, cpu);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(aead->hint, src->hint, sizeof(src->hint));
+ aead->mode = src->mode;
+ aead->salt = src->salt;
+ aead->authsize = src->authsize;
+ atomic_set(&aead->users, 0);
+ atomic64_set(&aead->seqno, 0);
+ refcount_set(&aead->refcnt, 1);
+
+ WARN_ON(!refcount_inc_not_zero(&src->refcnt));
+ aead->cloned = src;
+
+ *dst = aead;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_aead_mem_alloc - Allocate memory for AEAD request operations
+ * @tfm: cipher handle to be registered with the request
+ * @crypto_ctx_size: size of crypto context for callback
+ * @iv: returned pointer to IV data
+ * @req: returned pointer to AEAD request data
+ * @sg: returned pointer to SG lists
+ * @nsg: number of SG lists to be allocated
+ *
+ * Allocate memory to store the crypto context data, AEAD request, IV and SG
+ * lists, the memory layout is as follows:
+ * crypto_ctx || iv || aead_req || sg[]
+ *
+ * Return: the pointer to the memory areas in case of success, otherwise NULL
+ */
+static void *tipc_aead_mem_alloc(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+ unsigned int crypto_ctx_size,
+ u8 **iv, struct aead_request **req,
+ struct scatterlist **sg, int nsg)
+{
+ unsigned int iv_size, req_size;
+ unsigned int len;
+ u8 *mem;
+
+ iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+ req_size = sizeof(**req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm);
+
+ len = crypto_ctx_size;
+ len += iv_size;
+ len += crypto_aead_alignmask(tfm) & ~(crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1);
+ len = ALIGN(len, crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment());
+ len += req_size;
+ len = ALIGN(len, __alignof__(struct scatterlist));
+ len += nsg * sizeof(**sg);
+
+ mem = kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!mem)
+ return NULL;
+
+ *iv = (u8 *)PTR_ALIGN(mem + crypto_ctx_size,
+ crypto_aead_alignmask(tfm) + 1);
+ *req = (struct aead_request *)PTR_ALIGN(*iv + iv_size,
+ crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment());
+ *sg = (struct scatterlist *)PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)*req + req_size,
+ __alignof__(struct scatterlist));
+
+ return (void *)mem;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_aead_encrypt - Encrypt a message
+ * @aead: TIPC AEAD key for the message encryption
+ * @skb: the input/output skb
+ * @b: TIPC bearer where the message will be delivered after the encryption
+ * @dst: the destination media address
+ * @__dnode: TIPC dest node if "known"
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 : if the encryption has completed
+ * -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY : if a callback will be performed
+ * < 0 : the encryption has failed
+ */
+static int tipc_aead_encrypt(struct tipc_aead *aead, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct tipc_bearer *b,
+ struct tipc_media_addr *dst,
+ struct tipc_node *__dnode)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm = tipc_aead_tfm_next(aead);
+ struct tipc_crypto_tx_ctx *tx_ctx;
+ struct aead_request *req;
+ struct sk_buff *trailer;
+ struct scatterlist *sg;
+ struct tipc_ehdr *ehdr;
+ int ehsz, len, tailen, nsg, rc;
+ void *ctx;
+ u32 salt;
+ u8 *iv;
+
+ /* Make sure message len at least 4-byte aligned */
+ len = ALIGN(skb->len, 4);
+ tailen = len - skb->len + aead->authsize;
+
+ /* Expand skb tail for authentication tag:
+ * As for simplicity, we'd have made sure skb having enough tailroom
+ * for authentication tag @skb allocation. Even when skb is nonlinear
+ * but there is no frag_list, it should be still fine!
+ * Otherwise, we must cow it to be a writable buffer with the tailroom.
+ */
+#ifdef TIPC_CRYPTO_DEBUG
+ SKB_LINEAR_ASSERT(skb);
+ if (tailen > skb_tailroom(skb)) {
+ pr_warn("TX: skb tailroom is not enough: %d, requires: %d\n",
+ skb_tailroom(skb), tailen);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (unlikely(!skb_cloned(skb) && tailen <= skb_tailroom(skb))) {
+ nsg = 1;
+ trailer = skb;
+ } else {
+ /* TODO: We could avoid skb_cow_data() if skb has no frag_list
+ * e.g. by skb_fill_page_desc() to add another page to the skb
+ * with the wanted tailen... However, page skbs look not often,
+ * so take it easy now!
+ * Cloned skbs e.g. from link_xmit() seems no choice though :(
+ */
+ nsg = skb_cow_data(skb, tailen, &trailer);
+ if (unlikely(nsg < 0)) {
+ pr_err("TX: skb_cow_data() returned %d\n", nsg);
+ return nsg;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pskb_put(skb, trailer, tailen);
+
+ /* Allocate memory for the AEAD operation */
+ ctx = tipc_aead_mem_alloc(tfm, sizeof(*tx_ctx), &iv, &req, &sg, nsg);
+ if (unlikely(!ctx))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ TIPC_SKB_CB(skb)->crypto_ctx = ctx;
+
+ /* Map skb to the sg lists */
+ sg_init_table(sg, nsg);
+ rc = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len);
+ if (unlikely(rc < 0)) {
+ pr_err("TX: skb_to_sgvec() returned %d, nsg %d!\n", rc, nsg);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Prepare IV: [SALT (4 octets)][SEQNO (8 octets)]
+ * In case we're in cluster-key mode, SALT is varied by xor-ing with
+ * the source address (or w0 of id), otherwise with the dest address
+ * if dest is known.
+ */
+ ehdr = (struct tipc_ehdr *)skb->data;
+ salt = aead->salt;
+ if (aead->mode == CLUSTER_KEY)
+ salt ^= ehdr->addr; /* __be32 */
+ else if (__dnode)
+ salt ^= tipc_node_get_addr(__dnode);
+ memcpy(iv, &salt, 4);
+ memcpy(iv + 4, (u8 *)&ehdr->seqno, 8);
+
+ /* Prepare request */
+ ehsz = tipc_ehdr_size(ehdr);
+ aead_request_set_tfm(req, tfm);
+ aead_request_set_ad(req, ehsz);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, len - ehsz, iv);
+
+ /* Set callback function & data */
+ aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ tipc_aead_encrypt_done, skb);
+ tx_ctx = (struct tipc_crypto_tx_ctx *)ctx;
+ tx_ctx->aead = aead;
+ tx_ctx->bearer = b;
+ memcpy(&tx_ctx->dst, dst, sizeof(*dst));
+
+ /* Hold bearer */
+ if (unlikely(!tipc_bearer_hold(b))) {
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Now, do encrypt */
+ rc = crypto_aead_encrypt(req);
+ if (rc == -EINPROGRESS || rc == -EBUSY)
+ return rc;
+
+ tipc_bearer_put(b);
+
+exit:
+ kfree(ctx);
+ TIPC_SKB_CB(skb)->crypto_ctx = NULL;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void tipc_aead_encrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb = base->data;
+ struct tipc_crypto_tx_ctx *tx_ctx = TIPC_SKB_CB(skb)->crypto_ctx;
+ struct tipc_bearer *b = tx_ctx->bearer;
+ struct tipc_aead *aead = tx_ctx->aead;
+ struct tipc_crypto *tx = aead->crypto;
+ struct net *net = tx->net;
+
+ switch (err) {
+ case 0:
+ this_cpu_inc(tx->stats->stat[STAT_ASYNC_OK]);
+ if (likely(test_bit(0, &b->up)))
+ b->media->send_msg(net, skb, b, &tx_ctx->dst);
+ else
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ break;
+ case -EINPROGRESS:
+ return;
+ default:
+ this_cpu_inc(tx->stats->stat[STAT_ASYNC_NOK]);
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ kfree(tx_ctx);
+ tipc_bearer_put(b);
+ tipc_aead_put(aead);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_aead_decrypt - Decrypt an encrypted message
+ * @net: struct net
+ * @aead: TIPC AEAD for the message decryption
+ * @skb: the input/output skb
+ * @b: TIPC bearer where the message has been received
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 : if the decryption has completed
+ * -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY : if a callback will be performed
+ * < 0 : the decryption has failed
+ */
+static int tipc_aead_decrypt(struct net *net, struct tipc_aead *aead,
+ struct sk_buff *skb, struct tipc_bearer *b)
+{
+ struct tipc_crypto_rx_ctx *rx_ctx;
+ struct aead_request *req;
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+ struct sk_buff *unused;
+ struct scatterlist *sg;
+ struct tipc_ehdr *ehdr;
+ int ehsz, nsg, rc;
+ void *ctx;
+ u32 salt;
+ u8 *iv;
+
+ if (unlikely(!aead))
+ return -ENOKEY;
+
+ /* Cow skb data if needed */
+ if (likely(!skb_cloned(skb) &&
+ (!skb_is_nonlinear(skb) || !skb_has_frag_list(skb)))) {
+ nsg = 1 + skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
+ } else {
+ nsg = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &unused);
+ if (unlikely(nsg < 0)) {
+ pr_err("RX: skb_cow_data() returned %d\n", nsg);
+ return nsg;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate memory for the AEAD operation */
+ tfm = tipc_aead_tfm_next(aead);
+ ctx = tipc_aead_mem_alloc(tfm, sizeof(*rx_ctx), &iv, &req, &sg, nsg);
+ if (unlikely(!ctx))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ TIPC_SKB_CB(skb)->crypto_ctx = ctx;
+
+ /* Map skb to the sg lists */
+ sg_init_table(sg, nsg);
+ rc = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len);
+ if (unlikely(rc < 0)) {
+ pr_err("RX: skb_to_sgvec() returned %d, nsg %d\n", rc, nsg);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Reconstruct IV: */
+ ehdr = (struct tipc_ehdr *)skb->data;
+ salt = aead->salt;
+ if (aead->mode == CLUSTER_KEY)
+ salt ^= ehdr->addr; /* __be32 */
+ else if (ehdr->destined)
+ salt ^= tipc_own_addr(net);
+ memcpy(iv, &salt, 4);
+ memcpy(iv + 4, (u8 *)&ehdr->seqno, 8);
+
+ /* Prepare request */
+ ehsz = tipc_ehdr_size(ehdr);
+ aead_request_set_tfm(req, tfm);
+ aead_request_set_ad(req, ehsz);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, skb->len - ehsz, iv);
+
+ /* Set callback function & data */
+ aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ tipc_aead_decrypt_done, skb);
+ rx_ctx = (struct tipc_crypto_rx_ctx *)ctx;
+ rx_ctx->aead = aead;
+ rx_ctx->bearer = b;
+
+ /* Hold bearer */
+ if (unlikely(!tipc_bearer_hold(b))) {
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Now, do decrypt */
+ rc = crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
+ if (rc == -EINPROGRESS || rc == -EBUSY)
+ return rc;
+
+ tipc_bearer_put(b);
+
+exit:
+ kfree(ctx);
+ TIPC_SKB_CB(skb)->crypto_ctx = NULL;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void tipc_aead_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb = base->data;
+ struct tipc_crypto_rx_ctx *rx_ctx = TIPC_SKB_CB(skb)->crypto_ctx;
+ struct tipc_bearer *b = rx_ctx->bearer;
+ struct tipc_aead *aead = rx_ctx->aead;
+ struct tipc_crypto_stats __percpu *stats = aead->crypto->stats;
+ struct net *net = aead->crypto->net;
+
+ switch (err) {
+ case 0:
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_ASYNC_OK]);
+ break;
+ case -EINPROGRESS:
+ return;
+ default:
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_ASYNC_NOK]);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ kfree(rx_ctx);
+ tipc_crypto_rcv_complete(net, aead, b, &skb, err);
+ if (likely(skb)) {
+ if (likely(test_bit(0, &b->up)))
+ tipc_rcv(net, skb, b);
+ else
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ }
+
+ tipc_bearer_put(b);
+}
+
+static inline int tipc_ehdr_size(struct tipc_ehdr *ehdr)
+{
+ return (ehdr->user != LINK_CONFIG) ? EHDR_SIZE : EHDR_CFG_SIZE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_ehdr_validate - Validate an encryption message
+ * @skb: the message buffer
+ *
+ * Returns "true" if this is a valid encryption message, otherwise "false"
+ */
+bool tipc_ehdr_validate(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct tipc_ehdr *ehdr;
+ int ehsz;
+
+ if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, EHDR_MIN_SIZE)))
+ return false;
+
+ ehdr = (struct tipc_ehdr *)skb->data;
+ if (unlikely(ehdr->version != TIPC_EVERSION))
+ return false;
+ ehsz = tipc_ehdr_size(ehdr);
+ if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, ehsz)))
+ return false;
+ if (unlikely(skb->len <= ehsz + TIPC_AES_GCM_TAG_SIZE))
+ return false;
+ if (unlikely(!ehdr->tx_key))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_ehdr_build - Build TIPC encryption message header
+ * @net: struct net
+ * @aead: TX AEAD key to be used for the message encryption
+ * @tx_key: key id used for the message encryption
+ * @skb: input/output message skb
+ * @__rx: RX crypto handle if dest is "known"
+ *
+ * Return: the header size if the building is successful, otherwise < 0
+ */
+static int tipc_ehdr_build(struct net *net, struct tipc_aead *aead,
+ u8 tx_key, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct tipc_crypto *__rx)
+{
+ struct tipc_msg *hdr = buf_msg(skb);
+ struct tipc_ehdr *ehdr;
+ u32 user = msg_user(hdr);
+ u64 seqno;
+ int ehsz;
+
+ /* Make room for encryption header */
+ ehsz = (user != LINK_CONFIG) ? EHDR_SIZE : EHDR_CFG_SIZE;
+ WARN_ON(skb_headroom(skb) < ehsz);
+ ehdr = (struct tipc_ehdr *)skb_push(skb, ehsz);
+
+ /* Obtain a seqno first:
+ * Use the key seqno (= cluster wise) if dest is unknown or we're in
+ * cluster key mode, otherwise it's better for a per-peer seqno!
+ */
+ if (!__rx || aead->mode == CLUSTER_KEY)
+ seqno = atomic64_inc_return(&aead->seqno);
+ else
+ seqno = atomic64_inc_return(&__rx->sndnxt);
+
+ /* Revoke the key if seqno is wrapped around */
+ if (unlikely(!seqno))
+ return tipc_crypto_key_revoke(net, tx_key);
+
+ /* Word 1-2 */
+ ehdr->seqno = cpu_to_be64(seqno);
+
+ /* Words 0, 3- */
+ ehdr->version = TIPC_EVERSION;
+ ehdr->user = 0;
+ ehdr->keepalive = 0;
+ ehdr->tx_key = tx_key;
+ ehdr->destined = (__rx) ? 1 : 0;
+ ehdr->rx_key_active = (__rx) ? __rx->key.active : 0;
+ ehdr->reserved_1 = 0;
+ ehdr->reserved_2 = 0;
+
+ switch (user) {
+ case LINK_CONFIG:
+ ehdr->user = LINK_CONFIG;
+ memcpy(ehdr->id, tipc_own_id(net), NODE_ID_LEN);
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (user == LINK_PROTOCOL && msg_type(hdr) == STATE_MSG) {
+ ehdr->user = LINK_PROTOCOL;
+ ehdr->keepalive = msg_is_keepalive(hdr);
+ }
+ ehdr->addr = hdr->hdr[3];
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ehsz;
+}
+
+static inline void tipc_crypto_key_set_state(struct tipc_crypto *c,
+ u8 new_passive,
+ u8 new_active,
+ u8 new_pending)
+{
+#ifdef TIPC_CRYPTO_DEBUG
+ struct tipc_key old = c->key;
+ char buf[32];
+#endif
+
+ c->key.keys = ((new_passive & KEY_MASK) << (KEY_BITS * 2)) |
+ ((new_active & KEY_MASK) << (KEY_BITS)) |
+ ((new_pending & KEY_MASK));
+
+#ifdef TIPC_CRYPTO_DEBUG
+ pr_info("%s(%s): key changing %s ::%pS\n",
+ (c->node) ? "RX" : "TX",
+ (c->node) ? tipc_node_get_id_str(c->node) :
+ tipc_own_id_string(c->net),
+ tipc_key_change_dump(old, c->key, buf),
+ __builtin_return_address(0));
+#endif
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_crypto_key_init - Initiate a new user / AEAD key
+ * @c: TIPC crypto to which new key is attached
+ * @ukey: the user key
+ * @mode: the key mode (CLUSTER_KEY or PER_NODE_KEY)
+ *
+ * A new TIPC AEAD key will be allocated and initiated with the specified user
+ * key, then attached to the TIPC crypto.
+ *
+ * Return: new key id in case of success, otherwise: < 0
+ */
+int tipc_crypto_key_init(struct tipc_crypto *c, struct tipc_aead_key *ukey,
+ u8 mode)
+{
+ struct tipc_aead *aead = NULL;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /* Initiate with the new user key */
+ rc = tipc_aead_init(&aead, ukey, mode);
+
+ /* Attach it to the crypto */
+ if (likely(!rc)) {
+ rc = tipc_crypto_key_attach(c, aead, 0);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ tipc_aead_free(&aead->rcu);
+ }
+
+ pr_info("%s(%s): key initiating, rc %d!\n",
+ (c->node) ? "RX" : "TX",
+ (c->node) ? tipc_node_get_id_str(c->node) :
+ tipc_own_id_string(c->net),
+ rc);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_crypto_key_attach - Attach a new AEAD key to TIPC crypto
+ * @c: TIPC crypto to which the new AEAD key is attached
+ * @aead: the new AEAD key pointer
+ * @pos: desired slot in the crypto key array, = 0 if any!
+ *
+ * Return: new key id in case of success, otherwise: -EBUSY
+ */
+static int tipc_crypto_key_attach(struct tipc_crypto *c,
+ struct tipc_aead *aead, u8 pos)
+{
+ u8 new_pending, new_passive, new_key;
+ struct tipc_key key;
+ int rc = -EBUSY;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&c->lock);
+ key = c->key;
+ if (key.active && key.passive)
+ goto exit;
+ if (key.passive && !tipc_aead_users(c->aead[key.passive]))
+ goto exit;
+ if (key.pending) {
+ if (pos)
+ goto exit;
+ if (tipc_aead_users(c->aead[key.pending]) > 0)
+ goto exit;
+ /* Replace it */
+ new_pending = key.pending;
+ new_passive = key.passive;
+ new_key = new_pending;
+ } else {
+ if (pos) {
+ if (key.active && pos != key_next(key.active)) {
+ new_pending = key.pending;
+ new_passive = pos;
+ new_key = new_passive;
+ goto attach;
+ } else if (!key.active && !key.passive) {
+ new_pending = pos;
+ new_passive = key.passive;
+ new_key = new_pending;
+ goto attach;
+ }
+ }
+ new_pending = key_next(key.active ?: key.passive);
+ new_passive = key.passive;
+ new_key = new_pending;
+ }
+
+attach:
+ aead->crypto = c;
+ tipc_crypto_key_set_state(c, new_passive, key.active, new_pending);
+ tipc_aead_rcu_replace(c->aead[new_key], aead, &c->lock);
+
+ c->working = 1;
+ c->timer1 = jiffies;
+ c->timer2 = jiffies;
+ rc = new_key;
+
+exit:
+ spin_unlock_bh(&c->lock);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+void tipc_crypto_key_flush(struct tipc_crypto *c)
+{
+ int k;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&c->lock);
+ c->working = 0;
+ tipc_crypto_key_set_state(c, 0, 0, 0);
+ for (k = KEY_MIN; k <= KEY_MAX; k++)
+ tipc_crypto_key_detach(c->aead[k], &c->lock);
+ atomic_set(&c->peer_rx_active, 0);
+ atomic64_set(&c->sndnxt, 0);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&c->lock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_crypto_key_try_align - Align RX keys if possible
+ * @rx: RX crypto handle
+ * @new_pending: new pending slot if aligned (= TX key from peer)
+ *
+ * Peer has used an unknown key slot, this only happens when peer has left and
+ * rejoned, or we are newcomer.
+ * That means, there must be no active key but a pending key at unaligned slot.
+ * If so, we try to move the pending key to the new slot.
+ * Note: A potential passive key can exist, it will be shifted correspondingly!
+ *
+ * Return: "true" if key is successfully aligned, otherwise "false"
+ */
+static bool tipc_crypto_key_try_align(struct tipc_crypto *rx, u8 new_pending)
+{
+ struct tipc_aead *tmp1, *tmp2 = NULL;
+ struct tipc_key key;
+ bool aligned = false;
+ u8 new_passive = 0;
+ int x;
+
+ spin_lock(&rx->lock);
+ key = rx->key;
+ if (key.pending == new_pending) {
+ aligned = true;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if (key.active)
+ goto exit;
+ if (!key.pending)
+ goto exit;
+ if (tipc_aead_users(rx->aead[key.pending]) > 0)
+ goto exit;
+
+ /* Try to "isolate" this pending key first */
+ tmp1 = tipc_aead_rcu_ptr(rx->aead[key.pending], &rx->lock);
+ if (!refcount_dec_if_one(&tmp1->refcnt))
+ goto exit;
+ rcu_assign_pointer(rx->aead[key.pending], NULL);
+
+ /* Move passive key if any */
+ if (key.passive) {
+ tipc_aead_rcu_swap(rx->aead[key.passive], tmp2, &rx->lock);
+ x = (key.passive - key.pending + new_pending) % KEY_MAX;
+ new_passive = (x <= 0) ? x + KEY_MAX : x;
+ }
+
+ /* Re-allocate the key(s) */
+ tipc_crypto_key_set_state(rx, new_passive, 0, new_pending);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(rx->aead[new_pending], tmp1);
+ if (new_passive)
+ rcu_assign_pointer(rx->aead[new_passive], tmp2);
+ refcount_set(&tmp1->refcnt, 1);
+ aligned = true;
+ pr_info("RX(%s): key is aligned!\n", tipc_node_get_id_str(rx->node));
+
+exit:
+ spin_unlock(&rx->lock);
+ return aligned;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_crypto_key_pick_tx - Pick one TX key for message decryption
+ * @tx: TX crypto handle
+ * @rx: RX crypto handle (can be NULL)
+ * @skb: the message skb which will be decrypted later
+ *
+ * This function looks up the existing TX keys and pick one which is suitable
+ * for the message decryption, that must be a cluster key and not used before
+ * on the same message (i.e. recursive).
+ *
+ * Return: the TX AEAD key handle in case of success, otherwise NULL
+ */
+static struct tipc_aead *tipc_crypto_key_pick_tx(struct tipc_crypto *tx,
+ struct tipc_crypto *rx,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct tipc_skb_cb *skb_cb = TIPC_SKB_CB(skb);
+ struct tipc_aead *aead = NULL;
+ struct tipc_key key = tx->key;
+ u8 k, i = 0;
+
+ /* Initialize data if not yet */
+ if (!skb_cb->tx_clone_deferred) {
+ skb_cb->tx_clone_deferred = 1;
+ memset(&skb_cb->tx_clone_ctx, 0, sizeof(skb_cb->tx_clone_ctx));
+ }
+
+ skb_cb->tx_clone_ctx.rx = rx;
+ if (++skb_cb->tx_clone_ctx.recurs > 2)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Pick one TX key */
+ spin_lock(&tx->lock);
+ do {
+ k = (i == 0) ? key.pending :
+ ((i == 1) ? key.active : key.passive);
+ if (!k)
+ continue;
+ aead = tipc_aead_rcu_ptr(tx->aead[k], &tx->lock);
+ if (!aead)
+ continue;
+ if (aead->mode != CLUSTER_KEY ||
+ aead == skb_cb->tx_clone_ctx.last) {
+ aead = NULL;
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Ok, found one cluster key */
+ skb_cb->tx_clone_ctx.last = aead;
+ WARN_ON(skb->next);
+ skb->next = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (unlikely(!skb->next))
+ pr_warn("Failed to clone skb for next round if any\n");
+ WARN_ON(!refcount_inc_not_zero(&aead->refcnt));
+ break;
+ } while (++i < 3);
+ spin_unlock(&tx->lock);
+
+ return aead;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_crypto_key_synch: Synch own key data according to peer key status
+ * @rx: RX crypto handle
+ * @new_rx_active: latest RX active key from peer
+ * @hdr: TIPCv2 message
+ *
+ * This function updates the peer node related data as the peer RX active key
+ * has changed, so the number of TX keys' users on this node are increased and
+ * decreased correspondingly.
+ *
+ * The "per-peer" sndnxt is also reset when the peer key has switched.
+ */
+static void tipc_crypto_key_synch(struct tipc_crypto *rx, u8 new_rx_active,
+ struct tipc_msg *hdr)
+{
+ struct net *net = rx->net;
+ struct tipc_crypto *tx = tipc_net(net)->crypto_tx;
+ u8 cur_rx_active;
+
+ /* TX might be even not ready yet */
+ if (unlikely(!tx->key.active && !tx->key.pending))
+ return;
+
+ cur_rx_active = atomic_read(&rx->peer_rx_active);
+ if (likely(cur_rx_active == new_rx_active))
+ return;
+
+ /* Make sure this message destined for this node */
+ if (unlikely(msg_short(hdr) ||
+ msg_destnode(hdr) != tipc_own_addr(net)))
+ return;
+
+ /* Peer RX active key has changed, try to update owns' & TX users */
+ if (atomic_cmpxchg(&rx->peer_rx_active,
+ cur_rx_active,
+ new_rx_active) == cur_rx_active) {
+ if (new_rx_active)
+ tipc_aead_users_inc(tx->aead[new_rx_active], INT_MAX);
+ if (cur_rx_active)
+ tipc_aead_users_dec(tx->aead[cur_rx_active], 0);
+
+ atomic64_set(&rx->sndnxt, 0);
+ /* Mark the point TX key users changed */
+ tx->timer1 = jiffies;
+
+#ifdef TIPC_CRYPTO_DEBUG
+ pr_info("TX(%s): key users changed %d-- %d++, peer RX(%s)\n",
+ tipc_own_id_string(net), cur_rx_active,
+ new_rx_active, tipc_node_get_id_str(rx->node));
+#endif
+ }
+}
+
+static int tipc_crypto_key_revoke(struct net *net, u8 tx_key)
+{
+ struct tipc_crypto *tx = tipc_net(net)->crypto_tx;
+ struct tipc_key key;
+
+ spin_lock(&tx->lock);
+ key = tx->key;
+ WARN_ON(!key.active || tx_key != key.active);
+
+ /* Free the active key */
+ tipc_crypto_key_set_state(tx, key.passive, 0, key.pending);
+ tipc_crypto_key_detach(tx->aead[key.active], &tx->lock);
+ spin_unlock(&tx->lock);
+
+ pr_warn("TX(%s): key is revoked!\n", tipc_own_id_string(net));
+ return -EKEYREVOKED;
+}
+
+int tipc_crypto_start(struct tipc_crypto **crypto, struct net *net,
+ struct tipc_node *node)
+{
+ struct tipc_crypto *c;
+
+ if (*crypto)
+ return -EEXIST;
+
+ /* Allocate crypto */
+ c = kzalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!c)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Allocate statistic structure */
+ c->stats = alloc_percpu_gfp(struct tipc_crypto_stats, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!c->stats) {
+ kzfree(c);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ c->working = 0;
+ c->net = net;
+ c->node = node;
+ tipc_crypto_key_set_state(c, 0, 0, 0);
+ atomic_set(&c->peer_rx_active, 0);
+ atomic64_set(&c->sndnxt, 0);
+ c->timer1 = jiffies;
+ c->timer2 = jiffies;
+ spin_lock_init(&c->lock);
+ *crypto = c;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void tipc_crypto_stop(struct tipc_crypto **crypto)
+{
+ struct tipc_crypto *c, *tx, *rx;
+ bool is_rx;
+ u8 k;
+
+ if (!*crypto)
+ return;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ /* RX stopping? => decrease TX key users if any */
+ is_rx = !!((*crypto)->node);
+ if (is_rx) {
+ rx = *crypto;
+ tx = tipc_net(rx->net)->crypto_tx;
+ k = atomic_read(&rx->peer_rx_active);
+ if (k) {
+ tipc_aead_users_dec(tx->aead[k], 0);
+ /* Mark the point TX key users changed */
+ tx->timer1 = jiffies;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Release AEAD keys */
+ c = *crypto;
+ for (k = KEY_MIN; k <= KEY_MAX; k++)
+ tipc_aead_put(rcu_dereference(c->aead[k]));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ pr_warn("%s(%s) has been purged, node left!\n",
+ (is_rx) ? "RX" : "TX",
+ (is_rx) ? tipc_node_get_id_str((*crypto)->node) :
+ tipc_own_id_string((*crypto)->net));
+
+ /* Free this crypto statistics */
+ free_percpu(c->stats);
+
+ *crypto = NULL;
+ kzfree(c);
+}
+
+void tipc_crypto_timeout(struct tipc_crypto *rx)
+{
+ struct tipc_net *tn = tipc_net(rx->net);
+ struct tipc_crypto *tx = tn->crypto_tx;
+ struct tipc_key key;
+ u8 new_pending, new_passive;
+ int cmd;
+
+ /* TX key activating:
+ * The pending key (users > 0) -> active
+ * The active key if any (users == 0) -> free
+ */
+ spin_lock(&tx->lock);
+ key = tx->key;
+ if (key.active && tipc_aead_users(tx->aead[key.active]) > 0)
+ goto s1;
+ if (!key.pending || tipc_aead_users(tx->aead[key.pending]) <= 0)
+ goto s1;
+ if (time_before(jiffies, tx->timer1 + TIPC_TX_LASTING_LIM))
+ goto s1;
+
+ tipc_crypto_key_set_state(tx, key.passive, key.pending, 0);
+ if (key.active)
+ tipc_crypto_key_detach(tx->aead[key.active], &tx->lock);
+ this_cpu_inc(tx->stats->stat[STAT_SWITCHES]);
+ pr_info("TX(%s): key %d is activated!\n", tipc_own_id_string(tx->net),
+ key.pending);
+
+s1:
+ spin_unlock(&tx->lock);
+
+ /* RX key activating:
+ * The pending key (users > 0) -> active
+ * The active key if any -> passive, freed later
+ */
+ spin_lock(&rx->lock);
+ key = rx->key;
+ if (!key.pending || tipc_aead_users(rx->aead[key.pending]) <= 0)
+ goto s2;
+
+ new_pending = (key.passive &&
+ !tipc_aead_users(rx->aead[key.passive])) ?
+ key.passive : 0;
+ new_passive = (key.active) ?: ((new_pending) ? 0 : key.passive);
+ tipc_crypto_key_set_state(rx, new_passive, key.pending, new_pending);
+ this_cpu_inc(rx->stats->stat[STAT_SWITCHES]);
+ pr_info("RX(%s): key %d is activated!\n",
+ tipc_node_get_id_str(rx->node), key.pending);
+ goto s5;
+
+s2:
+ /* RX key "faulty" switching:
+ * The faulty pending key (users < -30) -> passive
+ * The passive key (users = 0) -> pending
+ * Note: This only happens after RX deactivated - s3!
+ */
+ key = rx->key;
+ if (!key.pending || tipc_aead_users(rx->aead[key.pending]) > -30)
+ goto s3;
+ if (!key.passive || tipc_aead_users(rx->aead[key.passive]) != 0)
+ goto s3;
+
+ new_pending = key.passive;
+ new_passive = key.pending;
+ tipc_crypto_key_set_state(rx, new_passive, key.active, new_pending);
+ goto s5;
+
+s3:
+ /* RX key deactivating:
+ * The passive key if any -> pending
+ * The active key -> passive (users = 0) / pending
+ * The pending key if any -> passive (users = 0)
+ */
+ key = rx->key;
+ if (!key.active)
+ goto s4;
+ if (time_before(jiffies, rx->timer1 + TIPC_RX_ACTIVE_LIM))
+ goto s4;
+
+ new_pending = (key.passive) ?: key.active;
+ new_passive = (key.passive) ? key.active : key.pending;
+ tipc_aead_users_set(rx->aead[new_pending], 0);
+ if (new_passive)
+ tipc_aead_users_set(rx->aead[new_passive], 0);
+ tipc_crypto_key_set_state(rx, new_passive, 0, new_pending);
+ pr_info("RX(%s): key %d is deactivated!\n",
+ tipc_node_get_id_str(rx->node), key.active);
+ goto s5;
+
+s4:
+ /* RX key passive -> freed: */
+ key = rx->key;
+ if (!key.passive || !tipc_aead_users(rx->aead[key.passive]))
+ goto s5;
+ if (time_before(jiffies, rx->timer2 + TIPC_RX_PASSIVE_LIM))
+ goto s5;
+
+ tipc_crypto_key_set_state(rx, 0, key.active, key.pending);
+ tipc_crypto_key_detach(rx->aead[key.passive], &rx->lock);
+ pr_info("RX(%s): key %d is freed!\n", tipc_node_get_id_str(rx->node),
+ key.passive);
+
+s5:
+ spin_unlock(&rx->lock);
+
+ /* Limit max_tfms & do debug commands if needed */
+ if (likely(sysctl_tipc_max_tfms <= TIPC_MAX_TFMS_LIM))
+ return;
+
+ cmd = sysctl_tipc_max_tfms;
+ sysctl_tipc_max_tfms = TIPC_MAX_TFMS_DEF;
+ tipc_crypto_do_cmd(rx->net, cmd);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_crypto_xmit - Build & encrypt TIPC message for xmit
+ * @net: struct net
+ * @skb: input/output message skb pointer
+ * @b: bearer used for xmit later
+ * @dst: destination media address
+ * @__dnode: destination node for reference if any
+ *
+ * First, build an encryption message header on the top of the message, then
+ * encrypt the original TIPC message by using the active or pending TX key.
+ * If the encryption is successful, the encrypted skb is returned directly or
+ * via the callback.
+ * Otherwise, the skb is freed!
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 : the encryption has succeeded (or no encryption)
+ * -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY : the encryption is ongoing, a callback will be made
+ * -ENOKEK : the encryption has failed due to no key
+ * -EKEYREVOKED : the encryption has failed due to key revoked
+ * -ENOMEM : the encryption has failed due to no memory
+ * < 0 : the encryption has failed due to other reasons
+ */
+int tipc_crypto_xmit(struct net *net, struct sk_buff **skb,
+ struct tipc_bearer *b, struct tipc_media_addr *dst,
+ struct tipc_node *__dnode)
+{
+ struct tipc_crypto *__rx = tipc_node_crypto_rx(__dnode);
+ struct tipc_crypto *tx = tipc_net(net)->crypto_tx;
+ struct tipc_crypto_stats __percpu *stats = tx->stats;
+ struct tipc_key key = tx->key;
+ struct tipc_aead *aead = NULL;
+ struct sk_buff *probe;
+ int rc = -ENOKEY;
+ u8 tx_key;
+
+ /* No encryption? */
+ if (!tx->working)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Try with the pending key if available and:
+ * 1) This is the only choice (i.e. no active key) or;
+ * 2) Peer has switched to this key (unicast only) or;
+ * 3) It is time to do a pending key probe;
+ */
+ if (unlikely(key.pending)) {
+ tx_key = key.pending;
+ if (!key.active)
+ goto encrypt;
+ if (__rx && atomic_read(&__rx->peer_rx_active) == tx_key)
+ goto encrypt;
+ if (TIPC_SKB_CB(*skb)->probe)
+ goto encrypt;
+ if (!__rx &&
+ time_after(jiffies, tx->timer2 + TIPC_TX_PROBE_LIM)) {
+ tx->timer2 = jiffies;
+ probe = skb_clone(*skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (probe) {
+ TIPC_SKB_CB(probe)->probe = 1;
+ tipc_crypto_xmit(net, &probe, b, dst, __dnode);
+ if (probe)
+ b->media->send_msg(net, probe, b, dst);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* Else, use the active key if any */
+ if (likely(key.active)) {
+ tx_key = key.active;
+ goto encrypt;
+ }
+ goto exit;
+
+encrypt:
+ aead = tipc_aead_get(tx->aead[tx_key]);
+ if (unlikely(!aead))
+ goto exit;
+ rc = tipc_ehdr_build(net, aead, tx_key, *skb, __rx);
+ if (likely(rc > 0))
+ rc = tipc_aead_encrypt(aead, *skb, b, dst, __dnode);
+
+exit:
+ switch (rc) {
+ case 0:
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_OK]);
+ break;
+ case -EINPROGRESS:
+ case -EBUSY:
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_ASYNC]);
+ *skb = NULL;
+ return rc;
+ default:
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_NOK]);
+ if (rc == -ENOKEY)
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_NOKEYS]);
+ else if (rc == -EKEYREVOKED)
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_BADKEYS]);
+ kfree_skb(*skb);
+ *skb = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ tipc_aead_put(aead);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_crypto_rcv - Decrypt an encrypted TIPC message from peer
+ * @net: struct net
+ * @rx: RX crypto handle
+ * @skb: input/output message skb pointer
+ * @b: bearer where the message has been received
+ *
+ * If the decryption is successful, the decrypted skb is returned directly or
+ * as the callback, the encryption header and auth tag will be trimed out
+ * before forwarding to tipc_rcv() via the tipc_crypto_rcv_complete().
+ * Otherwise, the skb will be freed!
+ * Note: RX key(s) can be re-aligned, or in case of no key suitable, TX
+ * cluster key(s) can be taken for decryption (- recursive).
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 : the decryption has successfully completed
+ * -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY : the decryption is ongoing, a callback will be made
+ * -ENOKEY : the decryption has failed due to no key
+ * -EBADMSG : the decryption has failed due to bad message
+ * -ENOMEM : the decryption has failed due to no memory
+ * < 0 : the decryption has failed due to other reasons
+ */
+int tipc_crypto_rcv(struct net *net, struct tipc_crypto *rx,
+ struct sk_buff **skb, struct tipc_bearer *b)
+{
+ struct tipc_crypto *tx = tipc_net(net)->crypto_tx;
+ struct tipc_crypto_stats __percpu *stats;
+ struct tipc_aead *aead = NULL;
+ struct tipc_key key;
+ int rc = -ENOKEY;
+ u8 tx_key = 0;
+
+ /* New peer?
+ * Let's try with TX key (i.e. cluster mode) & verify the skb first!
+ */
+ if (unlikely(!rx))
+ goto pick_tx;
+
+ /* Pick RX key according to TX key, three cases are possible:
+ * 1) The current active key (likely) or;
+ * 2) The pending (new or deactivated) key (if any) or;
+ * 3) The passive or old active key (i.e. users > 0);
+ */
+ tx_key = ((struct tipc_ehdr *)(*skb)->data)->tx_key;
+ key = rx->key;
+ if (likely(tx_key == key.active))
+ goto decrypt;
+ if (tx_key == key.pending)
+ goto decrypt;
+ if (tx_key == key.passive) {
+ rx->timer2 = jiffies;
+ if (tipc_aead_users(rx->aead[key.passive]) > 0)
+ goto decrypt;
+ }
+
+ /* Unknown key, let's try to align RX key(s) */
+ if (tipc_crypto_key_try_align(rx, tx_key))
+ goto decrypt;
+
+pick_tx:
+ /* No key suitable? Try to pick one from TX... */
+ aead = tipc_crypto_key_pick_tx(tx, rx, *skb);
+ if (aead)
+ goto decrypt;
+ goto exit;
+
+decrypt:
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ if (!aead)
+ aead = tipc_aead_get(rx->aead[tx_key]);
+ rc = tipc_aead_decrypt(net, aead, *skb, b);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+exit:
+ stats = ((rx) ?: tx)->stats;
+ switch (rc) {
+ case 0:
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_OK]);
+ break;
+ case -EINPROGRESS:
+ case -EBUSY:
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_ASYNC]);
+ *skb = NULL;
+ return rc;
+ default:
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_NOK]);
+ if (rc == -ENOKEY) {
+ kfree_skb(*skb);
+ *skb = NULL;
+ if (rx)
+ tipc_node_put(rx->node);
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_NOKEYS]);
+ return rc;
+ } else if (rc == -EBADMSG) {
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_BADMSGS]);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ tipc_crypto_rcv_complete(net, aead, b, skb, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void tipc_crypto_rcv_complete(struct net *net, struct tipc_aead *aead,
+ struct tipc_bearer *b,
+ struct sk_buff **skb, int err)
+{
+ struct tipc_skb_cb *skb_cb = TIPC_SKB_CB(*skb);
+ struct tipc_crypto *rx = aead->crypto;
+ struct tipc_aead *tmp = NULL;
+ struct tipc_ehdr *ehdr;
+ struct tipc_node *n;
+ u8 rx_key_active;
+ bool destined;
+
+ /* Is this completed by TX? */
+ if (unlikely(!rx->node)) {
+ rx = skb_cb->tx_clone_ctx.rx;
+#ifdef TIPC_CRYPTO_DEBUG
+ pr_info("TX->RX(%s): err %d, aead %p, skb->next %p, flags %x\n",
+ (rx) ? tipc_node_get_id_str(rx->node) : "-", err, aead,
+ (*skb)->next, skb_cb->flags);
+ pr_info("skb_cb [recurs %d, last %p], tx->aead [%p %p %p]\n",
+ skb_cb->tx_clone_ctx.recurs, skb_cb->tx_clone_ctx.last,
+ aead->crypto->aead[1], aead->crypto->aead[2],
+ aead->crypto->aead[3]);
+#endif
+ if (unlikely(err)) {
+ if (err == -EBADMSG && (*skb)->next)
+ tipc_rcv(net, (*skb)->next, b);
+ goto free_skb;
+ }
+
+ if (likely((*skb)->next)) {
+ kfree_skb((*skb)->next);
+ (*skb)->next = NULL;
+ }
+ ehdr = (struct tipc_ehdr *)(*skb)->data;
+ if (!rx) {
+ WARN_ON(ehdr->user != LINK_CONFIG);
+ n = tipc_node_create(net, 0, ehdr->id, 0xffffu, true);
+ rx = tipc_node_crypto_rx(n);
+ if (unlikely(!rx))
+ goto free_skb;
+ }
+
+ /* Skip cloning this time as we had a RX pending key */
+ if (rx->key.pending)
+ goto rcv;
+ if (tipc_aead_clone(&tmp, aead) < 0)
+ goto rcv;
+ if (tipc_crypto_key_attach(rx, tmp, ehdr->tx_key) < 0) {
+ tipc_aead_free(&tmp->rcu);
+ goto rcv;
+ }
+ tipc_aead_put(aead);
+ aead = tipc_aead_get(tmp);
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(err)) {
+ tipc_aead_users_dec(aead, INT_MIN);
+ goto free_skb;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the...
[truncated message content] |
|
From: Tuong L. <tuo...@de...> - 2019-10-14 11:07:57
|
This commit adds two netlink commands to TIPC in order for user to be
able to set or remove AEAD keys:
- TIPC_NL_KEY_SET
- TIPC_NL_KEY_FLUSH
When the 'KEY_SET' is given along with the key data, the key will be
initiated and attached to TIPC crypto. On the other hand, the
'KEY_FLUSH' command will remove all existing keys if any.
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuo...@de...>
---
include/uapi/linux/tipc_netlink.h | 4 ++
net/tipc/netlink.c | 16 ++++-
net/tipc/node.c | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
net/tipc/node.h | 2 +
4 files changed, 154 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tipc_netlink.h b/include/uapi/linux/tipc_netlink.h
index efb958fd167d..6c2194ab745b 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/tipc_netlink.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/tipc_netlink.h
@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ enum {
TIPC_NL_PEER_REMOVE,
TIPC_NL_BEARER_ADD,
TIPC_NL_UDP_GET_REMOTEIP,
+ TIPC_NL_KEY_SET,
+ TIPC_NL_KEY_FLUSH,
__TIPC_NL_CMD_MAX,
TIPC_NL_CMD_MAX = __TIPC_NL_CMD_MAX - 1
@@ -160,6 +162,8 @@ enum {
TIPC_NLA_NODE_UNSPEC,
TIPC_NLA_NODE_ADDR, /* u32 */
TIPC_NLA_NODE_UP, /* flag */
+ TIPC_NLA_NODE_ID, /* data */
+ TIPC_NLA_NODE_KEY, /* data */
__TIPC_NLA_NODE_MAX,
TIPC_NLA_NODE_MAX = __TIPC_NLA_NODE_MAX - 1
diff --git a/net/tipc/netlink.c b/net/tipc/netlink.c
index d32bbd0f5e46..f118cc9d0885 100644
--- a/net/tipc/netlink.c
+++ b/net/tipc/netlink.c
@@ -102,7 +102,11 @@ const struct nla_policy tipc_nl_link_policy[TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX + 1] = {
const struct nla_policy tipc_nl_node_policy[TIPC_NLA_NODE_MAX + 1] = {
[TIPC_NLA_NODE_UNSPEC] = { .type = NLA_UNSPEC },
[TIPC_NLA_NODE_ADDR] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
- [TIPC_NLA_NODE_UP] = { .type = NLA_FLAG }
+ [TIPC_NLA_NODE_UP] = { .type = NLA_FLAG },
+ [TIPC_NLA_NODE_ID] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
+ .len = TIPC_NODEID_LEN},
+ [TIPC_NLA_NODE_KEY] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
+ .len = TIPC_AEAD_KEY_SIZE_MAX},
};
/* Properties valid for media, bearer and link */
@@ -257,6 +261,16 @@ static const struct genl_ops tipc_genl_v2_ops[] = {
.dumpit = tipc_udp_nl_dump_remoteip,
},
#endif
+ {
+ .cmd = TIPC_NL_KEY_SET,
+ .validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP,
+ .doit = tipc_nl_node_set_key,
+ },
+ {
+ .cmd = TIPC_NL_KEY_FLUSH,
+ .validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP,
+ .doit = tipc_nl_node_flush_key,
+ },
};
struct genl_family tipc_genl_family __ro_after_init = {
diff --git a/net/tipc/node.c b/net/tipc/node.c
index e6e0c5bee4bc..6621091f22d1 100644
--- a/net/tipc/node.c
+++ b/net/tipc/node.c
@@ -2628,6 +2628,139 @@ int tipc_nl_node_dump_monitor_peer(struct sk_buff *skb,
return skb->len;
}
+static int tipc_nl_retrieve_key(struct nlattr **attrs,
+ struct tipc_aead_key **key)
+{
+ struct nlattr *attr = attrs[TIPC_NLA_NODE_KEY];
+
+ if (!attr)
+ return -ENODATA;
+
+ *key = (struct tipc_aead_key *)nla_data(attr);
+ if (nla_len(attr) < tipc_aead_key_size(*key))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tipc_nl_retrieve_nodeid(struct nlattr **attrs, u8 **node_id)
+{
+ struct nlattr *attr = attrs[TIPC_NLA_NODE_ID];
+
+ if (!attr)
+ return -ENODATA;
+
+ if (nla_len(attr) < TIPC_NODEID_LEN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *node_id = (u8 *)nla_data(attr);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int __tipc_nl_node_set_key(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ struct nlattr *attrs[TIPC_NLA_NODE_MAX + 1];
+ struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
+ struct tipc_net *tn = tipc_net(net);
+ struct tipc_node *n = NULL;
+ struct tipc_aead_key *ukey;
+ struct tipc_crypto *c;
+ u8 *id, *own_id;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!info->attrs[TIPC_NLA_NODE])
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ rc = nla_parse_nested(attrs, TIPC_NLA_NODE_MAX,
+ info->attrs[TIPC_NLA_NODE],
+ tipc_nl_node_policy, info->extack);
+ if (rc)
+ goto exit;
+
+ own_id = tipc_own_id(net);
+ if (!own_id) {
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ rc = tipc_nl_retrieve_key(attrs, &ukey);
+ if (rc)
+ goto exit;
+
+ rc = tipc_aead_key_validate(ukey);
+ if (rc)
+ goto exit;
+
+ rc = tipc_nl_retrieve_nodeid(attrs, &id);
+ switch (rc) {
+ case -ENODATA:
+ /* Cluster key mode */
+ rc = tipc_crypto_key_init(tn->crypto_tx, ukey, CLUSTER_KEY);
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ /* Per-node key mode */
+ if (!memcmp(id, own_id, NODE_ID_LEN)) {
+ c = tn->crypto_tx;
+ } else {
+ n = tipc_node_find_by_id(net, id) ?:
+ tipc_node_create(net, 0, id, 0xffffu, true);
+ if (unlikely(!n)) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ }
+ c = n->crypto_rx;
+ }
+
+ rc = tipc_crypto_key_init(c, ukey, PER_NODE_KEY);
+ if (n)
+ tipc_node_put(n);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+exit:
+ return (rc < 0) ? rc : 0;
+}
+
+int tipc_nl_node_set_key(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ rtnl_lock();
+ err = __tipc_nl_node_set_key(skb, info);
+ rtnl_unlock();
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+int __tipc_nl_node_flush_key(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
+ struct tipc_net *tn = tipc_net(net);
+ struct tipc_node *n;
+
+ tipc_crypto_key_flush(tn->crypto_tx);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(n, &tn->node_list, list)
+ tipc_crypto_key_flush(n->crypto_rx);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ pr_info("All keys are flushed!\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tipc_nl_node_flush_key(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ rtnl_lock();
+ err = __tipc_nl_node_flush_key(skb, info);
+ rtnl_unlock();
+
+ return err;
+}
+
/**
* tipc_node_dump - dump TIPC node data
* @n: tipc node to be dumped
diff --git a/net/tipc/node.h b/net/tipc/node.h
index ec44ab454aa9..a0c59893fbd6 100644
--- a/net/tipc/node.h
+++ b/net/tipc/node.h
@@ -115,4 +115,6 @@ int tipc_nl_node_get_monitor(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info);
int tipc_nl_node_dump_monitor(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb);
int tipc_nl_node_dump_monitor_peer(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlink_callback *cb);
+int tipc_nl_node_set_key(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info);
+int tipc_nl_node_flush_key(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info);
#endif
--
2.13.7
|
|
From: Ying X. <yin...@wi...> - 2019-10-16 12:25:26
|
Looks like this is an amazing proposal! I had the idea long time ago, but at that moment, I didn't think encrypting TIPC message was meaningful because TIPC was mostly used within internal network. After UDP bearer was supported and one TIPC node was capable of communicating with its peers across IP, it seemed the encryption feature became useful. But if needed, we could enable IPSEC during this situation. At present, the only useful scenario that I can image is that TIPC will be used as low level communication infrastructure in Docker or k8s environment. Is there other case? Sorry, I am pretty busy in this week, and significant changes are made in the series. I have to take a bit long time to review the series. Please wait for a while. On 10/14/19 7:07 PM, Tuong Lien wrote: > This series provides TIPC encryption feature, kernel part. There will be > another one in the 'iproute2/tipc' for user space to set key. > > Tuong Lien (5): > tipc: add reference counter to bearer > tipc: enable creating a "preliminary" node > tipc: add new AEAD key structure for user API > tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication > tipc: add support for AEAD key setting via netlink > > include/uapi/linux/tipc.h | 21 + > include/uapi/linux/tipc_netlink.h | 4 + > net/tipc/Makefile | 2 +- > net/tipc/bcast.c | 2 +- > net/tipc/bearer.c | 52 +- > net/tipc/bearer.h | 6 +- > net/tipc/core.c | 10 + > net/tipc/core.h | 4 + > net/tipc/crypto.c | 1986 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > net/tipc/crypto.h | 166 ++++ > net/tipc/link.c | 16 +- > net/tipc/link.h | 1 + > net/tipc/msg.c | 24 +- > net/tipc/msg.h | 44 +- > net/tipc/netlink.c | 16 +- > net/tipc/node.c | 314 +++++- > net/tipc/node.h | 10 + > net/tipc/sysctl.c | 9 + > net/tipc/udp_media.c | 1 + > 19 files changed, 2604 insertions(+), 84 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.c > create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.h > |
|
From: Jon M. <jon...@er...> - 2019-10-16 14:41:43
|
> -----Original Message----- > From: Ying Xue <yin...@wi...> > Sent: 16-Oct-19 08:13 > To: Tuong Tong Lien <tuo...@de...>; tipc- > dis...@li...; Jon Maloy <jon...@er...>; > ma...@do... > Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 0/5] TIPC encryption > > Looks like this is an amazing proposal! > > I had the idea long time ago, but at that moment, I didn't think encrypting TIPC > message was meaningful because TIPC was mostly used within internal > network. After UDP bearer was supported and one TIPC node was capable of > communicating with its peers across IP, it seemed the encryption feature > became useful. But if needed, we could enable IPSEC during this situation. > > At present, the only useful scenario that I can image is that TIPC will be used as > low level communication infrastructure in Docker or k8s environment. Is there > other case? The main driver for this has been that Ericsson customers want a fully encrypted "backplane" even for TIPC traffic that doesn't use UDP. We have considered MACsec, but that is not always desirable for our customers, just as they are not always happy with IPsec. So the solution was to make TIPC "self sufficient" regarding encryption. Now we can also benefit from the fact that we can encrypt true multicast, something nobody else is doing. > > Sorry, I am pretty busy in this week, and significant changes are made in the > series. I have to take a bit long time to review the series. > Please wait for a while. We are looking forward to your feedback. BR ///jon > > On 10/14/19 7:07 PM, Tuong Lien wrote: > > This series provides TIPC encryption feature, kernel part. There will > > be another one in the 'iproute2/tipc' for user space to set key. > > > > Tuong Lien (5): > > tipc: add reference counter to bearer > > tipc: enable creating a "preliminary" node > > tipc: add new AEAD key structure for user API > > tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication > > tipc: add support for AEAD key setting via netlink > > > > include/uapi/linux/tipc.h | 21 + > > include/uapi/linux/tipc_netlink.h | 4 + > > net/tipc/Makefile | 2 +- > > net/tipc/bcast.c | 2 +- > > net/tipc/bearer.c | 52 +- > > net/tipc/bearer.h | 6 +- > > net/tipc/core.c | 10 + > > net/tipc/core.h | 4 + > > net/tipc/crypto.c | 1986 > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > net/tipc/crypto.h | 166 ++++ > > net/tipc/link.c | 16 +- > > net/tipc/link.h | 1 + > > net/tipc/msg.c | 24 +- > > net/tipc/msg.h | 44 +- > > net/tipc/netlink.c | 16 +- > > net/tipc/node.c | 314 +++++- > > net/tipc/node.h | 10 + > > net/tipc/sysctl.c | 9 + > > net/tipc/udp_media.c | 1 + > > 19 files changed, 2604 insertions(+), 84 deletions(-) create mode > > 100644 net/tipc/crypto.c create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.h > > |
|
From: Xue, Y. <Yin...@wi...> - 2019-11-01 19:00:18
|
Good job. This is a big and complex feature. Particularly for most of users who might not consider to use this feature, please consider to give them a choice to completely disable it by adding a new kernel option like TIPC_CRYPTO. Thanks, Ying -----Original Message----- From: Tuong Lien [mailto:tuo...@de...] Sent: Monday, October 14, 2019 7:07 PM To: tip...@li...; jon...@er...; ma...@do...; Xue, Ying Subject: [PATCH RFC 0/5] TIPC encryption This series provides TIPC encryption feature, kernel part. There will be another one in the 'iproute2/tipc' for user space to set key. Tuong Lien (5): tipc: add reference counter to bearer tipc: enable creating a "preliminary" node tipc: add new AEAD key structure for user API tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication tipc: add support for AEAD key setting via netlink include/uapi/linux/tipc.h | 21 + include/uapi/linux/tipc_netlink.h | 4 + net/tipc/Makefile | 2 +- net/tipc/bcast.c | 2 +- net/tipc/bearer.c | 52 +- net/tipc/bearer.h | 6 +- net/tipc/core.c | 10 + net/tipc/core.h | 4 + net/tipc/crypto.c | 1986 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/tipc/crypto.h | 166 ++++ net/tipc/link.c | 16 +- net/tipc/link.h | 1 + net/tipc/msg.c | 24 +- net/tipc/msg.h | 44 +- net/tipc/netlink.c | 16 +- net/tipc/node.c | 314 +++++- net/tipc/node.h | 10 + net/tipc/sysctl.c | 9 + net/tipc/udp_media.c | 1 + 19 files changed, 2604 insertions(+), 84 deletions(-) create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.c create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.h -- 2.13.7 |
|
From: Tuong L. T. <tuo...@de...> - 2019-11-04 11:29:52
|
Hi Ying, Thanks a lot for reviewing the series! Your idea of a new kernel option is fine, but I'm not sure what its goal is. The new code is already "disabled" by default unless there's a key set by user, so it's generally still under user's control... The advantage I can see is the module's size but it is not that much (compared to the whole kernel). On the other hand, we will need to custom the kernel to get the feature on and some additional code for the "ifdef...else..." instructions. Do we really need the option? @Jon: What is your opinion about this? BR/Tuong -----Original Message----- From: Xue, Ying <Yin...@wi...> Sent: Friday, November 1, 2019 9:20 PM To: Tuong Lien <tuo...@de...>; tip...@li...; jon...@er...; ma...@do... Subject: RE: [PATCH RFC 0/5] TIPC encryption Good job. This is a big and complex feature. Particularly for most of users who might not consider to use this feature, please consider to give them a choice to completely disable it by adding a new kernel option like TIPC_CRYPTO. Thanks, Ying -----Original Message----- From: Tuong Lien [mailto:tuo...@de...] Sent: Monday, October 14, 2019 7:07 PM To: tip...@li...; jon...@er...; ma...@do...; Xue, Ying Subject: [PATCH RFC 0/5] TIPC encryption This series provides TIPC encryption feature, kernel part. There will be another one in the 'iproute2/tipc' for user space to set key. Tuong Lien (5): tipc: add reference counter to bearer tipc: enable creating a "preliminary" node tipc: add new AEAD key structure for user API tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication tipc: add support for AEAD key setting via netlink include/uapi/linux/tipc.h | 21 + include/uapi/linux/tipc_netlink.h | 4 + net/tipc/Makefile | 2 +- net/tipc/bcast.c | 2 +- net/tipc/bearer.c | 52 +- net/tipc/bearer.h | 6 +- net/tipc/core.c | 10 + net/tipc/core.h | 4 + net/tipc/crypto.c | 1986 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/tipc/crypto.h | 166 ++++ net/tipc/link.c | 16 +- net/tipc/link.h | 1 + net/tipc/msg.c | 24 +- net/tipc/msg.h | 44 +- net/tipc/netlink.c | 16 +- net/tipc/node.c | 314 +++++- net/tipc/node.h | 10 + net/tipc/sysctl.c | 9 + net/tipc/udp_media.c | 1 + 19 files changed, 2604 insertions(+), 84 deletions(-) create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.c create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.h -- 2.13.7 |
|
From: Jon M. <jon...@er...> - 2019-11-04 21:33:55
|
Tuong, Ying I am ok with a kernel option, as long as it is enabled by default. I can imagine smaller embedded systems where the deployer want a small module, and encryption anyway is managed differently, or not at all. ///jon > -----Original Message----- > From: Tuong Lien Tong <tuo...@de...> > Sent: 4-Nov-19 06:30 > To: 'Xue, Ying' <Yin...@wi...>; tip...@li...; Jon Maloy > <jon...@er...>; ma...@do... > Subject: RE: [PATCH RFC 0/5] TIPC encryption > > Hi Ying, > > Thanks a lot for reviewing the series! > Your idea of a new kernel option is fine, but I'm not sure what its goal is. The new code is already "disabled" > by default unless there's a key set by user, so it's generally still under user's control... The advantage I can > see is the module's size but it is not that much (compared to the whole kernel). On the other hand, we will > need to custom the kernel to get the feature on and some additional code for the "ifdef...else..." > instructions. Do we really need the option? > > @Jon: What is your opinion about this? > > BR/Tuong > > -----Original Message----- > From: Xue, Ying <Yin...@wi...> > Sent: Friday, November 1, 2019 9:20 PM > To: Tuong Lien <tuo...@de...>; tip...@li...; > jon...@er...; ma...@do... > Subject: RE: [PATCH RFC 0/5] TIPC encryption > > Good job. > > This is a big and complex feature. Particularly for most of users who might not consider to use this feature, > please consider to give them a choice to completely disable it by adding a new kernel option like > TIPC_CRYPTO. > > Thanks, > Ying > > -----Original Message----- > From: Tuong Lien [mailto:tuo...@de...] > Sent: Monday, October 14, 2019 7:07 PM > To: tip...@li...; jon...@er...; ma...@do...; Xue, Ying > Subject: [PATCH RFC 0/5] TIPC encryption > > This series provides TIPC encryption feature, kernel part. There will be > another one in the 'iproute2/tipc' for user space to set key. > > Tuong Lien (5): > tipc: add reference counter to bearer > tipc: enable creating a "preliminary" node > tipc: add new AEAD key structure for user API > tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication > tipc: add support for AEAD key setting via netlink > > include/uapi/linux/tipc.h | 21 + > include/uapi/linux/tipc_netlink.h | 4 + > net/tipc/Makefile | 2 +- > net/tipc/bcast.c | 2 +- > net/tipc/bearer.c | 52 +- > net/tipc/bearer.h | 6 +- > net/tipc/core.c | 10 + > net/tipc/core.h | 4 + > net/tipc/crypto.c | 1986 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > net/tipc/crypto.h | 166 ++++ > net/tipc/link.c | 16 +- > net/tipc/link.h | 1 + > net/tipc/msg.c | 24 +- > net/tipc/msg.h | 44 +- > net/tipc/netlink.c | 16 +- > net/tipc/node.c | 314 +++++- > net/tipc/node.h | 10 + > net/tipc/sysctl.c | 9 + > net/tipc/udp_media.c | 1 + > 19 files changed, 2604 insertions(+), 84 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.c > create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.h > > -- > 2.13.7 > |
|
From: Ying X. <yin...@wi...> - 2019-11-05 08:03:24
|
On 11/5/19 5:33 AM, Jon Maloy wrote: > Tuong, Ying > I am ok with a kernel option, as long as it is enabled by default. I can imagine smaller embedded systems where the deployer want a small module, and encryption anyway is managed differently, or not at all. > > ///jon When I gave the suggestion to add a new kernel option, I also ever figured out how to reach this goal based on this series of patches. In my opinion, we don't need to modify the patches of making some preparation things. For example, we don't need to change patch #1 at all. Patch #3, #4 and #5 are almost completely separate with current code. The only thing is that we need to consider how to modify patch #2. In sum, it looks like it's not very difficult to introduce the new kernel configuration option. The kernel option not only can help us keep TIPC module size smaller, but also can help us maintain it easily particularly with TIPC becoming more and more complex. Lastly, probably it can help to make it possible that the series of patches can be easily accepted by upstream if user can disable the feature with a kernel option. |
|
From: Tuong L. T. <tuo...@de...> - 2019-11-05 08:45:40
|
Hi Ying, Yes, that makes sense. I have updated the patches with your suggestion and am going to send them now. As for patch #2, I guess you're referring to creating a preliminary node. Let's consider it as separated from the tipc crypto as well. In fact, we had a boolean flag to control it, also in addition to the new kernel option, if the tipc crypto is disabled, it will be no meaningful at all but just fallback to the original one, so that the node must work exactly the same as usual (i.e. preliminary = false)... I think we can keep it without the "ifdef else" instructions, otherwise we might need to duplicate the code for two cases. Do you agree? BR/Tuong -----Original Message----- From: Ying Xue <yin...@wi...> Sent: Tuesday, November 5, 2019 3:02 PM To: Jon Maloy <jon...@er...>; Tuong Tong Lien <tuo...@de...>; tip...@li...; ma...@do... Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 0/5] TIPC encryption On 11/5/19 5:33 AM, Jon Maloy wrote: > Tuong, Ying > I am ok with a kernel option, as long as it is enabled by default. I can imagine smaller embedded systems where the deployer want a small module, and encryption anyway is managed differently, or not at all. > > ///jon When I gave the suggestion to add a new kernel option, I also ever figured out how to reach this goal based on this series of patches. In my opinion, we don't need to modify the patches of making some preparation things. For example, we don't need to change patch #1 at all. Patch #3, #4 and #5 are almost completely separate with current code. The only thing is that we need to consider how to modify patch #2. In sum, it looks like it's not very difficult to introduce the new kernel configuration option. The kernel option not only can help us keep TIPC module size smaller, but also can help us maintain it easily particularly with TIPC becoming more and more complex. Lastly, probably it can help to make it possible that the series of patches can be easily accepted by upstream if user can disable the feature with a kernel option. |
|
From: Tuong L. <tuo...@de...> - 2019-11-05 10:51:25
|
This series provides TIPC encryption feature, kernel part. There will be another one in the 'iproute2/tipc' for user space to set key. Tuong Lien (5): tipc: add reference counter to bearer tipc: enable creating a "preliminary" node tipc: add new AEAD key structure for user API tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication tipc: add support for AEAD key setting via netlink include/uapi/linux/tipc.h | 21 + include/uapi/linux/tipc_netlink.h | 8 + net/tipc/Kconfig | 12 + net/tipc/Makefile | 1 + net/tipc/bcast.c | 2 +- net/tipc/bearer.c | 54 +- net/tipc/bearer.h | 11 +- net/tipc/core.c | 18 + net/tipc/core.h | 8 + net/tipc/crypto.c | 1986 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/tipc/crypto.h | 167 ++++ net/tipc/link.c | 19 +- net/tipc/link.h | 1 + net/tipc/msg.c | 15 +- net/tipc/msg.h | 46 +- net/tipc/netlink.c | 20 +- net/tipc/node.c | 347 ++++++- net/tipc/node.h | 13 + net/tipc/sysctl.c | 11 + net/tipc/udp_media.c | 1 + 20 files changed, 2694 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.c create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.h -- 2.13.7 |
|
From: Tuong L. <tuo...@de...> - 2019-11-05 10:51:24
|
As a need to support the crypto asynchronous operations in the later
commits, apart from the current RCU mechanism for bearer pointer, we
add a 'refcnt' to the bearer object as well.
So, a bearer can be hold via 'tipc_bearer_hold()' without being freed
even though the bearer or interface can be disabled in the meanwhile.
If that happens, the bearer will be released then when the crypto
operation is completed and 'tipc_bearer_put()' is called.
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuo...@de...>
---
net/tipc/bearer.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
net/tipc/bearer.h | 3 +++
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/tipc/bearer.c b/net/tipc/bearer.c
index 0214aa1c4427..6e15b9b1f1ef 100644
--- a/net/tipc/bearer.c
+++ b/net/tipc/bearer.c
@@ -315,6 +315,7 @@ static int tipc_enable_bearer(struct net *net, const char *name,
b->net_plane = bearer_id + 'A';
b->priority = prio;
test_and_set_bit_lock(0, &b->up);
+ refcount_set(&b->refcnt, 1);
res = tipc_disc_create(net, b, &b->bcast_addr, &skb);
if (res) {
@@ -351,6 +352,17 @@ static int tipc_reset_bearer(struct net *net, struct tipc_bearer *b)
return 0;
}
+bool tipc_bearer_hold(struct tipc_bearer *b)
+{
+ return (b && refcount_inc_not_zero(&b->refcnt));
+}
+
+void tipc_bearer_put(struct tipc_bearer *b)
+{
+ if (b && refcount_dec_and_test(&b->refcnt))
+ kfree_rcu(b, rcu);
+}
+
/**
* bearer_disable
*
@@ -369,7 +381,7 @@ static void bearer_disable(struct net *net, struct tipc_bearer *b)
if (b->disc)
tipc_disc_delete(b->disc);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(tn->bearer_list[bearer_id], NULL);
- kfree_rcu(b, rcu);
+ tipc_bearer_put(b);
tipc_mon_delete(net, bearer_id);
}
diff --git a/net/tipc/bearer.h b/net/tipc/bearer.h
index ea0f3c49cbed..faca696d422f 100644
--- a/net/tipc/bearer.h
+++ b/net/tipc/bearer.h
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ struct tipc_bearer {
struct tipc_discoverer *disc;
char net_plane;
unsigned long up;
+ refcount_t refcnt;
};
struct tipc_bearer_names {
@@ -210,6 +211,8 @@ int tipc_media_set_window(const char *name, u32 new_value);
int tipc_media_addr_printf(char *buf, int len, struct tipc_media_addr *a);
int tipc_enable_l2_media(struct net *net, struct tipc_bearer *b,
struct nlattr *attrs[]);
+bool tipc_bearer_hold(struct tipc_bearer *b);
+void tipc_bearer_put(struct tipc_bearer *b);
void tipc_disable_l2_media(struct tipc_bearer *b);
int tipc_l2_send_msg(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *buf,
struct tipc_bearer *b, struct tipc_media_addr *dest);
--
2.13.7
|
|
From: Tuong L. <tuo...@de...> - 2019-11-05 10:51:25
|
When user sets RX key for a peer not existing on the own node, a new
node entry is needed to which the RX key will be attached. However,
since the peer node address (& capabilities) is unknown at that moment,
only the node-ID is provided, this commit allows the creation of a node
with only the data that we call as “preliminary”.
A preliminary node is not the object of the “tipc_node_find()” but the
“tipc_node_find_by_id()”. Once the first message i.e. LINK_CONFIG comes
from that peer, and is successfully decrypted by the own node, the
actual peer node data will be properly updated and the node will
function as usual.
In addition, the node timer always starts when a node object is created
so if a preliminary node is not used, it will be cleaned up.
The later encryption functions will also use the node timer and be able
to create a preliminary node automatically when needed.
v2: rebase
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuo...@de...>
---
net/tipc/node.c | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
net/tipc/node.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/tipc/node.c b/net/tipc/node.c
index 4b60928049ea..5d5c95c9b4e6 100644
--- a/net/tipc/node.c
+++ b/net/tipc/node.c
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ struct tipc_bclink_entry {
* @links: array containing references to all links to node
* @action_flags: bit mask of different types of node actions
* @state: connectivity state vs peer node
+ * @preliminary: a preliminary node or not
* @sync_point: sequence number where synch/failover is finished
* @list: links to adjacent nodes in sorted list of cluster's nodes
* @working_links: number of working links to node (both active and standby)
@@ -112,6 +113,7 @@ struct tipc_node {
int action_flags;
struct list_head list;
int state;
+ bool preliminary;
bool failover_sent;
u16 sync_point;
int link_cnt;
@@ -120,6 +122,7 @@ struct tipc_node {
u32 signature;
u32 link_id;
u8 peer_id[16];
+ char peer_id_string[NODE_ID_STR_LEN];
struct list_head publ_list;
struct list_head conn_sks;
unsigned long keepalive_intv;
@@ -245,6 +248,16 @@ u16 tipc_node_get_capabilities(struct net *net, u32 addr)
return caps;
}
+u32 tipc_node_get_addr(struct tipc_node *node)
+{
+ return (node) ? node->addr : 0;
+}
+
+char *tipc_node_get_id_str(struct tipc_node *node)
+{
+ return node->peer_id_string;
+}
+
static void tipc_node_kref_release(struct kref *kref)
{
struct tipc_node *n = container_of(kref, struct tipc_node, kref);
@@ -274,7 +287,7 @@ static struct tipc_node *tipc_node_find(struct net *net, u32 addr)
rcu_read_lock();
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &tn->node_htable[thash], hash) {
- if (node->addr != addr)
+ if (node->addr != addr || node->preliminary)
continue;
if (!kref_get_unless_zero(&node->kref))
node = NULL;
@@ -400,17 +413,39 @@ static void tipc_node_assign_peer_net(struct tipc_node *n, u32 hash_mixes)
static struct tipc_node *tipc_node_create(struct net *net, u32 addr,
u8 *peer_id, u16 capabilities,
- u32 signature, u32 hash_mixes)
+ u32 hash_mixes, bool preliminary)
{
struct tipc_net *tn = net_generic(net, tipc_net_id);
struct tipc_node *n, *temp_node;
struct tipc_link *l;
+ unsigned long intv;
int bearer_id;
int i;
spin_lock_bh(&tn->node_list_lock);
- n = tipc_node_find(net, addr);
+ n = tipc_node_find(net, addr) ?:
+ tipc_node_find_by_id(net, peer_id);
if (n) {
+ if (!n->preliminary)
+ goto update;
+ if (preliminary)
+ goto exit;
+ /* A preliminary node becomes "real" now, refresh its data */
+ tipc_node_write_lock(n);
+ n->preliminary = false;
+ n->addr = addr;
+ hlist_del_rcu(&n->hash);
+ hlist_add_head_rcu(&n->hash,
+ &tn->node_htable[tipc_hashfn(addr)]);
+ list_del_rcu(&n->list);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(temp_node, &tn->node_list, list) {
+ if (n->addr < temp_node->addr)
+ break;
+ }
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&n->list, &temp_node->list);
+ tipc_node_write_unlock_fast(n);
+
+update:
if (n->peer_hash_mix ^ hash_mixes)
tipc_node_assign_peer_net(n, hash_mixes);
if (n->capabilities == capabilities)
@@ -438,7 +473,9 @@ static struct tipc_node *tipc_node_create(struct net *net, u32 addr,
pr_warn("Node creation failed, no memory\n");
goto exit;
}
+ tipc_nodeid2string(n->peer_id_string, peer_id);
n->addr = addr;
+ n->preliminary = preliminary;
memcpy(&n->peer_id, peer_id, 16);
n->net = net;
n->peer_net = NULL;
@@ -463,26 +500,14 @@ static struct tipc_node *tipc_node_create(struct net *net, u32 addr,
n->signature = INVALID_NODE_SIG;
n->active_links[0] = INVALID_BEARER_ID;
n->active_links[1] = INVALID_BEARER_ID;
- if (!tipc_link_bc_create(net, tipc_own_addr(net),
- addr, U16_MAX,
- tipc_link_window(tipc_bc_sndlink(net)),
- n->capabilities,
- &n->bc_entry.inputq1,
- &n->bc_entry.namedq,
- tipc_bc_sndlink(net),
- &n->bc_entry.link)) {
- pr_warn("Broadcast rcv link creation failed, no memory\n");
- if (n->peer_net) {
- n->peer_net = NULL;
- n->peer_hash_mix = 0;
- }
- kfree(n);
- n = NULL;
- goto exit;
- }
+ n->bc_entry.link = NULL;
tipc_node_get(n);
timer_setup(&n->timer, tipc_node_timeout, 0);
- n->keepalive_intv = U32_MAX;
+ /* Start a slow timer anyway, crypto needs it */
+ n->keepalive_intv = 10000;
+ intv = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(n->keepalive_intv);
+ if (!mod_timer(&n->timer, intv))
+ tipc_node_get(n);
hlist_add_head_rcu(&n->hash, &tn->node_htable[tipc_hashfn(addr)]);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(temp_node, &tn->node_list, list) {
if (n->addr < temp_node->addr)
@@ -1000,6 +1025,8 @@ u32 tipc_node_try_addr(struct net *net, u8 *id, u32 addr)
{
struct tipc_net *tn = tipc_net(net);
struct tipc_node *n;
+ bool preliminary;
+ u32 sugg_addr;
/* Suggest new address if some other peer is using this one */
n = tipc_node_find(net, addr);
@@ -1015,9 +1042,11 @@ u32 tipc_node_try_addr(struct net *net, u8 *id, u32 addr)
/* Suggest previously used address if peer is known */
n = tipc_node_find_by_id(net, id);
if (n) {
- addr = n->addr;
+ sugg_addr = n->addr;
+ preliminary = n->preliminary;
tipc_node_put(n);
- return addr;
+ if (!preliminary)
+ return sugg_addr;
}
/* Even this node may be in conflict */
@@ -1034,7 +1063,7 @@ void tipc_node_check_dest(struct net *net, u32 addr,
bool *respond, bool *dupl_addr)
{
struct tipc_node *n;
- struct tipc_link *l;
+ struct tipc_link *l, *snd_l;
struct tipc_link_entry *le;
bool addr_match = false;
bool sign_match = false;
@@ -1048,12 +1077,27 @@ void tipc_node_check_dest(struct net *net, u32 addr,
*dupl_addr = false;
*respond = false;
- n = tipc_node_create(net, addr, peer_id, capabilities, signature,
- hash_mixes);
+ n = tipc_node_create(net, addr, peer_id, capabilities, hash_mixes,
+ false);
if (!n)
return;
tipc_node_write_lock(n);
+ if (unlikely(!n->bc_entry.link)) {
+ snd_l = tipc_bc_sndlink(net);
+ if (!tipc_link_bc_create(net, tipc_own_addr(net),
+ addr, U16_MAX,
+ tipc_link_window(snd_l),
+ n->capabilities,
+ &n->bc_entry.inputq1,
+ &n->bc_entry.namedq, snd_l,
+ &n->bc_entry.link)) {
+ pr_warn("Broadcast rcv link creation failed, no mem\n");
+ tipc_node_write_unlock_fast(n);
+ tipc_node_put(n);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
le = &n->links[b->identity];
@@ -2128,6 +2172,8 @@ int tipc_nl_node_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
}
list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &tn->node_list, list) {
+ if (node->preliminary)
+ continue;
if (last_addr) {
if (node->addr == last_addr)
last_addr = 0;
@@ -2643,11 +2689,6 @@ int tipc_nl_node_dump_monitor_peer(struct sk_buff *skb,
return skb->len;
}
-u32 tipc_node_get_addr(struct tipc_node *node)
-{
- return (node) ? node->addr : 0;
-}
-
/**
* tipc_node_dump - dump TIPC node data
* @n: tipc node to be dumped
diff --git a/net/tipc/node.h b/net/tipc/node.h
index c39cd861c07d..50f8838b32c2 100644
--- a/net/tipc/node.h
+++ b/net/tipc/node.h
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ enum {
void tipc_node_stop(struct net *net);
bool tipc_node_get_id(struct net *net, u32 addr, u8 *id);
u32 tipc_node_get_addr(struct tipc_node *node);
+char *tipc_node_get_id_str(struct tipc_node *node);
u32 tipc_node_try_addr(struct net *net, u8 *id, u32 addr);
void tipc_node_check_dest(struct net *net, u32 onode, u8 *peer_id128,
struct tipc_bearer *bearer,
--
2.13.7
|
|
From: Tuong L. <tuo...@de...> - 2019-11-05 10:51:28
|
The new structure 'tipc_aead_key' is added to the 'tipc.h' for user to
be able to transfer a key to TIPC in kernel. Netlink will be used for
this purpose in the later commits.
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuo...@de...>
---
include/uapi/linux/tipc.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tipc.h b/include/uapi/linux/tipc.h
index 76421b878767..add01db1daef 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/tipc.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/tipc.h
@@ -233,6 +233,27 @@ struct tipc_sioc_nodeid_req {
char node_id[TIPC_NODEID_LEN];
};
+/*
+ * TIPC Crypto, AEAD
+ */
+#define TIPC_AEAD_ALG_NAME (32)
+
+struct tipc_aead_key {
+ char alg_name[TIPC_AEAD_ALG_NAME];
+ unsigned int keylen; /* in bytes */
+ char key[];
+};
+
+#define TIPC_AEAD_KEYLEN_MIN (16 + 4)
+#define TIPC_AEAD_KEYLEN_MAX (32 + 4)
+#define TIPC_AEAD_KEY_SIZE_MAX (sizeof(struct tipc_aead_key) + \
+ TIPC_AEAD_KEYLEN_MAX)
+
+static inline int tipc_aead_key_size(struct tipc_aead_key *key)
+{
+ return sizeof(*key) + key->keylen;
+}
+
/* The macros and functions below are deprecated:
*/
--
2.13.7
|
|
From: Tuong L. <tuo...@de...> - 2019-11-05 10:51:29
|
This commit offers an option to encrypt and authenticate all messaging,
including the neighbor discovery messages. The currently most advanced
algorithm supported is the AEAD AES-GCM (like IPSec or TLS). All
encryption/decryption is done at the bearer layer, just before leaving
or after entering TIPC.
Supported features:
- Encryption & authentication of all TIPC messages (header + data);
- Two symmetric-key modes: Cluster and Per-node;
- Automatic key switching;
- Key-expired revoking (sequence number wrapped);
- Lock-free encryption/decryption (RCU);
- Asynchronous crypto, Intel AES-NI supported;
- Multiple cipher transforms;
- Logs & statistics;
Two key modes:
- Cluster key mode: One single key is used for both TX & RX in all
nodes in the cluster.
- Per-node key mode: Each nodes in the cluster has one specific TX key.
For RX, a node requires its peers' TX key to be able to decrypt the
messages from those peers.
Key setting from user-space is performed via netlink by a user program
(e.g. the iproute2 'tipc' tool).
Internal key state machine:
Attach Align(RX)
+-+ +-+
| V | V
+---------+ Attach +---------+
| IDLE |---------------->| PENDING |(user = 0)
+---------+ +---------+
A A Switch| A
| | | |
| | Free(switch/revoked) | |
(Free)| +----------------------+ | |Timeout
| (TX) | | |(RX)
| | | |
| | v |
+---------+ Switch +---------+
| PASSIVE |<----------------| ACTIVE |
+---------+ (RX) +---------+
(user = 1) (user >= 1)
The number of TFMs is 10 by default and can be changed via the procfs
'net/tipc/max_tfms'. At this moment, as for simplicity, this file is
also used to print the crypto statistics at runtime:
echo 0xfff1 > /proc/sys/net/tipc/max_tfms
The patch defines a new TIPC version (v7) for the encryption message (-
backward compatibility as well). The message is basically encapsulated
as follows:
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| TIPCv7 encryption | Original TIPCv2 | Authentication |
| header | packet (encrypted) | Tag |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
The throughput is about ~40% for small messages (compared with non-
encryption) and ~9% for large messages. With the support from hardware
crypto i.e. the Intel AES-NI CPU instructions, the throughput increases
upto ~85% for small messages and ~55% for large messages.
By default, the new feature is inactive (i.e. no encryption) until user
sets a key for TIPC. There is however also a new option - "TIPC_CRYPTO"
in the kernel configuration to enable/disable the new code when needed.
v2: rebase, add new kernel option ("TIPC_CRYPTO")
MAINTAINERS | add two new files 'crypto.h' & 'crypto.c' in tipc
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuo...@de...>
---
net/tipc/Kconfig | 12 +
net/tipc/Makefile | 1 +
net/tipc/bcast.c | 2 +-
net/tipc/bearer.c | 40 +-
net/tipc/bearer.h | 8 +-
net/tipc/core.c | 18 +
net/tipc/core.h | 8 +
net/tipc/crypto.c | 1986 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
net/tipc/crypto.h | 167 +++++
net/tipc/link.c | 19 +-
net/tipc/link.h | 1 +
net/tipc/msg.c | 15 +-
net/tipc/msg.h | 46 +-
net/tipc/node.c | 117 ++-
net/tipc/node.h | 8 +
net/tipc/sysctl.c | 11 +
net/tipc/udp_media.c | 1 +
17 files changed, 2422 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.c
create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.h
diff --git a/net/tipc/Kconfig b/net/tipc/Kconfig
index b83e16ade4d2..6d94ccf7a9e9 100644
--- a/net/tipc/Kconfig
+++ b/net/tipc/Kconfig
@@ -35,6 +35,18 @@ config TIPC_MEDIA_UDP
Saying Y here will enable support for running TIPC over IP/UDP
bool
default y
+config TIPC_CRYPTO
+ bool "TIPC encryption support"
+ depends on TIPC
+ help
+ Saying Y here will enable support for TIPC encryption.
+ All TIPC messages will be encrypted/decrypted by using the currently most
+ advanced algorithm: AEAD AES-GCM (like IPSec or TLS) before leaving/
+ entering the TIPC stack.
+ Key setting from user-space is performed via netlink by a user program
+ (e.g. the iproute2 'tipc' tool).
+ bool
+ default y
config TIPC_DIAG
tristate "TIPC: socket monitoring interface"
diff --git a/net/tipc/Makefile b/net/tipc/Makefile
index c86aba0282af..11255e970dd4 100644
--- a/net/tipc/Makefile
+++ b/net/tipc/Makefile
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ CFLAGS_trace.o += -I$(src)
tipc-$(CONFIG_TIPC_MEDIA_UDP) += udp_media.o
tipc-$(CONFIG_TIPC_MEDIA_IB) += ib_media.o
tipc-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
+tipc-$(CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO) += crypto.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TIPC_DIAG) += diag.o
diff --git a/net/tipc/bcast.c b/net/tipc/bcast.c
index 6ef1abdd525f..f41096a759fa 100644
--- a/net/tipc/bcast.c
+++ b/net/tipc/bcast.c
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static struct tipc_bc_base *tipc_bc_base(struct net *net)
*/
int tipc_bcast_get_mtu(struct net *net)
{
- return tipc_link_mtu(tipc_bc_sndlink(net)) - INT_H_SIZE;
+ return tipc_link_mss(tipc_bc_sndlink(net));
}
void tipc_bcast_disable_rcast(struct net *net)
diff --git a/net/tipc/bearer.c b/net/tipc/bearer.c
index 6e15b9b1f1ef..eeb5721f7bf4 100644
--- a/net/tipc/bearer.c
+++ b/net/tipc/bearer.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
#include "netlink.h"
#include "udp_media.h"
#include "trace.h"
+#include "crypto.h"
#define MAX_ADDR_STR 60
@@ -516,10 +517,15 @@ void tipc_bearer_xmit_skb(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id,
rcu_read_lock();
b = bearer_get(net, bearer_id);
- if (likely(b && (test_bit(0, &b->up) || msg_is_reset(hdr))))
- b->media->send_msg(net, skb, b, dest);
- else
+ if (likely(b && (test_bit(0, &b->up) || msg_is_reset(hdr)))) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO
+ tipc_crypto_xmit(net, &skb, b, dest, NULL);
+ if (skb)
+#endif
+ b->media->send_msg(net, skb, b, dest);
+ } else {
kfree_skb(skb);
+ }
rcu_read_unlock();
}
@@ -527,7 +533,13 @@ void tipc_bearer_xmit_skb(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id,
*/
void tipc_bearer_xmit(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id,
struct sk_buff_head *xmitq,
- struct tipc_media_addr *dst)
+#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO
+ struct tipc_media_addr *dst,
+ struct tipc_node *__dnode
+#else
+ struct tipc_media_addr *dst
+#endif
+ )
{
struct tipc_bearer *b;
struct sk_buff *skb, *tmp;
@@ -541,10 +553,15 @@ void tipc_bearer_xmit(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id,
__skb_queue_purge(xmitq);
skb_queue_walk_safe(xmitq, skb, tmp) {
__skb_dequeue(xmitq);
- if (likely(test_bit(0, &b->up) || msg_is_reset(buf_msg(skb))))
- b->media->send_msg(net, skb, b, dst);
- else
+ if (likely(test_bit(0, &b->up) || msg_is_reset(buf_msg(skb)))) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO
+ tipc_crypto_xmit(net, &skb, b, dst, __dnode);
+ if (skb)
+#endif
+ b->media->send_msg(net, skb, b, dst);
+ } else {
kfree_skb(skb);
+ }
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
@@ -555,6 +572,7 @@ void tipc_bearer_bc_xmit(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id,
struct sk_buff_head *xmitq)
{
struct tipc_net *tn = tipc_net(net);
+ struct tipc_media_addr *dst;
int net_id = tn->net_id;
struct tipc_bearer *b;
struct sk_buff *skb, *tmp;
@@ -569,7 +587,12 @@ void tipc_bearer_bc_xmit(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id,
msg_set_non_seq(hdr, 1);
msg_set_mc_netid(hdr, net_id);
__skb_dequeue(xmitq);
- b->media->send_msg(net, skb, b, &b->bcast_addr);
+ dst = &b->bcast_addr;
+#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO
+ tipc_crypto_xmit(net, &skb, b, dst, NULL);
+ if (skb)
+#endif
+ b->media->send_msg(net, skb, b, dst);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
@@ -596,6 +619,7 @@ static int tipc_l2_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
if (likely(b && test_bit(0, &b->up) &&
(skb->pkt_type <= PACKET_MULTICAST))) {
skb_mark_not_on_list(skb);
+ TIPC_SKB_CB(skb)->flags = 0;
tipc_rcv(dev_net(b->pt.dev), skb, b);
rcu_read_unlock();
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
diff --git a/net/tipc/bearer.h b/net/tipc/bearer.h
index faca696d422f..110754c333b4 100644
--- a/net/tipc/bearer.h
+++ b/net/tipc/bearer.h
@@ -232,7 +232,13 @@ void tipc_bearer_xmit_skb(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id,
struct tipc_media_addr *dest);
void tipc_bearer_xmit(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id,
struct sk_buff_head *xmitq,
- struct tipc_media_addr *dst);
+#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO
+ struct tipc_media_addr *dst,
+ struct tipc_node *__dnode
+#else
+ struct tipc_media_addr *dst
+#endif
+ );
void tipc_bearer_bc_xmit(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id,
struct sk_buff_head *xmitq);
void tipc_clone_to_loopback(struct net *net, struct sk_buff_head *pkts);
diff --git a/net/tipc/core.c b/net/tipc/core.c
index ab648dd150ee..73fccf48aa34 100644
--- a/net/tipc/core.c
+++ b/net/tipc/core.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
#include "socket.h"
#include "bcast.h"
#include "node.h"
+#include "crypto.h"
#include <linux/module.h>
@@ -68,6 +69,11 @@ static int __net_init tipc_init_net(struct net *net)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tn->node_list);
spin_lock_init(&tn->node_list_lock);
+#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO
+ err = tipc_crypto_start(&tn->crypto_tx, net, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_crypto;
+#endif
err = tipc_sk_rht_init(net);
if (err)
goto out_sk_rht;
@@ -93,16 +99,28 @@ static int __net_init tipc_init_net(struct net *net)
out_nametbl:
tipc_sk_rht_destroy(net);
out_sk_rht:
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO
+ tipc_crypto_stop(&tn->crypto_tx);
+out_crypto:
+#endif
return err;
}
static void __net_exit tipc_exit_net(struct net *net)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO
+ struct tipc_net *tn = tipc_net(net);
+#endif
+
tipc_detach_loopback(net);
tipc_net_stop(net);
tipc_bcast_stop(net);
tipc_nametbl_stop(net);
tipc_sk_rht_destroy(net);
+#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO
+ tipc_crypto_stop(&tn->crypto_tx);
+#endif
}
static void __net_exit tipc_pernet_pre_exit(struct net *net)
diff --git a/net/tipc/core.h b/net/tipc/core.h
index 8776d32a4a47..775848a5f27e 100644
--- a/net/tipc/core.h
+++ b/net/tipc/core.h
@@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ struct tipc_link;
struct tipc_name_table;
struct tipc_topsrv;
struct tipc_monitor;
+#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO
+struct tipc_crypto;
+#endif
#define TIPC_MOD_VER "2.0.0"
@@ -129,6 +132,11 @@ struct tipc_net {
/* Tracing of node internal messages */
struct packet_type loopback_pt;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO
+ /* TX crypto handler */
+ struct tipc_crypto *crypto_tx;
+#endif
};
static inline struct tipc_net *tipc_net(struct net *net)
diff --git a/net/tipc/crypto.c b/net/tipc/crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..05f7ca76e8ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/tipc/crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1986 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/**
+ * net/tipc/crypto.c: TIPC crypto for key handling & packet en/decryption
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2019, Ericsson AB
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the names of the copyright holders nor the names of its
+ * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
+ * this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * Alternatively, this software may be distributed under the terms of the
+ * GNU General Public License ("GPL") version 2 as published by the Free
+ * Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
+ * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include "crypto.h"
+
+#define TIPC_TX_PROBE_LIM msecs_to_jiffies(1000) /* > 1s */
+#define TIPC_TX_LASTING_LIM msecs_to_jiffies(120000) /* 2 mins */
+#define TIPC_RX_ACTIVE_LIM msecs_to_jiffies(3000) /* 3s */
+#define TIPC_RX_PASSIVE_LIM msecs_to_jiffies(180000) /* 3 mins */
+#define TIPC_MAX_TFMS_DEF 10
+#define TIPC_MAX_TFMS_LIM 1000
+
+/**
+ * TIPC Key ids
+ */
+enum {
+ KEY_UNUSED = 0,
+ KEY_MIN,
+ KEY_1 = KEY_MIN,
+ KEY_2,
+ KEY_3,
+ KEY_MAX = KEY_3,
+};
+
+/**
+ * TIPC Crypto statistics
+ */
+enum {
+ STAT_OK,
+ STAT_NOK,
+ STAT_ASYNC,
+ STAT_ASYNC_OK,
+ STAT_ASYNC_NOK,
+ STAT_BADKEYS, /* tx only */
+ STAT_BADMSGS = STAT_BADKEYS, /* rx only */
+ STAT_NOKEYS,
+ STAT_SWITCHES,
+
+ MAX_STATS,
+};
+
+/* TIPC crypto statistics' header */
+static const char *hstats[MAX_STATS] = {"ok", "nok", "async", "async_ok",
+ "async_nok", "badmsgs", "nokeys",
+ "switches"};
+
+/* Max TFMs number per key */
+int sysctl_tipc_max_tfms __read_mostly = TIPC_MAX_TFMS_DEF;
+
+/**
+ * struct tipc_key - TIPC keys' status indicator
+ *
+ * 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
+ * +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
+ * key: | (reserved)|passive idx| active idx|pending idx|
+ * +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
+ */
+struct tipc_key {
+#define KEY_BITS (2)
+#define KEY_MASK ((1 << KEY_BITS) - 1)
+ union {
+ struct {
+#if defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)
+ u8 pending:2,
+ active:2,
+ passive:2, /* rx only */
+ reserved:2;
+#elif defined(__BIG_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)
+ u8 reserved:2,
+ passive:2, /* rx only */
+ active:2,
+ pending:2;
+#else
+#error "Please fix <asm/byteorder.h>"
+#endif
+ } __packed;
+ u8 keys;
+ };
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct tipc_tfm - TIPC TFM structure to form a list of TFMs
+ */
+struct tipc_tfm {
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+ struct list_head list;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct tipc_aead - TIPC AEAD key structure
+ * @tfm_entry: per-cpu pointer to one entry in TFM list
+ * @crypto: TIPC crypto owns this key
+ * @cloned: reference to the source key in case cloning
+ * @users: the number of the key users (TX/RX)
+ * @salt: the key's SALT value
+ * @authsize: authentication tag size (max = 16)
+ * @mode: crypto mode is applied to the key
+ * @hint[]: a hint for user key
+ * @rcu: struct rcu_head
+ * @seqno: the key seqno (cluster scope)
+ * @refcnt: the key reference counter
+ */
+struct tipc_aead {
+#define TIPC_AEAD_HINT_LEN (5)
+ struct tipc_tfm * __percpu *tfm_entry;
+ struct tipc_crypto *crypto;
+ struct tipc_aead *cloned;
+ atomic_t users;
+ u32 salt;
+ u8 authsize;
+ u8 mode;
+ char hint[TIPC_AEAD_HINT_LEN + 1];
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+
+ atomic64_t seqno ____cacheline_aligned;
+ refcount_t refcnt ____cacheline_aligned;
+
+} ____cacheline_aligned;
+
+/**
+ * struct tipc_crypto_stats - TIPC Crypto statistics
+ */
+struct tipc_crypto_stats {
+ unsigned int stat[MAX_STATS];
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct tipc_crypto - TIPC TX/RX crypto structure
+ * @net: struct net
+ * @node: TIPC node (RX)
+ * @aead: array of pointers to AEAD keys for encryption/decryption
+ * @peer_rx_active: replicated peer RX active key index
+ * @key: the key states
+ * @working: the crypto is working or not
+ * @stats: the crypto statistics
+ * @sndnxt: the per-peer sndnxt (TX)
+ * @timer1: general timer 1 (jiffies)
+ * @timer2: general timer 1 (jiffies)
+ * @lock: tipc_key lock
+ */
+struct tipc_crypto {
+ struct net *net;
+ struct tipc_node *node;
+ struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead[KEY_MAX + 1]; /* key[0] is UNUSED */
+ atomic_t peer_rx_active;
+ struct tipc_key key;
+ u8 working:1;
+ struct tipc_crypto_stats __percpu *stats;
+
+ atomic64_t sndnxt ____cacheline_aligned;
+ unsigned long timer1;
+ unsigned long timer2;
+ spinlock_t lock; /* crypto lock */
+
+} ____cacheline_aligned;
+
+/* struct tipc_crypto_tx_ctx - TX context for callbacks */
+struct tipc_crypto_tx_ctx {
+ struct tipc_aead *aead;
+ struct tipc_bearer *bearer;
+ struct tipc_media_addr dst;
+};
+
+/* struct tipc_crypto_rx_ctx - RX context for callbacks */
+struct tipc_crypto_rx_ctx {
+ struct tipc_aead *aead;
+ struct tipc_bearer *bearer;
+};
+
+static struct tipc_aead *tipc_aead_get(struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead);
+static inline void tipc_aead_put(struct tipc_aead *aead);
+static void tipc_aead_free(struct rcu_head *rp);
+static int tipc_aead_users(struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead);
+static void tipc_aead_users_inc(struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead, int lim);
+static void tipc_aead_users_dec(struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead, int lim);
+static void tipc_aead_users_set(struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead, int val);
+static struct crypto_aead *tipc_aead_tfm_next(struct tipc_aead *aead);
+static int tipc_aead_init(struct tipc_aead **aead, struct tipc_aead_key *ukey,
+ u8 mode);
+static int tipc_aead_clone(struct tipc_aead **dst, struct tipc_aead *src);
+static void *tipc_aead_mem_alloc(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+ unsigned int crypto_ctx_size,
+ u8 **iv, struct aead_request **req,
+ struct scatterlist **sg, int nsg);
+static int tipc_aead_encrypt(struct tipc_aead *aead, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct tipc_bearer *b,
+ struct tipc_media_addr *dst,
+ struct tipc_node *__dnode);
+static void tipc_aead_encrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err);
+static int tipc_aead_decrypt(struct net *net, struct tipc_aead *aead,
+ struct sk_buff *skb, struct tipc_bearer *b);
+static void tipc_aead_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err);
+static inline int tipc_ehdr_size(struct tipc_ehdr *ehdr);
+static int tipc_ehdr_build(struct net *net, struct tipc_aead *aead,
+ u8 tx_key, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct tipc_crypto *__rx);
+static inline void tipc_crypto_key_set_state(struct tipc_crypto *c,
+ u8 new_passive,
+ u8 new_active,
+ u8 new_pending);
+static int tipc_crypto_key_attach(struct tipc_crypto *c,
+ struct tipc_aead *aead, u8 pos);
+static bool tipc_crypto_key_try_align(struct tipc_crypto *rx, u8 new_pending);
+static struct tipc_aead *tipc_crypto_key_pick_tx(struct tipc_crypto *tx,
+ struct tipc_crypto *rx,
+ struct sk_buff *skb);
+static void tipc_crypto_key_synch(struct tipc_crypto *rx, u8 new_rx_active,
+ struct tipc_msg *hdr);
+static int tipc_crypto_key_revoke(struct net *net, u8 tx_key);
+static void tipc_crypto_rcv_complete(struct net *net, struct tipc_aead *aead,
+ struct tipc_bearer *b,
+ struct sk_buff **skb, int err);
+static void tipc_crypto_do_cmd(struct net *net, int cmd);
+static char *tipc_crypto_key_dump(struct tipc_crypto *c, char *buf);
+#ifdef TIPC_CRYPTO_DEBUG
+static char *tipc_key_change_dump(struct tipc_key old, struct tipc_key new,
+ char *buf);
+#endif
+
+#define key_next(cur) ((cur) % KEY_MAX + 1)
+
+#define tipc_aead_rcu_ptr(rcu_ptr, lock) \
+ rcu_dereference_protected((rcu_ptr), lockdep_is_held(lock))
+
+#define tipc_aead_rcu_swap(rcu_ptr, ptr, lock) \
+ rcu_swap_protected((rcu_ptr), (ptr), lockdep_is_held(lock))
+
+#define tipc_aead_rcu_replace(rcu_ptr, ptr, lock) \
+do { \
+ typeof(rcu_ptr) __tmp = rcu_dereference_protected((rcu_ptr), \
+ lockdep_is_held(lock)); \
+ rcu_assign_pointer((rcu_ptr), (ptr)); \
+ tipc_aead_put(__tmp); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define tipc_crypto_key_detach(rcu_ptr, lock) \
+ tipc_aead_rcu_replace((rcu_ptr), NULL, lock)
+
+/**
+ * tipc_aead_key_validate - Validate a AEAD user key
+ */
+int tipc_aead_key_validate(struct tipc_aead_key *ukey)
+{
+ int keylen;
+
+ /* Check if algorithm exists */
+ if (unlikely(!crypto_has_alg(ukey->alg_name, 0, 0))) {
+ pr_info("Not found cipher: \"%s\"!\n", ukey->alg_name);
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ /* Currently, we only support the "gcm(aes)" cipher algorithm */
+ if (strcmp(ukey->alg_name, "gcm(aes)"))
+ return -ENOTSUPP;
+
+ /* Check if key size is correct */
+ keylen = ukey->keylen - TIPC_AES_GCM_SALT_SIZE;
+ if (unlikely(keylen != TIPC_AES_GCM_KEY_SIZE_128 &&
+ keylen != TIPC_AES_GCM_KEY_SIZE_192 &&
+ keylen != TIPC_AES_GCM_KEY_SIZE_256))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct tipc_aead *tipc_aead_get(struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead)
+{
+ struct tipc_aead *tmp;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tmp = rcu_dereference(aead);
+ if (unlikely(!tmp || !refcount_inc_not_zero(&tmp->refcnt)))
+ tmp = NULL;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return tmp;
+}
+
+static inline void tipc_aead_put(struct tipc_aead *aead)
+{
+ if (aead && refcount_dec_and_test(&aead->refcnt))
+ call_rcu(&aead->rcu, tipc_aead_free);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_aead_free - Release AEAD key incl. all the TFMs in the list
+ * @rp: rcu head pointer
+ */
+static void tipc_aead_free(struct rcu_head *rp)
+{
+ struct tipc_aead *aead = container_of(rp, struct tipc_aead, rcu);
+ struct tipc_tfm *tfm_entry, *head, *tmp;
+
+ if (aead->cloned) {
+ tipc_aead_put(aead->cloned);
+ } else {
+ head = *this_cpu_ptr(aead->tfm_entry);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(tfm_entry, tmp, &head->list, list) {
+ crypto_free_aead(tfm_entry->tfm);
+ list_del(&tfm_entry->list);
+ kfree(tfm_entry);
+ }
+ /* Free the head */
+ crypto_free_aead(head->tfm);
+ list_del(&head->list);
+ kfree(head);
+ }
+ free_percpu(aead->tfm_entry);
+ kfree(aead);
+}
+
+static int tipc_aead_users(struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead)
+{
+ struct tipc_aead *tmp;
+ int users = 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tmp = rcu_dereference(aead);
+ if (tmp)
+ users = atomic_read(&tmp->users);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return users;
+}
+
+static void tipc_aead_users_inc(struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead, int lim)
+{
+ struct tipc_aead *tmp;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tmp = rcu_dereference(aead);
+ if (tmp)
+ atomic_add_unless(&tmp->users, 1, lim);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+static void tipc_aead_users_dec(struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead, int lim)
+{
+ struct tipc_aead *tmp;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tmp = rcu_dereference(aead);
+ if (tmp)
+ atomic_add_unless(&rcu_dereference(aead)->users, -1, lim);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+static void tipc_aead_users_set(struct tipc_aead __rcu *aead, int val)
+{
+ struct tipc_aead *tmp;
+ int cur;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tmp = rcu_dereference(aead);
+ if (tmp) {
+ do {
+ cur = atomic_read(&tmp->users);
+ if (cur == val)
+ break;
+ } while (atomic_cmpxchg(&tmp->users, cur, val) != cur);
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_aead_tfm_next - Move TFM entry to the next one in list and return it
+ */
+static struct crypto_aead *tipc_aead_tfm_next(struct tipc_aead *aead)
+{
+ struct tipc_tfm **tfm_entry = this_cpu_ptr(aead->tfm_entry);
+
+ *tfm_entry = list_next_entry(*tfm_entry, list);
+ return (*tfm_entry)->tfm;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_aead_init - Initiate TIPC AEAD
+ * @aead: returned new TIPC AEAD key handle pointer
+ * @ukey: pointer to user key data
+ * @mode: the key mode
+ *
+ * Allocate a (list of) new cipher transformation (TFM) with the specific user
+ * key data if valid. The number of the allocated TFMs can be set via the sysfs
+ * "net/tipc/max_tfms" first.
+ * Also, all the other AEAD data are also initialized.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if the initiation is successful, otherwise: < 0
+ */
+static int tipc_aead_init(struct tipc_aead **aead, struct tipc_aead_key *ukey,
+ u8 mode)
+{
+ struct tipc_tfm *tfm_entry, *head;
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+ struct tipc_aead *tmp;
+ int keylen, err, cpu;
+ int tfm_cnt = 0;
+
+ if (unlikely(*aead))
+ return -EEXIST;
+
+ /* Allocate a new AEAD */
+ tmp = kzalloc(sizeof(*tmp), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (unlikely(!tmp))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* The key consists of two parts: [AES-KEY][SALT] */
+ keylen = ukey->keylen - TIPC_AES_GCM_SALT_SIZE;
+
+ /* Allocate per-cpu TFM entry pointer */
+ tmp->tfm_entry = alloc_percpu(struct tipc_tfm *);
+ if (!tmp->tfm_entry) {
+ kzfree(tmp);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ /* Make a list of TFMs with the user key data */
+ do {
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_aead(ukey->alg_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(!tfm_cnt &&
+ crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm) != TIPC_AES_GCM_IV_SIZE)) {
+ crypto_free_aead(tfm);
+ err = -ENOTSUPP;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ err |= crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, TIPC_AES_GCM_TAG_SIZE);
+ err |= crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, ukey->key, keylen);
+ if (unlikely(err)) {
+ crypto_free_aead(tfm);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ tfm_entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*tfm_entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (unlikely(!tfm_entry)) {
+ crypto_free_aead(tfm);
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ }
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tfm_entry->list);
+ tfm_entry->tfm = tfm;
+
+ /* First entry? */
+ if (!tfm_cnt) {
+ head = tfm_entry;
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ *per_cpu_ptr(tmp->tfm_entry, cpu) = head;
+ }
+ } else {
+ list_add_tail(&tfm_entry->list, &head->list);
+ }
+
+ } while (++tfm_cnt < sysctl_tipc_max_tfms);
+
+ /* Not any TFM is allocated? */
+ if (!tfm_cnt) {
+ free_percpu(tmp->tfm_entry);
+ kzfree(tmp);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy some chars from the user key as a hint */
+ memcpy(tmp->hint, ukey->key, TIPC_AEAD_HINT_LEN);
+ tmp->hint[TIPC_AEAD_HINT_LEN] = '\0';
+
+ /* Initialize the other data */
+ tmp->mode = mode;
+ tmp->cloned = NULL;
+ tmp->authsize = TIPC_AES_GCM_TAG_SIZE;
+ memcpy(&tmp->salt, ukey->key + keylen, TIPC_AES_GCM_SALT_SIZE);
+ atomic_set(&tmp->users, 0);
+ atomic64_set(&tmp->seqno, 0);
+ refcount_set(&tmp->refcnt, 1);
+
+ *aead = tmp;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_aead_clone - Clone a TIPC AEAD key
+ * @dst: dest key for the cloning
+ * @src: source key to clone from
+ *
+ * Make a "copy" of the source AEAD key data to the dest, the TFMs list is
+ * common for the keys.
+ * A reference to the source is hold in the "cloned" pointer for the later
+ * freeing purposes.
+ *
+ * Note: this must be done in cluster-key mode only!
+ * Return: 0 in case of success, otherwise < 0
+ */
+static int tipc_aead_clone(struct tipc_aead **dst, struct tipc_aead *src)
+{
+ struct tipc_aead *aead;
+ int cpu;
+
+ if (!src)
+ return -ENOKEY;
+
+ if (src->mode != CLUSTER_KEY)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (unlikely(*dst))
+ return -EEXIST;
+
+ aead = kzalloc(sizeof(*aead), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (unlikely(!aead))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ aead->tfm_entry = alloc_percpu_gfp(struct tipc_tfm *, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (unlikely(!aead->tfm_entry)) {
+ kzfree(aead);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ *per_cpu_ptr(aead->tfm_entry, cpu) =
+ *per_cpu_ptr(src->tfm_entry, cpu);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(aead->hint, src->hint, sizeof(src->hint));
+ aead->mode = src->mode;
+ aead->salt = src->salt;
+ aead->authsize = src->authsize;
+ atomic_set(&aead->users, 0);
+ atomic64_set(&aead->seqno, 0);
+ refcount_set(&aead->refcnt, 1);
+
+ WARN_ON(!refcount_inc_not_zero(&src->refcnt));
+ aead->cloned = src;
+
+ *dst = aead;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_aead_mem_alloc - Allocate memory for AEAD request operations
+ * @tfm: cipher handle to be registered with the request
+ * @crypto_ctx_size: size of crypto context for callback
+ * @iv: returned pointer to IV data
+ * @req: returned pointer to AEAD request data
+ * @sg: returned pointer to SG lists
+ * @nsg: number of SG lists to be allocated
+ *
+ * Allocate memory to store the crypto context data, AEAD request, IV and SG
+ * lists, the memory layout is as follows:
+ * crypto_ctx || iv || aead_req || sg[]
+ *
+ * Return: the pointer to the memory areas in case of success, otherwise NULL
+ */
+static void *tipc_aead_mem_alloc(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+ unsigned int crypto_ctx_size,
+ u8 **iv, struct aead_request **req,
+ struct scatterlist **sg, int nsg)
+{
+ unsigned int iv_size, req_size;
+ unsigned int len;
+ u8 *mem;
+
+ iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+ req_size = sizeof(**req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm);
+
+ len = crypto_ctx_size;
+ len += iv_size;
+ len += crypto_aead_alignmask(tfm) & ~(crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1);
+ len = ALIGN(len, crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment());
+ len += req_size;
+ len = ALIGN(len, __alignof__(struct scatterlist));
+ len += nsg * sizeof(**sg);
+
+ mem = kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!mem)
+ return NULL;
+
+ *iv = (u8 *)PTR_ALIGN(mem + crypto_ctx_size,
+ crypto_aead_alignmask(tfm) + 1);
+ *req = (struct aead_request *)PTR_ALIGN(*iv + iv_size,
+ crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment());
+ *sg = (struct scatterlist *)PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)*req + req_size,
+ __alignof__(struct scatterlist));
+
+ return (void *)mem;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_aead_encrypt - Encrypt a message
+ * @aead: TIPC AEAD key for the message encryption
+ * @skb: the input/output skb
+ * @b: TIPC bearer where the message will be delivered after the encryption
+ * @dst: the destination media address
+ * @__dnode: TIPC dest node if "known"
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 : if the encryption has completed
+ * -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY : if a callback will be performed
+ * < 0 : the encryption has failed
+ */
+static int tipc_aead_encrypt(struct tipc_aead *aead, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct tipc_bearer *b,
+ struct tipc_media_addr *dst,
+ struct tipc_node *__dnode)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm = tipc_aead_tfm_next(aead);
+ struct tipc_crypto_tx_ctx *tx_ctx;
+ struct aead_request *req;
+ struct sk_buff *trailer;
+ struct scatterlist *sg;
+ struct tipc_ehdr *ehdr;
+ int ehsz, len, tailen, nsg, rc;
+ void *ctx;
+ u32 salt;
+ u8 *iv;
+
+ /* Make sure message len at least 4-byte aligned */
+ len = ALIGN(skb->len, 4);
+ tailen = len - skb->len + aead->authsize;
+
+ /* Expand skb tail for authentication tag:
+ * As for simplicity, we'd have made sure skb having enough tailroom
+ * for authentication tag @skb allocation. Even when skb is nonlinear
+ * but there is no frag_list, it should be still fine!
+ * Otherwise, we must cow it to be a writable buffer with the tailroom.
+ */
+#ifdef TIPC_CRYPTO_DEBUG
+ SKB_LINEAR_ASSERT(skb);
+ if (tailen > skb_tailroom(skb)) {
+ pr_warn("TX: skb tailroom is not enough: %d, requires: %d\n",
+ skb_tailroom(skb), tailen);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (unlikely(!skb_cloned(skb) && tailen <= skb_tailroom(skb))) {
+ nsg = 1;
+ trailer = skb;
+ } else {
+ /* TODO: We could avoid skb_cow_data() if skb has no frag_list
+ * e.g. by skb_fill_page_desc() to add another page to the skb
+ * with the wanted tailen... However, page skbs look not often,
+ * so take it easy now!
+ * Cloned skbs e.g. from link_xmit() seems no choice though :(
+ */
+ nsg = skb_cow_data(skb, tailen, &trailer);
+ if (unlikely(nsg < 0)) {
+ pr_err("TX: skb_cow_data() returned %d\n", nsg);
+ return nsg;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pskb_put(skb, trailer, tailen);
+
+ /* Allocate memory for the AEAD operation */
+ ctx = tipc_aead_mem_alloc(tfm, sizeof(*tx_ctx), &iv, &req, &sg, nsg);
+ if (unlikely(!ctx))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ TIPC_SKB_CB(skb)->crypto_ctx = ctx;
+
+ /* Map skb to the sg lists */
+ sg_init_table(sg, nsg);
+ rc = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len);
+ if (unlikely(rc < 0)) {
+ pr_err("TX: skb_to_sgvec() returned %d, nsg %d!\n", rc, nsg);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Prepare IV: [SALT (4 octets)][SEQNO (8 octets)]
+ * In case we're in cluster-key mode, SALT is varied by xor-ing with
+ * the source address (or w0 of id), otherwise with the dest address
+ * if dest is known.
+ */
+ ehdr = (struct tipc_ehdr *)skb->data;
+ salt = aead->salt;
+ if (aead->mode == CLUSTER_KEY)
+ salt ^= ehdr->addr; /* __be32 */
+ else if (__dnode)
+ salt ^= tipc_node_get_addr(__dnode);
+ memcpy(iv, &salt, 4);
+ memcpy(iv + 4, (u8 *)&ehdr->seqno, 8);
+
+ /* Prepare request */
+ ehsz = tipc_ehdr_size(ehdr);
+ aead_request_set_tfm(req, tfm);
+ aead_request_set_ad(req, ehsz);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, len - ehsz, iv);
+
+ /* Set callback function & data */
+ aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ tipc_aead_encrypt_done, skb);
+ tx_ctx = (struct tipc_crypto_tx_ctx *)ctx;
+ tx_ctx->aead = aead;
+ tx_ctx->bearer = b;
+ memcpy(&tx_ctx->dst, dst, sizeof(*dst));
+
+ /* Hold bearer */
+ if (unlikely(!tipc_bearer_hold(b))) {
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Now, do encrypt */
+ rc = crypto_aead_encrypt(req);
+ if (rc == -EINPROGRESS || rc == -EBUSY)
+ return rc;
+
+ tipc_bearer_put(b);
+
+exit:
+ kfree(ctx);
+ TIPC_SKB_CB(skb)->crypto_ctx = NULL;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void tipc_aead_encrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb = base->data;
+ struct tipc_crypto_tx_ctx *tx_ctx = TIPC_SKB_CB(skb)->crypto_ctx;
+ struct tipc_bearer *b = tx_ctx->bearer;
+ struct tipc_aead *aead = tx_ctx->aead;
+ struct tipc_crypto *tx = aead->crypto;
+ struct net *net = tx->net;
+
+ switch (err) {
+ case 0:
+ this_cpu_inc(tx->stats->stat[STAT_ASYNC_OK]);
+ if (likely(test_bit(0, &b->up)))
+ b->media->send_msg(net, skb, b, &tx_ctx->dst);
+ else
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ break;
+ case -EINPROGRESS:
+ return;
+ default:
+ this_cpu_inc(tx->stats->stat[STAT_ASYNC_NOK]);
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ kfree(tx_ctx);
+ tipc_bearer_put(b);
+ tipc_aead_put(aead);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_aead_decrypt - Decrypt an encrypted message
+ * @net: struct net
+ * @aead: TIPC AEAD for the message decryption
+ * @skb: the input/output skb
+ * @b: TIPC bearer where the message has been received
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 : if the decryption has completed
+ * -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY : if a callback will be performed
+ * < 0 : the decryption has failed
+ */
+static int tipc_aead_decrypt(struct net *net, struct tipc_aead *aead,
+ struct sk_buff *skb, struct tipc_bearer *b)
+{
+ struct tipc_crypto_rx_ctx *rx_ctx;
+ struct aead_request *req;
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+ struct sk_buff *unused;
+ struct scatterlist *sg;
+ struct tipc_ehdr *ehdr;
+ int ehsz, nsg, rc;
+ void *ctx;
+ u32 salt;
+ u8 *iv;
+
+ if (unlikely(!aead))
+ return -ENOKEY;
+
+ /* Cow skb data if needed */
+ if (likely(!skb_cloned(skb) &&
+ (!skb_is_nonlinear(skb) || !skb_has_frag_list(skb)))) {
+ nsg = 1 + skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
+ } else {
+ nsg = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &unused);
+ if (unlikely(nsg < 0)) {
+ pr_err("RX: skb_cow_data() returned %d\n", nsg);
+ return nsg;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate memory for the AEAD operation */
+ tfm = tipc_aead_tfm_next(aead);
+ ctx = tipc_aead_mem_alloc(tfm, sizeof(*rx_ctx), &iv, &req, &sg, nsg);
+ if (unlikely(!ctx))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ TIPC_SKB_CB(skb)->crypto_ctx = ctx;
+
+ /* Map skb to the sg lists */
+ sg_init_table(sg, nsg);
+ rc = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len);
+ if (unlikely(rc < 0)) {
+ pr_err("RX: skb_to_sgvec() returned %d, nsg %d\n", rc, nsg);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Reconstruct IV: */
+ ehdr = (struct tipc_ehdr *)skb->data;
+ salt = aead->salt;
+ if (aead->mode == CLUSTER_KEY)
+ salt ^= ehdr->addr; /* __be32 */
+ else if (ehdr->destined)
+ salt ^= tipc_own_addr(net);
+ memcpy(iv, &salt, 4);
+ memcpy(iv + 4, (u8 *)&ehdr->seqno, 8);
+
+ /* Prepare request */
+ ehsz = tipc_ehdr_size(ehdr);
+ aead_request_set_tfm(req, tfm);
+ aead_request_set_ad(req, ehsz);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, skb->len - ehsz, iv);
+
+ /* Set callback function & data */
+ aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ tipc_aead_decrypt_done, skb);
+ rx_ctx = (struct tipc_crypto_rx_ctx *)ctx;
+ rx_ctx->aead = aead;
+ rx_ctx->bearer = b;
+
+ /* Hold bearer */
+ if (unlikely(!tipc_bearer_hold(b))) {
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Now, do decrypt */
+ rc = crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
+ if (rc == -EINPROGRESS || rc == -EBUSY)
+ return rc;
+
+ tipc_bearer_put(b);
+
+exit:
+ kfree(ctx);
+ TIPC_SKB_CB(skb)->crypto_ctx = NULL;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void tipc_aead_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb = base->data;
+ struct tipc_crypto_rx_ctx *rx_ctx = TIPC_SKB_CB(skb)->crypto_ctx;
+ struct tipc_bearer *b = rx_ctx->bearer;
+ struct tipc_aead *aead = rx_ctx->aead;
+ struct tipc_crypto_stats __percpu *stats = aead->crypto->stats;
+ struct net *net = aead->crypto->net;
+
+ switch (err) {
+ case 0:
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_ASYNC_OK]);
+ break;
+ case -EINPROGRESS:
+ return;
+ default:
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_ASYNC_NOK]);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ kfree(rx_ctx);
+ tipc_crypto_rcv_complete(net, aead, b, &skb, err);
+ if (likely(skb)) {
+ if (likely(test_bit(0, &b->up)))
+ tipc_rcv(net, skb, b);
+ else
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ }
+
+ tipc_bearer_put(b);
+}
+
+static inline int tipc_ehdr_size(struct tipc_ehdr *ehdr)
+{
+ return (ehdr->user != LINK_CONFIG) ? EHDR_SIZE : EHDR_CFG_SIZE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_ehdr_validate - Validate an encryption message
+ * @skb: the message buffer
+ *
+ * Returns "true" if this is a valid encryption message, otherwise "false"
+ */
+bool tipc_ehdr_validate(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct tipc_ehdr *ehdr;
+ int ehsz;
+
+ if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, EHDR_MIN_SIZE)))
+ return false;
+
+ ehdr = (struct tipc_ehdr *)skb->data;
+ if (unlikely(ehdr->version != TIPC_EVERSION))
+ return false;
+ ehsz = tipc_ehdr_size(ehdr);
+ if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, ehsz)))
+ return false;
+ if (unlikely(skb->len <= ehsz + TIPC_AES_GCM_TAG_SIZE))
+ return false;
+ if (unlikely(!ehdr->tx_key))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_ehdr_build - Build TIPC encryption message header
+ * @net: struct net
+ * @aead: TX AEAD key to be used for the message encryption
+ * @tx_key: key id used for the message encryption
+ * @skb: input/output message skb
+ * @__rx: RX crypto handle if dest is "known"
+ *
+ * Return: the header size if the building is successful, otherwise < 0
+ */
+static int tipc_ehdr_build(struct net *net, struct tipc_aead *aead,
+ u8 tx_key, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct tipc_crypto *__rx)
+{
+ struct tipc_msg *hdr = buf_msg(skb);
+ struct tipc_ehdr *ehdr;
+ u32 user = msg_user(hdr);
+ u64 seqno;
+ int ehsz;
+
+ /* Make room for encryption header */
+ ehsz = (user != LINK_CONFIG) ? EHDR_SIZE : EHDR_CFG_SIZE;
+ WARN_ON(skb_headroom(skb) < ehsz);
+ ehdr = (struct tipc_ehdr *)skb_push(skb, ehsz);
+
+ /* Obtain a seqno first:
+ * Use the key seqno (= cluster wise) if dest is unknown or we're in
+ * cluster key mode, otherwise it's better for a per-peer seqno!
+ */
+ if (!__rx || aead->mode == CLUSTER_KEY)
+ seqno = atomic64_inc_return(&aead->seqno);
+ else
+ seqno = atomic64_inc_return(&__rx->sndnxt);
+
+ /* Revoke the key if seqno is wrapped around */
+ if (unlikely(!seqno))
+ return tipc_crypto_key_revoke(net, tx_key);
+
+ /* Word 1-2 */
+ ehdr->seqno = cpu_to_be64(seqno);
+
+ /* Words 0, 3- */
+ ehdr->version = TIPC_EVERSION;
+ ehdr->user = 0;
+ ehdr->keepalive = 0;
+ ehdr->tx_key = tx_key;
+ ehdr->destined = (__rx) ? 1 : 0;
+ ehdr->rx_key_active = (__rx) ? __rx->key.active : 0;
+ ehdr->reserved_1 = 0;
+ ehdr->reserved_2 = 0;
+
+ switch (user) {
+ case LINK_CONFIG:
+ ehdr->user = LINK_CONFIG;
+ memcpy(ehdr->id, tipc_own_id(net), NODE_ID_LEN);
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (user == LINK_PROTOCOL && msg_type(hdr) == STATE_MSG) {
+ ehdr->user = LINK_PROTOCOL;
+ ehdr->keepalive = msg_is_keepalive(hdr);
+ }
+ ehdr->addr = hdr->hdr[3];
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ehsz;
+}
+
+static inline void tipc_crypto_key_set_state(struct tipc_crypto *c,
+ u8 new_passive,
+ u8 new_active,
+ u8 new_pending)
+{
+#ifdef TIPC_CRYPTO_DEBUG
+ struct tipc_key old = c->key;
+ char buf[32];
+#endif
+
+ c->key.keys = ((new_passive & KEY_MASK) << (KEY_BITS * 2)) |
+ ((new_active & KEY_MASK) << (KEY_BITS)) |
+ ((new_pending & KEY_MASK));
+
+#ifdef TIPC_CRYPTO_DEBUG
+ pr_info("%s(%s): key changing %s ::%pS\n",
+ (c->node) ? "RX" : "TX",
+ (c->node) ? tipc_node_get_id_str(c->node) :
+ tipc_own_id_string(c->net),
+ tipc_key_change_dump(old, c->key, buf),
+ __builtin_return_address(0));
+#endif
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_crypto_key_init - Initiate a new user / AEAD key
+ * @c: TIPC crypto to which new key is attached
+ * @ukey: the user key
+ * @mode: the key mode (CLUSTER_KEY or PER_NODE_KEY)
+ *
+ * A new TIPC AEAD key will be allocated and initiated with the specified user
+ * key, then attached to the TIPC crypto.
+ *
+ * Return: new key id in case of success, otherwise: < 0
+ */
+int tipc_crypto_key_init(struct tipc_crypto *c, struct tipc_aead_key *ukey,
+ u8 mode)
+{
+ struct tipc_aead *aead = NULL;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /* Initiate with the new user key */
+ rc = tipc_aead_init(&aead, ukey, mode);
+
+ /* Attach it to the crypto */
+ if (likely(!rc)) {
+ rc = tipc_crypto_key_attach(c, aead, 0);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ tipc_aead_free(&aead->rcu);
+ }
+
+ pr_info("%s(%s): key initiating, rc %d!\n",
+ (c->node) ? "RX" : "TX",
+ (c->node) ? tipc_node_get_id_str(c->node) :
+ tipc_own_id_string(c->net),
+ rc);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_crypto_key_attach - Attach a new AEAD key to TIPC crypto
+ * @c: TIPC crypto to which the new AEAD key is attached
+ * @aead: the new AEAD key pointer
+ * @pos: desired slot in the crypto key array, = 0 if any!
+ *
+ * Return: new key id in case of success, otherwise: -EBUSY
+ */
+static int tipc_crypto_key_attach(struct tipc_crypto *c,
+ struct tipc_aead *aead, u8 pos)
+{
+ u8 new_pending, new_passive, new_key;
+ struct tipc_key key;
+ int rc = -EBUSY;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&c->lock);
+ key = c->key;
+ if (key.active && key.passive)
+ goto exit;
+ if (key.passive && !tipc_aead_users(c->aead[key.passive]))
+ goto exit;
+ if (key.pending) {
+ if (pos)
+ goto exit;
+ if (tipc_aead_users(c->aead[key.pending]) > 0)
+ goto exit;
+ /* Replace it */
+ new_pending = key.pending;
+ new_passive = key.passive;
+ new_key = new_pending;
+ } else {
+ if (pos) {
+ if (key.active && pos != key_next(key.active)) {
+ new_pending = key.pending;
+ new_passive = pos;
+ new_key = new_passive;
+ goto attach;
+ } else if (!key.active && !key.passive) {
+ new_pending = pos;
+ new_passive = key.passive;
+ new_key = new_pending;
+ goto attach;
+ }
+ }
+ new_pending = key_next(key.active ?: key.passive);
+ new_passive = key.passive;
+ new_key = new_pending;
+ }
+
+attach:
+ aead->crypto = c;
+ tipc_crypto_key_set_state(c, new_passive, key.active, new_pending);
+ tipc_aead_rcu_replace(c->aead[new_key], aead, &c->lock);
+
+ c->working = 1;
+ c->timer1 = jiffies;
+ c->timer2 = jiffies;
+ rc = new_key;
+
+exit:
+ spin_unlock_bh(&c->lock);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+void tipc_crypto_key_flush(struct tipc_crypto *c)
+{
+ int k;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&c->lock);
+ c->working = 0;
+ tipc_crypto_key_set_state(c, 0, 0, 0);
+ for (k = KEY_MIN; k <= KEY_MAX; k++)
+ tipc_crypto_key_detach(c->aead[k], &c->lock);
+ atomic_set(&c->peer_rx_active, 0);
+ atomic64_set(&c->sndnxt, 0);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&c->lock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_crypto_key_try_align - Align RX keys if possible
+ * @rx: RX crypto handle
+ * @new_pending: new pending slot if aligned (= TX key from peer)
+ *
+ * Peer has used an unknown key slot, this only happens when peer has left and
+ * rejoned, or we are newcomer.
+ * That means, there must be no active key but a pending key at unaligned slot.
+ * If so, we try to move the pending key to the new slot.
+ * Note: A potential passive key can exist, it will be shifted correspondingly!
+ *
+ * Return: "true" if key is successfully aligned, otherwise "false"
+ */
+static bool tipc_crypto_key_try_align(struct tipc_crypto *rx, u8 new_pending)
+{
+ struct tipc_aead *tmp1, *tmp2 = NULL;
+ struct tipc_key key;
+ bool aligned = false;
+ u8 new_passive = 0;
+ int x;
+
+ spin_lock(&rx->lock);
+ key = rx->key;
+ if (key.pending == new_pending) {
+ aligned = true;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if (key.active)
+ goto exit;
+ if (!key.pending)
+ goto exit;
+ if (tipc_aead_users(rx->aead[key.pending]) > 0)
+ goto exit;
+
+ /* Try to "isolate" this pending key first */
+ tmp1 = tipc_aead_rcu_ptr(rx->aead[key.pending], &rx->lock);
+ if (!refcount_dec_if_one(&tmp1->refcnt))
+ goto exit;
+ rcu_assign_pointer(rx->aead[key.pending], NULL);
+
+ /* Move passive key if any */
+ if (key.passive) {
+ tipc_aead_rcu_swap(rx->aead[key.passive], tmp2, &rx->lock);
+ x = (key.passive - key.pending + new_pending) % KEY_MAX;
+ new_passive = (x <= 0) ? x + KEY_MAX : x;
+ }
+
+ /* Re-allocate the key(s) */
+ tipc_crypto_key_set_state(rx, new_passive, 0, new_pending);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(rx->aead[new_pending], tmp1);
+ if (new_passive)
+ rcu_assign_pointer(rx->aead[new_passive], tmp2);
+ refcount_set(&tmp1->refcnt, 1);
+ aligned = true;
+ pr_info("RX(%s): key is aligned!\n", tipc_node_get_id_str(rx->node));
+
+exit:
+ spin_unlock(&rx->lock);
+ return aligned;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_crypto_key_pick_tx - Pick one TX key for message decryption
+ * @tx: TX crypto handle
+ * @rx: RX crypto handle (can be NULL)
+ * @skb: the message skb which will be decrypted later
+ *
+ * This function looks up the existing TX keys and pick one which is suitable
+ * for the message decryption, that must be a cluster key and not used before
+ * on the same message (i.e. recursive).
+ *
+ * Return: the TX AEAD key handle in case of success, otherwise NULL
+ */
+static struct tipc_aead *tipc_crypto_key_pick_tx(struct tipc_crypto *tx,
+ struct tipc_crypto *rx,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct tipc_skb_cb *skb_cb = TIPC_SKB_CB(skb);
+ struct tipc_aead *aead = NULL;
+ struct tipc_key key = tx->key;
+ u8 k, i = 0;
+
+ /* Initialize data if not yet */
+ if (!skb_cb->tx_clone_deferred) {
+ skb_cb->tx_clone_deferred = 1;
+ memset(&skb_cb->tx_clone_ctx, 0, sizeof(skb_cb->tx_clone_ctx));
+ }
+
+ skb_cb->tx_clone_ctx.rx = rx;
+ if (++skb_cb->tx_clone_ctx.recurs > 2)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Pick one TX key */
+ spin_lock(&tx->lock);
+ do {
+ k = (i == 0) ? key.pending :
+ ((i == 1) ? key.active : key.passive);
+ if (!k)
+ continue;
+ aead = tipc_aead_rcu_ptr(tx->aead[k], &tx->lock);
+ if (!aead)
+ continue;
+ if (aead->mode != CLUSTER_KEY ||
+ aead == skb_cb->tx_clone_ctx.last) {
+ aead = NULL;
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Ok, found one cluster key */
+ skb_cb->tx_clone_ctx.last = aead;
+ WARN_ON(skb->next);
+ skb->next = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (unlikely(!skb->next))
+ pr_warn("Failed to clone skb for next round if any\n");
+ WARN_ON(!refcount_inc_not_zero(&aead->refcnt));
+ break;
+ } while (++i < 3);
+ spin_unlock(&tx->lock);
+
+ return aead;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_crypto_key_synch: Synch own key data according to peer key status
+ * @rx: RX crypto handle
+ * @new_rx_active: latest RX active key from peer
+ * @hdr: TIPCv2 message
+ *
+ * This function updates the peer node related data as the peer RX active key
+ * has changed, so the number of TX keys' users on this node are increased and
+ * decreased correspondingly.
+ *
+ * The "per-peer" sndnxt is also reset when the peer key has switched.
+ */
+static void tipc_crypto_key_synch(struct tipc_crypto *rx, u8 new_rx_active,
+ struct tipc_msg *hdr)
+{
+ struct net *net = rx->net;
+ struct tipc_crypto *tx = tipc_net(net)->crypto_tx;
+ u8 cur_rx_active;
+
+ /* TX might be even not ready yet */
+ if (unlikely(!tx->key.active && !tx->key.pending))
+ return;
+
+ cur_rx_active = atomic_read(&rx->peer_rx_active);
+ if (likely(cur_rx_active == new_rx_active))
+ return;
+
+ /* Make sure this message destined for this node */
+ if (unlikely(msg_short(hdr) ||
+ msg_destnode(hdr) != tipc_own_addr(net)))
+ return;
+
+ /* Peer RX active key has changed, try to update owns' & TX users */
+ if (atomic_cmpxchg(&rx->peer_rx_active,
+ cur_rx_active,
+ new_rx_active) == cur_rx_active) {
+ if (new_rx_active)
+ tipc_aead_users_inc(tx->aead[new_rx_active], INT_MAX);
+ if (cur_rx_active)
+ tipc_aead_users_dec(tx->aead[cur_rx_active], 0);
+
+ atomic64_set(&rx->sndnxt, 0);
+ /* Mark the point TX key users changed */
+ tx->timer1 = jiffies;
+
+#ifdef TIPC_CRYPTO_DEBUG
+ pr_info("TX(%s): key users changed %d-- %d++, peer RX(%s)\n",
+ tipc_own_id_string(net), cur_rx_active,
+ new_rx_active, tipc_node_get_id_str(rx->node));
+#endif
+ }
+}
+
+static int tipc_crypto_key_revoke(struct net *net, u8 tx_key)
+{
+ struct tipc_crypto *tx = tipc_net(net)->crypto_tx;
+ struct tipc_key key;
+
+ spin_lock(&tx->lock);
+ key = tx->key;
+ WARN_ON(!key.active || tx_key != key.active);
+
+ /* Free the active key */
+ tipc_crypto_key_set_state(tx, key.passive, 0, key.pending);
+ tipc_crypto_key_detach(tx->aead[key.active], &tx->lock);
+ spin_unlock(&tx->lock);
+
+ pr_warn("TX(%s): key is revoked!\n", tipc_own_id_string(net));
+ return -EKEYREVOKED;
+}
+
+int tipc_crypto_start(struct tipc_crypto **crypto, struct net *net,
+ struct tipc_node *node)
+{
+ struct tipc_crypto *c;
+
+ if (*crypto)
+ return -EEXIST;
+
+ /* Allocate crypto */
+ c = kzalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!c)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Allocate statistic structure */
+ c->stats = alloc_percpu_gfp(struct tipc_crypto_stats, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!c->stats) {
+ kzfree(c);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ c->working = 0;
+ c->net = net;
+ c->node = node;
+ tipc_crypto_key_set_state(c, 0, 0, 0);
+ atomic_set(&c->peer_rx_active, 0);
+ atomic64_set(&c->sndnxt, 0);
+ c->timer1 = jiffies;
+ c->timer2 = jiffies;
+ spin_lock_init(&c->lock);
+ *crypto = c;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void tipc_crypto_stop(struct tipc_crypto **crypto)
+{
+ struct tipc_crypto *c, *tx, *rx;
+ bool is_rx;
+ u8 k;
+
+ if (!*crypto)
+ return;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ /* RX stopping? => decrease TX key users if any */
+ is_rx = !!((*crypto)->node);
+ if (is_rx) {
+ rx = *crypto;
+ tx = tipc_net(rx->net)->crypto_tx;
+ k = atomic_read(&rx->peer_rx_active);
+ if (k) {
+ tipc_aead_users_dec(tx->aead[k], 0);
+ /* Mark the point TX key users changed */
+ tx->timer1 = jiffies;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Release AEAD keys */
+ c = *crypto;
+ for (k = KEY_MIN; k <= KEY_MAX; k++)
+ tipc_aead_put(rcu_dereference(c->aead[k]));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ pr_warn("%s(%s) has been purged, node left!\n",
+ (is_rx) ? "RX" : "TX",
+ (is_rx) ? tipc_node_get_id_str((*crypto)->node) :
+ tipc_own_id_string((*crypto)->net));
+
+ /* Free this crypto statistics */
+ free_percpu(c->stats);
+
+ *crypto = NULL;
+ kzfree(c);
+}
+
+void tipc_crypto_timeout(struct tipc_crypto *rx)
+{
+ struct tipc_net *tn = tipc_net(rx->net);
+ struct tipc_crypto *tx = tn->crypto_tx;
+ struct tipc_key key;
+ u8 new_pending, new_passive;
+ int cmd;
+
+ /* TX key activating:
+ * The pending key (users > 0) -> active
+ * The active key if any (users == 0) -> free
+ */
+ spin_lock(&tx->lock);
+ key = tx->key;
+ if (key.active && tipc_aead_users(tx->aead[key.active]) > 0)
+ goto s1;
+ if (!key.pending || tipc_aead_users(tx->aead[key.pending]) <= 0)
+ goto s1;
+ if (time_before(jiffies, tx->timer1 + TIPC_TX_LASTING_LIM))
+ goto s1;
+
+ tipc_crypto_key_set_state(tx, key.passive, key.pending, 0);
+ if (key.active)
+ tipc_crypto_key_detach(tx->aead[key.active], &tx->lock);
+ this_cpu_inc(tx->stats->stat[STAT_SWITCHES]);
+ pr_info("TX(%s): key %d is activated!\n", tipc_own_id_string(tx->net),
+ key.pending);
+
+s1:
+ spin_unlock(&tx->lock);
+
+ /* RX key activating:
+ * The pending key (users > 0) -> active
+ * The active key if any -> passive, freed later
+ */
+ spin_lock(&rx->lock);
+ key = rx->key;
+ if (!key.pending || tipc_aead_users(rx->aead[key.pending]) <= 0)
+ goto s2;
+
+ new_pending = (key.passive &&
+ !tipc_aead_users(rx->aead[key.passive])) ?
+ key.passive : 0;
+ new_passive = (key.active) ?: ((new_pending) ? 0 : key.passive);
+ tipc_crypto_key_set_state(rx, new_passive, key.pending, new_pending);
+ this_cpu_inc(rx->stats->stat[STAT_SWITCHES]);
+ pr_info("RX(%s): key %d is activated!\n",
+ tipc_node_get_id_str(rx->node), key.pending);
+ goto s5;
+
+s2:
+ /* RX key "faulty" switching:
+ * The faulty pending key (users < -30) -> passive
+ * The passive key (users = 0) -> pending
+ * Note: This only happens after RX deactivated - s3!
+ */
+ key = rx->key;
+ if (!key.pending || tipc_aead_users(rx->aead[key.pending]) > -30)
+ goto s3;
+ if (!key.passive || tipc_aead_users(rx->aead[key.passive]) != 0)
+ goto s3;
+
+ new_pending = key.passive;
+ new_passive = key.pending;
+ tipc_crypto_key_set_state(rx, new_passive, key.active, new_pending);
+ goto s5;
+
+s3:
+ /* RX key deactivating:
+ * The passive key if any -> pending
+ * The active key -> passive (users = 0) / pending
+ * The pending key if any -> passive (users = 0)
+ */
+ key = rx->key;
+ if (!key.active)
+ goto s4;
+ if (time_before(jiffies, rx->timer1 + TIPC_RX_ACTIVE_LIM))
+ goto s4;
+
+ new_pending = (key.passive) ?: key.active;
+ new_passive = (key.passive) ? key.active : key.pending;
+ tipc_aead_users_set(rx->aead[new_pending], 0);
+ if (new_passive)
+ tipc_aead_users_set(rx->aead[new_passive], 0);
+ tipc_crypto_key_set_state(rx, new_passive, 0, new_pending);
+ pr_info("RX(%s): key %d is deactivated!\n",
+ tipc_node_get_id_str(rx->node), key.active);
+ goto s5;
+
+s4:
+ /* RX key passive -> freed: */
+ key = rx->key;
+ if (!key.passive || !tipc_aead_users(rx->aead[key.passive]))
+ goto s5;
+ if (time_before(jiffies, rx->timer2 + TIPC_RX_PASSIVE_LIM))
+ goto s5;
+
+ tipc_crypto_key_set_state(rx, 0, key.active, key.pending);
+ tipc_crypto_key_detach(rx->aead[key.passive], &rx->lock);
+ pr_info("RX(%s): key %d is freed!\n", tipc_node_get_id_str(rx->node),
+ key.passive);
+
+s5:
+ spin_unlock(&rx->lock);
+
+ /* Limit max_tfms & do debug commands if needed */
+ if (likely(sysctl_tipc_max_tfms <= TIPC_MAX_TFMS_LIM))
+ return;
+
+ cmd = sysctl_tipc_max_tfms;
+ sysctl_tipc_max_tfms = TIPC_MAX_TFMS_DEF;
+ tipc_crypto_do_cmd(rx->net, cmd);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_crypto_xmit - Build & encrypt TIPC message for xmit
+ * @net: struct net
+ * @skb: input/output message skb pointer
+ * @b: bearer used for xmit later
+ * @dst: destination media address
+ * @__dnode: destination node for reference if any
+ *
+ * First, build an encryption message header on the top of the message, then
+ * encrypt the original TIPC message by using the active or pending TX key.
+ * If the encryption is successful, the encrypted skb is returned directly or
+ * via the callback.
+ * Otherwise, the skb is freed!
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 : the encryption has succeeded (or no encryption)
+ * -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY : the encryption is ongoing, a callback will be made
+ * -ENOKEK : the encryption has failed due to no key
+ * -EKEYREVOKED : the encryption has failed due to key revoked
+ * -ENOMEM : the encryption has failed due to no memory
+ * < 0 : the encryption has failed due to other reasons
+ */
+int tipc_crypto_xmit(struct net *net, struct sk_buff **skb,
+ struct tipc_bearer *b, struct tipc_media_addr *dst,
+ struct tipc_node *__dnode)
+{
+ struct tipc_crypto *__rx = tipc_node_crypto_rx(__dnode);
+ struct tipc_crypto *tx = tipc_net(net)->crypto_tx;
+ struct tipc_crypto_stats __percpu *stats = tx->stats;
+ struct tipc_key key = tx->key;
+ struct tipc_aead *aead = NULL;
+ struct sk_buff *probe;
+ int rc = -ENOKEY;
+ u8 tx_key;
+
+ /* No encryption? */
+ if (!tx->working)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Try with the pending key if available and:
+ * 1) This is the only choice (i.e. no active key) or;
+ * 2) Peer has switched to this key (unicast only) or;
+ * 3) It is time to do a pending key probe;
+ */
+ if (unlikely(key.pending)) {
+ tx_key = key.pending;
+ if (!key.active)
+ goto encrypt;
+ if (__rx && atomic_read(&__rx->peer_rx_active) == tx_key)
+ goto encrypt;
+ if (TIPC_SKB_CB(*skb)->probe)
+ goto encrypt;
+ if (!__rx &&
+ time_after(jiffies, tx->timer2 + TIPC_TX_PROBE_LIM)) {
+ tx->timer2 = jiffies;
+ probe = skb_clone(*skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (probe) {
+ TIPC_SKB_CB(probe)->probe = 1;
+ tipc_crypto_xmit(net, &probe, b, dst, __dnode);
+ if (probe)
+ b->media->send_msg(net, probe, b, dst);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* Else, use the active key if any */
+ if (likely(key.active)) {
+ tx_key = key.active;
+ goto encrypt;
+ }
+ goto exit;
+
+encrypt:
+ aead = tipc_aead_get(tx->aead[tx_key]);
+ if (unlikely(!aead))
+ goto exit;
+ rc = tipc_ehdr_build(net, aead, tx_key, *skb, __rx);
+ if (likely(rc > 0))
+ rc = tipc_aead_encrypt(aead, *skb, b, dst, __dnode);
+
+exit:
+ switch (rc) {
+ case 0:
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_OK]);
+ break;
+ case -EINPROGRESS:
+ case -EBUSY:
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_ASYNC]);
+ *skb = NULL;
+ return rc;
+ default:
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_NOK]);
+ if (rc == -ENOKEY)
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_NOKEYS]);
+ else if (rc == -EKEYREVOKED)
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_BADKEYS]);
+ kfree_skb(*skb);
+ *skb = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ tipc_aead_put(aead);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tipc_crypto_rcv - Decrypt an encrypted TIPC message from peer
+ * @net: struct net
+ * @rx: RX crypto handle
+ * @skb: input/output message skb pointer
+ * @b: bearer where the message has been received
+ *
+ * If the decryption is successful, the decrypted skb is returned directly or
+ * as the callback, the encryption header and auth tag will be trimed out
+ * before forwarding to tipc_rcv() via the tipc_crypto_rcv_complete().
+ * Otherwise, the skb will be freed!
+ * Note: RX key(s) can be re-aligned, or in case of no key suitable, TX
+ * cluster key(s) can be taken for decryption (- recursive).
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 : the decryption has successfully completed
+ * -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY : the decryption is ongoing, a callback will be made
+ * -ENOKEY : the decryption has failed due to no key
+ * -EBADMSG : the decryption has failed due to bad message
+ * -ENOMEM : the decryption has failed due to no memory
+ * < 0 : the decryption has failed due to other reasons
+ */
+int tipc_crypto_rcv(struct net *net, struct tipc_crypto *rx,
+ struct sk_buff **skb, struct tipc_bearer *b)
+{
+ struct tipc_crypto *tx = tipc_net(net)->crypto_tx;
+ struct tipc_crypto_stats __percpu *stats;
+ struct tipc_aead *aead = NULL;
+ struct tipc_key key;
+ int rc = -ENOKEY;
+ u8 tx_key = 0;
+
+ /* New peer?
+ * Let's try with TX key (i.e. cluster mode) & verify the skb first!
+ */
+ if (unlikely(!rx))
+ goto pick_tx;
+
+ /* Pick RX key according to TX key, three cases are possible:
+ * 1) The current active key (likely) or;
+ * 2) The pending (new or deactivated) key (if any) or;
+ * 3) The passive or old active key (i.e. users > 0);
+ */
+ tx_key = ((struct tipc_ehdr *)(*skb)->data)->tx_key;
+ key = rx->key;
+ if (likely(tx_key == key.active))
+ goto decrypt;
+ if (tx_key == key.pending)
+ goto decrypt;
+ if (tx_key == key.passive) {
+ rx->timer2 = jiffies;
+ if (tipc_aead_users(rx->aead[key.passive]) > 0)
+ goto decrypt;
+ }
+
+ /* Unknown key, let's try to align RX key(s) */
+ if (tipc_crypto_key_try_align(rx, tx_key))
+ goto decrypt;
+
+pick_tx:
+ /* No key suitable? Try to pick one from TX... */
+ aead = tipc_crypto_key_pick_tx(tx, rx, *skb);
+ if (aead)
+ goto decrypt;
+ goto exit;
+
+decrypt:
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ if (!aead)
+ aead = tipc_aead_get(rx->aead[tx_key]);
+ rc = tipc_aead_decrypt(net, aead, *skb, b);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+exit:
+ stats = ((rx) ?: tx)->stats;
+ switch (rc) {
+ case 0:
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_OK]);
+ break;
+ case -EINPROGRESS:
+ case -EBUSY:
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_ASYNC]);
+ *skb = NULL;
+ return rc;
+ default:
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_NOK]);
+ if (rc == -ENOKEY) {
+ kfree_skb(*skb);
+ *skb = NULL;
+ if (rx)
+ tipc_node_put(rx->node);
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_NOKEYS]);
+ return rc;
+ } else if (rc == -EBADMSG) {
+ this_cpu_inc(stats->stat[STAT_BADMSGS]);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ tipc_crypto_rcv_complete(net, aead, b, skb, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void tipc_crypto_rcv_complete(struct net *net, struct tipc_aead *aead,
+ struct tipc_bearer *b,
+ struct sk_buff **skb, int err)
+{
+ struct tipc_skb_cb *skb_cb = TIPC_SKB_CB(*skb);
+ struct tipc_crypto *rx = aead->crypto;
+ struct tipc_aead *tmp = NULL;
+ struct t...
[truncated message content] |
|
From: Tuong L. <tuo...@de...> - 2019-11-05 10:51:32
|
This commit adds two netlink commands to TIPC in order for user to be
able to set or remove AEAD keys:
- TIPC_NL_KEY_SET
- TIPC_NL_KEY_FLUSH
When the 'KEY_SET' is given along with the key data, the key will be
initiated and attached to TIPC crypto. On the other hand, the
'KEY_FLUSH' command will remove all existing keys if any.
v2: rebase, add new kernel option ("TIPC_CRYPTO")
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuo...@de...>
---
include/uapi/linux/tipc_netlink.h | 8 +++
net/tipc/netlink.c | 20 +++++-
net/tipc/node.c | 135 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
net/tipc/node.h | 4 ++
4 files changed, 166 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tipc_netlink.h b/include/uapi/linux/tipc_netlink.h
index efb958fd167d..d712e5d7b3e1 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/tipc_netlink.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/tipc_netlink.h
@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ enum {
TIPC_NL_PEER_REMOVE,
TIPC_NL_BEARER_ADD,
TIPC_NL_UDP_GET_REMOTEIP,
+#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO
+ TIPC_NL_KEY_SET,
+ TIPC_NL_KEY_FLUSH,
+#endif
__TIPC_NL_CMD_MAX,
TIPC_NL_CMD_MAX = __TIPC_NL_CMD_MAX - 1
@@ -160,6 +164,10 @@ enum {
TIPC_NLA_NODE_UNSPEC,
TIPC_NLA_NODE_ADDR, /* u32 */
TIPC_NLA_NODE_UP, /* flag */
+#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO
+ TIPC_NLA_NODE_ID, /* data */
+ TIPC_NLA_NODE_KEY, /* data */
+#endif
__TIPC_NLA_NODE_MAX,
TIPC_NLA_NODE_MAX = __TIPC_NLA_NODE_MAX - 1
diff --git a/net/tipc/netlink.c b/net/tipc/netlink.c
index d32bbd0f5e46..b63461c6db02 100644
--- a/net/tipc/netlink.c
+++ b/net/tipc/netlink.c
@@ -102,7 +102,13 @@ const struct nla_policy tipc_nl_link_policy[TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX + 1] = {
const struct nla_policy tipc_nl_node_policy[TIPC_NLA_NODE_MAX + 1] = {
[TIPC_NLA_NODE_UNSPEC] = { .type = NLA_UNSPEC },
[TIPC_NLA_NODE_ADDR] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
- [TIPC_NLA_NODE_UP] = { .type = NLA_FLAG }
+ [TIPC_NLA_NODE_UP] = { .type = NLA_FLAG },
+#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO
+ [TIPC_NLA_NODE_ID] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
+ .len = TIPC_NODEID_LEN},
+ [TIPC_NLA_NODE_KEY] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
+ .len = TIPC_AEAD_KEY_SIZE_MAX},
+#endif
};
/* Properties valid for media, bearer and link */
@@ -257,6 +263,18 @@ static const struct genl_ops tipc_genl_v2_ops[] = {
.dumpit = tipc_udp_nl_dump_remoteip,
},
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO
+ {
+ .cmd = TIPC_NL_KEY_SET,
+ .validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP,
+ .doit = tipc_nl_node_set_key,
+ },
+ {
+ .cmd = TIPC_NL_KEY_FLUSH,
+ .validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP,
+ .doit = tipc_nl_node_flush_key,
+ },
+#endif
};
struct genl_family tipc_genl_family __ro_after_init = {
diff --git a/net/tipc/node.c b/net/tipc/node.c
index 61d4656c7ccd..710315e778f8 100644
--- a/net/tipc/node.c
+++ b/net/tipc/node.c
@@ -2784,6 +2784,141 @@ int tipc_nl_node_dump_monitor_peer(struct sk_buff *skb,
return skb->len;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO
+static int tipc_nl_retrieve_key(struct nlattr **attrs,
+ struct tipc_aead_key **key)
+{
+ struct nlattr *attr = attrs[TIPC_NLA_NODE_KEY];
+
+ if (!attr)
+ return -ENODATA;
+
+ *key = (struct tipc_aead_key *)nla_data(attr);
+ if (nla_len(attr) < tipc_aead_key_size(*key))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tipc_nl_retrieve_nodeid(struct nlattr **attrs, u8 **node_id)
+{
+ struct nlattr *attr = attrs[TIPC_NLA_NODE_ID];
+
+ if (!attr)
+ return -ENODATA;
+
+ if (nla_len(attr) < TIPC_NODEID_LEN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *node_id = (u8 *)nla_data(attr);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int __tipc_nl_node_set_key(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ struct nlattr *attrs[TIPC_NLA_NODE_MAX + 1];
+ struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
+ struct tipc_net *tn = tipc_net(net);
+ struct tipc_node *n = NULL;
+ struct tipc_aead_key *ukey;
+ struct tipc_crypto *c;
+ u8 *id, *own_id;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!info->attrs[TIPC_NLA_NODE])
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ rc = nla_parse_nested(attrs, TIPC_NLA_NODE_MAX,
+ info->attrs[TIPC_NLA_NODE],
+ tipc_nl_node_policy, info->extack);
+ if (rc)
+ goto exit;
+
+ own_id = tipc_own_id(net);
+ if (!own_id) {
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ rc = tipc_nl_retrieve_key(attrs, &ukey);
+ if (rc)
+ goto exit;
+
+ rc = tipc_aead_key_validate(ukey);
+ if (rc)
+ goto exit;
+
+ rc = tipc_nl_retrieve_nodeid(attrs, &id);
+ switch (rc) {
+ case -ENODATA:
+ /* Cluster key mode */
+ rc = tipc_crypto_key_init(tn->crypto_tx, ukey, CLUSTER_KEY);
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ /* Per-node key mode */
+ if (!memcmp(id, own_id, NODE_ID_LEN)) {
+ c = tn->crypto_tx;
+ } else {
+ n = tipc_node_find_by_id(net, id) ?:
+ tipc_node_create(net, 0, id, 0xffffu, 0, true);
+ if (unlikely(!n)) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ }
+ c = n->crypto_rx;
+ }
+
+ rc = tipc_crypto_key_init(c, ukey, PER_NODE_KEY);
+ if (n)
+ tipc_node_put(n);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+exit:
+ return (rc < 0) ? rc : 0;
+}
+
+int tipc_nl_node_set_key(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ rtnl_lock();
+ err = __tipc_nl_node_set_key(skb, info);
+ rtnl_unlock();
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+int __tipc_nl_node_flush_key(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
+ struct tipc_net *tn = tipc_net(net);
+ struct tipc_node *n;
+
+ tipc_crypto_key_flush(tn->crypto_tx);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(n, &tn->node_list, list)
+ tipc_crypto_key_flush(n->crypto_rx);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ pr_info("All keys are flushed!\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tipc_nl_node_flush_key(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ rtnl_lock();
+ err = __tipc_nl_node_flush_key(skb, info);
+ rtnl_unlock();
+
+ return err;
+}
+#endif
+
/**
* tipc_node_dump - dump TIPC node data
* @n: tipc node to be dumped
diff --git a/net/tipc/node.h b/net/tipc/node.h
index 1a15cf82cb11..a6803b449a2c 100644
--- a/net/tipc/node.h
+++ b/net/tipc/node.h
@@ -119,5 +119,9 @@ int tipc_nl_node_get_monitor(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info);
int tipc_nl_node_dump_monitor(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb);
int tipc_nl_node_dump_monitor_peer(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlink_callback *cb);
+#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO
+int tipc_nl_node_set_key(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info);
+int tipc_nl_node_flush_key(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info);
+#endif
void tipc_node_pre_cleanup_net(struct net *exit_net);
#endif
--
2.13.7
|
|
From: Ying X. <yin...@wi...> - 2019-11-06 08:42:58
|
On 11/5/19 6:50 PM, Tuong Lien wrote: > void tipc_bearer_xmit(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id, > struct sk_buff_head *xmitq, > - struct tipc_media_addr *dst) > +#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO > + struct tipc_media_addr *dst, > + struct tipc_node *__dnode > +#else > + struct tipc_media_addr *dst > +#endif > + ) To make code simpler, I think we can directly add one new parameter (ie, __dnode) no matter whether CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO is enabled or not. When CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO is disabled, we just pass NULL to "__dnode" parameter. As a consequence, we don't need to use CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO config to separate the two different situations of whether CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO is enabled or not whenever tipc_bearer_xmit() is called. |
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From: Tuong L. T. <tuo...@de...> - 2019-11-06 10:17:14
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Hi Ying, Ok, I will remove that "ifdef ... else", I don't like it either, just worried about a compiler warning but I have tested & it is ok. I think we can pass the node pointer to the "__dnode" anyway (don't need a NULL), so can remove the other "ifdef ... else" at every function calls (total = 8), do you agree? BR/Tuong -----Original Message----- From: Ying Xue <yin...@wi...> Sent: Wednesday, November 6, 2019 3:42 PM To: Tuong Lien <tuo...@de...>; tip...@li...; jon...@er...; ma...@do... Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/5] tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication On 11/5/19 6:50 PM, Tuong Lien wrote: > void tipc_bearer_xmit(struct net *net, u32 bearer_id, > struct sk_buff_head *xmitq, > - struct tipc_media_addr *dst) > +#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO > + struct tipc_media_addr *dst, > + struct tipc_node *__dnode > +#else > + struct tipc_media_addr *dst > +#endif > + ) To make code simpler, I think we can directly add one new parameter (ie, __dnode) no matter whether CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO is enabled or not. When CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO is disabled, we just pass NULL to "__dnode" parameter. As a consequence, we don't need to use CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO config to separate the two different situations of whether CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO is enabled or not whenever tipc_bearer_xmit() is called. |
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From: Ying X. <yin...@wi...> - 2019-11-07 11:08:00
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Acked-by: Ying Xue <yin...@wi...> Great work! Thanks, Ying On 11/5/19 6:50 PM, Tuong Lien wrote: > This series provides TIPC encryption feature, kernel part. There will be > another one in the 'iproute2/tipc' for user space to set key. > > Tuong Lien (5): > tipc: add reference counter to bearer > tipc: enable creating a "preliminary" node > tipc: add new AEAD key structure for user API > tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication > tipc: add support for AEAD key setting via netlink > > include/uapi/linux/tipc.h | 21 + > include/uapi/linux/tipc_netlink.h | 8 + > net/tipc/Kconfig | 12 + > net/tipc/Makefile | 1 + > net/tipc/bcast.c | 2 +- > net/tipc/bearer.c | 54 +- > net/tipc/bearer.h | 11 +- > net/tipc/core.c | 18 + > net/tipc/core.h | 8 + > net/tipc/crypto.c | 1986 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > net/tipc/crypto.h | 167 ++++ > net/tipc/link.c | 19 +- > net/tipc/link.h | 1 + > net/tipc/msg.c | 15 +- > net/tipc/msg.h | 46 +- > net/tipc/netlink.c | 20 +- > net/tipc/node.c | 347 ++++++- > net/tipc/node.h | 13 + > net/tipc/sysctl.c | 11 + > net/tipc/udp_media.c | 1 + > 20 files changed, 2694 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.c > create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.h > |
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From: Tuong L. <tuo...@de...> - 2019-11-08 01:42:37
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This series provides TIPC encryption feature, kernel part. There will be another one in the 'iproute2/tipc' for user space to set key. Tuong Lien (5): tipc: add reference counter to bearer tipc: enable creating a "preliminary" node tipc: add new AEAD key structure for user API tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication tipc: add support for AEAD key setting via netlink include/uapi/linux/tipc.h | 21 + include/uapi/linux/tipc_netlink.h | 4 + net/tipc/Kconfig | 12 + net/tipc/Makefile | 1 + net/tipc/bcast.c | 2 +- net/tipc/bearer.c | 49 +- net/tipc/bearer.h | 6 +- net/tipc/core.c | 14 + net/tipc/core.h | 8 + net/tipc/crypto.c | 1986 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/tipc/crypto.h | 167 ++++ net/tipc/link.c | 19 +- net/tipc/link.h | 1 + net/tipc/msg.c | 15 +- net/tipc/msg.h | 46 +- net/tipc/netlink.c | 18 +- net/tipc/node.c | 329 +++++- net/tipc/node.h | 13 + net/tipc/sysctl.c | 11 + net/tipc/udp_media.c | 1 + 20 files changed, 2648 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-) create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.c create mode 100644 net/tipc/crypto.h -- 2.13.7 |
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From: Tuong L. <tuo...@de...> - 2019-11-08 01:42:36
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When user sets RX key for a peer not existing on the own node, a new
node entry is needed to which the RX key will be attached. However,
since the peer node address (& capabilities) is unknown at that moment,
only the node-ID is provided, this commit allows the creation of a node
with only the data that we call as “preliminary”.
A preliminary node is not the object of the “tipc_node_find()” but the
“tipc_node_find_by_id()”. Once the first message i.e. LINK_CONFIG comes
from that peer, and is successfully decrypted by the own node, the
actual peer node data will be properly updated and the node will
function as usual.
In addition, the node timer always starts when a node object is created
so if a preliminary node is not used, it will be cleaned up.
The later encryption functions will also use the node timer and be able
to create a preliminary node automatically when needed.
Acked-by: Ying Xue <yin...@wi...>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon...@er...>
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuo...@de...>
---
net/tipc/node.c | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
net/tipc/node.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/tipc/node.c b/net/tipc/node.c
index 1f1584518221..086e3385b463 100644
--- a/net/tipc/node.c
+++ b/net/tipc/node.c
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ struct tipc_bclink_entry {
* @links: array containing references to all links to node
* @action_flags: bit mask of different types of node actions
* @state: connectivity state vs peer node
+ * @preliminary: a preliminary node or not
* @sync_point: sequence number where synch/failover is finished
* @list: links to adjacent nodes in sorted list of cluster's nodes
* @working_links: number of working links to node (both active and standby)
@@ -112,6 +113,7 @@ struct tipc_node {
int action_flags;
struct list_head list;
int state;
+ bool preliminary;
bool failover_sent;
u16 sync_point;
int link_cnt;
@@ -120,6 +122,7 @@ struct tipc_node {
u32 signature;
u32 link_id;
u8 peer_id[16];
+ char peer_id_string[NODE_ID_STR_LEN];
struct list_head publ_list;
struct list_head conn_sks;
unsigned long keepalive_intv;
@@ -245,6 +248,16 @@ u16 tipc_node_get_capabilities(struct net *net, u32 addr)
return caps;
}
+u32 tipc_node_get_addr(struct tipc_node *node)
+{
+ return (node) ? node->addr : 0;
+}
+
+char *tipc_node_get_id_str(struct tipc_node *node)
+{
+ return node->peer_id_string;
+}
+
static void tipc_node_kref_release(struct kref *kref)
{
struct tipc_node *n = container_of(kref, struct tipc_node, kref);
@@ -274,7 +287,7 @@ static struct tipc_node *tipc_node_find(struct net *net, u32 addr)
rcu_read_lock();
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &tn->node_htable[thash], hash) {
- if (node->addr != addr)
+ if (node->addr != addr || node->preliminary)
continue;
if (!kref_get_unless_zero(&node->kref))
node = NULL;
@@ -400,17 +413,39 @@ static void tipc_node_assign_peer_net(struct tipc_node *n, u32 hash_mixes)
static struct tipc_node *tipc_node_create(struct net *net, u32 addr,
u8 *peer_id, u16 capabilities,
- u32 signature, u32 hash_mixes)
+ u32 hash_mixes, bool preliminary)
{
struct tipc_net *tn = net_generic(net, tipc_net_id);
struct tipc_node *n, *temp_node;
struct tipc_link *l;
+ unsigned long intv;
int bearer_id;
int i;
spin_lock_bh(&tn->node_list_lock);
- n = tipc_node_find(net, addr);
+ n = tipc_node_find(net, addr) ?:
+ tipc_node_find_by_id(net, peer_id);
if (n) {
+ if (!n->preliminary)
+ goto update;
+ if (preliminary)
+ goto exit;
+ /* A preliminary node becomes "real" now, refresh its data */
+ tipc_node_write_lock(n);
+ n->preliminary = false;
+ n->addr = addr;
+ hlist_del_rcu(&n->hash);
+ hlist_add_head_rcu(&n->hash,
+ &tn->node_htable[tipc_hashfn(addr)]);
+ list_del_rcu(&n->list);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(temp_node, &tn->node_list, list) {
+ if (n->addr < temp_node->addr)
+ break;
+ }
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&n->list, &temp_node->list);
+ tipc_node_write_unlock_fast(n);
+
+update:
if (n->peer_hash_mix ^ hash_mixes)
tipc_node_assign_peer_net(n, hash_mixes);
if (n->capabilities == capabilities)
@@ -438,7 +473,9 @@ static struct tipc_node *tipc_node_create(struct net *net, u32 addr,
pr_warn("Node creation failed, no memory\n");
goto exit;
}
+ tipc_nodeid2string(n->peer_id_string, peer_id);
n->addr = addr;
+ n->preliminary = preliminary;
memcpy(&n->peer_id, peer_id, 16);
n->net = net;
n->peer_net = NULL;
@@ -463,26 +500,14 @@ static struct tipc_node *tipc_node_create(struct net *net, u32 addr,
n->signature = INVALID_NODE_SIG;
n->active_links[0] = INVALID_BEARER_ID;
n->active_links[1] = INVALID_BEARER_ID;
- if (!tipc_link_bc_create(net, tipc_own_addr(net),
- addr, U16_MAX,
- tipc_link_window(tipc_bc_sndlink(net)),
- n->capabilities,
- &n->bc_entry.inputq1,
- &n->bc_entry.namedq,
- tipc_bc_sndlink(net),
- &n->bc_entry.link)) {
- pr_warn("Broadcast rcv link creation failed, no memory\n");
- if (n->peer_net) {
- n->peer_net = NULL;
- n->peer_hash_mix = 0;
- }
- kfree(n);
- n = NULL;
- goto exit;
- }
+ n->bc_entry.link = NULL;
tipc_node_get(n);
timer_setup(&n->timer, tipc_node_timeout, 0);
- n->keepalive_intv = U32_MAX;
+ /* Start a slow timer anyway, crypto needs it */
+ n->keepalive_intv = 10000;
+ intv = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(n->keepalive_intv);
+ if (!mod_timer(&n->timer, intv))
+ tipc_node_get(n);
hlist_add_head_rcu(&n->hash, &tn->node_htable[tipc_hashfn(addr)]);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(temp_node, &tn->node_list, list) {
if (n->addr < temp_node->addr)
@@ -1005,6 +1030,8 @@ u32 tipc_node_try_addr(struct net *net, u8 *id, u32 addr)
{
struct tipc_net *tn = tipc_net(net);
struct tipc_node *n;
+ bool preliminary;
+ u32 sugg_addr;
/* Suggest new address if some other peer is using this one */
n = tipc_node_find(net, addr);
@@ -1020,9 +1047,11 @@ u32 tipc_node_try_addr(struct net *net, u8 *id, u32 addr)
/* Suggest previously used address if peer is known */
n = tipc_node_find_by_id(net, id);
if (n) {
- addr = n->addr;
+ sugg_addr = n->addr;
+ preliminary = n->preliminary;
tipc_node_put(n);
- return addr;
+ if (!preliminary)
+ return sugg_addr;
}
/* Even this node may be in conflict */
@@ -1039,7 +1068,7 @@ void tipc_node_check_dest(struct net *net, u32 addr,
bool *respond, bool *dupl_addr)
{
struct tipc_node *n;
- struct tipc_link *l;
+ struct tipc_link *l, *snd_l;
struct tipc_link_entry *le;
bool addr_match = false;
bool sign_match = false;
@@ -1053,12 +1082,27 @@ void tipc_node_check_dest(struct net *net, u32 addr,
*dupl_addr = false;
*respond = false;
- n = tipc_node_create(net, addr, peer_id, capabilities, signature,
- hash_mixes);
+ n = tipc_node_create(net, addr, peer_id, capabilities, hash_mixes,
+ false);
if (!n)
return;
tipc_node_write_lock(n);
+ if (unlikely(!n->bc_entry.link)) {
+ snd_l = tipc_bc_sndlink(net);
+ if (!tipc_link_bc_create(net, tipc_own_addr(net),
+ addr, U16_MAX,
+ tipc_link_window(snd_l),
+ n->capabilities,
+ &n->bc_entry.inputq1,
+ &n->bc_entry.namedq, snd_l,
+ &n->bc_entry.link)) {
+ pr_warn("Broadcast rcv link creation failed, no mem\n");
+ tipc_node_write_unlock_fast(n);
+ tipc_node_put(n);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
le = &n->links[b->identity];
@@ -2138,6 +2182,8 @@ int tipc_nl_node_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
}
list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &tn->node_list, list) {
+ if (node->preliminary)
+ continue;
if (last_addr) {
if (node->addr == last_addr)
last_addr = 0;
@@ -2653,11 +2699,6 @@ int tipc_nl_node_dump_monitor_peer(struct sk_buff *skb,
return skb->len;
}
-u32 tipc_node_get_addr(struct tipc_node *node)
-{
- return (node) ? node->addr : 0;
-}
-
/**
* tipc_node_dump - dump TIPC node data
* @n: tipc node to be dumped
diff --git a/net/tipc/node.h b/net/tipc/node.h
index c39cd861c07d..50f8838b32c2 100644
--- a/net/tipc/node.h
+++ b/net/tipc/node.h
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ enum {
void tipc_node_stop(struct net *net);
bool tipc_node_get_id(struct net *net, u32 addr, u8 *id);
u32 tipc_node_get_addr(struct tipc_node *node);
+char *tipc_node_get_id_str(struct tipc_node *node);
u32 tipc_node_try_addr(struct net *net, u8 *id, u32 addr);
void tipc_node_check_dest(struct net *net, u32 onode, u8 *peer_id128,
struct tipc_bearer *bearer,
--
2.13.7
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From: Tuong L. <tuo...@de...> - 2019-11-08 01:42:37
|
As a need to support the crypto asynchronous operations in the later
commits, apart from the current RCU mechanism for bearer pointer, we
add a 'refcnt' to the bearer object as well.
So, a bearer can be hold via 'tipc_bearer_hold()' without being freed
even though the bearer or interface can be disabled in the meanwhile.
If that happens, the bearer will be released then when the crypto
operation is completed and 'tipc_bearer_put()' is called.
Acked-by: Ying Xue <yin...@wi...>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon...@er...>
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuo...@de...>
---
net/tipc/bearer.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
net/tipc/bearer.h | 3 +++
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/tipc/bearer.c b/net/tipc/bearer.c
index 0214aa1c4427..6e15b9b1f1ef 100644
--- a/net/tipc/bearer.c
+++ b/net/tipc/bearer.c
@@ -315,6 +315,7 @@ static int tipc_enable_bearer(struct net *net, const char *name,
b->net_plane = bearer_id + 'A';
b->priority = prio;
test_and_set_bit_lock(0, &b->up);
+ refcount_set(&b->refcnt, 1);
res = tipc_disc_create(net, b, &b->bcast_addr, &skb);
if (res) {
@@ -351,6 +352,17 @@ static int tipc_reset_bearer(struct net *net, struct tipc_bearer *b)
return 0;
}
+bool tipc_bearer_hold(struct tipc_bearer *b)
+{
+ return (b && refcount_inc_not_zero(&b->refcnt));
+}
+
+void tipc_bearer_put(struct tipc_bearer *b)
+{
+ if (b && refcount_dec_and_test(&b->refcnt))
+ kfree_rcu(b, rcu);
+}
+
/**
* bearer_disable
*
@@ -369,7 +381,7 @@ static void bearer_disable(struct net *net, struct tipc_bearer *b)
if (b->disc)
tipc_disc_delete(b->disc);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(tn->bearer_list[bearer_id], NULL);
- kfree_rcu(b, rcu);
+ tipc_bearer_put(b);
tipc_mon_delete(net, bearer_id);
}
diff --git a/net/tipc/bearer.h b/net/tipc/bearer.h
index ea0f3c49cbed..faca696d422f 100644
--- a/net/tipc/bearer.h
+++ b/net/tipc/bearer.h
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ struct tipc_bearer {
struct tipc_discoverer *disc;
char net_plane;
unsigned long up;
+ refcount_t refcnt;
};
struct tipc_bearer_names {
@@ -210,6 +211,8 @@ int tipc_media_set_window(const char *name, u32 new_value);
int tipc_media_addr_printf(char *buf, int len, struct tipc_media_addr *a);
int tipc_enable_l2_media(struct net *net, struct tipc_bearer *b,
struct nlattr *attrs[]);
+bool tipc_bearer_hold(struct tipc_bearer *b);
+void tipc_bearer_put(struct tipc_bearer *b);
void tipc_disable_l2_media(struct tipc_bearer *b);
int tipc_l2_send_msg(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *buf,
struct tipc_bearer *b, struct tipc_media_addr *dest);
--
2.13.7
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