From: Andreas S. (ML) <and...@ca...> - 2013-06-14 09:31:44
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O.K. so how do you as a private person register your key with a 3rd party ? And why should that third party trust your keys to be unique (and not spread across the Facebook community) ? The proposed mechanism only ensures that the key is unique and contained in a secure device from which there is no escape. And this assertion is quite important if you want to bind the identity to a device. I agree that there are some parallels with UEFI, but isn't PKI primarily about trusting at least someone along the chain ? To get your RootCA certificate integrated into the browser list, you can either ask the browser vendors to trust your CA or you put the certificate in there on your own. Same for the attestation key of the device. You either rely on someone else who verified the trustwortyness of the device manufacturer or you verify it yourself. Andreas Btw. I don't read that the private key is exposed to anyone. Am 14.06.2013 11:10, schrieb Alon Bar-Lev: > Hi, > > Sorry, I totally disagree... > > Manufacturer should manufacture secure platform that can be used for > various of implementations. It should be accountable for the operation > of the device. The trust within the manufacturer is limited to > providing a device with no backdoors. > > The content, and in this case the private key, should not be exposed > to anyone, including the manufacturer if I to trust the device. > > Establishing manufacturer trust chain will be the same as UEFI, bad > for everyone but who ever hold the key for the CA. > > Had you said that I can somehow generate a public key after I bought > the device and enroll it to some 3rd part to have it trusted, I would > have agreed. But enforcing trust is not something that should be > acceptable. > > Regards, > Alon > > > On Fri, Jun 14, 2013 at 12:03 PM, Andreas Schwier (ML) > <and...@ca...> wrote: >> As the scheme is based on a piece of hardware it makes sense to trust >> the manufacturer to provide a genuine device. >> >> This way you know the key remains safe on the client side and is not >> some software based / man-in-the-middle generated key pair. >> >> It's quite the same what Anders does with the webpki attestation key and >> what we do with the device authentication key in the SmartCard-HSM. >> >> The key questions is how this network of trusted suppliers will be >> build. Who will certify suppliers ? Who operates a root CA that >> certifies suppliers ? Will there be a security evaluation of the devices >> (like CC) ? >> >> Andreas >> >> Am 14.06.2013 10:54, schrieb Alon Bar-Lev: >>> Yes, at first read I thought there is nothing new, we can do this with >>> existing smartcards... >>> >>> But then read: >>> """ >>> Initial Signup: Site sends Javascript call to browser asking for >>> public key for user. Browser finds activated U2F, asks it for public >>> key to remember for user. U2F returns signed public key (signature is >>> by U2F vendor). Site (optionally) verifies public key signature to >>> ensure its an accepted vendor and saves public key + attached blob >>> (encrypted private key). >>> """ >>> >>> So it is a meter of trust, same as PKI... only that you are forced to >>> trust the manufacturer... which is totally wrong. >>> >>> Initially I thought that each registration will create its own key >>> pair... which could have been nice if the device has enough memory. >>> Even single key pair is OK if you would like to share it between >>> services. >>> >>> Regards, >>> Alon >>> >>> On Fri, Jun 14, 2013 at 11:41 AM, helpcrypto helpcrypto >>> <hel...@gm...> wrote: >>>> I love the big brother. >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 6:59 PM, Anders Rundgren <and...@te...> wrote: >>>>> https://sites.google.com/site/oauthgoog/gnubby >>>>> >>>>> I think it is actually good that I finally have a competitor! >>>>> >>>>> Smart Card middleware will be a thing of the past. Hooray! >>>>> >>>>> Anders >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> This SF.net email is sponsored by Windows: >>>>> >>>>> Build for Windows Store. >>>>> >>>>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/windows-dev2dev >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> Opensc-devel mailing list >>>>> Ope...@li... >>>>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> This SF.net email is sponsored by Windows: >>>> >>>> Build for Windows Store. >>>> >>>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/windows-dev2dev >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Opensc-devel mailing list >>>> Ope...@li... >>>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel >>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> This SF.net email is sponsored by Windows: >>> >>> Build for Windows Store. >>> >>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/windows-dev2dev >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Opensc-devel mailing list >>> Ope...@li... >>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel >> >> >> -- >> >> --------- CardContact Software & System Consulting >> |.##> <##.| Andreas Schwier >> |# #| Schülerweg 38 >> |# #| 32429 Minden, Germany >> |'##> <##'| Phone +49 571 56149 >> --------- http://www.cardcontact.de >> http://www.tscons.de >> http://www.openscdp.org >> >> >> -- >> >> --------- CardContact Software & System Consulting >> |.##> <##.| Andreas Schwier >> |# #| Schülerweg 38 >> |# #| 32429 Minden, Germany >> |'##> <##'| Phone +49 571 56149 >> --------- http://www.cardcontact.de >> http://www.tscons.de >> http://www.openscdp.org >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> This SF.net email is sponsored by Windows: >> >> Build for Windows Store. >> >> http://p.sf.net/sfu/windows-dev2dev >> _______________________________________________ >> Opensc-devel mailing list >> Ope...@li... >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel -- --------- CardContact Software & System Consulting |.##> <##.| Andreas Schwier |# #| Schülerweg 38 |# #| 32429 Minden, Germany |'##> <##'| Phone +49 571 56149 --------- http://www.cardcontact.de http://www.tscons.de http://www.openscdp.org |