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From: prabu v. <pra...@gm...> - 2019-01-21 18:48:25
|
Dear All, I'm using Net-SNMP-5.4.4 package with OpenWRT SDK to develop my Agent for Armv7l. While building the image in a build server(Alice) I'm facing one issue like *SNMPv3 Requests with AES/DES are not working properly*. And I observed that the summary states the Agent is not configured with AES/DES. SNMP Versions Supported: 1 2c 3 Net-SNMP Version: 5.4.4 Building for: linux Network transport support: Callback UDP UDPIPv6 SNMPv3 Security Modules: usm Agent MIB code: <Removed to reduce the number of lines> Embedded Perl support: disabled SNMP Perl modules: building -- not embeddable SNMP Python modules: disabled Authentication support: MD5 Encryption support: I have tried a lot of combination to link the libcrypto but not able to achieve it. Whereas in the same build server(Alice) I built another Agent with Net-SNMP-5.5 for x86_64 it is working fine. FYI, in that build server(Alice), I have upgraded the OpenSSL v1.0.2g to v1.1.0g then again downgraded to OpenSSL v1.0.2g. Does it cause this issue? Because *before doing the version upgrade/downgrade the Agent with v5.4.4 was working fine in the same build server(Alice).* Please help me to resolve this issue as I'm not able to grab the exact Root Cause. Note: The same Agent built with Net-SNMP-5.4.4 for Armv7l is *working fine if build the image in some other build server(Bob)*. It has OpenSSL v1.0.2g. Following is the summary of working Agent configuration. SNMP Versions Supported: 1 2c 3 Net-SNMP Version: 5.4.4 Building for: linux Network transport support: Callback UDP UDPIPv6 SNMPv3 Security Modules: usm Agent MIB code: <Removed to reduce the number of lines> Embedded Perl support: disabled SNMP Perl modules: disabled SNMP Python modules: disabled Authentication support: MD5 SHA1 Encryption support: DES AES Please let me know if any other configuration/platform details required. -- With Best Regards, Anandaprabu V <https://www.linkedin.com/in/anandaprabu-v-10867671/> VVDN Technologies Pvt. Ltd <http://www.vvdntech.com/>, Chennai Cell : +91 9500650885 | Skype : prabuvaradharajan |
From: Robert S. <rs...@fr...> - 2019-01-18 23:52:12
|
Hi Madhusudhana, Did you go back and confirm Wes' theory? Did you see an authPriv request which failed, followed by and auth request that succeeded? Robert On Wed, 9 Jan 2019 04:19:28 +0000 Madhusudhana wrote: MR> Thanks Wes. MR> MR> -----Original Message----- MR> From: Wes Hardaker [mailto:har...@us...] MR> Sent: Tuesday, January 08, 2019 10:08 PM MR> MR> Madhusudhana R <mad...@in...> writes: MR> MR> > Can you please let me know whether this feature is added MR> > newly in v5.8 or it was an existing feature in v5.7.3 ? MR> > If it is a new feature in v5.8, is there a way to toggle some MR> > MACRO value to make sure an user with authpriv protocol will MR> > always responds in encrypted way? MR> MR> It's not new at all; that behavior has been around since the MR> creation of the SNMPv3 code within Net-SNMP (which at the time MR> was called UCD-SNMP, showing how old this concept is). At the MR> time, encryption wasn't even possible for everyone deploying MR> the code (and the only encryption supported was DES). The MR> world tended to also believe that authentication (ensuring MR> packets weren't modified) was a "must have" but encryption was MR> merely a "would be nice if you could, but it's not critical". |
From: Robert S. <rs...@fr...> - 2019-01-18 23:51:14
|
On Tue, 8 Jan 2019 20:37:45 -0800 Bart wrote: BVA> On 1/2/19 2:28 PM, Wes Hardaker via Net-snmp-coders wrote: BVA> > [...] Thus, it's time to reconsider whether we should make BVA> > the move or whether people have concerns worth addressing. BVA> > BVA> > Thoughts? BVA> BVA> [...] However, SF is still an order of magnitude slower BVA> than GitHub. Additionally, all continuous integration services BVA> I'm familiar with support GitHub but none of them support SF. BVA> So I think there are at least two reasons to reconsider the BVA> migration of the code base to GitHub. There may be other BVA> reasons that I overlooked. I agree with Bart; I think we should move ahead with the transition. Robert |
From: Robert S. <rs...@fr...> - 2019-01-18 23:41:11
|
On Tue, 08 Jan 2019 08:40:20 -0800 Wes wrote: WHVNSC> Magnus Fromreide <ma...@ly...> writes: WHVNSC> WHVNSC> > I suppose the default value of the access control is WHVNSC> > "auth", the man page didn't say what the effects of that WHVNSC> > was? WHVNSC> > WHVNSC> > I think this is a bad idea as a default since that works WHVNSC> > against the "secure by default" ideal - if someone want WHVNSC> > to loosen restrictions then they should have to ask for WHVNSC> > that. WHVNSC> > [...] WHVNSC> I'd push back rather hard against breaking existing WHVNSC> implementations by changing the default. [...] WHVNSC> WHVNSC> If we want to change the default behavior, I'd suggest we WHVNSC> instead create a new token and push that out to all WHVNSC> documentation and examples rather than causing a version WHVNSC> update to suddenly make everyone's existing deployments WHVNSC> stop working. How about a migration path? Add a warning at startup if rwuser is specified without a level. i.e. "Warning: no securityLevel specified for rwuser; defaulting to auth". People will hate it. But even if we add a new token, we should have a warning that people need to migrate to it, and we'd have to drop support for it at some point (with a configure option to keep it enabled). Now is a good time to consider such things, since (in theory) we have another release before the next long-term support release. Robert |
From: Jayashree P. <jay...@gm...> - 2019-01-15 15:05:10
|
Hi Team, I'm using netsnmp 5.5 and INFORMS works perfectly fine. When install 5.7.3, i see some issues with Informs. When there is a inform sent from my agent , Manager where 5.7 is installed sends a packet with wrong engineID (looks like some dynamically created engineId) . Bcz of which inform is not receiveied by Manager. While netsnmp 5.5 sends correct engineID of Manager in the ack packet. Is there any known issue ? Is there any fix needs to be added in the agent side ? Thanks, Jayashree |
From: Masanari I. <sta...@gm...> - 2019-01-12 12:51:25
|
Hello Bart, Thanks for the patch. It is OK for me. Regards, Masanari On Sat, Jan 12, 2019 at 12:17 PM Bart Van Assche <bva...@ac...> wrote: > > On 1/11/19 1:20 AM, Masanari Iida wrote: > > Hello > > In snmpd.conf man page, in "monitor" option, > > I would like to see following information. > > > > Original: NAME is an administrative name for this expression, and is > > Original: used for indexing the mteTriggerTable (and related tables). > > Add: NAME should not be duplicated in snmpd.conf. > > > > Background > > My colleague accidentally configure 2 lines of "monitor" settings > > with exactly same NAME and saw "duplicated trigger name" > > messages. > > I think one line of additional information will help someone in the future. > > Thanks for having reported this. How about addressing this with the > patch below? > > Bart. > > > Subject: [PATCH] man/snmpd.conf.5.def: Document that monitor names must > be unique > > Reported-by: Masanari Iida <sta...@gm...> > --- > man/snmpd.conf.5.def | 4 +++- > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/man/snmpd.conf.5.def b/man/snmpd.conf.5.def > index 2c4ddad806eb..eaa904f4b077 100644 > --- a/man/snmpd.conf.5.def > +++ b/man/snmpd.conf.5.def > @@ -974,7 +974,9 @@ Note that the event will only be triggered once, > when the expression > first matches. This monitor entry will not fire again until the > monitored condition first becomes false, and then matches again. > NAME is an administrative name for this expression, and is used for > -indexing the \fCmteTriggerTable\fR (and related tables). > +indexing the \fCmteTriggerTable\fR (and related tables). Each monitor > +line must have a unique NAME. Monitor lines with a duplicate name are > +discarded and cause snmpd to log a duplicate index complaint. > Note also that such monitors use an internal SNMPv3 request to retrieve > the values being monitored (even if normal agent queries typically use > SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c). See the \fIiquerySecName\fP token described above. > -- > 2.20.1 > |
From: Bart V. A. <bva...@ac...> - 2019-01-12 03:17:52
|
On 1/11/19 1:20 AM, Masanari Iida wrote: > Hello > In snmpd.conf man page, in "monitor" option, > I would like to see following information. > > Original: NAME is an administrative name for this expression, and is > Original: used for indexing the mteTriggerTable (and related tables). > Add: NAME should not be duplicated in snmpd.conf. > > Background > My colleague accidentally configure 2 lines of "monitor" settings > with exactly same NAME and saw "duplicated trigger name" > messages. > I think one line of additional information will help someone in the future. Thanks for having reported this. How about addressing this with the patch below? Bart. Subject: [PATCH] man/snmpd.conf.5.def: Document that monitor names must be unique Reported-by: Masanari Iida <sta...@gm...> --- man/snmpd.conf.5.def | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/man/snmpd.conf.5.def b/man/snmpd.conf.5.def index 2c4ddad806eb..eaa904f4b077 100644 --- a/man/snmpd.conf.5.def +++ b/man/snmpd.conf.5.def @@ -974,7 +974,9 @@ Note that the event will only be triggered once, when the expression first matches. This monitor entry will not fire again until the monitored condition first becomes false, and then matches again. NAME is an administrative name for this expression, and is used for -indexing the \fCmteTriggerTable\fR (and related tables). +indexing the \fCmteTriggerTable\fR (and related tables). Each monitor +line must have a unique NAME. Monitor lines with a duplicate name are +discarded and cause snmpd to log a duplicate index complaint. Note also that such monitors use an internal SNMPv3 request to retrieve the values being monitored (even if normal agent queries typically use SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c). See the \fIiquerySecName\fP token described above. -- 2.20.1 |
From: Masanari I. <sta...@gm...> - 2019-01-11 09:21:01
|
Hello In snmpd.conf man page, in "monitor" option, I would like to see following information. Original: NAME is an administrative name for this expression, and is Original: used for indexing the mteTriggerTable (and related tables). Add: NAME should not be duplicated in snmpd.conf. Background My colleague accidentally configure 2 lines of "monitor" settings with exactly same NAME and saw "duplicated trigger name" messages. I think one line of additional information will help someone in the future. Masanari |
From: Wes H. <har...@us...> - 2019-01-10 20:45:00
|
Bart Van Assche <bva...@ac...> writes: > Regarding GitHub versus SourceForge: during the past few weeks none of > my git pushes to SF failed. That's a significant improvement. However, > SF is still an order of magnitude slower than GitHub. Additionally, > all continuous integration services I'm familiar with support GitHub > but none of them support SF. So I think there are at least two reasons > to reconsider the migration of the code base to GitHub. Um, I think that last sentence is reversed right? We were always considering it, we just postponed the decision with a pause. -- Wes Hardaker Please mail all replies to net...@li... |
From: Bart V. A. <bva...@ac...> - 2019-01-09 04:37:54
|
On 1/2/19 2:28 PM, Wes Hardaker via Net-snmp-coders wrote: > Previously [1] we agreed to moved at least the code base to GitHub, with > work on moving the wiki and other things as well. Shortly after that > decision was made, GitHub was bought out by MS and the consensus changed > to "hold and wait till we see what the fallout might be". It appears, > at least publicly, that no changes are to be made in the near future to > GitHub's operational model. Thus, it's time to reconsider whether we > should make the move or whether people have concerns worth addressing. > > Thoughts? Hi Wes, My best wishes for the new year! Regarding GitHub versus SourceForge: during the past few weeks none of my git pushes to SF failed. That's a significant improvement. However, SF is still an order of magnitude slower than GitHub. Additionally, all continuous integration services I'm familiar with support GitHub but none of them support SF. So I think there are at least two reasons to reconsider the migration of the code base to GitHub. There may be other reasons that I overlooked. See also https://blog.github.com/2017-11-07-github-welcomes-all-ci-tools/. Bart. |
From: Madhusudhana R <mad...@in...> - 2019-01-09 04:34:15
|
Thanks Wes. -----Original Message----- From: Wes Hardaker [mailto:har...@us...] Sent: Tuesday, January 08, 2019 10:08 PM To: Madhusudhana R <mad...@in...> Cc: Wes Hardaker <har...@us...>; net...@li... Subject: Re: Netsnmpv5.8 possible security flaw CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Madhusudhana R <mad...@in...> writes: > Can you please let me know whether this feature is added newly in v5.8 > or it was an existing feature in v5.7.3 ? > If it is a new feature in v5.8, is there a way to toggle some MACRO > value to make sure an user with authpriv protocol will always responds > in encrypted way? It's not new at all; that behavior has been around since the creation of the SNMPv3 code within Net-SNMP (which at the time was called UCD-SNMP, showing how old this concept is). At the time, encryption wasn't even possible for everyone deploying the code (and the only encryption supported was DES). The world tended to also believe that authentication (ensuring packets weren't modified) was a "must have" but encryption was merely a "would be nice if you could, but it's not critical". -- Wes Hardaker Please mail all replies to net...@li... |
From: Wes H. <har...@us...> - 2019-01-08 16:56:18
|
"Roedersheimer, Drew A. via Net-snmp-coders" <net...@li...> writes: > Denis Hainsworth wrote: > > Dug into this some more. I see whats happening and not sure if its a bug per se but > > I do agree that if there is a non-buggy trap sender its all working properly so will > > close the bug with some comments. > > I have added some comments to bug #2899 and uploaded the proposed patch in Sourceforge. > > Devs: could someone please close bug #2900 and review/merge the patch from bug #2899? Sorry for the delay... Good analysis and good patch, so it's applied! -- Wes Hardaker Please mail all replies to net...@li... |
From: Wes H. <har...@us...> - 2019-01-08 16:40:32
|
Magnus Fromreide <ma...@ly...> writes: > I suppose the default value of the access control is "auth", the man > page didn't say what the effects of that was? > > I think this is a bad idea as a default since that works against the > "secure by default" ideal - if someone want to loosen restrictions > then they should have to ask for that. > > Now, I do appreciate that changing this might break the setup for some > people but on the other hand it probably will close unintended holes > for others. I'd push back rather hard against breaking existing implementations by changing the default. As mentioned in the other thread, at the time that code was put into place the only encryption was DES and because the U.S. was still pushing hard against export controls of even prototcols like DES, the general consensus of the SNMPv3 world was encryption was a "nice" but may not be available everywhere. If we want to change the default behavior, I'd suggest we instead create a new token and push that out to all documentation and examples rather than causing a version update to suddenly make everyone's existing deployments stop working. -- Wes Hardaker Please mail all replies to net...@li... |
From: Wes H. <har...@us...> - 2019-01-08 16:38:24
|
Madhusudhana R <mad...@in...> writes: > Can you please let me know whether this feature is added newly in v5.8 > or it was an existing feature in v5.7.3 ? > If it is a new feature in v5.8, is there a way to toggle some MACRO > value to make sure an user with authpriv protocol will always responds > in encrypted way? It's not new at all; that behavior has been around since the creation of the SNMPv3 code within Net-SNMP (which at the time was called UCD-SNMP, showing how old this concept is). At the time, encryption wasn't even possible for everyone deploying the code (and the only encryption supported was DES). The world tended to also believe that authentication (ensuring packets weren't modified) was a "must have" but encryption was merely a "would be nice if you could, but it's not critical". -- Wes Hardaker Please mail all replies to net...@li... |
From: Magnus F. <ma...@ly...> - 2019-01-08 15:30:46
|
On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 11:16:02PM -0800, Wes Hardaker via Net-snmp-coders wrote: > Madhusudhana R <mad...@in...> writes: > > > With Netsnmp v5.8 upgraded to my project (which was already working with v5.7.3), I am finding one > > problem which is as described below. > > > > An user is created in agent (which is netsnmp v5.8) > > How did you configure the access control of the agent? Specifically, if > you have a line like "rwuser NAME" in it, you MUST change it to "rwuser > NAME priv" to force encryption-only traffic. Otherwise the agent will > answer with both encrypted and unencrypted requests (but still > authenticated). I suppose the default value of the access control is "auth", the man page didn't say what the effects of that was? I think this is a bad idea as a default since that works against the "secure by default" ideal - if someone want to loosen restrictions then they should have to ask for that. Now, I do appreciate that changing this might break the setup for some people but on the other hand it probably will close unintended holes for others. /MF |
From: Madhusudhana R <mad...@in...> - 2019-01-08 10:48:12
|
Thanks Wes. Can you please let me know whether this feature is added newly in v5.8 or it was an existing feature in v5.7.3 ? If it is a new feature in v5.8, is there a way to toggle some MACRO value to make sure an user with authpriv protocol will always responds in encrypted way? Thanks in advance. Regards, Madhu -----Original Message----- From: Wes Hardaker [mailto:har...@us...] Sent: Tuesday, January 08, 2019 12:46 PM To: Madhusudhana R <mad...@in...> Cc: net...@li... Subject: Re: Netsnmpv5.8 possible security flaw CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Madhusudhana R <mad...@in...> writes: > With Netsnmp v5.8 upgraded to my project (which was already working > with v5.7.3), I am finding one problem which is as described below. > > An user is created in agent (which is netsnmp v5.8) How did you configure the access control of the agent? Specifically, if you have a line like "rwuser NAME" in it, you MUST change it to "rwuser NAME priv" to force encryption-only traffic. Otherwise the agent will answer with both encrypted and unencrypted requests (but still authenticated). I suspect that this is your issue, and your network management software is attempting (and succeeding) at falling back to unencrypted. -- Wes Hardaker Please mail all replies to net...@li... |
From: Madhusudhana R <mad...@in...> - 2019-01-08 07:40:18
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Thanks Wes. Can you please let me know whether this feature is added newly in v5.8 or it was an existing feature in v5.7.3 ? If it is a new feature in v5.8, is there a way to toggle some MACRO value to make sure an user with authpriv protocol will always responds in encrypted way? Thanks in advance. Regards, Madhu -----Original Message----- From: Wes Hardaker [mailto:har...@us...] Sent: Tuesday, January 08, 2019 12:46 PM To: Madhusudhana R <mad...@in...> Cc: net...@li... Subject: Re: Netsnmpv5.8 possible security flaw CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Madhusudhana R <mad...@in...> writes: > With Netsnmp v5.8 upgraded to my project (which was already working > with v5.7.3), I am finding one problem which is as described below. > > An user is created in agent (which is netsnmp v5.8) How did you configure the access control of the agent? Specifically, if you have a line like "rwuser NAME" in it, you MUST change it to "rwuser NAME priv" to force encryption-only traffic. Otherwise the agent will answer with both encrypted and unencrypted requests (but still authenticated). I suspect that this is your issue, and your network management software is attempting (and succeeding) at falling back to unencrypted. -- Wes Hardaker Please mail all replies to net...@li... |
From: Wes H. <har...@us...> - 2019-01-08 07:16:13
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Madhusudhana R <mad...@in...> writes: > With Netsnmp v5.8 upgraded to my project (which was already working with v5.7.3), I am finding one > problem which is as described below. > > An user is created in agent (which is netsnmp v5.8) How did you configure the access control of the agent? Specifically, if you have a line like "rwuser NAME" in it, you MUST change it to "rwuser NAME priv" to force encryption-only traffic. Otherwise the agent will answer with both encrypted and unencrypted requests (but still authenticated). I suspect that this is your issue, and your network management software is attempting (and succeeding) at falling back to unencrypted. -- Wes Hardaker Please mail all replies to net...@li... |
From: Madhusudhana R <mad...@in...> - 2019-01-07 19:15:54
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Hi Coders, With Netsnmp v5.8 upgraded to my project (which was already working with v5.7.3), I am finding one problem which is as described below. An user is created in agent (which is netsnmp v5.8) Username: 'user1' Hash algo: 'SHA224' Password: 'password123' Priv algo: 'AES192' Password: 'passwordABC' When I polled from manager(iReasoning MIB Browser) for SNMP get request with below credentials for user Username: 'user1' Hash algo: 'SHA224' Password: 'password123' Priv algo: 'AES192' Password: ' ' (a whitespace) The get request was successful though the privacy protocol password is a white space which means agent responded with a valid get response. Observation on Wireshark: There was a get response packet in un-encrypted format(plain text). Observation on Manager(iReasoning MIB browser): The get response was successful. This looks like a security flaw since a user is configured with authPriv protocol and with wrong privacy password, the response comes as a plain text. Please correct me if my observation is wrong anyway. If not, can anyone please comment on this? Thanks in advance. Regards, Madhu |
From: Roedersheimer, D. A. <Dre...@le...> - 2019-01-04 19:54:21
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Denis Hainsworth wrote: > Dug into this some more. I see whats happening and not sure if its a bug per se but > I do agree that if there is a non-buggy trap sender its all working properly so will > close the bug with some comments. I have added some comments to bug #2899 and uploaded the proposed patch in Sourceforge. Devs: could someone please close bug #2900 and review/merge the patch from bug #2899? Thanks -Drew |
From: Wes H. <har...@us...> - 2019-01-02 22:28:48
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Previously [1] we agreed to moved at least the code base to GitHub, with work on moving the wiki and other things as well. Shortly after that decision was made, GitHub was bought out by MS and the consensus changed to "hold and wait till we see what the fallout might be". It appears, at least publicly, that no changes are to be made in the near future to GitHub's operational model. Thus, it's time to reconsider whether we should make the move or whether people have concerns worth addressing. Thoughts? [1] https://sourceforge.net/p/net-snmp/mailman/message/36314970/ -- Wes Hardaker Please mail all replies to net...@li... |
From: Denis H. <den...@gm...> - 2018-12-21 16:07:07
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On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 12:39:07AM +0000, Roedersheimer, Drew A. wrote: > Denis Hainsworth wrote: > > #2899 - snmptrap bug > > #2900 - snmptrapd bug > > > > -denis > > Denis, > > Sorry for the delayed response. I haven't had time to look at this until recently. > > Regarding the snmptrapd bug you created (#2900): I think this is working as expected. > I compiled and tested v5.7.3 from git source, and snmptrapd is certainly validating the > msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots value. Whenever I send a trap with a boot value that is > the same or greater than the last, the trap is received. If I send a trap with a > boot value that is less than a previous trap, I get the following error from snmptrapd: > > usm: USM processing begun... > usm: match on user testuser > usm: Verification succeeded. > usm: Remote boot count invalid. > > > As for the msgAuthoritativeEngineTime values, if the delta from the previous trap > is large enough, the trap is also rejected by snmptrapd. Here's the message you > will see (with -Dusm): > > usm: USM processing begun... > usm: match on user testuser > usm: Verification succeeded. > usm: Message too old. > > I haven't dug into the code deep enough to find the threshold, but I suspect it's > following the RFC. > > The end result is that I think that bug #2900 should be closed as invalid. > > Please let me know your thoughts. Dug into this some more. I see whats happening and not sure if its a bug per se but I do agree that if there is a non-buggy trap sender its all working properly so will close the bug with some comments. So per rfc2574 the only requirement is that a trap boots/time be at most 150s behind the last message received. Plus that boots/time always starts at 0/0. So because snmptrap binary we were using was always setting boots/time to 0/0 that was never less than 150s older so snmptrapd happily accepts the messages which I though meant it wasnt checking. This is namely because Cisco Prime Network snmp trap receiver throws the "notintimewindow" error for 0/0. I believe this is a restriction technically outside the strict reading of the RFC. I couldn't find a section that mandated the snmp receiver should error if boot/time never changes and/or always stays at 0/0. In this sense i think snmptrapd is potentially more RFC compliant but less restrictive than cisco. As you noted if I use a functional snmptrap program where I am able to set the boots/time and advance it to non zero values than I can see that I get proper errors if I back the time up past 150s prior to the latest time sent. So i'll update and close the snmptrapd bug. nice catch sorry for the confusion. -denis |
From: Roedersheimer, D. A. <Dre...@le...> - 2018-12-19 01:13:19
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Denis Hainsworth wrote: > #2899 - snmptrap bug > #2900 - snmptrapd bug > > -denis Denis, Sorry for the delayed response. I haven't had time to look at this until recently. Regarding the snmptrapd bug you created (#2900): I think this is working as expected. I compiled and tested v5.7.3 from git source, and snmptrapd is certainly validating the msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots value. Whenever I send a trap with a boot value that is the same or greater than the last, the trap is received. If I send a trap with a boot value that is less than a previous trap, I get the following error from snmptrapd: usm: USM processing begun... usm: match on user testuser usm: Verification succeeded. usm: Remote boot count invalid. As for the msgAuthoritativeEngineTime values, if the delta from the previous trap is large enough, the trap is also rejected by snmptrapd. Here's the message you will see (with -Dusm): usm: USM processing begun... usm: match on user testuser usm: Verification succeeded. usm: Message too old. I haven't dug into the code deep enough to find the threshold, but I suspect it's following the RFC. The end result is that I think that bug #2900 should be closed as invalid. Please let me know your thoughts. -Drew |
From: prabu v. <pra...@gm...> - 2018-12-18 19:10:09
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Thanks for the input Wes. I'll check it out how the v3 proxy may help in my case. Or can we consider the security aspects of SNMPv3 and proceed without any source address filtering whereas we can have the same filter for SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c only? In this case, I can make sure the User credentials should be strong one. FYI, my agent will support any one version at a time. On Tue 18 Dec, 2018 11:04 pm Wes Hardaker, <har...@us...> wrote: > prabu varadharajan <pra...@gm...> writes: > > > But as per the design, my agent will be configured with only one user > > which can be updated as rouser or rwuser. So can you please suggest > > any other way to achieve this if possible? > > You can't have a single user with different access levels, sorry. There > are hacky things you could do, like using v2c communities for read-only > (but that's insecure) or setting up a v3 proxy for the read-only manager > to proxy through that only allows read access even though the outgoing > access to the real device is using a read-write user. But that's a real > hack and not much better. > -- > Wes Hardaker > Please mail all replies to net...@li... > |
From: Wes H. <har...@us...> - 2018-12-18 17:34:30
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prabu varadharajan <pra...@gm...> writes: > But as per the design, my agent will be configured with only one user > which can be updated as rouser or rwuser. So can you please suggest > any other way to achieve this if possible? You can't have a single user with different access levels, sorry. There are hacky things you could do, like using v2c communities for read-only (but that's insecure) or setting up a v3 proxy for the read-only manager to proxy through that only allows read access even though the outgoing access to the real device is using a read-write user. But that's a real hack and not much better. -- Wes Hardaker Please mail all replies to net...@li... |