There were already lots of discussions about how the
RIAA could get you cornered and even on the "How MUTE
Protects Your Privacy" web site Jason reassured that
military-grade encryption prevents MIM attacks. But
why being man in the middle, if you can be all the
neighbors to one monitored node?
If the RIAA gets the chance to install "spy node
software" in the central offices of the ISPs this
software could simulate all the neighbors for each
single Mute client and could track whatever search
requests come out of that node and what traffic is
going in.
Therefore I would suggest to add sort of virtual
private network support into Mute to conntect to
let's say 3 known and trusted friends. Everybody who
wants to use that "Mutest Mode" has to exchange
certificates with his 3 or more friends in safe
manner and import them into his Mute client. Then he
can type in the IPs or dyndns names of these friends
and connect to them if they are online. In
the "Mutest Mode" Mute software refuses to work, if
not at least 3 trusted connections are up in addition
to the randomly built connections.
So if the RIAA wants to simulate you ALL neighbors
they would fail, because they cannot simulate your
trusted friends without the correct certificates.
If they do not want to leak out doing their spy thing
they have to leave your trusted connections through.
In this way a trust-chained "VPMN" (virtual private
Mute network) connects large blobs of nodes and every
single user can be sure, that he cannot be cornered
solely.
If your friends live in a certain distance and are
connected to another central office or even another
ISP, it gets nearly infeasable to track the chunk of
trust-chained nodes as a whole - not to mention
figuring out, who in detial was source or drain of
the monitored traffic.
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interesting suggestion