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From: Roberto S. <rob...@po...> - 2012-02-15 17:14:48
|
On 02/15/2012 05:55 PM, Gustavo Sverzut Barbieri wrote: > On Wed, Feb 15, 2012 at 2:26 PM, Roberto Sassu<rob...@po...> wrote: >> >> On 02/15/2012 03:30 PM, Gustavo Sverzut Barbieri wrote: >>> >>> On Wed, Feb 15, 2012 at 11:23 AM, Roberto Sassu<rob...@po...> wrote: >>>> >>>> The new function ima_setup() loads an IMA custom policy from a file in the >>>> default location '/etc/sysconfig/ima-policy', if present, and writes it to >>> >>> >>> isn't /etc/sysconfig too specific to Fedora? >>> >> >> Hi Gustavo >> >> probably yes. I see the code in 'src/locale-setup.c' where the >> the configuration directory depends on the target distribution. >> I can implement something like that in my patch. > > Can't IMA be changed? Lennart seems to be pushing for distribution > independent location files. If you can get IMA people to agree on > something, just use this one instead. > > People that use IMA with systemd must use this location. Eventually > this will happen with every configuration file we support. > The location of the policy file is not IMA dependent. I chose that because it seemed to me the right place where to put this file. So, i can easily modify the location to be distribution independent but i don't known which directory would be appropriate. Any proposal? Regards Roberto Sassu > >>> Also, I certainly have no such things in my system and see no point in >>> calling ima_setup() on it. Or even compiling the source file in such >>> case. >>> >> >> Ok. I can enclose the code in ima-setup.c within an 'ifdef HAVE_IMA' >> statement, as it happens for SELinux. However an issue is that there is no a specific package for IMA that can be checked to set the HAVE_IMA >> definition to yes. Instead, the code can be enabled for example by >> adding the parameter '--enable_ima' in the configure script. > > okay. > > -- > Gustavo Sverzut Barbieri > http://profusion.mobi embedded systems > -------------------------------------- > MSN: bar...@gm... > Skype: gsbarbieri > Mobile: +55 (19) 9225-2202 |
|
From: Gustavo S. B. <bar...@pr...> - 2012-02-15 16:55:50
|
On Wed, Feb 15, 2012 at 2:26 PM, Roberto Sassu <rob...@po...> wrote: > > On 02/15/2012 03:30 PM, Gustavo Sverzut Barbieri wrote: >> >> On Wed, Feb 15, 2012 at 11:23 AM, Roberto Sassu<rob...@po...> wrote: >>> >>> The new function ima_setup() loads an IMA custom policy from a file in the >>> default location '/etc/sysconfig/ima-policy', if present, and writes it to >> >> >> isn't /etc/sysconfig too specific to Fedora? >> > > Hi Gustavo > > probably yes. I see the code in 'src/locale-setup.c' where the > the configuration directory depends on the target distribution. > I can implement something like that in my patch. Can't IMA be changed? Lennart seems to be pushing for distribution independent location files. If you can get IMA people to agree on something, just use this one instead. People that use IMA with systemd must use this location. Eventually this will happen with every configuration file we support. >> Also, I certainly have no such things in my system and see no point in >> calling ima_setup() on it. Or even compiling the source file in such >> case. >> > > Ok. I can enclose the code in ima-setup.c within an 'ifdef HAVE_IMA' > statement, as it happens for SELinux. However an issue is that there is no a specific package for IMA that can be checked to set the HAVE_IMA > definition to yes. Instead, the code can be enabled for example by > adding the parameter '--enable_ima' in the configure script. okay. -- Gustavo Sverzut Barbieri http://profusion.mobi embedded systems -------------------------------------- MSN: bar...@gm... Skype: gsbarbieri Mobile: +55 (19) 9225-2202 |
|
From: Roberto S. <rob...@po...> - 2012-02-15 16:29:05
|
On 02/15/2012 03:30 PM, Gustavo Sverzut Barbieri wrote: > On Wed, Feb 15, 2012 at 11:23 AM, Roberto Sassu<rob...@po...> wrote: >> The new function ima_setup() loads an IMA custom policy from a file in the >> default location '/etc/sysconfig/ima-policy', if present, and writes it to > > isn't /etc/sysconfig too specific to Fedora? > Hi Gustavo probably yes. I see the code in 'src/locale-setup.c' where the the configuration directory depends on the target distribution. I can implement something like that in my patch. > Also, I certainly have no such things in my system and see no point in > calling ima_setup() on it. Or even compiling the source file in such > case. > Ok. I can enclose the code in ima-setup.c within an 'ifdef HAVE_IMA' statement, as it happens for SELinux. However an issue is that there is no a specific package for IMA that can be checked to set the HAVE_IMA definition to yes. Instead, the code can be enabled for example by adding the parameter '--enable_ima' in the configure script. Regards Roberto Sassu |
|
From: Gustavo S. B. <bar...@pr...> - 2012-02-15 14:30:40
|
On Wed, Feb 15, 2012 at 11:23 AM, Roberto Sassu <rob...@po...> wrote: > The new function ima_setup() loads an IMA custom policy from a file in the > default location '/etc/sysconfig/ima-policy', if present, and writes it to isn't /etc/sysconfig too specific to Fedora? Also, I certainly have no such things in my system and see no point in calling ima_setup() on it. Or even compiling the source file in such case. -- Gustavo Sverzut Barbieri http://profusion.mobi embedded systems -------------------------------------- MSN: bar...@gm... Skype: gsbarbieri Mobile: +55 (19) 9225-2202 |
|
From: Roberto S. <rob...@po...> - 2012-02-15 13:27:22
|
The new function ima_setup() loads an IMA custom policy from a file in the default location '/etc/sysconfig/ima-policy', if present, and writes it to the path 'ima/policy' in the security filesystem. This function is executed at early stage in order to avoid that some file operations are not measured by IMA and it is placed after the initialization of SELinux because IMA needs the latter (or other security modules) to understand LSM-specific rules. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <rob...@po...> Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ra...@po...> --- Makefile.am | 1 + src/ima-setup.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/ima-setup.h | 29 ++++++++++++++ src/main.c | 6 ++- 4 files changed, 149 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/ima-setup.c create mode 100644 src/ima-setup.h diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am index d3d0ed8..7476caa 100644 --- a/Makefile.am +++ b/Makefile.am @@ -515,6 +515,7 @@ libsystemd_core_la_SOURCES = \ src/mount-setup.c \ src/hostname-setup.c \ src/selinux-setup.c \ + src/ima-setup.c \ src/loopback-setup.c \ src/kmod-setup.c \ src/locale-setup.c \ diff --git a/src/ima-setup.c b/src/ima-setup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..45afc0c --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ima-setup.c @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +/*-*- Mode: C; c-basic-offset: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*-*/ + +/*** + This file is part of systemd. + + Copyright 2010 Lennart Poettering + Copyright (C) 2012 Roberto Sassu - Politecnico di Torino, Italy + TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it + + systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it + under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +***/ + +#include <unistd.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/mman.h> + +#include "ima-setup.h" +#include "mount-setup.h" +#include "macro.h" +#include "util.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "label.h" + +#define IMA_SECFS_DIR SECURITYFS_MNTPOINT "/ima" +#define IMA_SECFS_POLICY IMA_SECFS_DIR "/policy" +#define IMA_POLICY_PATH "/etc/sysconfig/ima-policy" + +int ima_setup(void) { + struct stat st; + ssize_t policy_size = 0, written = 0; + char *policy; + int policyfd = -1, imafd = -1; + int result = 0; + +#ifndef HAVE_SELINUX + /* Mount the securityfs filesystem */ + mount_setup_early(); +#endif + + if (stat(IMA_POLICY_PATH, &st) == -1) + return 0; + + policy_size = st.st_size; + if (stat(IMA_SECFS_DIR, &st) == -1) { + log_debug("IMA support is disabled in the kernel, ignoring."); + return 0; + } + + if (stat(IMA_SECFS_POLICY, &st) == -1) { + log_error("Another IMA custom policy has already been loaded, " + "ignoring."); + return 0; + } + + policyfd = open(IMA_POLICY_PATH, O_RDONLY); + if (policyfd < 0) { + log_error("Failed to open the IMA custom policy file %s (%s), " + "ignoring.", IMA_POLICY_PATH, strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + + imafd = open(IMA_SECFS_POLICY, O_WRONLY); + if (imafd < 0) { + log_error("Failed to open the IMA kernel interface %s (%s), " + "ignoring.", IMA_SECFS_POLICY, strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + + policy = mmap(NULL, policy_size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, policyfd, 0); + if (policy == NULL) { + log_error("mmap() failed (%s), freezing", strerror(errno)); + result = -errno; + goto out; + } + + while(written < policy_size) { + ssize_t len = write(imafd, policy + written, + policy_size - written); + if (len <= 0) { + log_error("Failed to load the IMA custom policy " + "file %s (%s), ignoring.", IMA_POLICY_PATH, + strerror(errno)); + goto out_mmap; + } + written += len; + } + + log_info("Successfully loaded the IMA custom policy %s.", + IMA_POLICY_PATH); +out_mmap: + munmap(policy, policy_size); +out: + if (policyfd >= 0) + close_nointr_nofail(policyfd); + if (imafd >= 0) + close_nointr_nofail(imafd); + return result; +} diff --git a/src/ima-setup.h b/src/ima-setup.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7d677cf --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ima-setup.h @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +/*-*- Mode: C; c-basic-offset: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*-*/ + +#ifndef fooimasetuphfoo +#define fooimasetuphfoo + +/*** + This file is part of systemd. + + Copyright 2010 Lennart Poettering + Copyright (C) 2012 Roberto Sassu - Politecnico di Torino, Italy + TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it + + systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it + under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +***/ + +int ima_setup(void); + +#endif diff --git a/src/main.c b/src/main.c index ed317b4..7ae8841 100644 --- a/src/main.c +++ b/src/main.c @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ #include "kmod-setup.h" #include "locale-setup.h" #include "selinux-setup.h" +#include "ima-setup.h" #include "machine-id-setup.h" #include "load-fragment.h" #include "fdset.h" @@ -1203,9 +1204,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { arg_running_as = MANAGER_SYSTEM; log_set_target(detect_container(NULL) > 0 ? LOG_TARGET_CONSOLE : LOG_TARGET_JOURNAL_OR_KMSG); - if (!is_reexec) + if (!is_reexec) { if (selinux_setup(&loaded_policy) < 0) goto finish; + if (ima_setup() < 0) + goto finish; + } log_open(); -- 1.7.7.6 |
|
From: Roberto S. <rob...@po...> - 2012-02-15 13:26:51
|
The mount of the securityfs filesystem is now performed in the main systemd
executable as it is used by IMA to provide the interface for loading custom
policies. The unit file 'units/sys-kernel-security.mount' has been removed
because it is not longer necessary.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <rob...@po...>
Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ra...@po...>
---
Makefile.am | 3 ---
src/mount-setup.c | 6 ++++--
src/mount-setup.h | 2 ++
units/sys-kernel-security.mount | 17 -----------------
4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 units/sys-kernel-security.mount
diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
index 983ea16..d3d0ed8 100644
--- a/Makefile.am
+++ b/Makefile.am
@@ -291,7 +291,6 @@ dist_systemunit_DATA = \
units/dev-mqueue.mount \
units/sys-kernel-config.mount \
units/sys-kernel-debug.mount \
- units/sys-kernel-security.mount \
units/sys-fs-fuse-connections.mount \
units/var-run.mount \
units/media.mount \
@@ -2374,7 +2373,6 @@ systemd-install-data-hook:
dev-mqueue.mount \
sys-kernel-config.mount \
sys-kernel-debug.mount \
- sys-kernel-security.mount \
sys-fs-fuse-connections.mount \
systemd-modules-load.service \
systemd-tmpfiles-setup.service \
@@ -2384,7 +2382,6 @@ systemd-install-data-hook:
$(LN_S) ../dev-mqueue.mount dev-mqueue.mount && \
$(LN_S) ../sys-kernel-config.mount sys-kernel-config.mount && \
$(LN_S) ../sys-kernel-debug.mount sys-kernel-debug.mount && \
- $(LN_S) ../sys-kernel-security.mount sys-kernel-security.mount && \
$(LN_S) ../sys-fs-fuse-connections.mount sys-fs-fuse-connections.mount && \
$(LN_S) ../systemd-modules-load.service systemd-modules-load.service && \
$(LN_S) ../systemd-tmpfiles-setup.service systemd-tmpfiles-setup.service && \
diff --git a/src/mount-setup.c b/src/mount-setup.c
index 7c14ea8..62bf743 100644
--- a/src/mount-setup.c
+++ b/src/mount-setup.c
@@ -51,13 +51,15 @@ typedef struct MountPoint {
} MountPoint;
/* The first three entries we might need before SELinux is up. The
- * other ones we can delay until SELinux is loaded. */
-#define N_EARLY_MOUNT 3
+ * fourth (securityfs) is needed by IMA to load a custom policy. The
+ * other ones we can delay until SELinux and IMA are loaded. */
+#define N_EARLY_MOUNT 4
static const MountPoint mount_table[] = {
{ "proc", "/proc", "proc", NULL, MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, true },
{ "sysfs", "/sys", "sysfs", NULL, MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, true },
{ "devtmpfs", "/dev", "devtmpfs", "mode=755", MS_NOSUID, true },
+ { "securityfs", SECURITYFS_MNTPOINT, "securityfs", NULL, MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, false },
{ "tmpfs", "/dev/shm", "tmpfs", "mode=1777", MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV, true },
{ "devpts", "/dev/pts", "devpts", "mode=620,gid=" STRINGIFY(TTY_GID), MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC, false },
{ "tmpfs", "/run", "tmpfs", "mode=755", MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV, true },
diff --git a/src/mount-setup.h b/src/mount-setup.h
index c1a27ba..df6f518 100644
--- a/src/mount-setup.h
+++ b/src/mount-setup.h
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
#include <stdbool.h>
+#define SECURITYFS_MNTPOINT "/sys/kernel/security"
+
int mount_setup_early(void);
int mount_setup(bool loaded_policy);
diff --git a/units/sys-kernel-security.mount b/units/sys-kernel-security.mount
deleted file mode 100644
index 80cd761..0000000
--- a/units/sys-kernel-security.mount
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-# This file is part of systemd.
-#
-# systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
-# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
-# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
-# (at your option) any later version.
-
-[Unit]
-Description=Security File System
-DefaultDependencies=no
-ConditionPathExists=/sys/kernel/security
-Before=sysinit.target
-
-[Mount]
-What=securityfs
-Where=/sys/kernel/security
-Type=securityfs
--
1.7.7.6
|
|
From: Peter M. <pm...@go...> - 2012-02-13 05:22:18
|
On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 7:34 PM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: > On Sun, 2012-02-12 at 16:52 -0800, Peter Moody wrote: >> On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 4:42 PM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: >> > On Sun, 2012-02-12 at 10:40 -0800, Peter Moody wrote: >> >> On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 4:05 PM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: >> >> > On Fri, 2012-02-10 at 10:02 -0800, Peter Moody wrote: >> >> >> I'm probably missing something obvious, but I'm interested in getting >> >> >> the contents of /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements >> >> >> into syslog. Is there an easy way to do this or do I have to write >> >> >> something to do it manually? >> >> > >> >> > The measurements are currently only added to the measurement list. With >> >> > IMA-appraisal, invalid measurements are audited. >> >> >> >> Is auditing the measurements something that you would consider >> >> worthwhile or if I want to do this should I find some syslog-y way of >> >> tailing the measurements file and sending them to syslog myself? >> > >> > The IMA measurement list is meant for remote attestation and would be >> > included in the TPM quote. Could you please explain why you'd want >> > these measurements written to syslog? >> >> I'd like to see the measurements on my central log-catcher(s). > > I kind of got that, but I'm asking why would you want all these > measurements cluttering syslog? You do realize the default policy > measures all executable files, all files mmaped executable and all files > opened by root? > > If you're only interested in recording the existing measurements at a > specific point in time, then redirect the output. If by "getting the > contents of /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements into > syslog", you mean logging the measurements to syslog as they're added to > the measurement list, then you'll have to modify ima_store_template(). Thanks! Cheers, peter > Mimi > -- Peter Moody Google 1.650.253.7306 Security Engineer pgp:0xC3410038 |
|
From: Mimi Z. <zo...@li...> - 2012-02-13 03:38:33
|
On Sun, 2012-02-12 at 16:52 -0800, Peter Moody wrote: > On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 4:42 PM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: > > On Sun, 2012-02-12 at 10:40 -0800, Peter Moody wrote: > >> On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 4:05 PM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: > >> > On Fri, 2012-02-10 at 10:02 -0800, Peter Moody wrote: > >> >> I'm probably missing something obvious, but I'm interested in getting > >> >> the contents of /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements > >> >> into syslog. Is there an easy way to do this or do I have to write > >> >> something to do it manually? > >> > > >> > The measurements are currently only added to the measurement list. With > >> > IMA-appraisal, invalid measurements are audited. > >> > >> Is auditing the measurements something that you would consider > >> worthwhile or if I want to do this should I find some syslog-y way of > >> tailing the measurements file and sending them to syslog myself? > > > > The IMA measurement list is meant for remote attestation and would be > > included in the TPM quote. Could you please explain why you'd want > > these measurements written to syslog? > > I'd like to see the measurements on my central log-catcher(s). I kind of got that, but I'm asking why would you want all these measurements cluttering syslog? You do realize the default policy measures all executable files, all files mmaped executable and all files opened by root? If you're only interested in recording the existing measurements at a specific point in time, then redirect the output. If by "getting the contents of /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements into syslog", you mean logging the measurements to syslog as they're added to the measurement list, then you'll have to modify ima_store_template(). Mimi |
|
From: Peter M. <pm...@go...> - 2012-02-13 00:52:38
|
On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 4:42 PM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: > On Sun, 2012-02-12 at 10:40 -0800, Peter Moody wrote: >> On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 4:05 PM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: >> > On Fri, 2012-02-10 at 10:02 -0800, Peter Moody wrote: >> >> I'm probably missing something obvious, but I'm interested in getting >> >> the contents of /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements >> >> into syslog. Is there an easy way to do this or do I have to write >> >> something to do it manually? >> > >> > The measurements are currently only added to the measurement list. With >> > IMA-appraisal, invalid measurements are audited. >> >> Is auditing the measurements something that you would consider >> worthwhile or if I want to do this should I find some syslog-y way of >> tailing the measurements file and sending them to syslog myself? > > The IMA measurement list is meant for remote attestation and would be > included in the TPM quote. Could you please explain why you'd want > these measurements written to syslog? I'd like to see the measurements on my central log-catcher(s). > IMA-appraisal verifies and enforces local file integrity. I don't see a > problem with IMA-appraisal auditing both valid and invalid measurements. > > thanks, > > Mimi > -- Peter Moody Google 1.650.253.7306 Security Engineer pgp:0xC3410038 |
|
From: Mimi Z. <zo...@li...> - 2012-02-13 00:45:40
|
On Sun, 2012-02-12 at 10:40 -0800, Peter Moody wrote: > On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 4:05 PM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: > > On Fri, 2012-02-10 at 10:02 -0800, Peter Moody wrote: > >> I'm probably missing something obvious, but I'm interested in getting > >> the contents of /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements > >> into syslog. Is there an easy way to do this or do I have to write > >> something to do it manually? > > > > The measurements are currently only added to the measurement list. With > > IMA-appraisal, invalid measurements are audited. > > Is auditing the measurements something that you would consider > worthwhile or if I want to do this should I find some syslog-y way of > tailing the measurements file and sending them to syslog myself? The IMA measurement list is meant for remote attestation and would be included in the TPM quote. Could you please explain why you'd want these measurements written to syslog? IMA-appraisal verifies and enforces local file integrity. I don't see a problem with IMA-appraisal auditing both valid and invalid measurements. thanks, Mimi |
|
From: Peter M. <pm...@go...> - 2012-02-12 18:41:16
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On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 4:05 PM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: > On Fri, 2012-02-10 at 10:02 -0800, Peter Moody wrote: >> I'm probably missing something obvious, but I'm interested in getting >> the contents of /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements >> into syslog. Is there an easy way to do this or do I have to write >> something to do it manually? >> >> Cheers, >> peter > > The measurements are currently only added to the measurement list. With > IMA-appraisal, invalid measurements are audited. Is auditing the measurements something that you would consider worthwhile or if I want to do this should I find some syslog-y way of tailing the measurements file and sending them to syslog myself? Cheers, peter > thanks, > > Mimi > -- Peter Moody Google 1.650.253.7306 Security Engineer pgp:0xC3410038 |
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From: Mimi Z. <zo...@li...> - 2012-02-12 00:08:23
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On Fri, 2012-02-10 at 10:02 -0800, Peter Moody wrote: > I'm probably missing something obvious, but I'm interested in getting > the contents of /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements > into syslog. Is there an easy way to do this or do I have to write > something to do it manually? > > Cheers, > peter The measurements are currently only added to the measurement list. With IMA-appraisal, invalid measurements are audited. thanks, Mimi |
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From: Peter M. <pm...@go...> - 2012-02-10 18:03:23
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I'm probably missing something obvious, but I'm interested in getting the contents of /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements into syslog. Is there an easy way to do this or do I have to write something to do it manually? Cheers, peter -- Peter Moody Google 1.650.253.7306 Security Engineer pgp:0xC3410038 |
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From: Mimi Z. <zo...@li...> - 2012-01-06 13:17:54
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On Thu, 2012-01-05 at 14:07 -0800, Sam Gandhi wrote: > [First apologies if there is an easy way to find this] > > I noticed that Linus has released 3.2 > (http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/1235375). http://lwn.net/Articles/473798/ summarizes the changes with links to other articles describing those changes. Release summary is also available from http://kernelnewbies.org/Linux_3.2 > So is it safe to assume that all the changes found in > git://git.selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security should be now in > 3.2 mainline kernel? linux-security is a git tree with multiple branches (eg. master, next, for-linus). 'next', as its name indcates, refers to patches targeted for the next release and are currently in linux-next. Shortly (days) after a new release, the merge window opens for the next release. > Is there any way to find out what changes from linux-security were > upstreamed to mainline linux kernel? > > -Sam Patches in 'next' are generally not upstreamed in the current release. Only bug fixes that were in 'for-linus' were upstreamed in 3.2. So where is EVM/IMA? EVM is included in the linux 3.2 release. The EVM digital signature extension is in linux-next and, most likely, will be merged in this open window. As for the IMA-appraisal extension, the patches are available from git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity/ 'next-ima-appraisal'. thanks, Mimi |
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From: James M. <jm...@na...> - 2011-10-14 00:21:36
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On Wed, 12 Oct 2011, Subodh Nijsure wrote: > What is the status of these patches moving to mainline? Unless there are any major objections, they will likely be merged soon. > FWIW I have tested evm: digital signature verification extension, as > well as IMA patches, on our embedded platform and work great. It > provides functionality so we can verify that system hasn't been > tampered with. Thanks for the report, it helps make the case for merging. -- James Morris <jm...@na...> |
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From: Subodh N. <nij...@gm...> - 2011-10-13 04:37:32
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What is the status of these patches moving to mainline? FWIW I have tested evm: digital signature verification extension, as well as IMA patches, on our embedded platform and work great. It provides functionality so we can verify that system hasn't been tampered with. We would rather use things that are "mainline", would a endorsement/test report from IMA/EVM verification users help move these things to mainline? -Subodh Nijsure |
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From: Mimi Z. <zo...@li...> - 2011-09-14 21:55:00
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On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 14:49 -0700, Subodh Nijsure wrote: > Should I be merging changes from > git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/ima-2.6.gitt/#next-ima-appraisal > for my testing? If yes, since kernel.org is still down is there > another place where I can look at those changes? I've just set up a temporary EVM/IMA-appraisal git repo until k.org returns: git://github.com/mzohar/linux-evm.git Mimi |
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From: Mimi Z. <zo...@li...> - 2011-09-14 12:16:47
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On Tue, 2011-09-13 at 20:09 -0700, Subodh Nijsure wrote: > On Mon, Sep 12, 2011 at 4:41 PM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: > > On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 14:49 -0700, Subodh Nijsure wrote: > >> On Mon, Sep 12, 2011 at 1:35 PM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: > >> > On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 11:50 -0700, Subodh Nijsure wrote: > >> >> Hello, > >> >> > >> >> I have been using repo that Dmitry pointed to few days ago to get > >> >> familiar with IMA/EVM feature set. > >> >> > >> >> I work for a embedded software hw/sw company and we are greatly > >> >> interested in this feature, and exactly what we are looking to assure > >> >> customers that stuff running on our device is not being compromised. > >> >> > >> >> Anyway, I have compiled the kernel as described at > >> >> http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/. For testing I am running the this > >> >> kernel to boot a Ubuntu system under Virtualbox. > >> >> > >> >> I am running evm_enable.sh script that is part of evm-utils. > >> >> > >> >> So I booted the system with kernel parameters rootflags=i_version > >> >> ima_audit=1 ima_appraise=fix evm=fix and ran the script > >> >> evm_label_all.sh. I created a test script call /bin/myscript.sh this > >> >> script had following security.* info > >> >> (This script just does echo "Hello World". ) > >> >> > >> >> # file: bin/myscript.sh > >> >> security.evm=0x02be034301cffd95fd237197ddf895d1e7e09ceed2 > >> >> security.ima=0x01c0c5e04cf9c08652faf0247afb19c6d708ccf5ba > >> >> > >> >> Now I rebooted this machine with kernel parameters rootflags=i_version > >> >> ima_audit=1 ima_tcb, then I updated /bin/myscript.sh to say echo > >> >> "Hello World1". Now this updates the security.* info on this file as > >> >> shown below. > >> >> > >> >> # file: bin/myscript.sh > >> >> security.evm=0x02acf40095e80e65a44c50724b723dea8363f1e26ebe > >> >> security.ima=0x01dc29420238f18fca4e06d970eec75725a36373ee > >> >> > >> >> My keyctl show following output: > >> >> > >> >> sudo keyctl list @u > >> >> 4 keys in keyring: > >> >> 666858261: --alswrv 0 0 user: kmk > >> >> 461487313: --alswrv 0 0 encrypted: evm-key > >> >> 715895674: --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _ima > >> >> 793114560: --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _evm > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> But I expected since I booted the system with ima_tcb I shouldn't be > >> >> able to execute the updated myscript.sh? What am doing wrong in doing > >> >> the basic IMA/EVM test? > >> > > >> > Nothing went wrong. :-) It's working as designed, permitting > >> > 'security.ima' and 'security.evm' to be updated, assuming the original > >> > values are valid. Modifying either security xattr offline will prevent > >> > the myscript.sh from being modified online. > >> > > >> > If 'security.ima' had been a digital signature, it wouldn't have been > >> > updated. As a result, executing myscripts.sh would subsequently fail. > >> > > >> > >> Sorry if this is obvious. > > > > Not at all. Having this discussion here on the mailing list is also > > important for those who didn't attend LSS. > > > >> I thought Dmitry's demo last week at Linux Plumbers conference showed > >> that it was possible i.e. once myscript.sh has security.ima signed by > >> security.ema, subsequent changes to myscript.sh would prevent its > >> execution. > > > > Dmitry's talk, given by Casey, and demo focused on the EVM/IMA-appraisal > > digital signatures extension. Initially, both security.ima and > > security.evm are flashed to the device containing digital signatures. > > Once verified, for performance, security.evm is converted to an HMAC. > > For immutable files, security.ima remains as a digital signature in > > order to prove authenticity. If the file changes, security.ima can not > > be updated as the system does not have the private key. I assume we're > > good to here. > > > > Understood. > > Yes I have been able to verify this. > > One more suggestion for document. Looking at the code > (default_appraise_setup) ima_appraise is "on" by default, if this > option is not specified on the kernel command line. Could this be made > explicit in http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/linux-ima-content.html-20110907#Enabling_IMA-appraisal? Sure. > On a side note, don't all the kernel command line options need to be > documented in Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt file? I didn't see > that in any of the patches, don't mean to push this off on to you > folks, can help if required. I just don't want folks to have reason to > reject this work when it comes time to moving this code to mainline > ;-) > > -Subodh The 'evm=' and 'ima_appraise=' boot command line options, as well as 'rootflags=', are documented in Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt. The other options specified on the boot command line, such as 'masterkey=' and 'evmkey=', are parsed by dracut and never make it to the kernel. Perhaps there is a list of dracut options that needs to be updated. thanks, Mimi |
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From: Kasatkin, D. <dmi...@in...> - 2011-09-14 09:09:24
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On Wed, Sep 14, 2011 at 6:10 AM, Subodh Nijsure <nij...@gm...> wrote: > On Tue, Sep 13, 2011 at 1:37 AM, Kasatkin, Dmitry > <dmi...@in...> wrote: >> Hello, >> >> See inline and bellow. >> >> On Tue, Sep 13, 2011 at 2:41 AM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: >>> On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 14:49 -0700, Subodh Nijsure wrote: >>>> On Mon, Sep 12, 2011 at 1:35 PM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: >>>> > On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 11:50 -0700, Subodh Nijsure wrote: >>>> >> Hello, >>>> >> >>>> >> I have been using repo that Dmitry pointed to few days ago to get >>>> >> familiar with IMA/EVM feature set. >>>> >> >>>> >> I work for a embedded software hw/sw company and we are greatly >>>> >> interested in this feature, and exactly what we are looking to assure >>>> >> customers that stuff running on our device is not being compromised. >>>> >> >>>> >> Anyway, I have compiled the kernel as described at >>>> >> http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/. For testing I am running the this >>>> >> kernel to boot a Ubuntu system under Virtualbox. >>>> >> >>>> >> I am running evm_enable.sh script that is part of evm-utils. >>>> >> >>>> >> So I booted the system with kernel parameters rootflags=i_version >>>> >> ima_audit=1 ima_appraise=fix evm=fix and ran the script >>>> >> evm_label_all.sh. I created a test script call /bin/myscript.sh this >>>> >> script had following security.* info >>>> >> (This script just does echo "Hello World". ) >>>> >> >> >> evm_label_all.sh is necessary to label security.evm with digital signatures. >> It is not for using it with ima_appraise=fix or evm=fix. >> It is for building images... >> >> On running system you can use ima_fix_dir.sh to label everything with HMAC... >> >> And bellow you do not see, obviously, digital signature.. > > Yes once I modified my script to put digital IMA signature things work > as I expected. > I used "evmctl sign --imasig " to sign binaries as well to get > expected behavior -- executables are immutable. > > Is there a specific reason why evm_label_all.sh only puts digital > signature on kernel modules, but only hash on executables owned by uid > 0? > Simply I only need IMA signatures for modules to load them... > > -Subodh >> >>>> >> # file: bin/myscript.sh >>>> >> security.evm=0x02be034301cffd95fd237197ddf895d1e7e09ceed2 >>>> >> security.ima=0x01c0c5e04cf9c08652faf0247afb19c6d708ccf5ba May be not... It depends on ima-2.6#next-ima-appraisal repository >>>> >> >>>> >> Now I rebooted this machine with kernel parameters rootflags=i_version >>>> >> ima_audit=1 ima_tcb, then I updated /bin/myscript.sh to say echo >>>> >> "Hello World1". Now this updates the security.* info on this file as >>>> >> shown below. >>>> >> >>>> >> # file: bin/myscript.sh >>>> >> security.evm=0x02acf40095e80e65a44c50724b723dea8363f1e26ebe >>>> >> security.ima=0x01dc29420238f18fca4e06d970eec75725a36373ee >>>> >> >>>> >> My keyctl show following output: >>>> >> >>>> >> sudo keyctl list @u >>>> >> 4 keys in keyring: >>>> >> 666858261: --alswrv 0 0 user: kmk >>>> >> 461487313: --alswrv 0 0 encrypted: evm-key >>>> >> 715895674: --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _ima >>>> >> 793114560: --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _evm >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> But I expected since I booted the system with ima_tcb I shouldn't be >>>> >> able to execute the updated myscript.sh? What am doing wrong in doing >>>> >> the basic IMA/EVM test? >>>> > >>>> > Nothing went wrong. :-) It's working as designed, permitting >>>> > 'security.ima' and 'security.evm' to be updated, assuming the original >>>> > values are valid. Modifying either security xattr offline will prevent >>>> > the myscript.sh from being modified online. >>>> > >>>> > If 'security.ima' had been a digital signature, it wouldn't have been >>>> > updated. As a result, executing myscripts.sh would subsequently fail. >>>> > >>>> >>>> Sorry if this is obvious. >>> >>> Not at all. Having this discussion here on the mailing list is also >>> important for those who didn't attend LSS. >>> >>>> I thought Dmitry's demo last week at Linux Plumbers conference showed >>>> that it was possible i.e. once myscript.sh has security.ima signed by >>>> security.ema, subsequent changes to myscript.sh would prevent its >>>> execution. >>> >>> Dmitry's talk, given by Casey, and demo focused on the EVM/IMA-appraisal >>> digital signatures extension. Initially, both security.ima and >>> security.evm are flashed to the device containing digital signatures. >>> Once verified, for performance, security.evm is converted to an HMAC. >>> For immutable files, security.ima remains as a digital signature in >>> order to prove authenticity. If the file changes, security.ima can not >>> be updated as the system does not have the private key. I assume we're >>> good to here. >>> >>> For mutable files, such as configuration files or scripts, which are >>> system dependent, security.ima contains the file hash. EVM protects >>> security.ima from an offline modification, but IMA-appraisal is >>> dependent on DAC/MAC protecting the running system. >>> >>> There are a number of ways of demonstrating EVM/IMA-appraisal. For >>> example, booting a kernel without EVM or IMA-appraisal enabled, >>> modifying the file, and rebooting with EVM/IMA-appraisal enabled. The >>> file's HMAC will not match security.evm, causing any file read/execute >>> to fail. >>> >>>> May be I missed some of the steps from Dmitry's demo at LSS, or that >>>> demo used some additional patch set? >>> >>> Perhaps Dmitry will make the demo available so that we can review it >>> here in more detail. >>> >>>> Should I be merging changes from >>>> git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/ima-2.6.gitt/#next-ima-appraisal >>>> for my testing? If yes, since kernel.org is still down is there >>>> another place where I can look at those changes? >>> >>> As you're interested in the EVM/IMA-appraisal digital signatures >>> extension, you can continue using #ima-ksign, which tracks the >>> EVM/IMA-appraisal tree. I am planning on making the trees available on >>> github. >>> >>> thanks, >>> >>> Mimi >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> BlackBerry® DevCon Americas, Oct. 18-20, San Francisco, CA >>> Learn about the latest advances in developing for the >>> BlackBerry® mobile platform with sessions, labs & more. >>> See new tools and technologies. Register for BlackBerry® DevCon today! >>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/rim-devcon-copy1 >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Linux-ima-user mailing list >>> Lin...@li... >>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-ima-user >>> >> >> IMA/EVM with digital signature signature extension while korg is done >> is located here: >> https://meego.gitorious.org/meego-platform-security/ima-ksign >> > > It doesn't look like this repo has applied patches below, should it? > > http://marc.info/?l=linux-security-module&m=131462935219688&w=2 > http://marc.info/?l=linux-security-module&m=131462935319695&w=2 > > /Subodh > |
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From: Subodh N. <nij...@gm...> - 2011-09-14 03:10:18
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On Tue, Sep 13, 2011 at 1:37 AM, Kasatkin, Dmitry <dmi...@in...> wrote: > Hello, > > See inline and bellow. > > On Tue, Sep 13, 2011 at 2:41 AM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: >> On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 14:49 -0700, Subodh Nijsure wrote: >>> On Mon, Sep 12, 2011 at 1:35 PM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: >>> > On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 11:50 -0700, Subodh Nijsure wrote: >>> >> Hello, >>> >> >>> >> I have been using repo that Dmitry pointed to few days ago to get >>> >> familiar with IMA/EVM feature set. >>> >> >>> >> I work for a embedded software hw/sw company and we are greatly >>> >> interested in this feature, and exactly what we are looking to assure >>> >> customers that stuff running on our device is not being compromised. >>> >> >>> >> Anyway, I have compiled the kernel as described at >>> >> http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/. For testing I am running the this >>> >> kernel to boot a Ubuntu system under Virtualbox. >>> >> >>> >> I am running evm_enable.sh script that is part of evm-utils. >>> >> >>> >> So I booted the system with kernel parameters rootflags=i_version >>> >> ima_audit=1 ima_appraise=fix evm=fix and ran the script >>> >> evm_label_all.sh. I created a test script call /bin/myscript.sh this >>> >> script had following security.* info >>> >> (This script just does echo "Hello World". ) >>> >> > > evm_label_all.sh is necessary to label security.evm with digital signatures. > It is not for using it with ima_appraise=fix or evm=fix. > It is for building images... > > On running system you can use ima_fix_dir.sh to label everything with HMAC... > > And bellow you do not see, obviously, digital signature.. Yes once I modified my script to put digital IMA signature things work as I expected. I used "evmctl sign --imasig " to sign binaries as well to get expected behavior -- executables are immutable. Is there a specific reason why evm_label_all.sh only puts digital signature on kernel modules, but only hash on executables owned by uid 0? -Subodh > >>> >> # file: bin/myscript.sh >>> >> security.evm=0x02be034301cffd95fd237197ddf895d1e7e09ceed2 >>> >> security.ima=0x01c0c5e04cf9c08652faf0247afb19c6d708ccf5ba >>> >> >>> >> Now I rebooted this machine with kernel parameters rootflags=i_version >>> >> ima_audit=1 ima_tcb, then I updated /bin/myscript.sh to say echo >>> >> "Hello World1". Now this updates the security.* info on this file as >>> >> shown below. >>> >> >>> >> # file: bin/myscript.sh >>> >> security.evm=0x02acf40095e80e65a44c50724b723dea8363f1e26ebe >>> >> security.ima=0x01dc29420238f18fca4e06d970eec75725a36373ee >>> >> >>> >> My keyctl show following output: >>> >> >>> >> sudo keyctl list @u >>> >> 4 keys in keyring: >>> >> 666858261: --alswrv 0 0 user: kmk >>> >> 461487313: --alswrv 0 0 encrypted: evm-key >>> >> 715895674: --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _ima >>> >> 793114560: --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _evm >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> But I expected since I booted the system with ima_tcb I shouldn't be >>> >> able to execute the updated myscript.sh? What am doing wrong in doing >>> >> the basic IMA/EVM test? >>> > >>> > Nothing went wrong. :-) It's working as designed, permitting >>> > 'security.ima' and 'security.evm' to be updated, assuming the original >>> > values are valid. Modifying either security xattr offline will prevent >>> > the myscript.sh from being modified online. >>> > >>> > If 'security.ima' had been a digital signature, it wouldn't have been >>> > updated. As a result, executing myscripts.sh would subsequently fail. >>> > >>> >>> Sorry if this is obvious. >> >> Not at all. Having this discussion here on the mailing list is also >> important for those who didn't attend LSS. >> >>> I thought Dmitry's demo last week at Linux Plumbers conference showed >>> that it was possible i.e. once myscript.sh has security.ima signed by >>> security.ema, subsequent changes to myscript.sh would prevent its >>> execution. >> >> Dmitry's talk, given by Casey, and demo focused on the EVM/IMA-appraisal >> digital signatures extension. Initially, both security.ima and >> security.evm are flashed to the device containing digital signatures. >> Once verified, for performance, security.evm is converted to an HMAC. >> For immutable files, security.ima remains as a digital signature in >> order to prove authenticity. If the file changes, security.ima can not >> be updated as the system does not have the private key. I assume we're >> good to here. >> >> For mutable files, such as configuration files or scripts, which are >> system dependent, security.ima contains the file hash. EVM protects >> security.ima from an offline modification, but IMA-appraisal is >> dependent on DAC/MAC protecting the running system. >> >> There are a number of ways of demonstrating EVM/IMA-appraisal. For >> example, booting a kernel without EVM or IMA-appraisal enabled, >> modifying the file, and rebooting with EVM/IMA-appraisal enabled. The >> file's HMAC will not match security.evm, causing any file read/execute >> to fail. >> >>> May be I missed some of the steps from Dmitry's demo at LSS, or that >>> demo used some additional patch set? >> >> Perhaps Dmitry will make the demo available so that we can review it >> here in more detail. >> >>> Should I be merging changes from >>> git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/ima-2.6.gitt/#next-ima-appraisal >>> for my testing? If yes, since kernel.org is still down is there >>> another place where I can look at those changes? >> >> As you're interested in the EVM/IMA-appraisal digital signatures >> extension, you can continue using #ima-ksign, which tracks the >> EVM/IMA-appraisal tree. I am planning on making the trees available on >> github. >> >> thanks, >> >> Mimi >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> BlackBerry® DevCon Americas, Oct. 18-20, San Francisco, CA >> Learn about the latest advances in developing for the >> BlackBerry® mobile platform with sessions, labs & more. >> See new tools and technologies. Register for BlackBerry® DevCon today! >> http://p.sf.net/sfu/rim-devcon-copy1 >> _______________________________________________ >> Linux-ima-user mailing list >> Lin...@li... >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-ima-user >> > > IMA/EVM with digital signature signature extension while korg is done > is located here: > https://meego.gitorious.org/meego-platform-security/ima-ksign > It doesn't look like this repo has applied patches below, should it? http://marc.info/?l=linux-security-module&m=131462935219688&w=2 http://marc.info/?l=linux-security-module&m=131462935319695&w=2 /Subodh |
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From: Subodh N. <nij...@gm...> - 2011-09-14 03:09:17
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On Mon, Sep 12, 2011 at 4:41 PM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: > On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 14:49 -0700, Subodh Nijsure wrote: >> On Mon, Sep 12, 2011 at 1:35 PM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: >> > On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 11:50 -0700, Subodh Nijsure wrote: >> >> Hello, >> >> >> >> I have been using repo that Dmitry pointed to few days ago to get >> >> familiar with IMA/EVM feature set. >> >> >> >> I work for a embedded software hw/sw company and we are greatly >> >> interested in this feature, and exactly what we are looking to assure >> >> customers that stuff running on our device is not being compromised. >> >> >> >> Anyway, I have compiled the kernel as described at >> >> http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/. For testing I am running the this >> >> kernel to boot a Ubuntu system under Virtualbox. >> >> >> >> I am running evm_enable.sh script that is part of evm-utils. >> >> >> >> So I booted the system with kernel parameters rootflags=i_version >> >> ima_audit=1 ima_appraise=fix evm=fix and ran the script >> >> evm_label_all.sh. I created a test script call /bin/myscript.sh this >> >> script had following security.* info >> >> (This script just does echo "Hello World". ) >> >> >> >> # file: bin/myscript.sh >> >> security.evm=0x02be034301cffd95fd237197ddf895d1e7e09ceed2 >> >> security.ima=0x01c0c5e04cf9c08652faf0247afb19c6d708ccf5ba >> >> >> >> Now I rebooted this machine with kernel parameters rootflags=i_version >> >> ima_audit=1 ima_tcb, then I updated /bin/myscript.sh to say echo >> >> "Hello World1". Now this updates the security.* info on this file as >> >> shown below. >> >> >> >> # file: bin/myscript.sh >> >> security.evm=0x02acf40095e80e65a44c50724b723dea8363f1e26ebe >> >> security.ima=0x01dc29420238f18fca4e06d970eec75725a36373ee >> >> >> >> My keyctl show following output: >> >> >> >> sudo keyctl list @u >> >> 4 keys in keyring: >> >> 666858261: --alswrv 0 0 user: kmk >> >> 461487313: --alswrv 0 0 encrypted: evm-key >> >> 715895674: --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _ima >> >> 793114560: --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _evm >> >> >> >> >> >> But I expected since I booted the system with ima_tcb I shouldn't be >> >> able to execute the updated myscript.sh? What am doing wrong in doing >> >> the basic IMA/EVM test? >> > >> > Nothing went wrong. :-) It's working as designed, permitting >> > 'security.ima' and 'security.evm' to be updated, assuming the original >> > values are valid. Modifying either security xattr offline will prevent >> > the myscript.sh from being modified online. >> > >> > If 'security.ima' had been a digital signature, it wouldn't have been >> > updated. As a result, executing myscripts.sh would subsequently fail. >> > >> >> Sorry if this is obvious. > > Not at all. Having this discussion here on the mailing list is also > important for those who didn't attend LSS. > >> I thought Dmitry's demo last week at Linux Plumbers conference showed >> that it was possible i.e. once myscript.sh has security.ima signed by >> security.ema, subsequent changes to myscript.sh would prevent its >> execution. > > Dmitry's talk, given by Casey, and demo focused on the EVM/IMA-appraisal > digital signatures extension. Initially, both security.ima and > security.evm are flashed to the device containing digital signatures. > Once verified, for performance, security.evm is converted to an HMAC. > For immutable files, security.ima remains as a digital signature in > order to prove authenticity. If the file changes, security.ima can not > be updated as the system does not have the private key. I assume we're > good to here. > Understood. Yes I have been able to verify this. One more suggestion for document. Looking at the code (default_appraise_setup) ima_appraise is "on" by default, if this option is not specified on the kernel command line. Could this be made explicit in http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/linux-ima-content.html-20110907#Enabling_IMA-appraisal? On a side note, don't all the kernel command line options need to be documented in Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt file? I didn't see that in any of the patches, don't mean to push this off on to you folks, can help if required. I just don't want folks to have reason to reject this work when it comes time to moving this code to mainline ;-) -Subodh > For mutable files, such as configuration files or scripts, which are > system dependent, security.ima contains the file hash. EVM protects > security.ima from an offline modification, but IMA-appraisal is > dependent on DAC/MAC protecting the running system. > > There are a number of ways of demonstrating EVM/IMA-appraisal. For > example, booting a kernel without EVM or IMA-appraisal enabled, > modifying the file, and rebooting with EVM/IMA-appraisal enabled. The > file's HMAC will not match security.evm, causing any file read/execute > to fail. > >> May be I missed some of the steps from Dmitry's demo at LSS, or that >> demo used some additional patch set? > > Perhaps Dmitry will make the demo available so that we can review it > here in more detail. > >> Should I be merging changes from >> git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/ima-2.6.gitt/#next-ima-appraisal >> for my testing? If yes, since kernel.org is still down is there >> another place where I can look at those changes? > > As you're interested in the EVM/IMA-appraisal digital signatures > extension, you can continue using #ima-ksign, which tracks the > EVM/IMA-appraisal tree. I am planning on making the trees available on > github. > > thanks, > > Mimi > > |
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From: Kasatkin, D. <dmi...@in...> - 2011-09-13 08:42:59
|
Hi, On Tue, Sep 13, 2011 at 12:49 AM, Subodh Nijsure <nij...@gm...> wrote: > On Mon, Sep 12, 2011 at 1:35 PM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: >> On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 11:50 -0700, Subodh Nijsure wrote: >>> Hello, >>> >>> I have been using repo that Dmitry pointed to few days ago to get >>> familiar with IMA/EVM feature set. >>> >>> I work for a embedded software hw/sw company and we are greatly >>> interested in this feature, and exactly what we are looking to assure >>> customers that stuff running on our device is not being compromised. >>> >>> Anyway, I have compiled the kernel as described at >>> http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/. For testing I am running the this >>> kernel to boot a Ubuntu system under Virtualbox. >>> >>> I am running evm_enable.sh script that is part of evm-utils. >>> >>> So I booted the system with kernel parameters rootflags=i_version >>> ima_audit=1 ima_appraise=fix evm=fix and ran the script >>> evm_label_all.sh. I created a test script call /bin/myscript.sh this >>> script had following security.* info >>> (This script just does echo "Hello World". ) >>> >>> # file: bin/myscript.sh >>> security.evm=0x02be034301cffd95fd237197ddf895d1e7e09ceed2 >>> security.ima=0x01c0c5e04cf9c08652faf0247afb19c6d708ccf5ba >>> >>> Now I rebooted this machine with kernel parameters rootflags=i_version >>> ima_audit=1 ima_tcb, then I updated /bin/myscript.sh to say echo >>> "Hello World1". Now this updates the security.* info on this file as >>> shown below. >>> >>> # file: bin/myscript.sh >>> security.evm=0x02acf40095e80e65a44c50724b723dea8363f1e26ebe >>> security.ima=0x01dc29420238f18fca4e06d970eec75725a36373ee >>> >>> My keyctl show following output: >>> >>> sudo keyctl list @u >>> 4 keys in keyring: >>> 666858261: --alswrv 0 0 user: kmk >>> 461487313: --alswrv 0 0 encrypted: evm-key >>> 715895674: --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _ima >>> 793114560: --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _evm >>> >>> >>> But I expected since I booted the system with ima_tcb I shouldn't be >>> able to execute the updated myscript.sh? What am doing wrong in doing >>> the basic IMA/EVM test? >> >> Nothing went wrong. :-) It's working as designed, permitting >> 'security.ima' and 'security.evm' to be updated, assuming the original >> values are valid. Modifying either security xattr offline will prevent >> the myscript.sh from being modified online. >> >> If 'security.ima' had been a digital signature, it wouldn't have been >> updated. As a result, executing myscripts.sh would subsequently fail. >> > > Sorry if this is obvious. > > I thought Dmitry's demo last week at Linux Plumbers conference showed > that it was possible i.e. once myscript.sh has security.ima signed by > security.ema, subsequent changes to myscript.sh would prevent its > execution. > > May be I missed some of the steps from Dmitry's demo at LSS, or that > demo used some additional patch set? > > Should I be merging changes from > git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/ima-2.6.gitt/#next-ima-appraisal > for my testing? If yes, since kernel.org is still down is there > another place where I can look at those changes? > > >>> I also see bunch of no evm keyring: -126, messages in the log, few >>> instances from the log shown below. >>> >>> [ 342.476799] type=1804 audit(1315852167.927:2686): pid=1548 uid=1000 >>> auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 op="add_template_measure" >>> cause="hash_added" comm="bash" name="/bin/more" dev=sda1 ino=97 res=0 >>> [ 416.364434] no evm keyring: -126 >>> [ 425.707144] no evm keyring: -126 Yes, you see it before keyring is created. evm_enable.sh should be called before mounting rootfs - from initramfs. In the demo, the images uses that... I have modified mkinitrd script from MeeGo to enable IMA/EVM. 1. it creates IMA policy 2. It enables IMA/EVM (it does not use evm_enable.sh, but does like that..) Script is attached... >>> [ 425.707883] type=1804 audit(1315852251.155:2687): pid=1583 uid=1000 >>> auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 op="add_template_measure" >>> cause="hash_added" comm="bash" name="/usr/bin/scp" dev=sda1 ino=1424 >>> res=0 >>> [ 466.291967] no evm keyring: -126 >>> [ 466.292507] type=1804 audit(1315852291.743:2688): pid=1591 uid=1000 >>> auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 op="add_template_measure" >>> cause="hash_added" comm="bash" name="/bin/ping" dev=sda1 ino=123 res=0 >>> [ 484.024376] no evm keyring: -126 >>> [ 484.024629] type=1804 audit(1315852309.475:2689): pid=1599 uid=1000 >>> auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 op="add_template_measure" >>> cause="hash_added" comm="scp" name="/usr/bin/ssh" dev=sda1 ino=1512 >>> res=0 >>> [ 485.860190] no evm keyring: -126 >>> >>> >>> >>> A minor correct to FAQ section of http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/. >>> The last question refers to kernel parameter ima-appraisal=fix >>> should it not be ima_appraise=fix? >>> >>> >>> -Subodh >> >> Thanks for catching that. >> >> Mimi >> >> > > -Subodh > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Doing More with Less: The Next Generation Virtual Desktop > What are the key obstacles that have prevented many mid-market businesses > from deploying virtual desktops? How do next-generation virtual desktops > provide companies an easier-to-deploy, easier-to-manage and more affordable > virtual desktop model.http://www.accelacomm.com/jaw/sfnl/114/51426474/ > _______________________________________________ > Linux-ima-user mailing list > Lin...@li... > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-ima-user > |
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From: Kasatkin, D. <dmi...@in...> - 2011-09-13 08:37:12
|
Hello, See inline and bellow. On Tue, Sep 13, 2011 at 2:41 AM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: > On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 14:49 -0700, Subodh Nijsure wrote: >> On Mon, Sep 12, 2011 at 1:35 PM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: >> > On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 11:50 -0700, Subodh Nijsure wrote: >> >> Hello, >> >> >> >> I have been using repo that Dmitry pointed to few days ago to get >> >> familiar with IMA/EVM feature set. >> >> >> >> I work for a embedded software hw/sw company and we are greatly >> >> interested in this feature, and exactly what we are looking to assure >> >> customers that stuff running on our device is not being compromised. >> >> >> >> Anyway, I have compiled the kernel as described at >> >> http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/. For testing I am running the this >> >> kernel to boot a Ubuntu system under Virtualbox. >> >> >> >> I am running evm_enable.sh script that is part of evm-utils. >> >> >> >> So I booted the system with kernel parameters rootflags=i_version >> >> ima_audit=1 ima_appraise=fix evm=fix and ran the script >> >> evm_label_all.sh. I created a test script call /bin/myscript.sh this >> >> script had following security.* info >> >> (This script just does echo "Hello World". ) >> >> evm_label_all.sh is necessary to label security.evm with digital signatures. It is not for using it with ima_appraise=fix or evm=fix. It is for building images... On running system you can use ima_fix_dir.sh to label everything with HMAC... And bellow you do not see, obviously, digital signature.. >> >> # file: bin/myscript.sh >> >> security.evm=0x02be034301cffd95fd237197ddf895d1e7e09ceed2 >> >> security.ima=0x01c0c5e04cf9c08652faf0247afb19c6d708ccf5ba >> >> >> >> Now I rebooted this machine with kernel parameters rootflags=i_version >> >> ima_audit=1 ima_tcb, then I updated /bin/myscript.sh to say echo >> >> "Hello World1". Now this updates the security.* info on this file as >> >> shown below. >> >> >> >> # file: bin/myscript.sh >> >> security.evm=0x02acf40095e80e65a44c50724b723dea8363f1e26ebe >> >> security.ima=0x01dc29420238f18fca4e06d970eec75725a36373ee >> >> >> >> My keyctl show following output: >> >> >> >> sudo keyctl list @u >> >> 4 keys in keyring: >> >> 666858261: --alswrv 0 0 user: kmk >> >> 461487313: --alswrv 0 0 encrypted: evm-key >> >> 715895674: --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _ima >> >> 793114560: --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _evm >> >> >> >> >> >> But I expected since I booted the system with ima_tcb I shouldn't be >> >> able to execute the updated myscript.sh? What am doing wrong in doing >> >> the basic IMA/EVM test? >> > >> > Nothing went wrong. :-) It's working as designed, permitting >> > 'security.ima' and 'security.evm' to be updated, assuming the original >> > values are valid. Modifying either security xattr offline will prevent >> > the myscript.sh from being modified online. >> > >> > If 'security.ima' had been a digital signature, it wouldn't have been >> > updated. As a result, executing myscripts.sh would subsequently fail. >> > >> >> Sorry if this is obvious. > > Not at all. Having this discussion here on the mailing list is also > important for those who didn't attend LSS. > >> I thought Dmitry's demo last week at Linux Plumbers conference showed >> that it was possible i.e. once myscript.sh has security.ima signed by >> security.ema, subsequent changes to myscript.sh would prevent its >> execution. > > Dmitry's talk, given by Casey, and demo focused on the EVM/IMA-appraisal > digital signatures extension. Initially, both security.ima and > security.evm are flashed to the device containing digital signatures. > Once verified, for performance, security.evm is converted to an HMAC. > For immutable files, security.ima remains as a digital signature in > order to prove authenticity. If the file changes, security.ima can not > be updated as the system does not have the private key. I assume we're > good to here. > > For mutable files, such as configuration files or scripts, which are > system dependent, security.ima contains the file hash. EVM protects > security.ima from an offline modification, but IMA-appraisal is > dependent on DAC/MAC protecting the running system. > > There are a number of ways of demonstrating EVM/IMA-appraisal. For > example, booting a kernel without EVM or IMA-appraisal enabled, > modifying the file, and rebooting with EVM/IMA-appraisal enabled. The > file's HMAC will not match security.evm, causing any file read/execute > to fail. > >> May be I missed some of the steps from Dmitry's demo at LSS, or that >> demo used some additional patch set? > > Perhaps Dmitry will make the demo available so that we can review it > here in more detail. > >> Should I be merging changes from >> git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/ima-2.6.gitt/#next-ima-appraisal >> for my testing? If yes, since kernel.org is still down is there >> another place where I can look at those changes? > > As you're interested in the EVM/IMA-appraisal digital signatures > extension, you can continue using #ima-ksign, which tracks the > EVM/IMA-appraisal tree. I am planning on making the trees available on > github. > > thanks, > > Mimi > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > BlackBerry® DevCon Americas, Oct. 18-20, San Francisco, CA > Learn about the latest advances in developing for the > BlackBerry® mobile platform with sessions, labs & more. > See new tools and technologies. Register for BlackBerry® DevCon today! > http://p.sf.net/sfu/rim-devcon-copy1 > _______________________________________________ > Linux-ima-user mailing list > Lin...@li... > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-ima-user > IMA/EVM with digital signature signature extension while korg is done is located here: https://meego.gitorious.org/meego-platform-security/ima-ksign - Dmitry |
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From: Mimi Z. <zo...@li...> - 2011-09-12 23:41:27
|
On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 14:49 -0700, Subodh Nijsure wrote: > On Mon, Sep 12, 2011 at 1:35 PM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: > > On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 11:50 -0700, Subodh Nijsure wrote: > >> Hello, > >> > >> I have been using repo that Dmitry pointed to few days ago to get > >> familiar with IMA/EVM feature set. > >> > >> I work for a embedded software hw/sw company and we are greatly > >> interested in this feature, and exactly what we are looking to assure > >> customers that stuff running on our device is not being compromised. > >> > >> Anyway, I have compiled the kernel as described at > >> http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/. For testing I am running the this > >> kernel to boot a Ubuntu system under Virtualbox. > >> > >> I am running evm_enable.sh script that is part of evm-utils. > >> > >> So I booted the system with kernel parameters rootflags=i_version > >> ima_audit=1 ima_appraise=fix evm=fix and ran the script > >> evm_label_all.sh. I created a test script call /bin/myscript.sh this > >> script had following security.* info > >> (This script just does echo "Hello World". ) > >> > >> # file: bin/myscript.sh > >> security.evm=0x02be034301cffd95fd237197ddf895d1e7e09ceed2 > >> security.ima=0x01c0c5e04cf9c08652faf0247afb19c6d708ccf5ba > >> > >> Now I rebooted this machine with kernel parameters rootflags=i_version > >> ima_audit=1 ima_tcb, then I updated /bin/myscript.sh to say echo > >> "Hello World1". Now this updates the security.* info on this file as > >> shown below. > >> > >> # file: bin/myscript.sh > >> security.evm=0x02acf40095e80e65a44c50724b723dea8363f1e26ebe > >> security.ima=0x01dc29420238f18fca4e06d970eec75725a36373ee > >> > >> My keyctl show following output: > >> > >> sudo keyctl list @u > >> 4 keys in keyring: > >> 666858261: --alswrv 0 0 user: kmk > >> 461487313: --alswrv 0 0 encrypted: evm-key > >> 715895674: --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _ima > >> 793114560: --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _evm > >> > >> > >> But I expected since I booted the system with ima_tcb I shouldn't be > >> able to execute the updated myscript.sh? What am doing wrong in doing > >> the basic IMA/EVM test? > > > > Nothing went wrong. :-) It's working as designed, permitting > > 'security.ima' and 'security.evm' to be updated, assuming the original > > values are valid. Modifying either security xattr offline will prevent > > the myscript.sh from being modified online. > > > > If 'security.ima' had been a digital signature, it wouldn't have been > > updated. As a result, executing myscripts.sh would subsequently fail. > > > > Sorry if this is obvious. Not at all. Having this discussion here on the mailing list is also important for those who didn't attend LSS. > I thought Dmitry's demo last week at Linux Plumbers conference showed > that it was possible i.e. once myscript.sh has security.ima signed by > security.ema, subsequent changes to myscript.sh would prevent its > execution. Dmitry's talk, given by Casey, and demo focused on the EVM/IMA-appraisal digital signatures extension. Initially, both security.ima and security.evm are flashed to the device containing digital signatures. Once verified, for performance, security.evm is converted to an HMAC. For immutable files, security.ima remains as a digital signature in order to prove authenticity. If the file changes, security.ima can not be updated as the system does not have the private key. I assume we're good to here. For mutable files, such as configuration files or scripts, which are system dependent, security.ima contains the file hash. EVM protects security.ima from an offline modification, but IMA-appraisal is dependent on DAC/MAC protecting the running system. There are a number of ways of demonstrating EVM/IMA-appraisal. For example, booting a kernel without EVM or IMA-appraisal enabled, modifying the file, and rebooting with EVM/IMA-appraisal enabled. The file's HMAC will not match security.evm, causing any file read/execute to fail. > May be I missed some of the steps from Dmitry's demo at LSS, or that > demo used some additional patch set? Perhaps Dmitry will make the demo available so that we can review it here in more detail. > Should I be merging changes from > git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/ima-2.6.gitt/#next-ima-appraisal > for my testing? If yes, since kernel.org is still down is there > another place where I can look at those changes? As you're interested in the EVM/IMA-appraisal digital signatures extension, you can continue using #ima-ksign, which tracks the EVM/IMA-appraisal tree. I am planning on making the trees available on github. thanks, Mimi |
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From: Subodh N. <nij...@gm...> - 2011-09-12 21:49:59
|
On Mon, Sep 12, 2011 at 1:35 PM, Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...> wrote: > On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 11:50 -0700, Subodh Nijsure wrote: >> Hello, >> >> I have been using repo that Dmitry pointed to few days ago to get >> familiar with IMA/EVM feature set. >> >> I work for a embedded software hw/sw company and we are greatly >> interested in this feature, and exactly what we are looking to assure >> customers that stuff running on our device is not being compromised. >> >> Anyway, I have compiled the kernel as described at >> http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/. For testing I am running the this >> kernel to boot a Ubuntu system under Virtualbox. >> >> I am running evm_enable.sh script that is part of evm-utils. >> >> So I booted the system with kernel parameters rootflags=i_version >> ima_audit=1 ima_appraise=fix evm=fix and ran the script >> evm_label_all.sh. I created a test script call /bin/myscript.sh this >> script had following security.* info >> (This script just does echo "Hello World". ) >> >> # file: bin/myscript.sh >> security.evm=0x02be034301cffd95fd237197ddf895d1e7e09ceed2 >> security.ima=0x01c0c5e04cf9c08652faf0247afb19c6d708ccf5ba >> >> Now I rebooted this machine with kernel parameters rootflags=i_version >> ima_audit=1 ima_tcb, then I updated /bin/myscript.sh to say echo >> "Hello World1". Now this updates the security.* info on this file as >> shown below. >> >> # file: bin/myscript.sh >> security.evm=0x02acf40095e80e65a44c50724b723dea8363f1e26ebe >> security.ima=0x01dc29420238f18fca4e06d970eec75725a36373ee >> >> My keyctl show following output: >> >> sudo keyctl list @u >> 4 keys in keyring: >> 666858261: --alswrv 0 0 user: kmk >> 461487313: --alswrv 0 0 encrypted: evm-key >> 715895674: --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _ima >> 793114560: --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _evm >> >> >> But I expected since I booted the system with ima_tcb I shouldn't be >> able to execute the updated myscript.sh? What am doing wrong in doing >> the basic IMA/EVM test? > > Nothing went wrong. :-) It's working as designed, permitting > 'security.ima' and 'security.evm' to be updated, assuming the original > values are valid. Modifying either security xattr offline will prevent > the myscript.sh from being modified online. > > If 'security.ima' had been a digital signature, it wouldn't have been > updated. As a result, executing myscripts.sh would subsequently fail. > Sorry if this is obvious. I thought Dmitry's demo last week at Linux Plumbers conference showed that it was possible i.e. once myscript.sh has security.ima signed by security.ema, subsequent changes to myscript.sh would prevent its execution. May be I missed some of the steps from Dmitry's demo at LSS, or that demo used some additional patch set? Should I be merging changes from git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/ima-2.6.gitt/#next-ima-appraisal for my testing? If yes, since kernel.org is still down is there another place where I can look at those changes? >> I also see bunch of no evm keyring: -126, messages in the log, few >> instances from the log shown below. >> >> [ 342.476799] type=1804 audit(1315852167.927:2686): pid=1548 uid=1000 >> auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 op="add_template_measure" >> cause="hash_added" comm="bash" name="/bin/more" dev=sda1 ino=97 res=0 >> [ 416.364434] no evm keyring: -126 >> [ 425.707144] no evm keyring: -126 >> [ 425.707883] type=1804 audit(1315852251.155:2687): pid=1583 uid=1000 >> auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 op="add_template_measure" >> cause="hash_added" comm="bash" name="/usr/bin/scp" dev=sda1 ino=1424 >> res=0 >> [ 466.291967] no evm keyring: -126 >> [ 466.292507] type=1804 audit(1315852291.743:2688): pid=1591 uid=1000 >> auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 op="add_template_measure" >> cause="hash_added" comm="bash" name="/bin/ping" dev=sda1 ino=123 res=0 >> [ 484.024376] no evm keyring: -126 >> [ 484.024629] type=1804 audit(1315852309.475:2689): pid=1599 uid=1000 >> auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 op="add_template_measure" >> cause="hash_added" comm="scp" name="/usr/bin/ssh" dev=sda1 ino=1512 >> res=0 >> [ 485.860190] no evm keyring: -126 >> >> >> >> A minor correct to FAQ section of http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/. >> The last question refers to kernel parameter ima-appraisal=fix >> should it not be ima_appraise=fix? >> >> >> -Subodh > > Thanks for catching that. > > Mimi > > -Subodh |