linux-ima-devel — Discussion list for problems or development.

Re: [Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v6 0/6] define new fs integrity_read method

[Christoph H. <hc...@ls...>]

On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 12:43:58PM +1000, James Morris wrote:
> On Tue, 15 Aug 2017, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> 
> > To resolve this locking problem, this patch set introduces a new
> > ->integrity_read file operation method.  Until all filesystems
> > define the new ->integrity_read method, files that were previously
> > measured might not be currently measured and files that were
> > previously appraised might fail to be appraised properly.
> 
> Are there any such filesystems in mainline which are not getting an 
> integrity_read method in this patchset?

There are a few, mostly because we're pretty sure the previous integrity
code did the wrong thing for them - e.g. ocfs2 and gfs2 where locking
vs operations on other cluster nodes was missing, or NFS where in addition
to the above deadlocks were 100% reprodicible with current code.

Re: [Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v6 0/6] define new fs integrity_read method

[James M. <jm...@na...>]

On Tue, 15 Aug 2017, Mimi Zohar wrote:

> To resolve this locking problem, this patch set introduces a new
> ->integrity_read file operation method.  Until all filesystems
> define the new ->integrity_read method, files that were previously
> measured might not be currently measured and files that were
> previously appraised might fail to be appraised properly.

Are there any such filesystems in mainline which are not getting an 
integrity_read method in this patchset?

-- 
James Morris
<jm...@na...>

Re: [Linux-ima-devel] [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH] tpm: improve tpm_tis send() performance by ignoring burstcount

[Ken G. <kg...@li...>]

On 8/13/2017 7:53 PM, msuchanek wrote:
> About 500 out of 700 mainboards sold today has a PS/2 port which is
> probably due to prevalence of legacy devices and usbhid limitations.
> 
> Similarily many boards have serial and parallel hardware ports.
> 
> In all diagrams detailed enough to show these ports I have seen them
> attached to the LPC bus.

Do these boards have a TPM?  Remember that the TPM requires special LPC 
bus cycles.

Even if so, the TPM LPC bus wait states are less than a usec.  My 
thought is that  it's unlikely that any device (serial port, mouse, 
keyboard, printer) will be adversely affected.

[Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v6 4/6] ima: use fs method to read integrity data

[Mimi Z. <zo...@li...>]

From: Christoph Hellwig <hc...@ls...>

Add a new ->integrity_read file operation to read data for integrity
hash collection.  This is defined to be equivalent to ->read_iter,
except that it will be called with the i_rwsem held exclusively.

(Based on Christoph's original patch.)

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hc...@ls...>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mj...@sr...>
Cc: Jan Kara <ja...@su...>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <ty...@mi...>
Cc: Andreas Dilger <adi...@di...>
Cc: Jaegeuk Kim <ja...@ke...>
Cc: Chao Yu <yu...@hu...>
Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swh...@re...>
Cc: Bob Peterson <rpe...@re...>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dw...@in...>
Cc: Dave Kleikamp <sh...@ke...>
Cc: Ryusuke Konishi <kon...@la...>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mf...@ve...>
Cc: Joel Becker <jl...@ev...>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <ri...@no...>
Cc: "Darrick J. Wong" <dar...@or...>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hu...@go...>
Cc: Chris Mason <cl...@fb...>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...>

---
Changelog v6:
- defined separate efivarfs and libfs patches.

Changelog v5:
- removed ocf2 and gfs2 integrity_read support.
- removed ext4 special case to fail O_DIRECT open for buffered read.

Changelog v4:
- define ext2/4 specific ->integrity_read functions.
- properly fail file open with O_DIRECT on filesystem not mounted
with "-o dax".

Changelog v3:
- define simple_read_iter_from_buffer
- replace the existing efivarfs ->read method with ->read_iter method.
- squashed other fs definitions of ->integrity_read with this patch.

Changelog v2:
- change iovec to kvec

Changelog v1:
- update the patch description, removing the concept that the presence of
->integrity_read indicates that the file system can support IMA. (Mimi)

 fs/btrfs/file.c           |  1 +
 fs/efivarfs/file.c        |  1 +
 fs/ext2/file.c            | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 fs/ext4/file.c            | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/f2fs/file.c            |  1 +
 fs/jffs2/file.c           |  1 +
 fs/jfs/file.c             |  1 +
 fs/nilfs2/file.c          |  1 +
 fs/ramfs/file-mmu.c       |  1 +
 fs/ramfs/file-nommu.c     |  1 +
 fs/ubifs/file.c           |  1 +
 fs/xfs/xfs_file.c         | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/fs.h        |  1 +
 mm/shmem.c                |  1 +
 security/integrity/iint.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------
 15 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/file.c b/fs/btrfs/file.c
index 9e75d8a39aac..2542dc66c85c 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/file.c
@@ -3125,6 +3125,7 @@ const struct file_operations btrfs_file_operations = {
 #endif
 	.clone_file_range = btrfs_clone_file_range,
 	.dedupe_file_range = btrfs_dedupe_file_range,
+	.integrity_read = generic_file_read_iter,
 };
 
 void btrfs_auto_defrag_exit(void)
diff --git a/fs/efivarfs/file.c b/fs/efivarfs/file.c
index 863f1b100165..17955a92a5b3 100644
--- a/fs/efivarfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/efivarfs/file.c
@@ -179,4 +179,5 @@ const struct file_operations efivarfs_file_operations = {
 	.write	= efivarfs_file_write,
 	.llseek	= no_llseek,
 	.unlocked_ioctl = efivarfs_file_ioctl,
+	.integrity_read	= efivarfs_file_read_iter,
 };
diff --git a/fs/ext2/file.c b/fs/ext2/file.c
index d34d32bdc944..111069de1973 100644
--- a/fs/ext2/file.c
+++ b/fs/ext2/file.c
@@ -192,6 +192,22 @@ static ssize_t ext2_file_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to)
 	return generic_file_read_iter(iocb, to);
 }
 
+static ssize_t ext2_file_integrity_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb,
+					     struct iov_iter *to)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp);
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&inode->i_rwsem);
+#ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX
+	if (!iov_iter_count(to))
+		return 0; /* skip atime */
+
+	if (IS_DAX(iocb->ki_filp->f_mapping->host))
+		return dax_iomap_rw(iocb, to, &ext2_iomap_ops);
+#endif
+	return generic_file_read_iter(iocb, to);
+}
+
 static ssize_t ext2_file_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX
@@ -216,6 +232,7 @@ const struct file_operations ext2_file_operations = {
 	.get_unmapped_area = thp_get_unmapped_area,
 	.splice_read	= generic_file_splice_read,
 	.splice_write	= iter_file_splice_write,
+	.integrity_read	= ext2_file_integrity_read_iter,
 };
 
 const struct inode_operations ext2_file_inode_operations = {
diff --git a/fs/ext4/file.c b/fs/ext4/file.c
index 58294c9a7e1d..3ab4105c8578 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/file.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/file.c
@@ -74,6 +74,25 @@ static ssize_t ext4_file_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to)
 	return generic_file_read_iter(iocb, to);
 }
 
+static ssize_t ext4_file_integrity_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb,
+					     struct iov_iter *to)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp);
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&inode->i_rwsem);
+	if (unlikely(ext4_forced_shutdown(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb))))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	if (!iov_iter_count(to))
+		return 0; /* skip atime */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX
+	if (IS_DAX(inode))
+		return dax_iomap_rw(iocb, to, &ext4_iomap_ops);
+#endif
+	return generic_file_read_iter(iocb, to);
+}
+
 /*
  * Called when an inode is released. Note that this is different
  * from ext4_file_open: open gets called at every open, but release
@@ -747,6 +766,7 @@ const struct file_operations ext4_file_operations = {
 	.splice_read	= generic_file_splice_read,
 	.splice_write	= iter_file_splice_write,
 	.fallocate	= ext4_fallocate,
+	.integrity_read	= ext4_file_integrity_read_iter,
 };
 
 const struct inode_operations ext4_file_inode_operations = {
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/file.c b/fs/f2fs/file.c
index 2706130c261b..82ea81da0b2d 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c
@@ -2514,4 +2514,5 @@ const struct file_operations f2fs_file_operations = {
 #endif
 	.splice_read	= generic_file_splice_read,
 	.splice_write	= iter_file_splice_write,
+	.integrity_read	= generic_file_read_iter,
 };
diff --git a/fs/jffs2/file.c b/fs/jffs2/file.c
index c12476e309c6..5a63034cccf5 100644
--- a/fs/jffs2/file.c
+++ b/fs/jffs2/file.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ const struct file_operations jffs2_file_operations =
 	.mmap =		generic_file_readonly_mmap,
 	.fsync =	jffs2_fsync,
 	.splice_read =	generic_file_splice_read,
+	.integrity_read = generic_file_read_iter,
 };
 
 /* jffs2_file_inode_operations */
diff --git a/fs/jfs/file.c b/fs/jfs/file.c
index 739492c7a3fd..423512a810e4 100644
--- a/fs/jfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/jfs/file.c
@@ -162,4 +162,5 @@ const struct file_operations jfs_file_operations = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 	.compat_ioctl	= jfs_compat_ioctl,
 #endif
+	.integrity_read	= generic_file_read_iter,
 };
diff --git a/fs/nilfs2/file.c b/fs/nilfs2/file.c
index c5fa3dee72fc..55e058ac487f 100644
--- a/fs/nilfs2/file.c
+++ b/fs/nilfs2/file.c
@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ const struct file_operations nilfs_file_operations = {
 	/* .release	= nilfs_release_file, */
 	.fsync		= nilfs_sync_file,
 	.splice_read	= generic_file_splice_read,
+	.integrity_read	= generic_file_read_iter,
 };
 
 const struct inode_operations nilfs_file_inode_operations = {
diff --git a/fs/ramfs/file-mmu.c b/fs/ramfs/file-mmu.c
index 12af0490322f..4f24d1b589b1 100644
--- a/fs/ramfs/file-mmu.c
+++ b/fs/ramfs/file-mmu.c
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ const struct file_operations ramfs_file_operations = {
 	.splice_write	= iter_file_splice_write,
 	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 	.get_unmapped_area	= ramfs_mmu_get_unmapped_area,
+	.integrity_read	= generic_file_read_iter,
 };
 
 const struct inode_operations ramfs_file_inode_operations = {
diff --git a/fs/ramfs/file-nommu.c b/fs/ramfs/file-nommu.c
index 2ef7ce75c062..5ee704fa84e0 100644
--- a/fs/ramfs/file-nommu.c
+++ b/fs/ramfs/file-nommu.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ const struct file_operations ramfs_file_operations = {
 	.splice_read		= generic_file_splice_read,
 	.splice_write		= iter_file_splice_write,
 	.llseek			= generic_file_llseek,
+	.integrity_read		= generic_file_read_iter,
 };
 
 const struct inode_operations ramfs_file_inode_operations = {
diff --git a/fs/ubifs/file.c b/fs/ubifs/file.c
index 8cad0b19b404..5e52a315e18b 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/file.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/file.c
@@ -1747,4 +1747,5 @@ const struct file_operations ubifs_file_operations = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 	.compat_ioctl   = ubifs_compat_ioctl,
 #endif
+	.integrity_read = generic_file_read_iter,
 };
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_file.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_file.c
index c4893e226fd8..0a6704b563d6 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_file.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_file.c
@@ -292,6 +292,26 @@ xfs_file_read_iter(
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static ssize_t
+xfs_integrity_read(
+	struct kiocb		*iocb,
+	struct iov_iter		*to)
+{
+	struct inode		*inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp);
+	struct xfs_mount	*mp = XFS_I(inode)->i_mount;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&inode->i_rwsem);
+
+	XFS_STATS_INC(mp, xs_read_calls);
+
+	if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(mp))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	if (IS_DAX(inode))
+		return dax_iomap_rw(iocb, to, &xfs_iomap_ops);
+	return generic_file_read_iter(iocb, to);
+}
+
 /*
  * Zero any on disk space between the current EOF and the new, larger EOF.
  *
@@ -1175,6 +1195,7 @@ const struct file_operations xfs_file_operations = {
 	.fallocate	= xfs_file_fallocate,
 	.clone_file_range = xfs_file_clone_range,
 	.dedupe_file_range = xfs_file_dedupe_range,
+	.integrity_read	= xfs_integrity_read,
 };
 
 const struct file_operations xfs_dir_file_operations = {
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index fdec9b763b54..8d0d10e1dd93 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -1699,6 +1699,7 @@ struct file_operations {
 			u64);
 	ssize_t (*dedupe_file_range)(struct file *, u64, u64, struct file *,
 			u64);
+	ssize_t (*integrity_read)(struct kiocb *, struct iov_iter *);
 } __randomize_layout;
 
 struct inode_operations {
diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c
index b0aa6075d164..805d99011ca4 100644
--- a/mm/shmem.c
+++ b/mm/shmem.c
@@ -3849,6 +3849,7 @@ static const struct file_operations shmem_file_operations = {
 	.splice_read	= generic_file_splice_read,
 	.splice_write	= iter_file_splice_write,
 	.fallocate	= shmem_fallocate,
+	.integrity_read	= shmem_file_read_iter,
 #endif
 };
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index 6fc888ca468e..df04f35a1d40 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/rbtree.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/uio.h>
 #include "integrity.h"
 
 static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT;
@@ -184,18 +185,25 @@ security_initcall(integrity_iintcache_init);
 int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
 			  void *addr, unsigned long count)
 {
-	mm_segment_t old_fs;
-	char __user *buf = (char __user *)addr;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct kvec iov = { .iov_base = addr, .iov_len = count };
+	struct kiocb kiocb;
+	struct iov_iter iter;
 	ssize_t ret;
 
+	lockdep_assert_held(&inode->i_rwsem);
+
 	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
 		return -EBADF;
+	if (!file->f_op->integrity_read)
+		return -EBADF;
 
-	old_fs = get_fs();
-	set_fs(get_ds());
-	ret = __vfs_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
-	set_fs(old_fs);
+	init_sync_kiocb(&kiocb, file);
+	kiocb.ki_pos = offset;
+	iov_iter_kvec(&iter, READ | ITER_KVEC, &iov, 1, count);
 
+	ret = file->f_op->integrity_read(&kiocb, &iter);
+	BUG_ON(ret == -EIOCBQUEUED);
 	return ret;
 }
 
-- 
2.7.4

[Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v6 6/6] ima: define "fs_unsafe" builtin policy

[Mimi Z. <zo...@li...>]

Permit normally denied access/execute permission for files in policy
on IMA unsupported filesystems.  This patch defines "fs_unsafe", a
builtin policy.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...>

---
Changelog v3:
- include dont_failsafe rule when displaying policy
 
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  8 +++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c             | 12 ++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index d9c171ce4190..4e303be83df6 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1502,7 +1502,7 @@
 
 	ima_policy=	[IMA]
 			The builtin policies to load during IMA setup.
-			Format: "tcb | appraise_tcb | secure_boot"
+			Format: "tcb | appraise_tcb | secure_boot | fs_unsafe"
 
 			The "tcb" policy measures all programs exec'd, files
 			mmap'd for exec, and all files opened with the read
@@ -1517,6 +1517,12 @@
 			of files (eg. kexec kernel image, kernel modules,
 			firmware, policy, etc) based on file signatures.
 
+			The "fs_unsafe" policy permits normally denied
+			access/execute permission for files in policy on IMA
+			unsupported filesystems.  Note this option, as the
+			name implies, is not safe and not recommended for
+			any environments other than testing.
+
 	ima_tcb		[IMA] Deprecated.  Use ima_policy= instead.
 			Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted
 			Computing Base.  This means IMA will measure all
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 43b85a4fb8e8..cddd9dfb01e1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -169,6 +169,10 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
 };
 
+static struct ima_rule_entry dont_failsafe_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
+	{.action = DONT_FAILSAFE}
+};
+
 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
 static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
 static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules);
@@ -188,6 +192,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
 
 static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
 static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata;
+static bool ima_use_dont_failsafe __initdata;
 static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
 {
 	char *p;
@@ -201,6 +206,10 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
 			ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1;
 		else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0)
 			ima_use_secure_boot = 1;
+		else if (strcmp(p, "fs_unsafe") == 0) {
+			ima_use_dont_failsafe = 1;
+			set_failsafe(0);
+		}
 	}
 
 	return 1;
@@ -470,6 +479,9 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 			temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
 	}
 
+	if (ima_use_dont_failsafe)
+		list_add_tail(&dont_failsafe_rules[0].list, &ima_default_rules);
+
 	ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
 	ima_update_policy_flag();
 }
-- 
2.7.4

[Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v6 5/6] ima: define "dont_failsafe" policy action rule

[Mimi Z. <zo...@li...>]

Permit normally denied access/execute permission for files in policy
on IMA unsupported filesystems.  This patch defines the "dont_failsafe"
policy action rule.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...>

---
Changelog v3:
- include dont_failsafe rule when displaying policy
- fail attempt to add dont_failsafe rule when appending to the policy
 
 Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy |  3 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h         |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c    | 12 +++++++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c  | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index e76432b9954d..f271207743e5 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ Description:
 
 		rule format: action [condition ...]
 
-		action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise | audit
+		action: measure | dont_meaure | appraise | dont_appraise |
+			audit | dont_failsafe
 		condition:= base | lsm  [option]
 			base:	[[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=]
 				[euid=] [fowner=]]
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index d52b487ad259..c5f34f7c5b0f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos);
 void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos);
 void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
 int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
+void set_failsafe(bool flag);
 
 /* Appraise integrity measurements */
 #define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE	0x01
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index d23dfe6ede18..b00186914df8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ int ima_appraise;
 int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
 static int hash_setup_done;
 
+static bool ima_failsafe = 1;
+void set_failsafe(bool flag)
+{
+	ima_failsafe = flag;
+}
+
 static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
 {
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
@@ -260,8 +266,12 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 		__putname(pathbuf);
 out:
 	inode_unlock(inode);
-	if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+	if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
+		if (!ima_failsafe && rc == -EBADF)
+			return 0;
+
 		return -EACCES;
+	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 95209a5f8595..43b85a4fb8e8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -40,12 +40,14 @@
 #define APPRAISE	0x0004	/* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
 #define DONT_APPRAISE	0x0008
 #define AUDIT		0x0040
+#define DONT_FAILSAFE	0x0400
 
 #define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \
 	(a) >= (FIELD_SIZEOF(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))
 
 int ima_policy_flag;
 static int temp_ima_appraise;
+static bool temp_failsafe = 1;
 
 #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
 enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
@@ -513,6 +515,9 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
 	if (ima_rules != policy) {
 		ima_policy_flag = 0;
 		ima_rules = policy;
+
+		/* Only update on initial policy replacement, not append */
+		set_failsafe(temp_failsafe);
 	}
 	ima_update_policy_flag();
 }
@@ -529,7 +534,7 @@ enum {
 	Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt,
 	Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
 	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio,
-	Opt_pcr
+	Opt_pcr, Opt_dont_failsafe
 };
 
 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -560,6 +565,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
 	{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
 	{Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
+	{Opt_dont_failsafe, "dont_failsafe"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -630,6 +636,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 		if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t'))
 			continue;
 		token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
+		if (entry->action == DONT_FAILSAFE) {
+			/* no args permitted, force invalid rule */
+			token = Opt_dont_failsafe;
+		}
+
 		switch (token) {
 		case Opt_measure:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "action", "measure");
@@ -671,6 +682,19 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 
 			entry->action = AUDIT;
 			break;
+		case Opt_dont_failsafe:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_failsafe");
+
+			if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+				result = -EINVAL;
+
+			/* Permit on initial policy replacement only */
+			if (ima_rules != &ima_policy_rules)
+				temp_failsafe = 0;
+			else
+				result = -EINVAL;
+			entry->action = DONT_FAILSAFE;
+			break;
 		case Opt_func:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
 
@@ -949,6 +973,7 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void)
 	int i;
 
 	temp_ima_appraise = 0;
+	temp_failsafe = 1;
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) {
 		for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
 			kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
@@ -1040,6 +1065,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 		seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_appraise));
 	if (entry->action & AUDIT)
 		seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_audit));
+	if (entry->action & DONT_FAILSAFE)
+		seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_failsafe));
 
 	seq_puts(m, " ");
 
-- 
2.7.4

[Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v6 3/6] ima: always measure and audit files in policy

[Mimi Z. <zo...@li...>]

All files matching a "measure" rule must be included in the IMA
measurement list, even when the file hash cannot be calculated.
Similarly, all files matching an "audit" rule must be audited, even when
the file hash can not be calculated.

The file data hash field contained in the IMA measurement list template
data will contain 0's instead of the actual file hash digest.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...>

---
Changelog v6:
- replace "?:" with if/then
- annotate i_version usage
- reword O_DIRECT comment

Changelog v5:
- Fail files opened O_DIRECT, but include attempt in measurement list.

Changelog v4:
- Based on both -EBADF and -EINVAL
- clean up ima_collect_measurement()

 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c    | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 10 ++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c   |  7 ++--
 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c2edba8de35e..1dee695642a4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -199,42 +199,59 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	const char *filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
 	int result = 0;
+	int length;
+	void *tmpbuf;
+	u64 i_version;
 	struct {
 		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
 		char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	} hash;
 
-	if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
-		u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
+	if (iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)
+		goto out;
 
-		if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) {
-			audit_cause = "failed(directio)";
-			result = -EACCES;
-			goto out;
-		}
+	/*
+	 * Dectecting file change is based on i_version. On filesystems
+	 * which do not support i_version, support is limited to an initial
+	 * measurement/appraisal/audit.
+	 */
+	i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
+	hash.hdr.algo = algo;
 
-		hash.hdr.algo = algo;
-
-		result = (!buf) ?  ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr) :
-			ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr);
-		if (!result) {
-			int length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length;
-			void *tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length,
-						GFP_NOFS);
-			if (tmpbuf) {
-				iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf;
-				memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
-				iint->version = i_version;
-				iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
-			} else
-				result = -ENOMEM;
-		}
+	/* Initialize hash digest to 0's in case of failure */
+	memset(&hash.digest, 0, sizeof(hash.digest));
+
+	if (buf)
+		result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr);
+	else
+		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
+
+	if (result && result != -EBADF && result != -EINVAL)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length;
+	tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!tmpbuf) {
+		result = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
 	}
+
+	iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf;
+	memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
+	iint->version = i_version;
+
+	/* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */
+	if (result != -EBADF && result != -EINVAL)
+		iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
 out:
-	if (result)
+	if (result) {
+		if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
+			audit_cause = "failed(directio)";
+
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
 				    filename, "collect_data", audit_cause,
 				    result, 0);
+	}
 	return result;
 }
 
@@ -278,7 +295,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	}
 
 	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr);
-	if (!result || result == -EEXIST) {
+	if ((!result || result == -EEXIST) && !(file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)) {
 		iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED;
 		iint->measured_pcrs |= (0x1 << pcr);
 	}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 802d5d20f36f..a856d8c9c9f3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -441,6 +441,16 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
 	loff_t i_size;
 	int rc;
 
+	/*
+	 * For consistency, fail file's opened with the O_DIRECT flag on
+	 * filesystems mounted with/without DAX option.
+	 */
+	if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) {
+		hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
+		hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
 
 	if (ima_ahash_minsize && i_size >= ima_ahash_minsize) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 2aebb7984437..d23dfe6ede18 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -235,11 +235,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 	hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
 
 	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo);
-	if (rc != 0) {
-		if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
-			rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES;
+	if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL)
 		goto out_digsig;
-	}
 
 	if (!pathbuf)	/* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
 		pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename);
@@ -247,7 +244,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
 		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
 				      xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr);
-	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
+	if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK))
 		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname,
 					      xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);
 	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
-- 
2.7.4

[Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v6 2/6] efivarfs: replaces the read file operation with read_iter

[Mimi Z. <zo...@li...>]

In preparation for defining the integrity_read file operation
method, replace the read file operation method with read_iter.

Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hc...@ls...>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mj...@sr...>

---
Changelog v6:
- Defined as a separate patch.
 
 fs/efivarfs/file.c | 11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/efivarfs/file.c b/fs/efivarfs/file.c
index 5f22e74bbade..863f1b100165 100644
--- a/fs/efivarfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/efivarfs/file.c
@@ -64,9 +64,10 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_write(struct file *file,
 	return bytes;
 }
 
-static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
-		size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb,
+				       struct iov_iter *iter)
 {
+	struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
 	struct efivar_entry *var = file->private_data;
 	unsigned long datasize = 0;
 	u32 attributes;
@@ -96,8 +97,8 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
 		goto out_free;
 
 	memcpy(data, &attributes, sizeof(attributes));
-	size = simple_read_from_buffer(userbuf, count, ppos,
-				       data, datasize + sizeof(attributes));
+	size = simple_read_iter_from_buffer(iocb, iter, data,
+					    datasize + sizeof(attributes));
 out_free:
 	kfree(data);
 
@@ -174,7 +175,7 @@ efivarfs_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long p)
 
 const struct file_operations efivarfs_file_operations = {
 	.open	= simple_open,
-	.read	= efivarfs_file_read,
+	.read_iter = efivarfs_file_read_iter,
 	.write	= efivarfs_file_write,
 	.llseek	= no_llseek,
 	.unlocked_ioctl = efivarfs_file_ioctl,
-- 
2.7.4

[Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v6 1/6] libfs: define simple_read_iter_from_buffer

[Mimi Z. <zo...@li...>]

In preparation for defining an integrity_read file operation
method for efivarfs, define a simple_read_iter_from_buffer()
function.

(Based on Al's code as posted in thread.)

Suggested-by: Al Viro <vi...@ze...>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mj...@sr...>

---
Changelog v6:
- defined as a separate patch
 
 fs/libfs.c         | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/fs.h |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/libfs.c b/fs/libfs.c
index 3aabe553fc45..b6e304c6828b 100644
--- a/fs/libfs.c
+++ b/fs/libfs.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/exportfs.h>
 #include <linux/writeback.h>
 #include <linux/buffer_head.h> /* sync_mapping_buffers */
+#include <linux/uio.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 
@@ -676,6 +677,37 @@ ssize_t simple_write_to_buffer(void *to, size_t available, loff_t *ppos,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(simple_write_to_buffer);
 
 /**
+ * simple_read_iter_from_buffer - copy data from the buffer to user space
+ * @iocb: struct containing the file, the current position and other info
+ * @to: the user space buffer to read to
+ * @from: the buffer to read from
+ * @available: the size of the buffer
+ *
+ * The simple_read_iter_from_buffer() function reads up to @available bytes
+ * from the current buffer into the user space buffer.
+ *
+ * On success, the current buffer offset is advanced by the number of bytes
+ * read, or a negative value is returned on error.
+ **/
+ssize_t simple_read_iter_from_buffer(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to,
+				     const void *from, size_t available)
+{
+	loff_t pos = iocb->ki_pos;
+	size_t ret;
+
+	if (pos < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (pos >= available)
+		return 0;
+	ret = copy_to_iter(from + pos, available - pos, to);
+	if (!ret && iov_iter_count(to))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	iocb->ki_pos = pos + ret;
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(simple_read_iter_from_buffer);
+
+/**
  * memory_read_from_buffer - copy data from the buffer
  * @to: the kernel space buffer to read to
  * @count: the maximum number of bytes to read
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 6e1fd5d21248..fdec9b763b54 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -3097,6 +3097,8 @@ extern void simple_release_fs(struct vfsmount **mount, int *count);
 
 extern ssize_t simple_read_from_buffer(void __user *to, size_t count,
 			loff_t *ppos, const void *from, size_t available);
+extern ssize_t simple_read_iter_from_buffer(struct kiocb *iocb,
+		struct iov_iter *to, const void *from, size_t available);
 extern ssize_t simple_write_to_buffer(void *to, size_t available, loff_t *ppos,
 		const void __user *from, size_t count);
 
-- 
2.7.4

[Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v6 0/6] define new fs integrity_read method

[Mimi Z. <zo...@li...>]

With the introduction of IMA-appraisal and the need to write file
hashes as security xattrs, IMA needed to take the global i_mutex
lock.  process_measurement() took the iint->mutex first and then
the i_mutex, while setxattr, chmod and chown took the locks in
reverse order.  To resolve this potential deadlock, the iint->mutex
was removed.

Some filesystems have recently replaced their filesystem dependent
lock with the global i_rwsem (formerly the i_mutex) to read a file.
As a result, when IMA attempts to calculate the file hash, reading
the file attempts to take the i_rwsem again.

To resolve this locking problem, this patch set introduces a new
->integrity_read file operation method.  Until all filesystems
define the new ->integrity_read method, files that were previously
measured might not be currently measured and files that were
previously appraised might fail to be appraised properly.

Version 2 of this patch set, introduced measurement entries and
IMA-audit messages containing file hash values of 0's, instead
of the actual file hash, to indicate that the file hash could not
be calculated.  Like for any other file signature verification
error, file access/execute permission is denied.

To override the IMA policy, allowing unverified code to be
accessed/executed on filesystems not supported by IMA, version 2 of
this patch set defined a new policy "action" named "dont_failsafe"
and a new builtin policy named "fs_unsafe", which can be specified
on the boot command line.

Direct Access:
Although the new integrity_read method works for files opened with
the "O_DIRECT" flag on block devices that support DAX, for consistency
fail filesystems mounted with/without DAX.  (Refer to commit f9b2a735bddd
"ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag" for detals.)

Changelog v6:
- Defined simple_read_iter_from_buffer() as a separate patch.
- Made efivarfs usage of simple_read_iter_from_buffer() a separate patch.

Changelog v5:
- fail files opened O_DIRECT, but include access attempt in measurement
list.
- removed ocf2 and gfs2 integrity_read support.

Changelog v4:
- define ext2/4 specific ->integrity_read functions based Jan Kara's
review.
- properly fail file open with O_DIRECT on filesystems not mounted
with "-o dax".
- remove the "permit_directio" IMA policy option.

Changelog v3:
- define simple_read_iter_from_buffer
- replace the existing efivarfs ->read method with ->read_iter method.
- squashed other fs definitions of ->integrity_read with this patch.
- include dont_failsafe rule when displaying policy.
- fail attempt to add dont_failsafe rule when appending to the policy.
- moved '---' divider before change log, as requested in review.

Mimi

Christoph Hellwig (1):
*** BLURB HERE ***

Christoph Hellwig (1):
  ima: use fs method to read integrity data

Mimi Zohar (5):
  libfs: define simple_read_iter_from_buffer
  efivarfs: replaces the read file operation with read_iter
  ima: always measure and audit files in policy
  ima: define "dont_failsafe" policy action rule
  ima: define "fs_unsafe" builtin policy

 Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy            |  3 +-
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  8 ++-
 fs/btrfs/file.c                                 |  1 +
 fs/efivarfs/file.c                              | 12 +++--
 fs/ext2/file.c                                  | 17 +++++++
 fs/ext4/file.c                                  | 20 ++++++++
 fs/f2fs/file.c                                  |  1 +
 fs/jffs2/file.c                                 |  1 +
 fs/jfs/file.c                                   |  1 +
 fs/libfs.c                                      | 32 ++++++++++++
 fs/nilfs2/file.c                                |  1 +
 fs/ramfs/file-mmu.c                             |  1 +
 fs/ramfs/file-nommu.c                           |  1 +
 fs/ubifs/file.c                                 |  1 +
 fs/xfs/xfs_file.c                               | 21 ++++++++
 include/linux/fs.h                              |  3 ++
 mm/shmem.c                                      |  1 +
 security/integrity/iint.c                       | 20 +++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h                    |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c                | 67 ++++++++++++++++---------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c             | 10 ++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c               | 19 ++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c             | 41 ++++++++++++++-
 23 files changed, 238 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

-- 
2.7.4

Re: [Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v5 04/19] crypto: marvell/cesa: remove redundant backlog checks on EBUSY

[Boris B. <bor...@fr...>]

Le Mon, 14 Aug 2017 18:21:14 +0300,
Gilad Ben-Yossef <gi...@be...> a écrit :

> Now that -EBUSY return code only indicates backlog queueing
> we can safely remove the now redundant check for the
> CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG flag when -EBUSY is returned.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gi...@be...>

Acked-by: Boris Brezillon <bor...@fr...>

> ---
>  drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa.c | 3 +--
>  drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa.h | 2 +-
>  2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa.c b/drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa.c
> index 6e7a5c7..269737f 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa.c
> @@ -183,8 +183,7 @@ int mv_cesa_queue_req(struct crypto_async_request *req,
>  	spin_lock_bh(&engine->lock);
>  	ret = crypto_enqueue_request(&engine->queue, req);
>  	if ((mv_cesa_req_get_type(creq) == CESA_DMA_REQ) &&
> -	    (ret == -EINPROGRESS ||
> -	    (ret == -EBUSY && req->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG)))
> +	    (ret == -EINPROGRESS || ret == -EBUSY)
>  		mv_cesa_tdma_chain(engine, creq);
>  	spin_unlock_bh(&engine->lock);
>  
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa.h b/drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa.h
> index b7872f6..63c8457 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa.h
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa.h
> @@ -763,7 +763,7 @@ static inline int mv_cesa_req_needs_cleanup(struct crypto_async_request *req,
>  	 * the backlog and will be processed later. There's no need to
>  	 * clean it up.
>  	 */
> -	if (ret == -EBUSY && req->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG)
> +	if (ret == -EBUSY)
>  		return false;
>  
>  	/* Request wasn't queued, we need to clean it up */

Re: [Linux-ima-devel] [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH] tpm: improve tpm_tis send() performance by ignoring burstcount

[Jarkko S. <jar...@li...>]

On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 08:12:53AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2017-08-14 at 13:56 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> 
> > > > Since the main concern about this change is breaking old systems that
> > > > might potentially have other peripherals hanging off the LPC bus, can
> > > > we define a new Kconfig option, with the default as 'N'?
> > > > 
> > > > Mimi
> > > 
> > > I guess that could make sense but I would like to hear feedback first.
> > > 
> > > /Jarkko
> > 
> > And I'm worried would that it'd be left for many years to come as an
> > option.  I do not have any metrics what portion of hardware in the field
> > would break if this is turned on.
> > 
> > It would slow down kernel testing as I would have to run tests for the
> > driver with that option turned on and off because it is a major shift
> > from how driver functions. And I have zero idea how long I would go on
> > doing this.
> > 
> > One maybe a little bit better option would be to have a sysfs attribute
> > for this functionality (disable_burst_count). What do you think about
> > that?
> 
> That works!  So we'll define a module_param named disable_burst_count,
> which can be specified on the boot command line.
> 
> Mimi

That would work for me.

/Jarkko

Re: [Linux-ima-devel] [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH] tpm: improve tpm_tis send() performance by ignoring burstcount

[Jarkko S. <jar...@li...>]

On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 08:03:05AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2017-08-14 at 13:56 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> 
> > > > > I would like to see tpm_msleep() wrapper to replace current msleep()
> > > > > usage across the subsystem before considering this. I.e. wrapper that
> > > > > internally uses usleep_range(). This way we can mechanically convert
> > > > > everything to a more low latency option.
> > > > 
> > > > Fine.  I assume you meant tpm_sleep(), not tpm_msleep().
> > > 
> > > I think it would sense to have a function that takes msecs because msecs
> > > are mostly used everywhere in the subsystem. This way we don't have to
> > > change any of the existing constants.
> 
> For now converting from msleep() to tpm_msleep() will be straight
> forward.  Internally we would just use usleep_range().
> 
> Going forward, my concern is that even 1 msec might be too long for
> some of these sleeps.
> 
> Mimi

We can revisit this. I would take the simple route right now.

/Jarkko

Re: [Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v5 18/19] crypto: mediatek: move to generic async completion

[Ryder L. <ryd...@me...>]

On Mon, 2017-08-14 at 18:21 +0300, Gilad Ben-Yossef wrote:
> The mediatek driver starts several async crypto ops and waits for their
> completions. Move it over to generic code doing the same.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gi...@be...>
> ---

Acked-by: Ryder Lee <ryd...@me...>

>  drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c | 31 +++++--------------------------
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c b/drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c
> index 9e845e8..e2c7c95 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c
> @@ -137,11 +137,6 @@ struct mtk_aes_gcm_ctx {
>  	struct crypto_skcipher *ctr;
>  };
>  
> -struct mtk_aes_gcm_setkey_result {
> -	int err;
> -	struct completion completion;
> -};
> -
>  struct mtk_aes_drv {
>  	struct list_head dev_list;
>  	/* Device list lock */
> @@ -936,17 +931,6 @@ static int mtk_aes_gcm_crypt(struct aead_request *req, u64 mode)
>  				    &req->base);
>  }
>  
> -static void mtk_gcm_setkey_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
> -{
> -	struct mtk_aes_gcm_setkey_result *result = req->data;
> -
> -	if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
> -		return;
> -
> -	result->err = err;
> -	complete(&result->completion);
> -}
> -
>  /*
>   * Because of the hardware limitation, we need to pre-calculate key(H)
>   * for the GHASH operation. The result of the encryption operation
> @@ -962,7 +946,7 @@ static int mtk_aes_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
>  		u32 hash[4];
>  		u8 iv[8];
>  
> -		struct mtk_aes_gcm_setkey_result result;
> +		struct crypto_wait wait;
>  
>  		struct scatterlist sg[1];
>  		struct skcipher_request req;
> @@ -1002,22 +986,17 @@ static int mtk_aes_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
>  	if (!data)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
>  
> -	init_completion(&data->result.completion);
> +	crypto_init_wait(&data->wait);
>  	sg_init_one(data->sg, &data->hash, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
>  	skcipher_request_set_tfm(&data->req, ctr);
>  	skcipher_request_set_callback(&data->req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |
>  				      CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
> -				      mtk_gcm_setkey_done, &data->result);
> +				      crypto_req_done, &data->wait);
>  	skcipher_request_set_crypt(&data->req, data->sg, data->sg,
>  				   AES_BLOCK_SIZE, data->iv);
>  
> -	err = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(&data->req);
> -	if (err == -EINPROGRESS || err == -EBUSY) {
> -		err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(
> -			&data->result.completion);
> -		if (!err)
> -			err = data->result.err;
> -	}
> +	err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(&data->req),
> +			      &data->wait);
>  	if (err)
>  		goto out;
>  

Re: [Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v5 05/19] crypto: introduce crypto wait for async op

[Jonathan C. <Jon...@hu...>]

On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 18:21:15 +0300
Gilad Ben-Yossef <gi...@be...> wrote:

> Invoking a possibly async. crypto op and waiting for completion
> while correctly handling backlog processing is a common task
> in the crypto API implementation and outside users of it.
> 
> This patch adds a generic implementation for doing so in
> preparation for using it across the board instead of hand
> rolled versions.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gi...@be...>
> CC: Eric Biggers <ebi...@gm...>

One really trivial point inline I happened to notice.

> ---
>  crypto/api.c           | 13 +++++++++++++
>  include/linux/crypto.h | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/crypto/api.c b/crypto/api.c
> index 941cd4c..2a2479d 100644
> --- a/crypto/api.c
> +++ b/crypto/api.c
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
>  #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
>  #include <linux/slab.h>
>  #include <linux/string.h>
> +#include <linux/completion.h>
>  #include "internal.h"
>  
>  LIST_HEAD(crypto_alg_list);
> @@ -595,5 +596,17 @@ int crypto_has_alg(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_has_alg);
>  
> +void crypto_req_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
> +{
> +	struct crypto_wait *wait = req->data;
> +
> +	if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
> +		return;
> +
> +	wait->err = err;
> +	complete(&wait->completion);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_req_done);
> +
>  MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Cryptographic core API");
>  MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
> diff --git a/include/linux/crypto.h b/include/linux/crypto.h
> index 84da997..bb00186 100644
> --- a/include/linux/crypto.h
> +++ b/include/linux/crypto.h
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
>  #include <linux/slab.h>
>  #include <linux/string.h>
>  #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +#include <linux/completion.h>
>  
>  /*
>   * Autoloaded crypto modules should only use a prefixed name to avoid allowing
> @@ -468,6 +469,45 @@ struct crypto_alg {
>  } CRYPTO_MINALIGN_ATTR;
>  
>  /*
> + * A helper struct for waiting for completion of async crypto ops
> + */
> +struct crypto_wait {
> +	struct completion completion;
> +	int err;
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * Macro for declaring a crypto op async wait object on stack
> + */
> +#define DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(_wait) \
> +	struct crypto_wait _wait = { \
> +		COMPLETION_INITIALIZER_ONSTACK((_wait).completion), 0 }
> +
> +/*
> + * Async ops completion helper functioons
> + */
> +void crypto_req_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err);
> +
> +static inline int crypto_wait_req(int err, struct crypto_wait *wait)
> +{
> +	switch (err) {
> +	case -EINPROGRESS:
> +	case -EBUSY:
> +		wait_for_completion(&wait->completion);
> +		reinit_completion(&wait->completion);
> +		err = wait->err;
> +		break;
> +	};
> +
> +	return err;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void crypto_init_wait(struct crypto_wait *wait)
> +{
> +	init_completion(&wait->completion);
> +}
> +
> +/*
>   * Algorithm registration interface.
>   */
>  int crypto_register_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg);
> @@ -1604,5 +1644,6 @@ static inline int crypto_comp_decompress(struct crypto_comp *tfm,
>  						    src, slen, dst, dlen);
>  }
>  
> +

Trivial observation.  Shouldn't have this bonus blank line inserted here.

>  #endif	/* _LINUX_CRYPTO_H */
>  

Re: [Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v5 02/19] crypto: ccp: use -EAGAIN for transient busy indication

[Gary R H. <gar...@am...>]

On 08/14/2017 10:21 AM, Gilad Ben-Yossef wrote:
> Replace -EBUSY with -EAGAIN when reporting transient busy
> indication in the absence of backlog.
>
> Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gi...@be...>

Reviewed-by: Gary R Hook <gar...@am...>

> ---
>  drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-main.c | 8 +++-----
>  drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-dev.c         | 7 +++++--
>  2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-main.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-main.c
> index 35a9de7..403ff0a 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-main.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-main.c
> @@ -222,9 +222,10 @@ static int ccp_crypto_enqueue_cmd(struct ccp_crypto_cmd *crypto_cmd)
>
>  	/* Check if the cmd can/should be queued */
>  	if (req_queue.cmd_count >= CCP_CRYPTO_MAX_QLEN) {
> -		ret = -EBUSY;
> -		if (!(crypto_cmd->cmd->flags & CCP_CMD_MAY_BACKLOG))
> +		if (!(crypto_cmd->cmd->flags & CCP_CMD_MAY_BACKLOG)) {
> +			ret = -EAGAIN;
>  			goto e_lock;
> +		}
>  	}
>
>  	/* Look for an entry with the same tfm.  If there is a cmd
> @@ -243,9 +244,6 @@ static int ccp_crypto_enqueue_cmd(struct ccp_crypto_cmd *crypto_cmd)
>  		ret = ccp_enqueue_cmd(crypto_cmd->cmd);
>  		if (!ccp_crypto_success(ret))
>  			goto e_lock;	/* Error, don't queue it */
> -		if ((ret == -EBUSY) &&
> -		    !(crypto_cmd->cmd->flags & CCP_CMD_MAY_BACKLOG))
> -			goto e_lock;	/* Not backlogging, don't queue it */
>  	}
>
>  	if (req_queue.cmd_count >= CCP_CRYPTO_MAX_QLEN) {
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-dev.c
> index 4e029b1..3d637e3 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-dev.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-dev.c
> @@ -292,9 +292,12 @@ int ccp_enqueue_cmd(struct ccp_cmd *cmd)
>  	i = ccp->cmd_q_count;
>
>  	if (ccp->cmd_count >= MAX_CMD_QLEN) {
> -		ret = -EBUSY;
> -		if (cmd->flags & CCP_CMD_MAY_BACKLOG)
> +		if (cmd->flags & CCP_CMD_MAY_BACKLOG) {
> +			ret = -EBUSY;
>  			list_add_tail(&cmd->entry, &ccp->backlog);
> +		} else {
> +			ret = -EAGAIN;
> +		}
>  	} else {
>  		ret = -EINPROGRESS;
>  		ccp->cmd_count++;
>

[Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v5 19/19] crypto: adapt api sample to use async. op wait

[Gilad Ben-Y. <gi...@be...>]

The code sample is waiting for an async. crypto op completion.
Adapt sample to use the new generic infrastructure to do the same.

This also fixes a possible data coruption bug created by the
use of wait_for_completion_interruptible() without dealing
correctly with an interrupt aborting the wait prior to the
async op finishing.

Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gi...@be...>
---
 Documentation/crypto/api-samples.rst | 52 +++++++-----------------------------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/crypto/api-samples.rst b/Documentation/crypto/api-samples.rst
index 2531948..006827e 100644
--- a/Documentation/crypto/api-samples.rst
+++ b/Documentation/crypto/api-samples.rst
@@ -7,59 +7,27 @@ Code Example For Symmetric Key Cipher Operation
 ::
 
 
-    struct tcrypt_result {
-        struct completion completion;
-        int err;
-    };
-
     /* tie all data structures together */
     struct skcipher_def {
         struct scatterlist sg;
         struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
         struct skcipher_request *req;
-        struct tcrypt_result result;
+        struct crypto_wait wait;
     };
 
-    /* Callback function */
-    static void test_skcipher_cb(struct crypto_async_request *req, int error)
-    {
-        struct tcrypt_result *result = req->data;
-
-        if (error == -EINPROGRESS)
-            return;
-        result->err = error;
-        complete(&result->completion);
-        pr_info("Encryption finished successfully\n");
-    }
-
     /* Perform cipher operation */
     static unsigned int test_skcipher_encdec(struct skcipher_def *sk,
                          int enc)
     {
-        int rc = 0;
+        int rc;
 
         if (enc)
-            rc = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(sk->req);
+            rc = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(sk->req), &sk->wait);
         else
-            rc = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(sk->req);
-
-        switch (rc) {
-        case 0:
-            break;
-        case -EINPROGRESS:
-        case -EBUSY:
-            rc = wait_for_completion_interruptible(
-                &sk->result.completion);
-            if (!rc && !sk->result.err) {
-                reinit_completion(&sk->result.completion);
-                break;
-            }
-        default:
-            pr_info("skcipher encrypt returned with %d result %d\n",
-                rc, sk->result.err);
-            break;
-        }
-        init_completion(&sk->result.completion);
+            rc = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_decrypt(sk->req), &sk->wait);
+
+	if (rc)
+		pr_info("skcipher encrypt returned with result %d\n", rc);
 
         return rc;
     }
@@ -89,8 +57,8 @@ Code Example For Symmetric Key Cipher Operation
         }
 
         skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
-                          test_skcipher_cb,
-                          &sk.result);
+                          crypto_req_done,
+                          &sk.wait);
 
         /* AES 256 with random key */
         get_random_bytes(&key, 32);
@@ -122,7 +90,7 @@ Code Example For Symmetric Key Cipher Operation
         /* We encrypt one block */
         sg_init_one(&sk.sg, scratchpad, 16);
         skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sk.sg, &sk.sg, 16, ivdata);
-        init_completion(&sk.result.completion);
+        crypto_init_wait(&sk.wait);
 
         /* encrypt data */
         ret = test_skcipher_encdec(&sk, 1);
-- 
2.1.4

[Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v5 18/19] crypto: mediatek: move to generic async completion

[Gilad Ben-Y. <gi...@be...>]

The mediatek driver starts several async crypto ops and waits for their
completions. Move it over to generic code doing the same.

Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gi...@be...>
---
 drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c | 31 +++++--------------------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c b/drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c
index 9e845e8..e2c7c95 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c
@@ -137,11 +137,6 @@ struct mtk_aes_gcm_ctx {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *ctr;
 };
 
-struct mtk_aes_gcm_setkey_result {
-	int err;
-	struct completion completion;
-};
-
 struct mtk_aes_drv {
 	struct list_head dev_list;
 	/* Device list lock */
@@ -936,17 +931,6 @@ static int mtk_aes_gcm_crypt(struct aead_request *req, u64 mode)
 				    &req->base);
 }
 
-static void mtk_gcm_setkey_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
-{
-	struct mtk_aes_gcm_setkey_result *result = req->data;
-
-	if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
-		return;
-
-	result->err = err;
-	complete(&result->completion);
-}
-
 /*
  * Because of the hardware limitation, we need to pre-calculate key(H)
  * for the GHASH operation. The result of the encryption operation
@@ -962,7 +946,7 @@ static int mtk_aes_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
 		u32 hash[4];
 		u8 iv[8];
 
-		struct mtk_aes_gcm_setkey_result result;
+		struct crypto_wait wait;
 
 		struct scatterlist sg[1];
 		struct skcipher_request req;
@@ -1002,22 +986,17 @@ static int mtk_aes_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
 	if (!data)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	init_completion(&data->result.completion);
+	crypto_init_wait(&data->wait);
 	sg_init_one(data->sg, &data->hash, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 	skcipher_request_set_tfm(&data->req, ctr);
 	skcipher_request_set_callback(&data->req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |
 				      CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
-				      mtk_gcm_setkey_done, &data->result);
+				      crypto_req_done, &data->wait);
 	skcipher_request_set_crypt(&data->req, data->sg, data->sg,
 				   AES_BLOCK_SIZE, data->iv);
 
-	err = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(&data->req);
-	if (err == -EINPROGRESS || err == -EBUSY) {
-		err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(
-			&data->result.completion);
-		if (!err)
-			err = data->result.err;
-	}
+	err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(&data->req),
+			      &data->wait);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
-- 
2.1.4

[Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v5 17/19] crypto: qce: move to generic async completion

[Gilad Ben-Y. <gi...@be...>]

The qce driver starts several async crypto ops and  waits for their
completions. Move it over to generic code doing the same.

Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gi...@be...>
---
 drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c | 30 ++++--------------------------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c b/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c
index 47e114a..53227d7 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c
@@ -349,28 +349,12 @@ static int qce_ahash_digest(struct ahash_request *req)
 	return qce->async_req_enqueue(tmpl->qce, &req->base);
 }
 
-struct qce_ahash_result {
-	struct completion completion;
-	int error;
-};
-
-static void qce_digest_complete(struct crypto_async_request *req, int error)
-{
-	struct qce_ahash_result *result = req->data;
-
-	if (error == -EINPROGRESS)
-		return;
-
-	result->error = error;
-	complete(&result->completion);
-}
-
 static int qce_ahash_hmac_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key,
 				 unsigned int keylen)
 {
 	unsigned int digestsize = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
 	struct qce_sha_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(&tfm->base);
-	struct qce_ahash_result result;
+	struct crypto_wait wait;
 	struct ahash_request *req;
 	struct scatterlist sg;
 	unsigned int blocksize;
@@ -405,9 +389,9 @@ static int qce_ahash_hmac_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key,
 		goto err_free_ahash;
 	}
 
-	init_completion(&result.completion);
+	crypto_init_wait(&wait);
 	ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
-				   qce_digest_complete, &result);
+				   crypto_req_done, &wait);
 	crypto_ahash_clear_flags(ahash_tfm, ~0);
 
 	buf = kzalloc(keylen + QCE_MAX_ALIGN_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -420,13 +404,7 @@ static int qce_ahash_hmac_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key,
 	sg_init_one(&sg, buf, keylen);
 	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, ctx->authkey, keylen);
 
-	ret = crypto_ahash_digest(req);
-	if (ret == -EINPROGRESS || ret == -EBUSY) {
-		ret = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&result.completion);
-		if (!ret)
-			ret = result.error;
-	}
-
+	ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_digest(req), &wait);
 	if (ret)
 		crypto_ahash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
 
-- 
2.1.4

[Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v5 16/19] crypto: talitos: move to generic async completion

[Gilad Ben-Y. <gi...@be...>]

The talitos driver starts several async crypto ops and  waits for their
completions. Move it over to generic code doing the same.

Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gi...@be...>
---
 drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 38 +++++---------------------------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
index 79791c6..194a307 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
@@ -2037,22 +2037,6 @@ static int ahash_import(struct ahash_request *areq, const void *in)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-struct keyhash_result {
-	struct completion completion;
-	int err;
-};
-
-static void keyhash_complete(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
-{
-	struct keyhash_result *res = req->data;
-
-	if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
-		return;
-
-	res->err = err;
-	complete(&res->completion);
-}
-
 static int keyhash(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen,
 		   u8 *hash)
 {
@@ -2060,10 +2044,10 @@ static int keyhash(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen,
 
 	struct scatterlist sg[1];
 	struct ahash_request *req;
-	struct keyhash_result hresult;
+	struct crypto_wait wait;
 	int ret;
 
-	init_completion(&hresult.completion);
+	crypto_init_wait(&wait);
 
 	req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!req)
@@ -2072,25 +2056,13 @@ static int keyhash(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen,
 	/* Keep tfm keylen == 0 during hash of the long key */
 	ctx->keylen = 0;
 	ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
-				   keyhash_complete, &hresult);
+				   crypto_req_done, &wait);
 
 	sg_init_one(&sg[0], key, keylen);
 
 	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, hash, keylen);
-	ret = crypto_ahash_digest(req);
-	switch (ret) {
-	case 0:
-		break;
-	case -EINPROGRESS:
-	case -EBUSY:
-		ret = wait_for_completion_interruptible(
-			&hresult.completion);
-		if (!ret)
-			ret = hresult.err;
-		break;
-	default:
-		break;
-	}
+	ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_digest(req), &wait);
+
 	ahash_request_free(req);
 
 	return ret;
-- 
2.1.4

[Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v5 15/19] crypto: tcrypt: move to generic async completion

[Gilad Ben-Y. <gi...@be...>]

tcrypt starts several async crypto ops and  waits for their completions.
Move it over to generic code doing the same.

Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gi...@be...>
---
 crypto/tcrypt.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++----------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/tcrypt.c b/crypto/tcrypt.c
index 0022a18..802aa81 100644
--- a/crypto/tcrypt.c
+++ b/crypto/tcrypt.c
@@ -79,34 +79,11 @@ static char *check[] = {
 	NULL
 };
 
-struct tcrypt_result {
-	struct completion completion;
-	int err;
-};
-
-static void tcrypt_complete(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
-{
-	struct tcrypt_result *res = req->data;
-
-	if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
-		return;
-
-	res->err = err;
-	complete(&res->completion);
-}
-
 static inline int do_one_aead_op(struct aead_request *req, int ret)
 {
-	if (ret == -EINPROGRESS || ret == -EBUSY) {
-		struct tcrypt_result *tr = req->base.data;
+	struct crypto_wait *wait = req->base.data;
 
-		ret = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&tr->completion);
-		if (!ret)
-			ret = tr->err;
-		reinit_completion(&tr->completion);
-	}
-
-	return ret;
+	return crypto_wait_req(ret, wait);
 }
 
 static int test_aead_jiffies(struct aead_request *req, int enc,
@@ -248,7 +225,7 @@ static void test_aead_speed(const char *algo, int enc, unsigned int secs,
 	char *axbuf[XBUFSIZE];
 	unsigned int *b_size;
 	unsigned int iv_len;
-	struct tcrypt_result result;
+	struct crypto_wait wait;
 
 	iv = kzalloc(MAX_IVLEN, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!iv)
@@ -284,7 +261,7 @@ static void test_aead_speed(const char *algo, int enc, unsigned int secs,
 		goto out_notfm;
 	}
 
-	init_completion(&result.completion);
+	crypto_init_wait(&wait);
 	printk(KERN_INFO "\ntesting speed of %s (%s) %s\n", algo,
 			get_driver_name(crypto_aead, tfm), e);
 
@@ -296,7 +273,7 @@ static void test_aead_speed(const char *algo, int enc, unsigned int secs,
 	}
 
 	aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
-				  tcrypt_complete, &result);
+				  crypto_req_done, &wait);
 
 	i = 0;
 	do {
@@ -397,21 +374,16 @@ static void test_hash_sg_init(struct scatterlist *sg)
 
 static inline int do_one_ahash_op(struct ahash_request *req, int ret)
 {
-	if (ret == -EINPROGRESS || ret == -EBUSY) {
-		struct tcrypt_result *tr = req->base.data;
+	struct crypto_wait *wait = req->base.data;
 
-		wait_for_completion(&tr->completion);
-		reinit_completion(&tr->completion);
-		ret = tr->err;
-	}
-	return ret;
+	return crypto_wait_req(ret, wait);
 }
 
 struct test_mb_ahash_data {
 	struct scatterlist sg[TVMEMSIZE];
 	char result[64];
 	struct ahash_request *req;
-	struct tcrypt_result tresult;
+	struct crypto_wait wait;
 	char *xbuf[XBUFSIZE];
 };
 
@@ -440,7 +412,7 @@ static void test_mb_ahash_speed(const char *algo, unsigned int sec,
 		if (testmgr_alloc_buf(data[i].xbuf))
 			goto out;
 
-		init_completion(&data[i].tresult.completion);
+		crypto_init_wait(&data[i].wait);
 
 		data[i].req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!data[i].req) {
@@ -449,8 +421,8 @@ static void test_mb_ahash_speed(const char *algo, unsigned int sec,
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		ahash_request_set_callback(data[i].req, 0,
-					   tcrypt_complete, &data[i].tresult);
+		ahash_request_set_callback(data[i].req, 0, crypto_req_done,
+					   &data[i].wait);
 		test_hash_sg_init(data[i].sg);
 	}
 
@@ -492,16 +464,16 @@ static void test_mb_ahash_speed(const char *algo, unsigned int sec,
 			if (ret)
 				break;
 
-			complete(&data[k].tresult.completion);
-			data[k].tresult.err = 0;
+			crypto_req_done(&data[k].req->base, 0);
 		}
 
 		for (j = 0; j < k; j++) {
-			struct tcrypt_result *tr = &data[j].tresult;
+			struct crypto_wait *wait = &data[j].wait;
+			int wait_ret;
 
-			wait_for_completion(&tr->completion);
-			if (tr->err)
-				ret = tr->err;
+			wait_ret = crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, wait);
+			if (wait_ret)
+				ret = wait_ret;
 		}
 
 		end = get_cycles();
@@ -679,7 +651,7 @@ static void test_ahash_speed_common(const char *algo, unsigned int secs,
 				    struct hash_speed *speed, unsigned mask)
 {
 	struct scatterlist sg[TVMEMSIZE];
-	struct tcrypt_result tresult;
+	struct crypto_wait wait;
 	struct ahash_request *req;
 	struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
 	char *output;
@@ -708,9 +680,9 @@ static void test_ahash_speed_common(const char *algo, unsigned int secs,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	init_completion(&tresult.completion);
+	crypto_init_wait(&wait);
 	ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
-				   tcrypt_complete, &tresult);
+				   crypto_req_done, &wait);
 
 	output = kmalloc(MAX_DIGEST_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!output)
@@ -765,15 +737,9 @@ static void test_hash_speed(const char *algo, unsigned int secs,
 
 static inline int do_one_acipher_op(struct skcipher_request *req, int ret)
 {
-	if (ret == -EINPROGRESS || ret == -EBUSY) {
-		struct tcrypt_result *tr = req->base.data;
-
-		wait_for_completion(&tr->completion);
-		reinit_completion(&tr->completion);
-		ret = tr->err;
-	}
+	struct crypto_wait *wait = req->base.data;
 
-	return ret;
+	return crypto_wait_req(ret, wait);
 }
 
 static int test_acipher_jiffies(struct skcipher_request *req, int enc,
@@ -853,7 +819,7 @@ static void test_skcipher_speed(const char *algo, int enc, unsigned int secs,
 				unsigned int tcount, u8 *keysize, bool async)
 {
 	unsigned int ret, i, j, k, iv_len;
-	struct tcrypt_result tresult;
+	struct crypto_wait wait;
 	const char *key;
 	char iv[128];
 	struct skcipher_request *req;
@@ -866,7 +832,7 @@ static void test_skcipher_speed(const char *algo, int enc, unsigned int secs,
 	else
 		e = "decryption";
 
-	init_completion(&tresult.completion);
+	crypto_init_wait(&wait);
 
 	tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(algo, 0, async ? 0 : CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
 
@@ -887,7 +853,7 @@ static void test_skcipher_speed(const char *algo, int enc, unsigned int secs,
 	}
 
 	skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
-				      tcrypt_complete, &tresult);
+				      crypto_req_done, &wait);
 
 	i = 0;
 	do {
-- 
2.1.4

[Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v5 14/19] ima: move to generic async completion

[Gilad Ben-Y. <gi...@be...>]

ima starts several async crypto ops and  waits for their completions.
Move it over to generic code doing the same.

Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gi...@be...>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zo...@li...>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 56 +++++++++++--------------------------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 802d5d2..0e4db1fe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -27,11 +27,6 @@
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
-struct ahash_completion {
-	struct completion completion;
-	int err;
-};
-
 /* minimum file size for ahash use */
 static unsigned long ima_ahash_minsize;
 module_param_named(ahash_minsize, ima_ahash_minsize, ulong, 0644);
@@ -196,30 +191,13 @@ static void ima_free_atfm(struct crypto_ahash *tfm)
 		crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
 }
 
-static void ahash_complete(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
+static inline int ahash_wait(int err, struct crypto_wait *wait)
 {
-	struct ahash_completion *res = req->data;
 
-	if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
-		return;
-	res->err = err;
-	complete(&res->completion);
-}
+	err = crypto_wait_req(err, wait);
 
-static int ahash_wait(int err, struct ahash_completion *res)
-{
-	switch (err) {
-	case 0:
-		break;
-	case -EINPROGRESS:
-	case -EBUSY:
-		wait_for_completion(&res->completion);
-		reinit_completion(&res->completion);
-		err = res->err;
-		/* fall through */
-	default:
+	if (err)
 		pr_crit_ratelimited("ahash calculation failed: err: %d\n", err);
-	}
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -233,7 +211,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file,
 	int rc, read = 0, rbuf_len, active = 0, ahash_rc = 0;
 	struct ahash_request *req;
 	struct scatterlist sg[1];
-	struct ahash_completion res;
+	struct crypto_wait wait;
 	size_t rbuf_size[2];
 
 	hash->length = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
@@ -242,12 +220,12 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file,
 	if (!req)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	init_completion(&res.completion);
+	crypto_init_wait(&wait);
 	ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
 				   CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
-				   ahash_complete, &res);
+				   crypto_req_done, &wait);
 
-	rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_init(req), &res);
+	rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_init(req), &wait);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out1;
 
@@ -288,7 +266,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file,
 			 * read/request, wait for the completion of the
 			 * previous ahash_update() request.
 			 */
-			rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res);
+			rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &wait);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out3;
 		}
@@ -304,7 +282,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file,
 			 * read/request, wait for the completion of the
 			 * previous ahash_update() request.
 			 */
-			rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res);
+			rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &wait);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out3;
 		}
@@ -318,7 +296,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file,
 			active = !active; /* swap buffers, if we use two */
 	}
 	/* wait for the last update request to complete */
-	rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res);
+	rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &wait);
 out3:
 	if (read)
 		file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
@@ -327,7 +305,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file,
 out2:
 	if (!rc) {
 		ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, hash->digest, 0);
-		rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_final(req), &res);
+		rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_final(req), &wait);
 	}
 out1:
 	ahash_request_free(req);
@@ -527,7 +505,7 @@ static int calc_buffer_ahash_atfm(const void *buf, loff_t len,
 {
 	struct ahash_request *req;
 	struct scatterlist sg;
-	struct ahash_completion res;
+	struct crypto_wait wait;
 	int rc, ahash_rc = 0;
 
 	hash->length = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
@@ -536,12 +514,12 @@ static int calc_buffer_ahash_atfm(const void *buf, loff_t len,
 	if (!req)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	init_completion(&res.completion);
+	crypto_init_wait(&wait);
 	ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
 				   CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
-				   ahash_complete, &res);
+				   crypto_req_done, &wait);
 
-	rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_init(req), &res);
+	rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_init(req), &wait);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -551,10 +529,10 @@ static int calc_buffer_ahash_atfm(const void *buf, loff_t len,
 	ahash_rc = crypto_ahash_update(req);
 
 	/* wait for the update request to complete */
-	rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res);
+	rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &wait);
 	if (!rc) {
 		ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, hash->digest, 0);
-		rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_final(req), &res);
+		rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_final(req), &wait);
 	}
 out:
 	ahash_request_free(req);
-- 
2.1.4

[Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v5 13/19] cifs: move to generic async completion

[Gilad Ben-Y. <gi...@be...>]

cifs starts an async. crypto op and waits for their completion.
Move it over to generic code doing the same.

Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gi...@be...>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <ps...@mi...>
---
 fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 30 ++++--------------------------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
index cfacf2c..16fb041 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
@@ -1878,22 +1878,6 @@ init_sg(struct smb_rqst *rqst, u8 *sign)
 	return sg;
 }
 
-struct cifs_crypt_result {
-	int err;
-	struct completion completion;
-};
-
-static void cifs_crypt_complete(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
-{
-	struct cifs_crypt_result *res = req->data;
-
-	if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
-		return;
-
-	res->err = err;
-	complete(&res->completion);
-}
-
 static int
 smb2_get_enc_key(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, __u64 ses_id, int enc, u8 *key)
 {
@@ -1934,12 +1918,10 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct smb_rqst *rqst, int enc)
 	struct aead_request *req;
 	char *iv;
 	unsigned int iv_len;
-	struct cifs_crypt_result result = {0, };
+	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
 	struct crypto_aead *tfm;
 	unsigned int crypt_len = le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize);
 
-	init_completion(&result.completion);
-
 	rc = smb2_get_enc_key(server, tr_hdr->SessionId, enc, key);
 	if (rc) {
 		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not get %scryption key\n", __func__,
@@ -1999,14 +1981,10 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct smb_rqst *rqst, int enc)
 	aead_request_set_ad(req, assoc_data_len);
 
 	aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
-				  cifs_crypt_complete, &result);
+				  crypto_req_done, &wait);
 
-	rc = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
-
-	if (rc == -EINPROGRESS || rc == -EBUSY) {
-		wait_for_completion(&result.completion);
-		rc = result.err;
-	}
+	rc = crypto_wait_req(enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req)
+				: crypto_aead_decrypt(req), &wait);
 
 	if (!rc && enc)
 		memcpy(&tr_hdr->Signature, sign, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
-- 
2.1.4

[Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v5 12/19] dm: move dm-verity to generic async completion

[Gilad Ben-Y. <gi...@be...>]

dm-verity is starting async. crypto ops and waiting for them to complete.
Move it over to generic code doing the same.

This also fixes a possible data coruption bug created by the
use of wait_for_completion_interruptible() without dealing
correctly with an interrupt aborting the wait prior to the
async op finishing.

Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gi...@be...>
---
 drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c | 81 +++++++++++--------------------------------
 drivers/md/dm-verity.h        |  5 ---
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
index 79f18d4..8df08a8 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
@@ -92,74 +92,33 @@ static sector_t verity_position_at_level(struct dm_verity *v, sector_t block,
 	return block >> (level * v->hash_per_block_bits);
 }
 
-/*
- * Callback function for asynchrnous crypto API completion notification
- */
-static void verity_op_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err)
-{
-	struct verity_result *res = (struct verity_result *)base->data;
-
-	if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
-		return;
-
-	res->err = err;
-	complete(&res->completion);
-}
-
-/*
- * Wait for async crypto API callback
- */
-static inline int verity_complete_op(struct verity_result *res, int ret)
-{
-	switch (ret) {
-	case 0:
-		break;
-
-	case -EINPROGRESS:
-	case -EBUSY:
-		ret = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&res->completion);
-		if (!ret)
-			ret = res->err;
-		reinit_completion(&res->completion);
-		break;
-
-	default:
-		DMERR("verity_wait_hash: crypto op submission failed: %d", ret);
-	}
-
-	if (unlikely(ret < 0))
-		DMERR("verity_wait_hash: crypto op failed: %d", ret);
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
 static int verity_hash_update(struct dm_verity *v, struct ahash_request *req,
 				const u8 *data, size_t len,
-				struct verity_result *res)
+				struct crypto_wait *wait)
 {
 	struct scatterlist sg;
 
 	sg_init_one(&sg, data, len);
 	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, NULL, len);
 
-	return verity_complete_op(res, crypto_ahash_update(req));
+	return crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_update(req), wait);
 }
 
 /*
  * Wrapper for crypto_ahash_init, which handles verity salting.
  */
 static int verity_hash_init(struct dm_verity *v, struct ahash_request *req,
-				struct verity_result *res)
+				struct crypto_wait *wait)
 {
 	int r;
 
 	ahash_request_set_tfm(req, v->tfm);
 	ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |
 					CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
-					verity_op_done, (void *)res);
-	init_completion(&res->completion);
+					crypto_req_done, (void *)wait);
+	crypto_init_wait(wait);
 
-	r = verity_complete_op(res, crypto_ahash_init(req));
+	r = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_init(req), wait);
 
 	if (unlikely(r < 0)) {
 		DMERR("crypto_ahash_init failed: %d", r);
@@ -167,18 +126,18 @@ static int verity_hash_init(struct dm_verity *v, struct ahash_request *req,
 	}
 
 	if (likely(v->salt_size && (v->version >= 1)))
-		r = verity_hash_update(v, req, v->salt, v->salt_size, res);
+		r = verity_hash_update(v, req, v->salt, v->salt_size, wait);
 
 	return r;
 }
 
 static int verity_hash_final(struct dm_verity *v, struct ahash_request *req,
-			     u8 *digest, struct verity_result *res)
+			     u8 *digest, struct crypto_wait *wait)
 {
 	int r;
 
 	if (unlikely(v->salt_size && (!v->version))) {
-		r = verity_hash_update(v, req, v->salt, v->salt_size, res);
+		r = verity_hash_update(v, req, v->salt, v->salt_size, wait);
 
 		if (r < 0) {
 			DMERR("verity_hash_final failed updating salt: %d", r);
@@ -187,7 +146,7 @@ static int verity_hash_final(struct dm_verity *v, struct ahash_request *req,
 	}
 
 	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, digest, 0);
-	r = verity_complete_op(res, crypto_ahash_final(req));
+	r = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_final(req), wait);
 out:
 	return r;
 }
@@ -196,17 +155,17 @@ int verity_hash(struct dm_verity *v, struct ahash_request *req,
 		const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 *digest)
 {
 	int r;
-	struct verity_result res;
+	struct crypto_wait wait;
 
-	r = verity_hash_init(v, req, &res);
+	r = verity_hash_init(v, req, &wait);
 	if (unlikely(r < 0))
 		goto out;
 
-	r = verity_hash_update(v, req, data, len, &res);
+	r = verity_hash_update(v, req, data, len, &wait);
 	if (unlikely(r < 0))
 		goto out;
 
-	r = verity_hash_final(v, req, digest, &res);
+	r = verity_hash_final(v, req, digest, &wait);
 
 out:
 	return r;
@@ -389,7 +348,7 @@ int verity_hash_for_block(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
  * Calculates the digest for the given bio
  */
 int verity_for_io_block(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
-			struct bvec_iter *iter, struct verity_result *res)
+			struct bvec_iter *iter, struct crypto_wait *wait)
 {
 	unsigned int todo = 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits;
 	struct bio *bio = dm_bio_from_per_bio_data(io, v->ti->per_io_data_size);
@@ -414,7 +373,7 @@ int verity_for_io_block(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
 		 */
 		sg_set_page(&sg, bv.bv_page, len, bv.bv_offset);
 		ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, NULL, len);
-		r = verity_complete_op(res, crypto_ahash_update(req));
+		r = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_update(req), wait);
 
 		if (unlikely(r < 0)) {
 			DMERR("verity_for_io_block crypto op failed: %d", r);
@@ -482,7 +441,7 @@ static int verity_verify_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
 	struct dm_verity *v = io->v;
 	struct bvec_iter start;
 	unsigned b;
-	struct verity_result res;
+	struct crypto_wait wait;
 
 	for (b = 0; b < io->n_blocks; b++) {
 		int r;
@@ -507,17 +466,17 @@ static int verity_verify_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
 			continue;
 		}
 
-		r = verity_hash_init(v, req, &res);
+		r = verity_hash_init(v, req, &wait);
 		if (unlikely(r < 0))
 			return r;
 
 		start = io->iter;
-		r = verity_for_io_block(v, io, &io->iter, &res);
+		r = verity_for_io_block(v, io, &io->iter, &wait);
 		if (unlikely(r < 0))
 			return r;
 
 		r = verity_hash_final(v, req, verity_io_real_digest(v, io),
-					&res);
+					&wait);
 		if (unlikely(r < 0))
 			return r;
 
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity.h b/drivers/md/dm-verity.h
index a59e0ad..b675bc0 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-verity.h
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity.h
@@ -90,11 +90,6 @@ struct dm_verity_io {
 	 */
 };
 
-struct verity_result {
-	struct completion completion;
-	int err;
-};
-
 static inline struct ahash_request *verity_io_hash_req(struct dm_verity *v,
 						     struct dm_verity_io *io)
 {
-- 
2.1.4

[Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v5 11/19] fscrypt: move to generic async completion

[Gilad Ben-Y. <gi...@be...>]

fscrypt starts several async. crypto ops and waiting for them to
complete. Move it over to generic code doing the same.

Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gi...@be...>
---
 fs/crypto/crypto.c          | 28 ++++------------------------
 fs/crypto/fname.c           | 36 ++++++------------------------------
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 10 ----------
 fs/crypto/keyinfo.c         | 21 +++------------------
 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/crypto/crypto.c b/fs/crypto/crypto.c
index c7835df..80a3cad 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/crypto.c
@@ -126,21 +126,6 @@ struct fscrypt_ctx *fscrypt_get_ctx(const struct inode *inode, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_get_ctx);
 
-/**
- * page_crypt_complete() - completion callback for page crypto
- * @req: The asynchronous cipher request context
- * @res: The result of the cipher operation
- */
-static void page_crypt_complete(struct crypto_async_request *req, int res)
-{
-	struct fscrypt_completion_result *ecr = req->data;
-
-	if (res == -EINPROGRESS)
-		return;
-	ecr->res = res;
-	complete(&ecr->completion);
-}
-
 int fscrypt_do_page_crypto(const struct inode *inode, fscrypt_direction_t rw,
 			   u64 lblk_num, struct page *src_page,
 			   struct page *dest_page, unsigned int len,
@@ -151,7 +136,7 @@ int fscrypt_do_page_crypto(const struct inode *inode, fscrypt_direction_t rw,
 		u8 padding[FS_IV_SIZE - sizeof(__le64)];
 	} iv;
 	struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
-	DECLARE_FS_COMPLETION_RESULT(ecr);
+	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
 	struct scatterlist dst, src;
 	struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ci->ci_ctfm;
@@ -179,7 +164,7 @@ int fscrypt_do_page_crypto(const struct inode *inode, fscrypt_direction_t rw,
 
 	skcipher_request_set_callback(
 		req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
-		page_crypt_complete, &ecr);
+		crypto_req_done, &wait);
 
 	sg_init_table(&dst, 1);
 	sg_set_page(&dst, dest_page, len, offs);
@@ -187,14 +172,9 @@ int fscrypt_do_page_crypto(const struct inode *inode, fscrypt_direction_t rw,
 	sg_set_page(&src, src_page, len, offs);
 	skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst, len, &iv);
 	if (rw == FS_DECRYPT)
-		res = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
+		res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req), &wait);
 	else
-		res = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
-	if (res == -EINPROGRESS || res == -EBUSY) {
-		BUG_ON(req->base.data != &ecr);
-		wait_for_completion(&ecr.completion);
-		res = ecr.res;
-	}
+		res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
 	skcipher_request_free(req);
 	if (res) {
 		printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR
diff --git a/fs/crypto/fname.c b/fs/crypto/fname.c
index ad9f814..a80a0d3 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fname.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/fname.c
@@ -15,21 +15,6 @@
 #include "fscrypt_private.h"
 
 /**
- * fname_crypt_complete() - completion callback for filename crypto
- * @req: The asynchronous cipher request context
- * @res: The result of the cipher operation
- */
-static void fname_crypt_complete(struct crypto_async_request *req, int res)
-{
-	struct fscrypt_completion_result *ecr = req->data;
-
-	if (res == -EINPROGRESS)
-		return;
-	ecr->res = res;
-	complete(&ecr->completion);
-}
-
-/**
  * fname_encrypt() - encrypt a filename
  *
  * The caller must have allocated sufficient memory for the @oname string.
@@ -40,7 +25,7 @@ static int fname_encrypt(struct inode *inode,
 			const struct qstr *iname, struct fscrypt_str *oname)
 {
 	struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
-	DECLARE_FS_COMPLETION_RESULT(ecr);
+	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
 	struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ci->ci_ctfm;
 	int res = 0;
@@ -76,17 +61,12 @@ static int fname_encrypt(struct inode *inode,
 	}
 	skcipher_request_set_callback(req,
 			CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
-			fname_crypt_complete, &ecr);
+			crypto_req_done, &wait);
 	sg_init_one(&sg, oname->name, cryptlen);
 	skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, cryptlen, iv);
 
 	/* Do the encryption */
-	res = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
-	if (res == -EINPROGRESS || res == -EBUSY) {
-		/* Request is being completed asynchronously; wait for it */
-		wait_for_completion(&ecr.completion);
-		res = ecr.res;
-	}
+	res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
 	skcipher_request_free(req);
 	if (res < 0) {
 		printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR
@@ -110,7 +90,7 @@ static int fname_decrypt(struct inode *inode,
 				struct fscrypt_str *oname)
 {
 	struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
-	DECLARE_FS_COMPLETION_RESULT(ecr);
+	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
 	struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
 	struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ci->ci_ctfm;
@@ -131,7 +111,7 @@ static int fname_decrypt(struct inode *inode,
 	}
 	skcipher_request_set_callback(req,
 		CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
-		fname_crypt_complete, &ecr);
+		crypto_req_done, &wait);
 
 	/* Initialize IV */
 	memset(iv, 0, FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
@@ -140,11 +120,7 @@ static int fname_decrypt(struct inode *inode,
 	sg_init_one(&src_sg, iname->name, iname->len);
 	sg_init_one(&dst_sg, oname->name, oname->len);
 	skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, iname->len, iv);
-	res = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
-	if (res == -EINPROGRESS || res == -EBUSY) {
-		wait_for_completion(&ecr.completion);
-		res = ecr.res;
-	}
+	res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req), &wait);
 	skcipher_request_free(req);
 	if (res < 0) {
 		printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR
diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
index a1d5021..c0f1881 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
+++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
@@ -69,16 +69,6 @@ typedef enum {
 #define FS_CTX_REQUIRES_FREE_ENCRYPT_FL		0x00000001
 #define FS_CTX_HAS_BOUNCE_BUFFER_FL		0x00000002
 
-struct fscrypt_completion_result {
-	struct completion completion;
-	int res;
-};
-
-#define DECLARE_FS_COMPLETION_RESULT(ecr) \
-	struct fscrypt_completion_result ecr = { \
-		COMPLETION_INITIALIZER_ONSTACK((ecr).completion), 0 }
-
-
 /* crypto.c */
 extern int fscrypt_initialize(unsigned int cop_flags);
 extern struct workqueue_struct *fscrypt_read_workqueue;
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
index 018c588..3c84cac 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
@@ -17,17 +17,6 @@
 
 static struct crypto_shash *essiv_hash_tfm;
 
-static void derive_crypt_complete(struct crypto_async_request *req, int rc)
-{
-	struct fscrypt_completion_result *ecr = req->data;
-
-	if (rc == -EINPROGRESS)
-		return;
-
-	ecr->res = rc;
-	complete(&ecr->completion);
-}
-
 /**
  * derive_key_aes() - Derive a key using AES-128-ECB
  * @deriving_key: Encryption key used for derivation.
@@ -42,7 +31,7 @@ static int derive_key_aes(u8 deriving_key[FS_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE],
 {
 	int res = 0;
 	struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
-	DECLARE_FS_COMPLETION_RESULT(ecr);
+	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
 	struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, 0);
 
@@ -59,7 +48,7 @@ static int derive_key_aes(u8 deriving_key[FS_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE],
 	}
 	skcipher_request_set_callback(req,
 			CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
-			derive_crypt_complete, &ecr);
+			crypto_req_done, &wait);
 	res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, deriving_key,
 					FS_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE);
 	if (res < 0)
@@ -69,11 +58,7 @@ static int derive_key_aes(u8 deriving_key[FS_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE],
 	sg_init_one(&dst_sg, derived_raw_key, source_key->size);
 	skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, source_key->size,
 				   NULL);
-	res = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
-	if (res == -EINPROGRESS || res == -EBUSY) {
-		wait_for_completion(&ecr.completion);
-		res = ecr.res;
-	}
+	res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
 out:
 	skcipher_request_free(req);
 	crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
-- 
2.1.4