Re: [Linux-igd-devel] Security issues to address...
Status: Beta
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From: <ju...@ik...> - 2006-08-18 13:46:40
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On Fri, 18 Aug 2006 12:02:35 +0300 "Nektarios K. Papadopoulos" <npa...@in...> wrote: > So, the security issue here is that a malicious control point can add a > port mapping that let an external entity to connect to your IGD on a > port and then forward this connection to another external host > pretending to be your IGD? > I see only two minor bad issues with this scenario: > - Unnecessary traffic is passing through your IGD > - The external host (RemoteHost upnp arg) can be fulled to allow the > connection based on your IP. How about if someone visits a lan host and forwards some external ports and then route all his spamming and cracking attempts through IGD IP address. I agree this could be done without this vulnerability as well if the malicious user already has access to any lan computers. But it does make it much harder to detect. Just something that comes into my mind. > However, unless we implement e.g. DeviceSecurity service, a malicious > control point in the LAN can open up whatever port pleases it and be > upnp correct anyway ;-) UPnP just sucks in security big time. On the other hand this makes it important to pay some extra attention to security issues. Juho |