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From: Dr. P. <dir...@op...> - 2022-12-15 23:33:11
|
Hello LibPKI Community, as some of you noticed, we have been working, recently, to provide support for post-quantum certificates in LibPKI. Specifically, the current version of the source (0.9.6) is looking at exploring few different options for the next generation PKIs. Here's some of the features we are working on that we really would like the community support for. *Composite Crypto Support (Hybrid Classic and Post-Quantum)* LibPKI is adding support for using multiple algorithms/keys via the Composite Crypto idea that we are promoting for standardization at the IETF. The Composite Crypto option combines multiple public keys in certificates and multiple signatures in all X.509 and other data structures we support. You can find more info here: * https://github.com/EntrustCorporation/draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-keys (composite keys) * https://github.com/EntrustCorporation/draft-ounsworth-composite-sigs (composite signatures) Many companies and projects are implementing this solution to provide Hybrid options for the ones of us that do not trust neither classic or post-quantum by itself. The LibPKI implementation, currently, generates a new Algorithm (the COMPOSITE) and allows for generating keys, requests, etc. More work is needed to provide support for explicit combinations of algorithms and for the verifying of multiple signatures within a composite signature. The use of Composite Crypto could be seen as a one-off need or maybe a change in our field. Specifically, the question that it is on our minds is about the longevity of PKIs (i.e., 50 years horizons). With the advent of post-quantum cryptography and group-based theories, maybe the time for long-term PKIs is now over? Maybe it is time for us to really look into shorter crypto-periods (7-10 years) and evolution of PKIs into dynamic ecosystems (7-10 years with migration built-in). If you are interested in working on Composite Crypto... please join our efforts! The IETF discussion on Hybrid certificates is available from the LAMPS working group: * https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/spasm/ (mailing list archive) *Post-Quantum Certificates (Direct vs. Hash-n-Sign)* The standardization process for post-quantum public-key cryptography has progressed into its final phase and we need to start talking about how we are going to integrate these new algorithms in our certificates and PKIs. We are leading a small group of people and companies to investigate and propose approaches for how to use, for example, direct signing vs. hash-n-sign. This has many implications for the use of hybrid cryptography (i.e., the number of different OIDs to identify algorithm combinations). The LibPKI support is provided through the OQS library and the OQS-OpenSSL wrapper that is available here: * https://openquantumsafe.org/ We are also working on a LibPKI-native implementation of Dilithium to investigate the use of a single algorithm identifier to handle all security levels of the algorithms (i.e., Dilithium2022 -> Level 2, Level 3, and Level 5). At IETF 115 we started a interoperability project/hackaton for PQC and Composite Crypto. The project was started at IETF 115 Hackaton and is supported by many different entities such as big companies (e.g., DigiCert, CISCO, etc.) and open-source projects (e.g., PyCrypto, Rust Crypto). The GITHUB repository is available here: * https://github.com/IETF-Hackathon/pqc-certificates *A Complex World Requires Higher Ethics* When we started the OpenCA projects, we lived in a different world. Regrettably, today, terrorists countries like Russia are threatening the world-peace, making all other issues that we are dealing with much worst. At OpenCA Labs, we condemn the use of violence in any form and, in particular, the use of WAR as an instrument of political gain. Russia and all the countries that continue to support a terrorist attack on the sovereign country of Ukraine are on the WRONG side of history and we will do everything we can to support the free people of Ukraine. Because of these reasons, we have changed our LICENSE agreement to make sure that we do not directly or indirectly support terrorists, violence, and wars. If you or your organization are directly or indirectly supporting the war or the Russian terrorist country, please be aware that you are no longer among the welcome people in our community and you are legally required NOT to use any of our products. We hope that this policy will make you change your mind about supporting terrorism, violence, and death. *Happy Holidays* We hope that the world could grow and understand the need for a more ethical and intelligent way of taking decisions and in the meantime we would like to wish you all the best possible holidays you can celebrate. At OpenCA we will never stop striving for a better world with our work and commitment to providing easy security for all. Happy Holidays!!! -- Best Regards, Massimiliano Pala, Ph.D. OpenCA Labs Director OpenCA Logo |
From: Massimiliano P. <dir...@op...> - 2015-11-23 20:25:29
|
Hi all, we started a new initiatives for defining specifications for "Standard Interfaces for Cryptographic APIs". The idea is to provide a very practical approach to defining an API that can be implemented on top of current (and future) cryptographic libraries that will provide application portability. We are currently hosting few web pages here: http://cryptoapi.openca.org There we have the link to the mailing list we will use for discussing the work. The initiative is at its very beginning and we hope to involve many experts, practitioners, cryptographers, and vendors. The expected output for the (not yet an IETF WG) working group is twofold: specifications and implementations. Please let me know if you would like to participate.. and/or just subscribe to the mailing list and post your questions there. Have a great day, Cheers, Dr. Max |
From: Martin H. <he...@hl...> - 2014-08-29 16:00:14
|
On 08/29/2014 05:37 PM, Martin Hecht wrote: > your stack trace starts in PKI_HTTP_free and this is not very often > used. sorry, this was bad English. I meant that this function is not called in many places in the code, which helps to locate the problem (of course this function is used to free the data structure after every request is processed) > ...Geert De Prins has proposed a patch for libpki 0.8.5... and this fix addresses an issue in this section of code which handles the PKI_HTTP data structure and therefore I am proposing to try this patch and see if it solves the problem. Martin |
From: Martin H. <he...@hl...> - 2014-08-29 15:38:06
|
Hi, your stack trace starts in PKI_HTTP_free and this is not very often used. I don't know what exactly microsofts certutil does to connect to the ocspd, but in my tests this week the daemon was running without problems. However, Geert De Prins has proposed a patch for libpki 0.8.5 (http://sourceforge.net/p/openca/mailman/message/32603322/) which shall fix problems with large CRL lists. Maybe this is the case here as well: the response of the root ca might not be large enough to overflow the buffer, but the one of the inermediate ca might be. The patch applies (with exception of a comment line) with a few lines offset to libpki 0.8.7 (see attachment). You might want to try this. kind regards, Martin On 08/28/2014 09:48 PM, Asd wrote: > I have installed libpki (0.8.7) and ocspd (3.1.0) onDebian Stable Linux 3.15.0 CEST 2014 i686 GNU/Linux.libpki: ./configure --prefix=/usr; make; make installocspd: ./configure --prefix=; make; make install Then start:# /etc/init.d/ocspd start-debug syslog:ocspd[29204]: Configuration loaded and parsed On WIndows 7:certutil -URL .....\rootCA.crt works, butcertutil -URL .....\interCA.crt makes segfault. In syslog:ocspd[29205]: [core.c:291] [ERROR] SIGABRT::received - should not happen, > ocspd[29205]: [core.c:292] [ERROR] SIGABRT::please enable strict locking. > ocspd[29205]: [core.c:293] [ERROR] ERROR::SIGABRT::Fatal Error, aborting server! in terminal:# *** glibc detected *** /sbin/ocspd: double free or corruption (!prev): 0x095874c8 *** > ======= Backtrace: ========= > /lib/i386-linux-gnu/i686/cmov/libc.so.6(+0x70ff1)[0xb7155ff1] > /lib/i386-linux-gnu/i686/cmov/libc.so.6(+0x72858)[0xb7157858] > /lib/i386-linux-gnu/i686/cmov/libc.so.6(cfree+0x6d)[0xb715a99d] > /usr/lib/libpki.so.87(PKI_Free+0x2e)[0xb767b3de] > /usr/lib/libpki.so.87(PKI_ZFree+0x4a)[0xb767b43a] > /usr/lib/libpki.so.87(PKI_MEM_free+0x3c)[0xb767b48c] > /usr/lib/libpki.so.87(PKI_HTTP_free+0x54)[0xb76ad374] > /sbin/ocspd[0x804c613] > /sbin/ocspd[0x804c2c5] > /lib/i386-linux-gnu/i686/cmov/libpthread.so.0(+0x5c39)[0xb7645c39] > /lib/i386-linux-gnu/i686/cmov/libc.so.6(clone+0x5e)[0xb71bbe1e] What am I doing wrong? > |
From: Massimiliano P. <dir...@op...> - 2014-07-29 12:42:56
|
Hi All, As many of us have probably had to deal with some pain points when developing and/or using applications together with X509 PKIs. I hope that the projects we promote (i.e., OpenCA PKI, OpenCA OCSPD, and LibPKI) have been helpful in providing useful solution. However, issues still exist in interacting with PKIs. In particular, some of the most painful areas are related to service (and repository) discovery and efficient revocation. Besides implementing specific solutions for well-defined (and usually quite closed) environments, no existing standards efficiently address these issues. In the past we participated to discussions within the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and implemented the standardized protocols (e.g., OCSP). However, the Working Group (WG) that was historically responsible for advancing the status of these standards (required for interoperability across applications and organizations) was declared closed - therefore, today, there is no proper venue where this standardization work can happen. It seems that the IETF is still on the fence about the need for solving these issues and that strong consensus is required in order to open a new WG that will address these problems. I was wondering what the OpenCA community thinks about the need to provide standards that cover the aforementioned issues (e.g., by providing enhancements over existing solutions - like OCSP over DNS, by providing new more-compact revocation formats that would better cope with high-volume transactions environments than OCSP, and - ultimetely - by providing PKIX discovery protocols that will ease interacting with certificate-related services and with federating identities) and if anybody would feel like they can contribute to the discussion and, eventually, to the needed work (via the PKIX mailing list - https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix). If the proposal for working on these issues will move forward, I think that the OpenCA Labs could very well work on implementing those standards and, therefore, solve those issues for lots of us in a standardized and interoperable way. Cheers, Max |
From: Martin H. <he...@hl...> - 2013-11-18 17:42:13
|
Hi, I have found out a few more details on the problem with Macintosh's ocspd: My previous patch helped to have the server running stable, but PKI_HTTP_get_message still didn't return a useful path value for ocspd. I have added a few lines to fix this for the time being, until the official release appears. The other thing with the GET requests is that they were not(!) url-encoded, so there are slashes somewhere in the middle of the query. I have created a patch for ocspd which gives it a second try when B64 decoding fails due to such a request. However, I believe this is non-standard and should be fixed by Macintosh. By the way, I have finally found a simple way to debug the get-requests: wget ${server-ip}:2560/${request} -O ocsp.response where I grab the request string using tcpdump -vvv -A | grep GET.*HTTP and last but not least I verify the response with: openssl ocsp -respin ocsp.response -CAfile cacert.pem Doing so, I noticed that step of url-encoding this string was not done on the client-side and that was the reason, why the request was not valid and the communication was closed (actually, ocspd did send the 5-byte response to the client). With the attached patches our server runs stable and the ocspd on the client side successfully verifies the certificates for Safari, even for non-url-encoded get-requests. It takes some time and there are several ocsp requests for the same certificate at once, but that's really something to fix on the client side. best regards, Martin PS: Sorry for creating so much "noise" on the mailing list, but I hope that this work might help others, too. |
From: Martin H. <he...@hl...> - 2013-11-15 17:14:53
|
Hi, I have created a patch for libpki-0.8.2. Basically, if the Request-URI starts with a '/' we have to do something special, because the default parser is unable to extract an url from such a request. As I have written beginning of the week my idea was to prepend "localhost" and give that to the default parser (without "http://", because that is stripped off anyway, if it was present). Furthermore, I believe I have found the reason for the crashes we have observed. The trailing '\x0' char was written beyond the end of the string, and I have included the checks on the url pointers I mentioned last week, also in this patch in the attachment. With this fix I have a running ocspd 2.5.1 with libpki 0.8.2 now, in the sense that the daemon does not crash. But still the Macintosh ocspd as a client refuses to work together with the openca-ocspd server. The client sends its GET request which can be handled now (no crashes, no errors about B64 decoding the requests), but when I listen on the network there is no reply from the server. This could be because the client closes the connection too early. The request itself is ok, because when I capture it and send it manually with openssl, I receive a proper answer (well, ok, submitting it with openssl it is send via POST and not via GET method, but anyhow, the request itself is not messed up). The http headers in the GET request captured from the communication of the Mac look as follows: GET //{base64 encoded request in der form} HTTP/1.1 Host: {RA-host extracted from the certificate to verify}:2560 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept: */* User-Agent: ocspd/1.0.1 Accept-Language: de-de Cache-Control: max-age=300 Connection: keep-alive Is there any check of the accepted language? I didn't find anything like that. Maybe the client simply closes the connection before the server has a chance to send an answer. Anyhow, browsing around it seems OSX 10.9 "Mavericks" is having problems with their OCSP and some users are reporting that they have "solved" the problem by turning off CRL & OCSP checking in the Certificates Preferences in Keychain Access... best regards, Martin |
From: Martin H. <he...@hl...> - 2013-11-12 17:55:13
|
Hi developers, We had a closer look at our crashes of ocspd. I'm adding libpki-devel to this mail (previous mails went to the ocspd-devel list, but by now I believe the fix should be done in libpki). The client which caused the trouble is a Macintosh implementation of oscpd (running on a Mac with OS X 10.9) which handles the verification of certificates for Safari. Actually, it sends a GET-request (in contrast to my firefox which uses POST to send the data, which works fine). According to RFC 2560 a get request looks as follows: GET {url}/{url-encoding of base-64 encoding of the DER encoding of the OCSPRequest} In the requests which caused the crashes, {url} was "/", so there were two slashes after the GET and url- and base64-decoding failed due to this extra slash at the beginning. When I strip off all the slashes at the beginning, I can successfully decode the original der-formatted ocsp request, save it to a temporary file, parse it with openssl, and re-send it to the ocspd which then returns "Response verify OK". Let's look at the sources now. The problem is that in ocspd_req_get_socket in ocspd/src/ocspd/request.c, there is a call to PKI_HTTP_get_message in libpki/src/net/http_s.c. To make this work for this particular case, the latter should be able to parse an URL containing just a slash, and it should return a reasonable http_msg object. I believe it would work fine, if we would prepend urls that start with a slash e.g. by "http://localhost" somewhere where the http headers are parsed. Maybe if this is done in the right place, later on in the code sock->url is properly defined. I haven't looked that much into the details of libpki/src/net/pki_socket.c yet, but I'm going to try this out. best regards, Martin |
From: Massimiliano P. <Massimiliano.Pala@Dartmouth.edu> - 2011-02-17 13:43:27
|
Hi Oden, thanks a lot!!! I will review the patch and include them in the new version of the library - which I plan to release soon as I made some more upgrades to the provided command-line tools. Cheers, Max On 02/17/2011 06:24 AM, Oden Eriksson wrote: > Hello. > > We have been patching libpki for quite some time now to get rid of format > string errors in the code (patch attached). These error as seen when you use > "-Wformat -Werror=format-security". |
From: Massimiliano P. <Massimiliano.Pala@Dartmouth.edu> - 2010-08-27 23:28:13
|
Dear OpenCA Community, we recently worked very hard to provide a new look to our website. We hope that the change will help you to easily find the required resources. Please provide us with feedback about the new layout by sending us simple comments (e.g., "I really like it!", "I preferred the old layout..") or suggestions (e.g., "The link to AbC should be moved here..", "You should add a new link to DeFgh.."). Best Regards, Massimiliano Pala OpenCA Labs |
From: Massimiliano P. <Massimiliano.Pala@Dartmouth.edu> - 2009-04-20 06:58:29
|
Announcement: ============= The OpenCA Team announce the availability of the new version of the LibPKI library: Current Version: v0.3.0 (tiger) Project Overview: ================= The LibPKI Project is aimed to provide an easy-to-use PKI library for PKI enabled application development. The library provides the developer with functionalities to manage Public Key Certificates, from generation to validation. The LibPKI Project enables developers with the possibility to implement complex cryptographic operations with a few simple library calls by implementing an high-level cryptographic API. The library constitutes the core of the OpenCA-NG Project. We provide it as a separate package in order to encourage applications developers to use it in their packages. Currently we support for OpenSSL libraries as low-level crypto provider. Project Status: =============== o [19 Apr 2009] Tiger release available for download (libpki v0.3.0) o [16 Jan 2009] Shark release available for download (libpki v0.2.0) o [20 Mar 2008] Third release available for download (libpki v0.1.9) o [25 Oct 2007] Second release available for download (libpki v0.1.8) o [23 Mar 2007] First initial code available for download (libpki v0.1.1) Major Changes and Fixes: ======================== o added support for Cross Certificate Pair (for bridge PKI support) via pki-xpair tool which allows to download (from a URI), create, parse the crossCertificatPair data object o updated the PRQP module to the last specs from IETF (draft-ietf-pkix-prqp-03.txt) o added full support for PKCS#11 devices o added a new command line tool - pki-tool - that allows to manage the PKI TOKENS (both hardware and software). In particular it is possible to generate keys, sign requests, sign certificates, etc. Current Project developers' Tasks: ================================== Massimiliano Pala is currently working on: - Continuing Integration of TPM for Key operations/management; - Enhancing support for PKCS#11 devices (adding ECDSA/DSA support for future devices) - Fixing extension management code; - Extending the Log subsystem to provide signed and verifiable logs; Open Issues: ============ o Extensions management is still not stable for complex exts, the code needs to be checked and extended o Integration with TPM in development o Support for NSS still pending o Porting to Win32 (provide support for Microsoft Crypto API) Wishes: ======= o Let us know (!) References: =========== The OpenCA Project main website can be found at http://www.openca.org/ You can find all current versions and available documentation there. You can also download any part of the software or documentation also at the official ftp site: http://www.openca.org/projects/libpki http://ftp.openca.org/libpki or from one of the official mirrors: http://www.openca.org/mirrors.shtml Thanks ====== Thank you for supporting the Open Source community by using/contributing to/ reporting bugs/cheering this project! Now go ahead and actively contribute to make the world a better place! - The OpenCA Team - |
From: Massimiliano P. <Massimiliano.Pala@Dartmouth.edu> - 2009-01-27 19:14:05
|
Hi all, I am developing the PKCS#11 driver for LibPKI and I am playing around with some other code - especially the libp11 which is used by many software: - OpenSSL's ENGINE for PKCS#11 - OpenSC When creating the key, the behaviour a user would expect from these driver is to generate the keypair in the device and then, eventually, export the public part. However, the libp11 behaves differently. What it really does is generating the key is software and then import it into the device - which totally invalidates the assumptions made when using a PKCS#11 device! Therefore, my advice is: do not use OpenSC + libp11 (for PKCS#11 access) if you are concerned about the security of your private key! I will develop an application that will print out the "properties" of public/private keys in a PKCS#11 device so that you can check out what the status of your generated keys is - the tool will probably be part of the LibPKI package. Later, Max |
From: Massimiliano P. <Massimiliano.Pala@Dartmouth.edu> - 2009-01-19 23:18:25
|
Announcement: ============= The OpenCA Team announce the availability of the new version of the LibPKI library: Current Version: v0.2.0 (shark) Project Overview: ================= The LibPKI Project is aimed to provide an easy-to-use PKI library for PKI enabled application development. The library provides the developer with functionalities to manage Public Key Certificates, from generation to validation. The LibPKI Project enables developers with the possibility to implement complex cryptographic operations with a few simple library calls by implementing an high-level cryptographic API. The library constitutes the core of the OpenCA-NG Project. We provide it as a separate package in order to encourage applications developers to use it in their packages. Currently we support for OpenSSL libraries as low-level crypto provider. Project Status: =============== o [16 Jan 2009] Shark release available for download (libpki v0.2.0) o [20 Mar 2008] Third release available for download (libpki v0.1.9) o [25 Oct 2007] Second release available for download (libpki v0.1.8) o [23 Mar 2007] First initial code available for download (libpki v0.1.1) Major Changes and Fixes: ======================== o Added graphical installer for different distributions (Linux/Fedora, Linux/Ubuntu, Mac OS X/Darwin, etc.) o Updated the PRQP module to the last specs from IETF PKIX WG (draft-ietf-pkix-prqp-02.txt) o Fixed support for multi threaded applications (dynamic and static threads initialization for OpenSSL/ENGINE) o Fixed support for nChipher devices o Updated PKCS11 driver (added Slot Interface and Slot info retrieval functionalities) Current Project developers' Tasks: ================================== Massimiliano Pala is currently working on: - Continuing Integration of TPM for Key operations/management; - Enhancing support for PKCS#11 devices; - Fixing extension management code; - Extending the Log subsystem to provide signed and verifiable logs; Open Issues: ============ o Extensions management is still not stable for complex exts, the code needs to be checked and extended o Integration with TPM in development o Support for NSS still pending o Porting to Win32 (provide support for Microsoft Crypto API) Wishes: ======= o Let us know (!) References: =========== The OpenCA Project main website can be found at http://www.openca.org/ You can find all current versions and available documentation there. You can also download any part of the software or documentation also at the official ftp site: http://www.openca.org/projects/libpki http://ftp.openca.org/libpki or from one of the official mirrors: http://www.openca.org/mirrors.shtml Thanks ====== Thank you for supporting the Open Source community by using/contributing to/ reporting bugs/cheering this project! Now go ahead and actively contribute to make the world a better place! - The OpenCA Team - |
From: Massimiliano P. <pa...@cs...> - 2007-10-29 17:30:12
|
Announcement: ============= The OpenCA Team announce the availability of the new version of the LibPKI library: Current Version: v0.1.8 Project Overview: ================= The LibPKI Project is aimed to provide an easy-to-use PKI library for PKI enabled application development. The library provides the developer the needed functionalities to manage Public Key Certificates, from generation to validation. The LibPKI Project enables developers with the possibility to implement complex cryptographic operations with a few simple function calls by implementing an high-level cryptographic API. The library constitutes the core of the OpenCA-NG Project, anyway we provide it as a separate package in order to encourage applications developers to use it in their packages. Currently support for OpenSSL and KMF libraries is provided as low-level crypto provider. Project Status: =============== o [25 Oct 2007] Second release available for download (libpki v0.1.8) o [23 Mar 2007] First initial code available for download (libpki v0.1.1) Major Changes and Fixes: ======================== o Added a Log subsystem o Integrated new version of PRQP o Added support for OpenSSL ENGINE usage o Added first support for PKCS11 URL retrieval (pkcs11://) o Added MySQL support for URL retrieval o Fixed support for LDAP URL retrieval o Added support for SCEP messages to the library o Initial CMS support added o support for extensions management into libpki by using certificate profiles and oid configuration file (xml based) o Added support for certificate, request and certificate chain writing through PKI_TOKEN interface o Added support for different signature schemes (RSA/DSA/ECDSA with RC2/RC5/SHA1) o Fixed compilation problems on Solaris 9/Solaris 10/Solaris 11 o Fixed compilation problems on FreeBSD o Fixed LDAP differences with OpenLDAP and Sun's LDAP (support for both is provided) Current Project developers' Tasks: ================================== Massimiliano Pala is currently working on: - Integration of TPM for Key operations/management; - Adding support for PKCS#11 devices; - Fixing extension management code; - Extending the Log subsystem to provide signed and verifiable logs; Open Issues: ============ o Extensions management is still not stable for complex exts, the code needs to be checked and extended o Integration with TPM in development o Still deciding if to provide our own PKCS#11 subsystem or rely on the crypto lower layer (e.g., ENGINE or KMF) o Binary Packages generation for Ubuntu (linux) and MacOS X o Porting to Win32 (provide support for Microsoft Crypto API) Wishes: ======= o Let us know (!) References: =========== The OpenCA Project main website can be found at http://www.openca.org/ You can find all current versions and available documentation there. You can also download any part of the software or documentation also at the official ftp site: http://www.openca.org/projects/libpki http://ftp.openca.org/libpki or from one of the official mirrors: http://www.openca.org/mirrors.shtml Thanks ====== Thank you for supporting the Open Source community by using/contributing to/ reporting bugs/cheering this project! Now go ahead and actively contribute to make the world a better place! - The OpenCA Team - |
From: Massimiliano P. <pa...@cs...> - 2007-09-17 00:06:26
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Hi all, Scott, I have finally managed to integrate the new version of the PRQP into libPKI. We now have a client that is capable to generate requests and parse responses for PRQP. Much work is still to be done about verification and parsing of responses, though. Here it is the output for the various services that can be queried through the prqp_client example program. Any feedback about the options is welcome! ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: USAGE: ./prqp_client options Where options are: -issuer <dn> - Issuer's of the CA certificate DN (optional if certfile or cacertfile is provided) -serial <num> - Serial Number of the CA certificate (optional) -certfile <file> - Certificate to find CA services for (optional if issuer is provided) -cacertfile <file> - CA certificate to find serviced of (optional) -service <id> - Service which URL is to be asked (optional, multiple accepted) Where service <id> can be: * General Services [ocsp] OCSP Service [caIssuers] CA Information [timeStamping] TimeStamping Service [dvcs] DVCS Service [scvp] SCVP Service * Repositories Location: [certificateRepository] Certificate Repository [crlRepository] CRL Repository [deltaCrl] Delta CRL Base Address * PKI Service Gateways: [cmsGateway] CMS Gateway [scepGateway] SCEP Gateway [xkmsGateway] XKMS Gateway * PKI Basic Services Location: [revokeCertificate] Certificate Revocation Service [requestCertificate] Certificate Revocation Service [suspendCertificate] Certificate Suspension Service * Extended Services Location: [webdavCert] Webdav Certificate Validation Service [webdavRev] Webdav Certificate Revocation Service :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: -- Best Regards, Massimiliano Pala --o------------------------------------------------------------------------ Massimiliano Pala [OpenCA Project Manager] pa...@cs... pro...@op... Dartmouth Computer Science Dept Home Phone: +1 (603) 397-3883 PKI/Trust - Office 063 Work Phone: +1 (603) 646-9179 --o------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
From: Massimiliano P. <pa...@cs...> - 2007-09-15 18:07:54
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Hi Scott, all, I was thinking about integrating the PRQP protocol support directly into libPKI. The RFC of PRQP can be downloaded from here: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-pala-prqp-00.txt This would have the advantage to have the PRPQ available through libPKI, but the disadvantage that it will be impossible to distribute the libPRQP without libPKI... although I think this is the right thing to do, let me know if you have arguments against this... Later, Max |