#90 combat: !ggz_read_string_alloc

[Jason Dorje Short]

Hastings uses ggz_read_string_alloc to read an options
string from the client. This is somewhat unsafe, as a
malicious client could send a string of arbitrary
length (although libggz does impose a maximum length).

It also looks like this string is not properly freed;
for instance if the player is not the host. A
malicious client could use this loophole to repeatedly
send large options strings, exhausting memory on the
server.

[Jason Dorje Short]

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Obviously, I meant Combat not Hastings. Sorry.

[Ismael Orenstein]

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Ok, I've changed the client (the server wasn't touched
yet) so that all these strings are properly freed (with
ggz_free). However, I'm still using ggz_read_string_alloc,
because I'm lazy and I think we should trust the server in
this case.

The server code should really be more careful, but the
fact
that ggz_read_string_alloc has a maximum length isn't be
enough security for the client (assuming that all this
alloced memory is freed, of course)?

ps: Please check if there are any more memory leaks (or
better, teach me how to do it! :) )