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Sat, 10 Dec 2011 16:31:43 -0000

WikiPage Home modified by

Mon, 05 Dec 2011 08:46:39 -0000

WikiPage Home modified by

Mon, 05 Dec 2011 08:39:34 -0000

--- v25 
+++ v26 
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 [[download_button]]
 
 Links:
-EVM with Internal Vtoken
-
EVM with Barcode
+EVM with Internal Vtoken
+
EVM with Barcode
 
 
 e-Voting Application is an open source project aiming to create an e-voting system which complies to European e-Voting standard and EML specification.

WikiPage Home modified by

Mon, 05 Dec 2011 08:14:11 -0000

WikiPage Home modified by

Mon, 05 Dec 2011 08:12:38 -0000

--- v23 
+++ v24 
@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
 [[project_admins]]
 [[download_button]]
 
+Links:
+EVM with Internal Vtoken
+
EVM with Barcode
+
+
 e-Voting Application is an open source project aiming to create an e-voting system which complies to European e-Voting standard and EML specification.
 
 e-Voting Application Components

WikiPage Home modified by

Mon, 05 Dec 2011 08:05:22 -0000

WikiPage Home modified by

Mon, 05 Dec 2011 07:09:21 -0000

--- v21 
+++ v22 
@@ -44,33 +44,33 @@
 Vtoken is validated as the one that is not already used before.
 
 
-
 Voting
 Voter uses EVM to cast a vote by:
 Validate vtoken.
 
Choose a candidate with a touch.
 
Confirm the choice with a touch.
 
Take paper audit trail and put it in audit box.
 
 
 
Vote sealing
 Each vote casted by voters is combined by their unique vtoken and sealed.
 
By sealing it means:
 Encrypts “vtoken + vote”.
 Makes it hard-to-read by bad guys.
 
 
Digitally signs the encrypted “vtoken + vote”.
 Makes it cannot be altered (integrity).
 
Makes it cannot be denied as coming from the machine (non-repudiation).
 
 
 
 
Vote collection
 Each sealed vote (encrypted and digitally signed) is collected into electronic ballot box.
 Technically speaking, they are collected in a table in MySQL database.
 
 
Sealed votes are collected in random order such that it cannot be traced down to the voter.
 After each vote the table storage is physically reordered according to some random number.
+
 
 
 Voting closing

WikiPage Home modified by

Mon, 05 Dec 2011 07:05:37 -0000

--- v20 
+++ v21 
@@ -18,137 +18,79 @@
 e-Voting Scenario
 
 Voting opening
-Administrator opens voting process on the machine by pressing an open voting button on VG/EVM.
-
When opening voting process, VG/EVM:
-Activates and deactivates some functions.
-
Generates a pair of private key – public key for digital signature:
-
VG: vtoken-private.bin and vtoken-public.bin
-
EVM: private.bin and public.bin
-
-
vtoken-public.bin is then copied from VG machine to each EVM machine. 
-
Before administrator open voting process:
-VG cannot be used to generate vtoken.
-
VG can be used to reset ballot box.
-
EVM cannot be used to cast votes.
-
EVM can be used to view result.
-
EVM can be used to reset ballot box.
-
-
After administrator open voting process:
-VG can be used to generate vtoken.
-
VG cannot be used to reset ballot box.
-
EVM can be used to cast votes.
-
EVM cannot be used to view result.
-
EVM cannot be used to reset ballot box.
-
-
+Administrator opens voting process on the machine.
+
 
Voting process
 Voter verification
 Before voter casts a vote, administrator verifies for two things:
 voter's identity, and
 
whether voter is eligible to vote.
 
 
Administrator performs voter verification:
 manually using traditional identity card, or
 
electronically using digital identity card, or
 
combination of both.
 
 
 
Vtoken generation
 Vtoken is a proof of right-to-vote for voter.
 
It is issued by administrator after voter verification.
-
It is generated by Voter Generator (VG) application as a unique random number.
 
It is validated by EVM before voter casts vote. 
 
 
Vtoken validation
 Before EVM can be used to cast vote, it should validates vtoken of the voter.
 
Voter can use EVM to cast a vote, if:
 Vtoken is validated as the right one issued by administrator.
 
Vtoken is validated as the one that is not already used before.
 
 
 
 
Voting
 Voter uses EVM to cast a vote by:
-Scanning vtoken barcode.
+Validate vtoken.
 
Choose a candidate with a touch.
 
Confirm the choice with a touch.
 
Take paper audit trail and put it in audit box.
 
 
 
Vote sealing
 Each vote casted by voters is combined by their unique vtoken and sealed.
 
By sealing it means:
 Encrypts “vtoken + vote”.
 Makes it hard-to-read by bad guys.
 
 
Digitally signs the encrypted “vtoken + vote”.
 Makes it cannot be altered (integrity).
 
Makes it cannot be denied as coming from the machine (non-repudiation).
 
 
 
 
Vote collection
 Each sealed vote (encrypted and digitally signed) is collected into electronic ballot box.
 Technically speaking, they are collected in a table in MySQL database.
 
 
Sealed votes are collected in random order such that it cannot be traced down to the voter.
 After each vote the table storage is physically reordered according to some random number.
 
 
 
Voting closing
-Administrator closes voting process on the machine by pressing a close voting button on VG/EVM.
-
When closing voting process, VG/EVM:
-Activates and deactivates buttons.
-
Generates a result file: 
-vtokens.bin containing vtokens generated.
-
result.bin containing voting result.
-
-
-
Before administrator close voting process:
-VG can be used to generate vtoken.
-
VG cannot be used to reset ballot box.
-
EVM can be used to cast votes.
-
EVM cannot be used to view result.
-
EVM cannot be used to reset ballot box.
-
-
After administrator close voting process, VG:
-VG cannot be used to generate vtoken.
-
VG can be used to reset ballot box.
-
EVM cannot be used to cast votes.
-
EVM can be used to view result.
-
EVM can be used to reset ballot box.
-
+Administrator closes voting process on the machine.
 
 
Result management
 Administrator sends voting results from each machine to election body.
-
Each EVM machine generates voting result:
-#-*-result.bin: a binary file containing all sealed votes casted by voters on the machine.
-
#-*-public.bin: a binary file containing key to verify and decrypt the sealed votes.
-
-
VG and each EVM also generates audit result:
-#-vtokens.bin with #-vtoken-public.bin
-
#-vtoken-audit.log, #-*-audit.log
-
 
Voting Result Management
 Files result.bin contains sealed votes which are encrypted and digitally signed.
 
To verify and decrypt this sealed votes, the suitable public key is needed.
 
Therefore each #-*-result.bin should always be accompanied by corresponding #-*-public.bin.
 
 
Audit Result Management
-File vtokens.bin contains generated vtokens which are digitally signed.
-
To verify this vtokens, the suitable public key is needed.
-
Therefore each #-vtokens.bin should always be accompanied by corresponding #-vtoken-public.bin.
-
Files #-vtoken-audit.log, #-*-audit.log contains record of all actions taken by user along with its timestamp.
+#-*-audit.log contains record of all actions taken by user along with its timestamp.
 
These could be used to reconstruct all actions happened during evoting process for audit purpose.
 
Since all sensitive information related to vote confidentiality is not recorded, these cannot be used to trace down voters and their choice.
 
 
 
Key Management
-VG machine generated a pair of key:
-#-vtoken-private.bin
-
#-vtoken-public.bin
-
-
Each EVM generated a pair of key:
+Each EVM generated a pair of key:
 #-*-private.bin
 
#-*-public.bin

WikiPage Home modified by

Mon, 05 Dec 2011 06:00:59 -0000

--- v19 
+++ v20 
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@
 Result management
 Administrator sends voting results from each machine to election body.
 
Each EVM machine generates voting result:
-#-*-result.bin: a binary file containing all sealed votes casted by voters on the machine.
+#-*-result.bin: a binary file containing all sealed votes casted by voters on the machine.
 
#-*-public.bin: a binary file containing key to verify and decrypt the sealed votes.
 
 VG and each EVM also generates audit result:

WikiPage Home modified by

Mon, 05 Dec 2011 06:00:08 -0000

--- v18 
+++ v19 
@@ -120,7 +120,59 @@
 
 
 Result management
-Administrator sends result to election body.
+Administrator sends voting results from each machine to election body.
+
Each EVM machine generates voting result:
+#-*-result.bin: a binary file containing all sealed votes casted by voters on the machine.
+#-*-public.bin: a binary file containing key to verify and decrypt the sealed votes.
+
+
VG and each EVM also generates audit result:
+#-vtokens.bin with #-vtoken-public.bin
+
#-vtoken-audit.log, #-*-audit.log
+
+
Voting Result Management
+Files result.bin contains sealed votes which are encrypted and digitally signed.
+
To verify and decrypt this sealed votes, the suitable public key is needed.
+
Therefore each #-*-result.bin should always be accompanied by corresponding #-*-public.bin.
+
+
Audit Result Management
+File vtokens.bin contains generated vtokens which are digitally signed.
+
To verify this vtokens, the suitable public key is needed.
+
Therefore each #-vtokens.bin should always be accompanied by corresponding #-vtoken-public.bin.
+
Files #-vtoken-audit.log, #-*-audit.log contains record of all actions taken by user along with its timestamp.
+
These could be used to reconstruct all actions happened during evoting process for audit purpose.
+
Since all sensitive information related to vote confidentiality is not recorded, these cannot be used to trace down voters and their choice.
+
+
+
Key Management
+VG machine generated a pair of key:
+#-vtoken-private.bin
+
#-vtoken-public.bin
+
+
Each EVM generated a pair of key:
+#-*-private.bin
+
#-*-public.bin
+
+#: precinct no.

+*: room no.
+
Private Key Management
+Private key is used to digitally sign vtoken as well as sealed vote.
+
After voting process finished, private key from all machines should be: 
+copied to external media,
+
deleted from each machine, and
+
guarded securely from being misused.
+
+
Misuse of private key for example could generate forged votes as being genuine.
+
+
Public Key Management
+Public key is used to verify digital sign of vtoken and sealed vote.
+
Public key is also used to decrypt sealed vote.
+
After voting process finished, public key from all machines should be: 
+copied to external media together with corresponding result.bin/vtokens.bin
+
deleted from each machine, and
+
guarded securely from being misused.
+
+
Misuse of public key for example to decrypt sealed vote by unauthorized person.
+