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evoting (3) machine (3) evm (3) barcode (2) vtoken (3) vtoken generator (2) seal (3) vote sealing (3) encryption (3) private key (3) public key (3) security (3) audit (3) audit trail (3) paper audit trail (3)
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e-Voting Application is an open source project aiming to create an e-voting system which complies to European e-Voting standard and EML specification.

e-Voting Application Components
  • Client side applications:
    • Vtoken Generating application (VG). √
    • e-Voting Machine application (EVM). √
    • Vote Counting application (VC).
  • Server side systems:
    • e-Voting Tabulation system (EVT).
e-Voting Scenario
  • Voting opening
    • Administrator opens voting process on the machine.
  • Voting process
    • Voter verification
      • Before voter casts a vote, administrator verifies for two things:
        • voter's identity, and
        • whether voter is eligible to vote.
      • Administrator performs voter verification:
        • manually using traditional identity card, or
        • electronically using digital identity card, or
        • combination of both.
    • Vtoken generation
      • Vtoken is a proof of right-to-vote for voter.
      • It is issued by administrator after voter verification.
      • It is validated by EVM before voter casts vote.
    • Vtoken validation
      • Before EVM can be used to cast vote, it should validates vtoken of the voter.
      • Voter can use EVM to cast a vote, if:
        • Vtoken is validated as the right one issued by administrator.
        • Vtoken is validated as the one that is not already used before.
    • Voting
      • Voter uses EVM to cast a vote by:
        • Validate vtoken.
        • Choose a candidate with a touch.
        • Confirm the choice with a touch.
        • Take paper audit trail and put it in audit box.
    • Vote sealing
      • Each vote casted by voters is combined by their unique vtoken and sealed.
      • By sealing it means:
        • Encrypts “vtoken + vote”.
          • Makes it hard-to-read by bad guys.
        • Digitally signs the encrypted “vtoken + vote”.
          • Makes it cannot be altered (integrity).
          • Makes it cannot be denied as coming from the machine (non-repudiation).
    • Vote collection
      • Each sealed vote (encrypted and digitally signed) is collected into electronic ballot box.
        • Technically speaking, they are collected in a table in MySQL database.
      • Sealed votes are collected in random order such that it cannot be traced down to the voter.
        • After each vote the table storage is physically reordered according to some random number.
  • Voting closing
    • Administrator closes voting process on the machine.
  • Result management
    • Administrator sends voting results from each machine to election body.
    • Voting Result Management
      • Files result.bin contains sealed votes which are encrypted and digitally signed.
      • To verify and decrypt this sealed votes, the suitable public key is needed.
      • Therefore each #-*-result.bin should always be accompanied by corresponding #-*-public.bin.
    • Audit Result Management
      • #-*-audit.log contains record of all actions taken by user along with its timestamp.
      • These could be used to reconstruct all actions happened during evoting process for audit purpose.
      • Since all sensitive information related to vote confidentiality is not recorded, these cannot be used to trace down voters and their choice.
  • Key Management
    • Each EVM generated a pair of key:
      • #-*-private.bin
      • #-*-public.bin

      #: precinct no.
      *: room no.

    • Private Key Management
      • Private key is used to digitally sign vtoken as well as sealed vote.
      • After voting process finished, private key from all machines should be:
        • copied to external media,
        • deleted from each machine, and
        • guarded securely from being misused.
      • Misuse of private key for example could generate forged votes as being genuine.
    • Public Key Management
      • Public key is used to verify digital sign of vtoken and sealed vote.
      • Public key is also used to decrypt sealed vote.
      • After voting process finished, public key from all machines should be:
        • copied to external media together with corresponding result.bin/vtokens.bin
        • deleted from each machine, and
        • guarded securely from being misused.
      • Misuse of public key for example to decrypt sealed vote by unauthorized person.

See attachments for presentations.