|
From: Andreas S. <and...@ca...> - 2014-07-28 08:11:36
|
Hi Tomas, let me know if you would like to get some SmartCard-HSM samples. I'm not really a J2EE expert, so I'm probably not in position to code that. Andreas On 07/22/2014 12:48 PM, Tomas Gustavsson wrote: > > So for EJBCA a new CryptoToken is probably needed, in order to use your > the provider (sine it is not generic PKCS#11). > > That's a very isolated code though, and can be done in an almost > pluggable way I think. > > Cheers, > Tomas > > On 2014-07-21 14:43, Andreas Schwier wrote: >> After the client connects to the server, the server reads the device and >> device issuer CV-certificates from the SmartCard-HSM and verifies the >> integrity and authenticity of the device authentication public key. This >> public key is then used to establish symmetric session keys using ECDH >> and an ephemeral key pair at the server. The session keys are >> subsequently used to protect all APDU exchange between the server and >> the remote device. This happens in the OCF layer and is transparent at >> the JCE layer. >> >> Using this mechanism, the CA server knows that he talks to an identified >> and authentic remote device. Encryption and MACing in the secure channel >> protects all data exchanged, in particular data to be signed by the >> private key in the remote device. >> >> CV certificates are used because they are considerably smaller that >> X.509 certificates. >> >> The mechanics are similar to TLS server authentication, with the smart >> card as the server and X.509 certificates replaced by CV-certificates. >> The protection is actually on the APDU layer, HTTP is just used as >> transport channel to carry APDU exchange. >> >> Andreas >> >> On 07/21/2014 01:45 PM, Andreas Kuehne wrote: >>> Hi Andreas, >>>> Would be interesting to get something like this integrated with EJBCA. >>>> >>>> That shouldn't be too complicated: The server side is just a small >>>> servlet that provides the APDU channel via HTTP to the device on the >>>> client side. The servlet talks to OCF on the server and a JCE Provider >>>> on top of it. >>>> >>>> The CA would just need to access the private key operation via JCE. >>> I would go with any security enhancement ... but dtmo the >>> cv-certificates do make sense when two cards interact. If one and is a >>> server with 'usual' security level it does not provide any benefit, does >>> it? Just just a strong link to chain but leave the other links weak as >>> they are ... >>> >>> Greetings, >>> >>> Andreas Kuehne >>> >>> >> >> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and > search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck > Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code > search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now. > http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds > _______________________________________________ > Ejbca-develop mailing list > Ejb...@li... > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/ejbca-develop > -- --------- CardContact Software & System Consulting |.##> <##.| Andreas Schwier |# #| Schülerweg 38 |# #| 32429 Minden, Germany |'##> <##'| Phone +49 571 56149 --------- http://www.cardcontact.de http://www.tscons.de http://www.openscdp.org http://www.smartcard-hsm.com |