From: <smi...@us...> - 2003-12-27 02:52:55
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Update of /cvsroot/devil-linux/build/scripts/configuration/help In directory sc8-pr-cvs1:/tmp/cvs-serv3585/scripts/configuration/help Modified Files: gcc.help Log Message: - added support for compiling all executables as ET_DYN Index: gcc.help =================================================================== RCS file: /cvsroot/devil-linux/build/scripts/configuration/help/gcc.help,v retrieving revision 1.2 retrieving revision 1.3 diff -u -d -r1.2 -r1.3 --- gcc.help 24 Dec 2003 23:14:37 -0000 1.2 +++ gcc.help 27 Dec 2003 02:52:51 -0000 1.3 @@ -9,3 +9,26 @@ CONFIG_GCC_STACK_PROTECTOR This is a C and C++ security extension for GCC. + +CONFIG_GCC_ET_DYN + Makes use of the Address Space Layout Randomization feature of PAX. + + Quotes out of the README file: + + One of the features of PaX is Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) + that allows the kernel to randomize the addresses of various areas in + the task's address space. While most of ASLR requires no changes in + userland, randomizing the main executable's base address presents a + challenge as traditionally such ELF executables of the ET_EXEC kind + do not contain enough relocation information. Nevertheless, PaX provides + two ways to solve this problem: RANDEXEC and RANDMMAP. + + RANDMMAP on the other hand works on ELF files of the ET_DYN kind which is + normally used for dynamically linkable libraries. This approach has none + of the drawbacks that plague RANDEXEC because such ET_DYN ELF files have + enough relocation information and the dynamic linker has no problem with + relocating them (and there is no performance penalty at runtime), nor is + there a chance for false positive attack detections as none is done in the + first place. This means that protecting against the return-to-libc style + attack (in case the information about the randomization can leak to the + attacker) requires other approaches, which is not discussed here. |