Search Results for "service"

...It automates the process of attempting common or customized passwords against many accounts while respecting timing and throttling controls to reduce obvious lockout noise. The project includes features for credential list management, target selection (users, service accounts, or collections), and configurable rate limits so testers can tune the balance between coverage and stealth. Output formats include summary reports and structured logs to help analysts triage which accounts were hit and where to prioritize defensive follow-up. The codebase is written to be used by penetration testers, red teams, and security assessors in authorized engagements and emphasizes responsible use; the README explicitly warns against unauthorized use and stresses running tests only with permission.

AzureAD-Attack-Defense is a community-maintained playbook that collects common attack scenarios against Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure Active Directory) together with detection and mitigation guidance. The repository is organized into focused chapters — for example: Password Spray, Consent Grant, Service Principals in Azure DevOps, Entra Connect Sync Service Account, Replay of Primary Refresh Token (PRT), Entra ID Security Config Analyzer, and Adversary-in-the-Middle — each written to explain the attack, show detection approaches, and recommend mitigation steps. For each scenario the playbook describes the attack flow, maps the techniques to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, and explains how to leverage Microsoft’s security stack (Microsoft Defender XDR, Microsoft Sentinel, Azure Entra ID Connect, and Defender for Cloud) to detect and respond.

PersistenceSniper is a digitally signed PowerShell module aimed at blue teams and incident responders for automated detection of persistence mechanisms on Windows systems. It implements detection logic for techniques listed in MITRE ATT&CK (e.g. registry run keys, scheduled tasks, service modifications) and is regularly updated with new detection paths.

...It parses common sources—including Windows Security, System, Application, PowerShell logs, and Sysmon event ID 1—then applies a rich set of detection heuristics for things like suspicious account changes, password guessing and spraying, service tampering, PowerShell obfuscation and download-string usage, long or unusual command lines, and credential dumping attempts. Output is emitted as native PowerShell objects so analysts can pipe results to CSV, JSON, HTML, GridView, or custom pipelines for further triage and reporting. The codebase includes helpers for command-line decoding and de-obfuscation (automatic base64/deflate handling), safelisting/hash workflows (DeepBlueHash), and sample EVTX files so teams can test the tool on realistic attack traces.